MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Christina A. Selvaggio brings this action against three employees of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) — Police Officer (“P.O.”) Anaida Patterson, P.O. Robin Lestrade, and Sergeant Walsh (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) — and the City of New York (the “City”). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, she asserts claims of false arrest, excessive force, and municipal liability in connection with her April 6, 2012, arrest.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Except as otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. , Where facts are in dispute, the courts credits Plaintiffs version of the facts.
On December 6, 2011, Plaintiffs husband, Larry Mansour (“Mansour”), filed a domestic incident report against Plaintiff (the “2011 DIR”).
On April 2, 2012, Mansour filed a second domestic incident report against Plaintiff (the “2012 DIR”). (Nam Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. 37-2); see also Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 5; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 5.) In the 2012 DIR, Mansour reported that Plaintiff accused him of sneaking his “alleged ‘mistress’ ” into his bedroom, “even though [Plaintiff] has the key to a dead bolt lock which locks both from the inside and the outside and of which I have no control over and in spite of the fact [Plaintiff] has all the'screens on all the windows screwed-shut to disallow their being able to be opened .... ” (2012 DIR at 3.) The 2012 DIR states that Mansour was “fearful,” and that Plaintiff had a history of abusing drugs or alcohol (see id. at 1); however, at his deposition, Mansour testified that he was never asked such questions by the reporting officer. (Mansour Dep. (Dkt. 48-2)
Plaintiff had filed her own DIR against Mansour the previous day, on April 1, 2012 (“PL’s DIR”). (Deck of Christina A. Sel-
When Mansour went to the precinct to file the 2012 DIR, Plaintiff followed after him in order to file yet another complaint against Mansour, regarding an incident that had occurred that morning, during which “Mansour was yelling and cursing at my Mother and he tried to bum rush her, as well.” (PL’s Opp’n at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that while she and Mansour were at the precinct on April 2, 2012, apparently yelling at each other (see id. at 8), P.O. Plonczynski shouted: “ ‘[S]hut up, shut the ‘F’ up and get a divorce already, stop filing hundreds of complaints.’” (Id. at 8; see also Mansour Dep. at 27:17-28:9 (“Officer [Plonczynski] was screaming at the top of his lungs ... and with a face wrenched with anger. Shut the fuck up. Stop coming in here and filing all these— stop coming in here and filing hundreds of complaints.... I’m tired of all this fuckin’ bullshit. This has to fuckin’ stop.”); Mansour Aff. at 6.) Mansour asserts that Sergeant Walsh also said to him: “ ‘She’s a F — k—g psycho. You look like a smart guy, get rid of her. Just move out. Don’t pay the mortgage. Let her ... live in the street.’ ” (Mansour Aff. at 6; see also Mansour Dep. at 29:8-22.) Mansour claims that he responded to Sergeant Walsh’s comments by affirming his love for Plaintiff and Plaintiffs right to question him and his loyalty. (See Mansour Aff. at 6.) After they completed filing their respective complaints, Plaintiff and Mansour returned home. (PL’s Opp’n at 8.)
Four days later, on April 6, 2012, Defendants Patterson, Walsh, and Lestrade arrived at Plaintiffs residence. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 8; PL’s 56.1 ¶8.) Walsh asked if the officers could enter the home, and Plaintiff and/or Mansour allowed them inside. (See Compl. (Dkt. 1) at 1.) Walsh observed screws in the window screens, a lock on the back door, and a dead bolt lock on the front door; he photographed all three.
Mansour also told Walsh that he did not want Plaintiff to be arrested. (Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to PL’s Interrogs. (Selvaggio Decl., Ex. 9 (Dkt. 42-9)) at 9 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 19); Mans-our Aff. ¶ 3.) In his affidavit, Mansour states, “I pleaded with Sergeant Walsh that I did not file a complaint against my wife for false imprisonment because I’m not falsely imprisoned,” and “I pleaded with him not to arrest [Plaintiff], because that’s not what I reported, or, what I wanted.” (Mansour Aff. ¶ 3; see also Mansour Dep. at 34:2-10 (“I said ... I filed a complaint that my wife accused me of adultery. I said my wife was not guilty of false imprisonment. My wife didn’t commit a crime. My wife sh[oul]d not be arrested. I do not want her to be arrested. It was my intent to give my version of the story. I said my wife should not be arrested.... I said my wife did nothing at any time without my knowledge and without my approval.”).) However, Defendants contend that when Plaintiff was no longer present, Mansour stated that he “was fearful of [P]laintiff and has no way
After Walsh informed her that she was about to be arrested, Plaintiff went upstairs to change her clothing, and she was accompanied by Patterson. In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that Patterson “whispered to me and Larry, ... ‘I am' sorry, it is not me, it is him, it is my boss,’ and she is pointing at Thomas [Walsh].” (Selvaggio Dep. at 23:15-18; see also Mansour Aff. ¶ 4; Compl. at 1-2 (“[S]he whispered to Larry and I that it wasn’t the State that was doing it, it was her boss Sergeant Walsh, who wants it.”).) Patterson told them Plaintiff would “be coming home tonight, because the District Attorney probably won’t press charges and send her home, if we get there quickly.” (Compl. at 1-2; see also Mansour Aff. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff was placed under arrest for Unlawful Imprisonment pursuant to New York Penal Law section 135.05. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl.’s Arrest Report (Nam Decl., Ex. F (Dkt. 37-6)) at 1.) Patterson handcuffed Plaintiff behind her back, placed her in the back seat of the car, and secured the seatbelt; at some point while Plaintiff was in the police car, she unbuckled her own seatbelt. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 16; Pl.’s 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 16; Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that she was not provided with Miranda warnings at this time; she did not receive them until approximately an hour after she had already arrived at the police station. (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 13; Compl. at 2; Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.)
In her opposition memorandum, Plaintiff contends that she experienced “more than pain and red marks. There was scabbing that lasted approximately one week.” (PL’s Opp’n at 27.) Defendants argue that this is contradicted by Plaintiffs deposition testimony, in which Plaintiff stated that she had “minimal physical injuries,” which she identified as “abrasions,” and could not recall how long the abrasions lasted.
After being detained at the precinct for several hours, Plaintiff was released without charges. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 17; Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 17.) She drove herself to the hospital that evening. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 17; Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 17; Selvaggio Dep. at 54:24-55:3.) Plaintiff states that she went to the hospital because of both “a bad headache and abrasions on both wrists.” (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 18.) At the hospital, Plaintiff was given medication for a headache — pills, which she testified that ultimately she did not take, due to a heart condition. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 17; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 17; Selvaggio Dep. at 55:17-21.) Plaintiff received no treatment for her wrist abrasions at the hospital; no MRIs or X-rays were taken of Plaintiffs wrists, and no additional medical treatment (other than the prescribed but untaken pills) was ever required with respect to either Plaintiffs wrist abrasions or headache. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 19-22; PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiff also asserts that she suffers from emotional injuries caused by the incident, although she has not received any treatment for psychological or emotional damage. (Selvaggio Dep. at 60:4-6, 15-17.)
At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she named the City as a Defendant in this lawsuit “[b]ecause they employ [the Individual Defendants] and they are responsible for their actions.” (Selvaggio Dep. at 70:21-22.) In her Rule 56.1 Statement, Plaintiff contends that she “is suing the City of New York because they failed to properly train and supervise Sergeant Walsh, Officer Patterson and Officer Lestrade.” (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 23.)
In discovery, Defendants produced a list containing all Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) and Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations made against the Individual Defendants related to false arrest, false statements, and dishonesty for the ten-year period ending April 6, 2012. (See Defs.’ Reply (Dkt. 44) at 14; Individual Defs.’ IAB and CCRB Records (“Discip. Records”) (Selvaggio Deck, Ex. 8 (Dkt. 42-8)).) Apart from those apparently filed by Plaintiff related to her April 6, 2012, arrest, three such allegations were made against Walsh during that time period: (1) an open IAB allegation of an off-duty arrest from August 30, 2004; (2) a substantiated IAB allegation of “Memobook In-comp/improp” that occurred April 7, 2011; and (3) a CCRB allegation of “other misconduct” that occurred on April 7, 2011. (Discip. Records at 2-6.) Two allegations were lodged against Lestrade: (1) an open IAB allegation of a July 18, 2006, disputed arrest; and (2) an open IAB allegation of “Investigate Incomp/Improp” from February 5, 2010. (Id. at 11-13.) There were no allegations made against Patterson during that time period aside from those apparently filed by Plaintiff. (See id. at 7-10.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her Complaint against P.O. Lestrade, P.O. Patters on, Sergeant Walsh,
Defendants sought permission to file a motion for summary judgment. (Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf. (Dkt. 24).) With leave of court, Defendants filed their fully briefed motion on July 23, 2014. (Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 34).) Plaintiff opposed the motion. (See Pl.’s Opp’n.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
The moving party bears the initial burden to show an absence of genuine factual dispute. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
III. DISCUSSION
A. False Arrest
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs false arrest claim must be dismissed because probable cause for her arrest existed as a matter of law; and that, in the alternative, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs false arrest claim. As explained below, the court cannot agree on the current record. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiffs claim of false arrest.
1. Admissibility of 2011 DIR
Plaintiff argues that the 2011 DIR should be excluded from evidence because' the police report from her arrest indicates that she was arrested pursuant to the 2012 DIR, and it does not mention the 2011 DIR. (See Pl.’s 56.1 ¶ 1; Selvaggio Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 4; Mot. in Limine (Pl.’s Ex. 5 (Dkt. 42-5)); see also Pl.’s Arrest Report (Nam Decl., Ex. F (Dkt. 37-6)) at 1.) In his interrogatory responses, Sergeant Walsh stated that he went to Plaintiffs residence on April 6, 2012, to follow up on the 2012 DIR. (Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to PL’s Interrogs. at 5 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 9).) Plaintiff argues, therefore, that the 2011 DIR could not have contributed to providing probable cause for her arrest. (PL’s 56.1 ¶ 1.) She appears to claim that it is inadmissible because it is irrelevant. Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 402 (relevant evidence is generally admissible).
Defendants argue-that the “details portion of the NYPD Arrest Forms does not always contain an all-inclusive summary.” (Defs.’ Reply at 2 n. 2 (citing Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to PL’s Interrogs. at 3-4 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 4)).) As Defendants also note, the 2011 DIR indicates that Sergeant Walsh signed off on the report on December 13, 2011 (see 2011 DIR at 2), and Sergeant Walsh stated in his interrogatory responses that “upon information and belief, he personally reviewed and signed off’ on the 2011 DIR (Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to PL’s Interrogs. at 2 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 1)). Defendants contend, therefore, that “one of the facts confronting Sergeant Walsh at the time of [Pjlaintiffs arrest for false imprisonment” was the 2011 DIR. (Defs.’ Reply at 2 n. 2.)
Although the standard for probable cause is an objective one, and does not depend upon an officer’s subjective motivations, Whren v. United States,
2. Probable Cause
Plaintiffs § 1983 false arrest claim stems from the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes the right to be free from arrest absent probable cause.
Probable cause exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer has “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Id.; see also Dunaway v. New York,
In their motion papers, Defendants first argue that the 2011 and 2012 DIRs, even without more, created probable cause for the officers to conclude that Plaintiff had unlawfully imprisoned Mans-our. (See Defs.’ Mem. at 7-8.) Under New York Penal Law, “a person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when he restrains another person.” N.Y. Penal. L. § 135.05.
“Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined “without consent” when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person ....
Id. § 135.00(1). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had substantially interfered with Mansour’s liberty by intentionally confining him in their home, Plaintiff would not be guilty of unlawful imprisonment if Mansour had voluntarily assented to the confinement, as this would have negated the lack-of-consent element of the offense.
Defendants are correct that under certain circumstances, the DIRs would have provided a reasonable basis to conclude that the complainant had been confined without consent. In the 2011 DIR, Mans-our alleged: “[Plaintiff] has our window screens bolted shut and a special lock on our front [and] back door that you can lock with a key [and] you cannot open without a key. I do NOT have a key. [Plaintiff] often goes out & locks me in .... ” (2011 DIR at 3.) Similarly, the 2012 DIR alleged: “[Plaintiff] has the key to a dead bolt lock which locks both from the inside and the outside and of which I have no control over, and ... [Plaintiff] has all the screens on all the windows screwed-shut .... ” (2012 DIR at 3.) If the officers’ relevant knowledge had consisted solely of these allegations, Mansour’s statements would have been sufficient to warrant a reasonable officer in the belief that Plaintiff had intentionally confined him to their home and that he had not consented thereto.
However, the officers also knew of an ongoing conflict between Plaintiff and Mansour,
As noted, the police officers knew that Plaintiff and Mansour’s relationship was frequently hostile. Walsh had headed the Domestic Violence Unit since November 2011 (see Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to Pl.’s Interrogs. at 5 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 7)); Plaintiff had previously filed several reports against Mansour (see Sel-vaggio Dep. 36:13-15; Pl.’s Opp’n at 8); the Domestic Violence Unit had visited the home three or four times (see Selvaggio Dep. at 39:19-20); and Walsh had been present at the precinct on April 2, 2012, when Plaintiff and Mansour each filed additional complaints (see id. at 31:14-16), and when P.O. Plonczynski lost patience with them for filing “hundreds of complaints” and suggested that they “get a divorce already.” See supra pages 59-61. Accordingly, they had reason to doubt Mansour’s motivations for filing the two DIRs and to question his truthfulness. Moreover, the officers should have doubted the veracity of any statements implying that Mansour was unable to leave his home, given that Mansour had freely done so each time he filed a DIR at the precinct. Under the totality of the circumstances, the DIRs alone did not establish probable cause; further investigation was required.
Defendants note that they did conduct such an investigation. And they argue, alternatively, that the evidence obtained upon the officers’ visit to Plaintiff and Mansour’s residence on April 6, 2012, corroborated the information contained in the DIRs and established probable cause for Plaintiff s arrest. (See Defs.’ Mem. at 9.) Specifically, the officers observed the screwed-in windows and the two locks, including a dead bolt (see Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10, 12; Evid. Photos), and Plaintiff admitted to Officer Walsh that Mansour did not have a key to the locks (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 11; PL’s 56.1 ¶ 11; Compl. at 2). This additional information did buttress Mansour’s DIRs, and momentarily provided the officers with a reasonable basis to conclude that the information contained therein was truthful. However, the court still cannot
Accepting as true Plaintiffs disputed evidence, Plaintiff and Mansour both informed the officers prior to the arrest that Mansour did not have a key because he did not want a key, and that the door was locked only when everyone in the residence went “out.” (See Mansour Dep. at 48:10-13 (Mansour told Walsh that “I told my wife I don’t want a copy of the key. I don’t need a copy of the key. We lock I when we go out and I don’t need it.”); id. at 32:2-10 (“I said my wife did nothing at any time without my knowledge and without my approval.”); Compl. at 2 (stating that Plaintiff explained to Walsh that Mansour did not have a key “only because he don’t want one and I only lock it when we all go out”).) It is not the court’s role to assess the credibility of this testimony; a jury could find that Mansour and Plaintiff made these statements. And with these statements, the probable cause created by the DIRs’ corroboration would have dissipated, as Plaintiff’s and Mans-our’s explanations not only rebutted the lack-of-consent element of the offense, but also indicated that Mansour was not confined in the home at all. See Jocks v. Tavernier,
Certainly, where there is conflicting testimony from two witnesses, or from the victim and the accused, the police may choose to rely on either of the statements. See, e.g., Wieder v. City of New York,
Were Mansour’s DIRs and the officers’ observations at the residence the only evidence known to the Defendants at the time of Plaintiffs arrest, Plaintiffs protest that she was innocent and that Mansour did not have a key only because he did not want one would not have sufficed to defeat probable cause; the officers would have had no obligation to investigate the veracity of Plaintiffs statements. However, when Mansour, the purported victim, made statements controverting the elements of the false imprisonment offense, any probable cause that previously existed dissipated. Moreover, many of Mansour’s April 6, 2012, statements do not unambiguously conflict with the DIRs, and may be understood as expanding on or clarifying the DIRs and providing the. officers with added information.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further argue that even if probable cause to arrest did not exist, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs false arrest claim. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,
Even applying this more permissive test, the court is not convinced on the factual record that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest. In his affidavit and deposition 'testimony, Mansour claims that he explained to the officers at the time of Plaintiffs arrest that he did not have a key to the dead bolt lock by choice; that the lock and screwed-in windows were intended to keep bugs and intruders away; that the front door was locked only when he and Plaintiff were both out; and that Plaintiff “did nothing at any time without [his] knowledge and [his] approval.” (Mansour Dep. at 34:2-10, 47:18-25, 48:10-13.) As explained above, these statements would have negated two required elements of the false imprisonment offense. Taken together with the knowledge that Mansour had freely visited the police precinct on at least two occasions, no objectively reasonable officer could have believed that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See Ward v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-7380 (RJH),
B. Excessive Force
The denial of summary judgment on Plaintiffs false arrest claim does not prevent the court from finding that summary judgment is appropriate on her excessive force claim. See Mesa v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-10464 (JPO),
A claim that law enforcement officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. See Graham v. Connor,
Plaintiffs excessive force claim is based on tight handcuffing.
“The injury requirement is ‘particularly important,’ ” Usavage v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J.,
While Plaintiffs testimony is sufficient to raise a question of fact as to the first two prongs of the test — she alleges that the handcuffs were too tight, and that she repeatedly asked the officers to loosen them, to no avail — the record does not support the existence of an injury sufficient in degree to survive summary judgment. Plaintiff testified that her injury was “minimal,” that she could not remember how long the abrasions to her wrists lasted, and that she received no medical treatment for them. (Selvaggio Dep. at 53:24, 54:14-18, 55:24-25.) In her opposition memorandum, Plaintiff contends that she experienced “scabbing that lasted approximately one week.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 27.)
In the court’s view, “abrasions” and “scabbing” are interchangeable injuries, and under either formulation, the temporary, admittedly “minimal” abrasions or scabs that Plaintiff reports — for which medical treatment was found unnecessary — do not rise to the level of injury that courts in this circuit have held to satisfy the injury requirement. Cf. Morgan,
With no additional allegations of force beyond the handcuffing,
Alternatively, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs excessive force claim. “[I]n the context of excessive force, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry tends to converge with the qualified immunity reasonableness inquiry.” Wang,
C. Municipal Liability
In her Rule 56.1 Statement, Plaintiff asserts that she “is suing the City of New York because they failed to properly train and supervise Sergeant Walsh, Officer Patterson and Officer Lestrade.” (Pl.’s 56.1 ¶23.) In her opposition memorandum, Plaintiff contends that the City is liable for her alleged false arrest because it “failed to make sure [Walsh, Patterson, and Lestrade] received continuous training.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 32.) Defendants ar
A municipality may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the constitutional violation at issue results from the municipality’s official policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
1. Failure to Train
Plaintiffs first theory of Mo-nell liability is a failure to train. “[A] local government’s decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government policy” only if the failure to train “amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’ ” Connick v. Thompson,
Upon review of the entire record submitted on this motion, there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs failure-to-train claim with respect to her alleged false arrest.
Plaintiffs conclusory allegations cannot even survive a motion to dismiss, let alone summary judgment. See King,
2. Failure to Supervise
Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with her failure-to-discipline theory, Plaintiffs failure-to-supervise theory requires her to establish that the City acted with deliberate indifference. See Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,
Plaintiff submitted the three Individual Defendants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip.
Moreover, even if these five varied allegations over the course of a ten-year-period were sufficient to put the City on notice of a constitutional problem, Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence to suggest that the City did not meaningfully investigate the allegations; indeed, she has “presented no evidence as to the municipality’s response to any prior incident of misconduct.”
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With regard to Plaintiffs false arrest claim, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the City of New York, and DENIED for the three Individual Defendants. With regard to Plaintiffs excessive force claim, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of all Defendants. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to dismiss the City of New York from the case.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiffs pro se Complaint (Dkt. 1) does not make explicit that she asserts these three claims; however, the court believes that Defendants are correct to have so construed Plaintiffs claims in their motion for summary judgment.
. Plaintiff addressed the facts asserted in Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement (Dkt. 36) in her own opposing statement as required by Local Civil Rule 56.1 (see Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ("Pl.'s 56.1”) (Dkt. 41)); however, she did not assert additional material facts therein, but did so instead through her opposing memorandum (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n (‘‘Pl.’s Opp'n”) (Dkt. 43)), a declaration (Decl. of Christina A. Sel-vaggio in Opp’n of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Selvaggio Deck”) (Dkt. 42)), and additional exhibits (Selvaggio Decl., Exs. 1-10 (Dkts. 42-1 to -10)). Cf. Local Civil Rule 56.1(b). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court has performed an independent review of the entire record submitted by the parties to determine whether there are disputed issues of material fact. See McClendon v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 11-CV-0190 (SJF)(ETB),
. Plaintiff argues that the 2011 DIR should be excluded from evidence because the police report from her arrest indicates that she was arrested pursuant to a domestic incident report that was filed by Mansour on April 2,2012 (the "2012 DIR”), and it does not mention the 2011 DIR. (See Pl.’s Rule 56.1 St. ("Pl.'s 56.1”) ¶ 1; Decl. of Christina A. Sel-k vaggio in Opp’n of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (“Selvaggio Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 8; Pl.'s Opp'n at 4; Mot. in Limine (Selvaggio Decl., Ex. 5 (Dkt. 42-5)); see also Pl.’s Arrest Report (Nam Decl., Ex. F (Dkt. 37-6)) at 1.) Plaintiff argues that the 2011 DIR could not have contributed to providing probable cause for her arrest. (Pl.’s 56.1 V 1.) As explained below, see infra Part III.A.1, the court need not determine the ultimate admissibility of the 2011 DIR upon this motion, as it finds that summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim should be denied even when taking it into account.
. Sergeant Walsh has been the head of the Domestic Violence Unit since November 2011. (See Def. Sgt. Walsh’s Resp. & Obj. to Pl.’s Interrogs. (Decl. of Christina A. Selvaggio in Opp'n of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ("Selvaggio Decl.”), Ex. 9 (Dkt. 42-9)) at 5 (Obj. & Resp. to Interrog. No. 7).)
. Defendants submitted excerpts from the transcript of Plaintiffs deposition; however, Defendants’ submission did not contain page 22 of the deposition. (See Selvaggio Dep. Excerpts (Nam Deck, Ex. D (Dkt. 37-4)).) Plaintiff submitted page 22 as an attachment to a letter dated July 28, 2014. (Dkt. 46.) With her opposition papers, Plaintiff submitted a single page from the transcript of Larry Mansour’s 'deposition. (See Mansour Dep. Excerpt (Deck of Christina A. Selvaggio in Opp’n of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ("Selvaggio Deck”), Ex. 10 (Dkt. 42-10)).) Per the court’s request, counsel for Defendants subsequently submitted the (nearly) complete transcripts of these two depositions, and the court cites to these transcripts in this Memorandum and Order. (See Selvaggio Dep. (Dkt. 48-1); Mansour Dep. (Dkt. 48-2).) Although page 58 was omitted from the "complete” version of Plaintiff's deposition transcript, this page is available for review in the excerpt previously submitted by Defendants, and the court has indeed reviewed the entire transcripts of both depositions.
. Plaintiff reports that she has filed "multiple complaints against Larry Mansour, all which went unanswered and not investigated.” (PL’s Opp’n at 8.) According to Mansour, he and Plaintiff had also filed numerous complaints against the former owner of their home, Phyllis March, regarding alleged harassment and/or stalking. (See Mansour Dep. at 29:23-31:21.)
. Plaintiff argues that Walsh lacked both a search warrant and arrest warrant at the time and that she did not give him permission to take the photographs. (PL’s 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 8.) Defendants note in their reply brief that Plaintiff did not allege in her Complaint that Walsh unlawfully searched her home or seized evidence, and that she did not express any resistance to Walsh's entering the home or taking of photographs. (See Defs.’ Reply (Dkt. 44) at 12.) The Complaint states that Walsh asked Plaintiff and/or Mansour if the officers could enter, and suggests strongly that they gave consent to the entry and subsequent conversation. (See Compl. at 1.) The court agrees that Plaintiff failed to raise any claim contesting Defendants’ entry into her home or taking of
To the extent Plaintiff contends that the photographs are inadmissible pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the court disagrees — there is no indication of an illegal search in any of Plaintiff's filings. It appears that Plaintiff voluntarily permitted Defendants to enter the home. After entering the home, the officers were entitled to photograph objects in their plain view, and they were also permitted to photograph evidence they viewed from outside the residence, such as the window screens. See Wilson v. Supt., Attica Corr. Facility, No. 00-CV-0767 (NAM)(GLS),
. Mansour further asserts that he no longer feels comfortable driving due to side effects of prostate cancer treatment and that "since [Plaintiff] drives me everywhere I need to go, I don't need or want a key.” (Mansour Aff. ¶ 2.)
. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a § 1983 claim based on the officers’ failure to provide Miranda warnings, the claim fails because there is no constitutional right to receive Miranda warnings. See Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. v. Safir,
.Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not allege any "scabbing” in her deposition or Complaint, and that Plaintiff's opposition memorandum thus improperly attempts to raise an issue of fact by contradicting Plaintiff's own prior testimony. (Defs.' Reply (Dkt. 44) at 8 (citing Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
. Plaintiff subsequently submitted several letters to the court, taking issue with defense counsel’s request for an extension of time to serve and file Defendants’ reply memorandum and for additional pages, and also reiterating certain arguments from her opposition papers. (See July 24, 2014, Ltr. (Dkt. 45); July 30, 2014, Ltr. (Dkt. 46); see also Feb. 23, 2015, Ltr. (Dkt. 51).) Although the court has previously cautioned defense counsel regarding the importance of using care in filing court documents (Jan. 22, 2015, Order (Dkt. 47)), the court does not believe that defense counsel has willfully acted in disregard of pro se Plaintiff's rights, and Plaintiff's complaints to the contrary do not affect the court’s analysis in the instant Memorandum and Order. The court has fully considered Plaintiff's substantive arguments, including those in her letters, in consideration of this motion.
. A false arrest claim under § 1983 is substantially similar to a claim for false arrest under New York law. See Weyant v. Okst,
. Pursuant to the collective knowledge doctrine, facts known to one member of a law enforcement team cooperating in an investigation are presumed to be shared by the others when determining the existence of probable cause to arrest. See Savino v. City of New York,
.As such, any suggestion raised by Plaintiff's submissions and the factual record that the Individual Defendants arrested her because they were irritated by her and Mans-our’s numerous complaints are not relevant to her false arrest claim. (See, e.g., Compl. at 2 ("[T]hey were maliciously and purposefully purporting this arrest in order to stop me from filing police reports and because I complained to ... Sergeant Walsh on the telephone a couple of days prior to this false arrest, about one of his Officer[ ]s and how he treated Larry and I on 02 April 2012 ....”); Pl.’s Opp'n at 8 ("[T]he false arrest was purely based on his[] personal feelings and agenda.”).) See also supra pages 60-61 (discussing events of April 2, 2012).
. The officers could have also inferred that Plaintiff likely knew that the confinement was unlawful. See Krause v. Bennett,
. See supra pages 59-61 (noting, inter alia, four DIRs filed by Plaintiff and Mansour, at least two of which Walsh had signed off on;
. Other circuits have confirmed the notion that additional evidence discovered before an arrest may vitiate probable cause, rendering the arrest unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez,
. For example, Mansour stated in the 2011 DIR that Plaintiff had the window screens bolted shut and a dead bolt lock on the door, and that "I do NOT have a key. [Plaintiff] often goes out & locks me in .... ” (2011 DIR at 3.) While the officers may have understood this to be an assertion that Mansour was confined in his home against his will, the DIR did not state this explicitly, and Mansour’s April 6 statements negated the inference of lack of consent that the officers might have drawn from the DIR. (See Mansour Dep. at 48:10-13 (explaining that Mansour did not want or need a copy of the key); id. at 34:9-10 (averring that Plaintiff “did nothing at any time without my knowledge and approval”).) Mansour also explained why, if not to keep him confined against his will, the screws and dead bolt had been installed — to prevent bugs from entering and intruders from breaking in. (Id. at 47:18-25.) Accordingly, Mansour’s later statements clarified and expanded on the DIRs as much, if not more, than they contradicted them. Notably, if the 2011 DIR were to be excluded from evidence, and only the 2012 DIR considered, there would be no conflict at all between that DIR and Mansour’s April 6 statements, as Mansour did not state in the 2012 DIR that Plaintiff ever went out and locked Mansour inside. (See 2012 DIR at 3-4.)
. Accordingly, as with probable cause, the court's inquiry into the existence of arguable probable cause is objective and does not consider the subjective intent or motivations of the officer. See Garcia v. Jane and John Does 1-40,
. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert an excessive force claim relating to her tight seatbelt, such a claim fails. Plaintiff does not allege that she suffered any injury as a result of the tight seatbelt, and Plaintiff herself unbuckled the seatbelt while in the police vehicle. Accordingly, as any force used in this context was truly de minimis, this claim is not viable. See Washpon v. Parr,
. Cf. Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ),
. Having found that Plaintiffs excessive force claim is not viable, she cannot sustain a Monell claim for excessive force. See Johnson v. City of New York,
. "Deliberate indifference may also be shown through expert testimony that a practice condoned by the defendant municipality was 'contrary to the practice of most police
. Although'a single disciplinary failure can support an inference of deliberate indifference under certain circumstances, see Amnesty Am.,
. At least one of the allegations — Defendant Walsh’s incomplete or improper memobook— was deemed substantiated after an investigation. (See Discip. Records at 2-6, 11-13.)