Pinkham v. RiversPinkham v. Rivers
NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Candy Pinkham (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on December 19, 2023, asserting a claim under
Presently before the Court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment pursuant to
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Defendants’ Statements of Material Facts submitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 and are deemed admitted except where properly controverted by Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 counterstatements with citation to admissible evidence. Although Plaintiff submitted extensive counterstatements, many do not directly address the asserted facts, instead
Local Rule 56.1 requires a response that “specifically controvert[s]” each factual assertion with citation to admissible evidence. Local Civ. R. 56.1(c), (d). Argumentative commentary, legal conclusions, or extraneous narrative do not create genuine disputes of material fact. See Costello v. N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n, 783 F. Supp. 2d 656, 661 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (disregarding Rule 56.1 responses consisting of “conclusory assertions” or “legal arguments” rather than proper factual disputes); Baity v. Kralik, 51 F. Supp. 3d 414, 417–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (deeming facts admitted where responses were argumentative or failed to properly controvert asserted facts). This is not the first instance in which Plaintiff’s counsel has been cautioned regarding noncompliant Rule 56.1 submissions. See Baity, 51 F. Supp. 3d at 417–18. The Court will not sift through improper responses to manufacture disputes on Plaintiff’s behalf. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 responses fail to directly and properly dispute Defendants’ factual assertions with citation to admissible evidence, those facts are deemed admitted.
A. Factual Background
On March 14, 2023, Orange County 911 initially received a call concerning a disturbance at 135 Old Minisink Trail in the Town of Goshen. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 4–6, 8.) Officers responded to that initial call and cleared the scene without making an arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) Shortly thereafter, Orange County 911 broadcast a second call for available units to respond again to the same address for what was reported as a physical domestic disturbance. (Id. ¶¶ 83, 86, 135-137, 167-168.) The second dispatch advised that the caller reported that Plaintiff would not allow the son’s boyfriend to leave the home and that yelling and banging were occurring upstairs, although it was unclear whether the disturbance had become physical. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7.) Plaintiff maintains that the disturbance was verbal only
Town of Goshen Police Officers Bernard Rivers and Kevin Donohue responded to the second dispatch, and Orange County Sheriff’s Deputies Andre Frontis, Justin Velez, and Deputy Lichtenfeld (also spelled “Lichtenfield” in portions of the record) were dispatched to assist. (County 56.1 ¶¶ 1–2, 203; Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 8–9.) An unidentified female officer, likely “Jane Doe” in the Complaint, was also present during the second response and later assisted in taking custody of Plaintiff. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 49.) Officer Rivers acted as the senior Town officer on scene during the second response. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 85.)
When officers arrived during the second response, Ryan Minard was standing outside in the driveway. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 12.) Deputy Frontis made contact with Minard and prepared an incident report stating that Minard appeared distraught and crying and reported that Plaintiff would not allow him to leave the residence. (Id. ¶ 17.) Frontis’s report states that Minard claimed Plaintiff physically restrained him and refused to put away a Rottweiler dog known to be aggressive. (Id.) Plaintiff denies that she restrained Minard, maintains that Minard did not claim she blocked him from leaving, and asserts that he was clearly unrestrained outside when officers approached. (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 14, 17.)
Minard stated that he had gone downstairs because he needed a charger from his car and that Plaintiff would not put the dog away so that he could exit the house. (Goshen. 56.1 ¶¶ 178-181.) Minard’s statement was corroborated by both Plaintiff’s husband, Ralph Pinkham, who described the incident as “entrapment”, and Plaintiff’s son, Leland Pinkham. (Id. ¶¶ 25-28.) In a written statement dated March 14, 2023, Minard stated that Ralph entered the residence and let him out so that he could retrieve the charger from his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 16.) After retrieving the charger and attempting to reenter the house, Minard stated that Plaintiff placed both hands on his arms and pushed him back outside.
Plaintiff does not dispute that contact occurred but characterizes the contact as brief and nonviolent and occurring only after she demanded that he leave her home. (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 22, 82, 112, 116.) She denies that she prevented Minard from leaving and disputes that she physically restrained him in any meaningful way. (Id.) She also asserts that the family dog had already been secured in the garage, that Minard was capable of exiting safely, and that body-worn camera footage reflects inconsistencies in Minard’s statements regarding both the alleged shove and the dog. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 14-15- 21–23.)
When officers initially approached the rear of the residence, they knocked at the back door but were directed to proceed toward the garage due to the presence of the family dog. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 50.) Plaintiff then spoke with Officer Rivers directly in the garage. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff asserts that Officer Rivers raised his voice and threatened to “shoot her dog” if she opened the interior garage door, and further contends that he responded negatively when she indicated she would contact his supervisor. (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 51, 57.) She subsequently walked into the driveway, where she observed Minard, before walking back toward the house and encountering her brother, Craig Carr. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 52-53.) Plaintiff then obtained her brother’s cell phone and went into the backyard, where she placed a 911 call. (Id. ¶ 56.)
According to the incident reports of Deputies Frontis and Lichtenfeld, Officers Donohue and Rivers instructed Plaintiff not to reenter the residence while the investigation was ongoing and advised that she could be arrested for obstruction if she did so. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 17–18, 196–198.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff nevertheless reentered the residence, locked the door, and went upstairs. (Id.) Another individual unlocked the door to permit officers to enter, after which Plaintiff
While these events were unfolding inside the residence, Deputy Frontis conducted a second conversation with Minard outside. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 30, 189.) After returning inside, Frontis stated to Officer Rivers, “He’s saying it’s physical. If you want to arrest her, go for it.” (Id. ¶ 191.) Immediately thereafter, Officer Donohue stated that Plaintiff would be “coming with us,” and it is undisputed that Officer Rivers made the determination that Plaintiff would be arrested. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 192, 201.) The officers then proceeded up the stairs, Deputy Lichtenfeld took Plaintiff’s right arm to prevent her from moving toward a bedroom, Plaintiff’s brother attempted to block the officers, and Deputies Velez and Frontis moved the brother aside to allow for Plaintiff to be handcuffed. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff asserts that she complied with the arrest, instructed her brother not to interfere, and repeatedly stated that Officer Donohue could ask her questions. (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 18, 62, 156.) She also states that after being told she was under arrest, she asked why and received no explanation. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Officer Donohue and Deputy Lichtenfeld proceeded to place Plaintiff in handcuffs on the second floor. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 63.) Plaintiff was escorted downstairs, through the garage, and into the driveway. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64.) An unidentified female officer, identified in the Complaint as “Jane Doe,” took custody of Plaintiff for placement into a Town of Goshen patrol vehicle. (County 56.1 ¶ 6.) Prior to transport, Deputy Frontis patted Plaintiff down while holding her arm. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was then transported to the Town of Goshen Police Department for processing. (Id. ¶ 8.) During processing, Plaintiff asserts she was handcuffed to a bench “for hours.” (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶ 65.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 19, 2023, asserting a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim under
Plaintiff opposed both motions and submitted counterstatements1 pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. (Pltf. Goshen Opp. & 56.1 Counter, Pltf. County Opp. & 56.1 Counter, ECF Nos. 55, 58-59, 62.) Defendants thereafter filed their respective replies to Plaintiff’s counterstatements. (County Reply & Goshen Reply, ECF Nos. 50, 53.)
A. Motion for Summary Judgment (Rule 56(c))
Under
Courts must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). If the initial burden is met, the non-moving party “must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine issue of fact exists. If the evidence [presented by the non-moving party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). “Conclusory statements, conjecture or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.” Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. Section 1983
DISCUSSION
“An arrest undertaken without a warrant must be supported by probable cause or else it violates the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Valentine, 539 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008). In other words, an arrest is privileged if supported by probable cause and it “is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012). Probable cause exists “when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed.” Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. Courts evaluate probable cause based on the “totality of the circumstances” and the “facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002). A false arrest claim fails if probable cause existed for any offense; it is irrelevant “whether probable cause existed with respect to each individual charge.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, the Court examines whether probable cause existed for any of the offenses charged against Plaintiff—Unlawful Imprisonment, Obstructing Governmental Administration, or Harassment. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 19.)
A. Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 135.05 )
When officers receive information from a putative victim or eyewitness, probable cause ordinarily exists “unless the circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Officers are also “entitled to rely on the implications of the information known to [them]” in assessing whether the suspect acted knowingly and unlawfully. Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989). If probable cause existed for this offense, Plaintiff’s false arrest claim fails regardless of the viability of any other charge. Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 154. The Court considers each Defendant in turn.
i. Officer Bernard Rivers
The Court first considers whether probable cause existed as to Officer Bernard Rivers, the senior Town officer on scene and the officer who drafted and signed the misdemeanor complaint. [Cite 56.1] Viewing the totality of the circumstances known to Rivers at the time of arrest, the Court concludes that it did.
Officers were dispatched to a reported domestic disturbance involving allegations that Ryan Minard was being prevented from leaving the residence. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 4–6, 8.) The 911 caller advised that Plaintiff would not allow Minard to exit and was refusing to secure the family Rottweiler so he could leave safely. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10.) That information was conveyed to responding officers before they arrived. (Id.) Upon arrival, Minard reiterated that he was not being permitted to leave and that the family’s guard dog was not being secured to facilitate his exit. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) He later provided a written statement consistent with that account. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff’s husband and son,
Plaintiff counters that Minard was not physically confined, that no door was locked, and that he could have left the residence if he chose to do so.2 (Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶¶ 14, 17.) That argument misapprehends the standard. The statute does not require locked doors or physical grappling; it requires intentional conduct that “restrict[s] a person’s movements … so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.”
Here, officers were confronted with contemporaneous statements that Minard’s movements were being intentionally restricted — not by mere verbal disagreement, but by refusal to secure a dog
Nor were they obligated to resolve factual disputes between the parties or conclusively determine guilt before acting. Krause, 887 F.2d at 371. Given the victim’s consistent on-scene account, corroborating statements from other occupants, and the body-camera footage reflecting the dog’s characterization as a guard animal, no circumstance existed that would have required Officer Rivers to doubt Minard’s veracity. See Selvaggio, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 69.
Accordingly, probable cause existed for unlawful imprisonment, defeating the false arrest claim against Officer Rivers. See Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 154.
ii. Officer Keith Donohue
The same conclusion applies to Officer Keith Donohue. Donohue responded to the domestic disturbance call and participated in the on-scene investigation. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 2, 4–6.) He was aware that the 911 caller reported Minard was being prevented from leaving and that the family Rottweiler was not being secured to allow a safe exit. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10.) Upon arrival, Minard reiterated that he could not leave because the dog remained unsecured, and he later provided a written statement consistent with that account. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) Other occupants similarly conveyed that Minard was being prevented from leaving. (Id. ¶¶ 25–28.) Donohue was also present during the encounter captured on body-worn camera footage, which reflects the dog being described as a “guard dog” that
Even if Donohue did not personally hear every statement, he was entitled to rely on information communicated by Officer Rivers and other officers under the collective knowledge doctrine. See United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of officers working together); Daniels v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-2251 (RJS), 2016 WL 4368378, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2016). Under the totality of the circumstances, Donohue possessed reasonably trustworthy information that Minard’s freedom of movement was being substantially restricted by the refusal to secure a guard dog allegedly preventing safe exit. He was not required to independently verify each fact or resolve competing narratives before acting. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 119; Krause, 887 F.2d at 371. Accordingly, probable cause existed as to unlawful imprisonment with respect to Officer Donohue, and the false arrest claim against him fails as a matter of law. See Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 154
iii. Deputies Andre Frontis and Justin Velez
Plaintiff’s claims against Deputies Frontis and Velez fail for an even more fundamental reason: this was a Town of Goshen investigation, led and controlled by Goshen officers. The undisputed record establishes that Officer Rivers was the senior officer on scene and the officer who drafted and signed the misdemeanor complaint. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 2, 19, 85.) The County Deputies did not direct the investigation, did not issue the operative commands to Plaintiff, and did not make the arrest determination. (County 56.1 ¶¶ 3-5.)
Rather, Deputies Frontis and Velez responded in a limited support capacity. They spoke with Minard, gathered information, and relayed his account to the Goshen officers. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 30, 189, 191.) They did not instruct Plaintiff to remain outside, did not determine that probable cause existed, and did not draft or approve the charging instrument. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 19, 196–198.) The body
Even assuming arguendo that the Deputies participated in effectuating the arrest, that fact does not create liability. Officers assisting at a scene are entitled to rely on reasonably trustworthy information provided by an alleged victim and by fellow officers actively directing the investigation. See Colon, 250 F.3d at 135; Daniels, 2016 WL 4368378, at 5. The Deputies were not required to independently reassess the legal sufficiency of the charges where the Town officers possessed and acted upon probable cause.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s attempt—raised for the first time in opposition—to recast her claims as a failure-to-intervene theory fails both procedurally and substantively. (Pltf. County Opp. at 11-13.) As an initial matter, a plaintiff may not amend her complaint or introduce a new theory of liability in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Brandon v. City of N.Y., 705 F.Supp.2d 261, 278 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“It is black letter law that a party may not raise new claims for the first time in opposition to summary judgment.); Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Heletsi v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc., No. 99CV4793(SJ), 2001 WL 1646518, at *1 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2001) (“A party cannot amend their complaint simply by alleging new facts and theories in their memoranda opposing summary judgment.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only false arrest and contains no allegation that any Defendant failed to intervene to prevent a constitutional violation. (See generally Compl.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s belated failure-to-intervene theory provides no basis for liability.
Accordingly, because probable cause supported the arrest and Deputies Frontis and Velez neither directed, initiated, nor independently caused the arrest, no reasonable jury could find them liable for false arrest as a matter of law.
iv. Jane Doe Officer
B. Obstruction of Governmental Administration (N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05 )
Even if probable cause did not exist as to Unlawful Imprisonment, probable cause existed for at least one of the other charges against Plaintiff—OGA in the Second Degree. (Goshen 56.1 ¶ 19.) A person is guilty of OGA in the Second Degree when he “intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act[.]”
Although interference must be at least in part “physical” and “cannot consist solely of verbal statements,” officers may consider both words and actions in determining whether conduct rises to obstruction. Kass v. City of New York, 864 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2017). Physical force is not required; the element is satisfied where an individual “intrudes himself into, or gets in the way of, an ongoing police activity,” and engages in conduct sufficiently “inappropriate and disruptive” at the scene of an
The Court addresses each defendant in turn.
i. Officer Bernard Rivers
Officer Rivers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for OGA. The body-worn camera footage and record reflect that officers were conducting an active domestic disturbance investigation involving allegations that Minard had been prevented from leaving the residence. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 4–6, 16.) In that context, officers were attempting to stabilize a volatile scene.
During the investigation, Officers Rivers and Donohue expressly directed Plaintiff not to reenter the residence and warned her that doing so could result in arrest for obstruction. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 17–18, 196–198.) The body-worn camera footage confirms that, despite those explicit warnings, Plaintiff attempted to open the interior garage door and ultimately reentered the home in direct contravention of the officers’ instructions. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17, 196–198.) After regaining entry, she locked the door behind her and ran upstairs toward her bedroom—facts she does not dispute in her Rule 56.1 response. (Id. ¶ 58; Pltf. Goshen 56.1 Counter ¶ 58.) This was not passive noncompliance; it was deliberate defiance of lawful commands issued during an active domestic disturbance investigation. By locking the door and retreating upstairs, Plaintiff temporarily impeded officers’ access to the scene and forced them to resecure entry before continuing their investigation. In the context of a volatile
Once inside, Plaintiff positioned herself on the upstairs landing with her brother, Craig Carr, and refused repeated directives to come downstairs so officers could continue their investigation. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 17–18, 196–198.) Rather than comply, she insisted that officers speak to her from the landing and affirmatively declined to descend. (Id. ¶ 62.) This refusal followed her prior defiance of explicit instructions not to reenter the residence and her act of locking the door behind her, thereby requiring officers to regain access before proceeding. When officers moved upstairs to effectuate the arrest, Carr physically interposed himself between Plaintiff and the officers, delaying their access until Deputies Velez and Frontis moved him aside. (Id. ¶ 18.) The body-worn camera footage further reflects Plaintiff gesturing toward Officer Rivers and speaking in an animated and confrontational manner while refusing to comply. (Exs. H & I.)
While verbal disagreement alone is insufficient to establish obstruction, the statute is satisfied where an individual intrudes into or gets in the way of an ongoing police activity through conduct that is at least partly physical and disruptive. See Kass, 864 F.3d at 210. Here, Plaintiff’s conduct went beyond speech. By reentering the residence after a clear warning, locking the door, retreating upstairs, refusing lawful directives to descend, and remaining in a position that required officers to advance into the home to secure her, she materially impeded the officers’ ability to stabilize and investigate a volatile domestic disturbance scene. See Tierney, 133 F.3d at 197.
Probable cause requires only reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing an offense has been committed. See Singer, 63 F.3d at 119. The inquiry is objective and does not turn on Plaintiff’s subjective belief that she was cooperating.
Plaintiff’s contrary characterization of her conduct does not negate probable cause. On this record, no reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Rivers lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for OGA.
ii. Officer Keith Donohue
The analysis as to Officer Donohue is materially the same as Officer Rivers with respect to OGA. Donohue was present during Plaintiff’s reentry, observed her refusal to comply with directives, and participated in the effort to regain control of the scene. Even assuming arguendo that Rivers made the ultimate arrest determination, Donohue personally witnessed conduct sufficient to establish probable cause for obstruction. Moreover, as discussed in the unlawful-imprisonment section, Donohue was entitled to rely on the collective knowledge of the officers directing the investigation. See Colon, 250 F.3d at 135. Accordingly, because probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for OGA, Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Officer Donohue fails as a matter of law.
iii. Deputies Andre Frontis and Justin Velez
The analysis as to the County Deputies parallels the unlawful-imprisonment discussion and need not be repeated in full.
This was a Town of Goshen investigation directed by Officer Rivers. (Goshen 56.1 ¶¶ 2, 19, 85.) Deputies Frontis and Velez responded in a support capacity. (County 56.1 ¶¶ 3–5.) They did not issue the operative commands to Plaintiff, did not direct the investigation, and did not determine that probable cause existed. (Id.) The body-worn camera footage further confirms the limited role of the
Because probable cause existed and the County Deputies neither independently initiated nor directed the arrest, Plaintiff’s OGA-based false arrest claim against Deputies Frontis and Velez fails as a matter of law.
iv. Jane Doe Officer
The claim against the unidentified “Jane Doe” officer fails for the same reasons discussed in the unlawful-imprisonment section. Plaintiff identifies no evidence that Jane Doe directed the investigation, issued any operative commands, influenced the arrest decision, or participated in the probable cause determination. (Goshen Mem. at 17–18.) Section 1983 liability requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676. Where, as here, an officer merely assists in executing an arrest supported by probable cause,
Because probable cause existed and the record contains no evidence that Jane Doe exercised independent judgment or played any role in initiating or directing the arrest, Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite personal involvement. Accordingly, the false arrest claim against the Jane Doe officer fails as a matter of law.3
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree and Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree as to all Defendants. Because probable cause defeats Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim as a matter of law, summary judgment is warranted in Defendants’ favor. Ackerson, 702 F.3d at 19. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Andre Frontis and Justin Velez (ECF No. 43), and the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Bernard Rivers and Keith Donohue (ECF No. 44). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Bernard Rivers, Keith Donohue, Andre Frontis, Justin Velez, and Jane Doe, terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 43 and 44, and terminate this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 17, 2026
White Plains, New York
NELSON S. ROMÁN
United States District Judge