No. 16-2029
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
June 28, 2017
PUBLISHED. Argued: May 10, 2017. Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Keenan joined.
THE FUND FOR ANIMALS; THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES; DELCIANNA J. WINDERS, Academic Fellow, Animal Law & Policy Program, Harvard Law School,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (5:15-cv-00429-D)
ARGUED: Katherine Anne Meyer, MEYER GLITZENSTEIN & EUBANKS, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Matthew Fesak, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jonathan D. Sasser, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Jenni R. James, PETA FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. Anna Frostic, Laura Friend, Laura Fox, Kim Ockene, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Washington, D.C., for Amici The Humane Society of the United States and The Fund for Animals. John Vail, JOHN VAIL LAW PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Delcianna J. Winders.
THACKER, Circuit Judge:
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA“) challenges the license renewal process for animal exhibitors promulgated by the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA“), through which the USDA may renew such license despite a licensee‘s noncompliance with the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA” or “the Act“). PETA argues that such renewal process undermines a key purpose of the Act, that is, ensuring the humane treatment of animals. The district court granted the USDA‘s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding
I.
PETA sued the USDA and Tom Vilsack1 in his official capacity as Secretary of the USDA under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA“). PETA alleges that the USDA has a “policy, pattern, and practice of rubber-stamping . . . license renewal applications” of applicants that the USDA cites for violating the AWA, some only days before renewing their licenses. J.A. 5.2 Specifically, PETA highlights certain entities and individuals (collectively, “Exhibitors“)3 that obtained license renewals despite violating the AWA.4
As part of its mission to protect animals from “abuse, neglect, and cruelty,” PETA asserts that it has spent resources (1) sending its members to document animal conditions at Exhibitors’ facilities; (2) submitting violation reports to the USDA; and (3) disseminating information about the violations through its website, publications, and other media. J.A. 9. PETA further asserts that by renewing Exhibitors’ licenses despite their alleged repeated violations, the USDA “causes PETA to spend additional resources monitoring, documenting, and addressing the unlawful licensing decision and the inhumane conditions at the applicants’ facilities.” Id. As a result, PETA seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the USDA‘s renewal policy -- both facially and as applied to Exhibitors -- violates the APA; (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the USDA from implementing their renewal process; (3) nullification of the Exhibitors’ license renewals; and (4) reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs. See id. at 40.
The district court granted the USDA‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Dep‘t of Agric., 194 F. Supp. 3d 404, 407 (E.D.N.C. 2016). In doing so, the district court first determined that the AWA only addressed license
II.
A.
We review de novo the district court‘s ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), see Butler v. United States, 702 F.3d 749, 751–52 (4th Cir. 2012), applying the standard for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) -- that is, such a motion should “only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff‘s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff‘s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief,” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).
B.
This case tasks us with examining an “agency‘s construction of the statute which it administers.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. As a result, we implement the familiar framework established under Chevron. See City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013); Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2001). At its core, that framework operates as a tool of statutory construction whereby we give plain and unambiguous statutes their full effect; but, where a statute is either silent or ambiguous, we afford deference “to the reasonable judgments of agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms [or silence] in statutes that they are charged with administering.” Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996). Chevron deference provides that “any ensuing regulation” related to the ambiguity or silence “is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). This deference is rooted in the widely understood notions that the “well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), as well as the fact that “Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.” City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
Nonetheless, Chevron deference is not a given. Indeed, an agency must meet certain threshold procedural requirements before courts may address Chevron deference, particularly notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124–2126 (2016) (“When Congress authorizes an agency to proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking, that relatively formal administrative procedure is a very good indicator that Congress intended the regulation to carry the force of law, so Chevron should apply . . . . But Chevron deference is not warranted where . . . the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). If such procedural requirements
III.
A.
To say, as PETA asserts, that the USDA did not promulgate its interpretation via notice-and-comment, and more generally, did not adequately consider the issue of renewals is belied by the record. Indeed, the record here demonstrates that the USDA consistently engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking with regard to issuing and renewing licenses.
For example, in 1995, the USDA engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking regarding its license renewal process, and one commenter specifically questioned the renewal application‘s certification of compliance, suggesting that simply certifying compliance “would be ineffective” in ensuring actual compliance by a licensee. Animal Welfare, Licensing and Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,893, 13,894 (Mar. 15, 1995). The USDA responded that though licensees certify their compliance during renewal, the certification does not “take the place of inspections” by the USDA. Id. And during this same notice-and-comment period, the USDA received additional comments related to altering its renewal process. The USDA considered and responded to each comment. See id. at 13,893–13,894.
More recently, in 2000, the USDA began a notice-and-comment period that culminated in a final ruling in 2004. Toward that end, “[the USDA] published in the Federal Register . . . a proposal to amend the regulations by revising and clarifying . . . the procedures for applying for licenses and renewals.” Animal Welfare, Inspection, Licensing, and Procurement of Animals, 69 Fed. Reg. 42,089, 42,089 (July 14, 2004). The USDA “solicited comments concerning [its] proposal for 60 days ending on October 3, 2000,” and at “the request of several commenters, [] extended the comment period to November 20, 2000,” and ultimately received 395 comments. Id. During the notice-and-comment period, a commenter questioned the renewal process, suggesting that the USDA should deny renewal unless the subject licensee “was inspected and found compliant just prior to the renewal date.” See id. at 42,094. The USDA responded to the comment in its 2004 final ruling, stating that it enforces the AWA through “random, unannounced inspections to determine compliance,” and that after inspections, “all licensees are given an appropriate amount of time to correct any problems and become compliant.” Id. Based on its enforcement methods and the nature of citations, the USDA concluded, “[i]t is unrealistic and counterproductive to
Nonetheless, PETA urges us to discount the USDA‘s response in its 2004 final ruling, arguing that the response was posted in a final ruling, and so provided an insufficient opportunity for public comment. But this position ignores the full scope of the notice-and-comment proceedings. The 2004 final ruling was based on a notice-and-comment period spanning four years, beginning in 2000. As indicated in the 2004 final ruling, the USDA accepted a wide array of comments, some related to the proposed changes and others unrelated. In fact, the USDA specifically considered the alternative renewal process for which PETA argues today -- that renewal should be denied unless a licensee passes inspection at the time of renewal -- but determined that the proposed change would be “unrealistic and counterproductive” to its enforcement efforts. Animal Welfare, Inspection, Licensing, and Procurement of Animals, 69 Fed. Reg. 42,089, 42,089 (July 14, 2004).
B.
Chevron: Step One
Because the USDA has properly engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking, we turn to the first step of Chevron, which requires us to determine if Congress has spoken to the issue of whether the USDA may renew a license even though the licensee has violated the Act or the USDA‘s regulations.
1.
Congress passed the AWA in 1966 to regulate the research, exhibition, and sale of animals, as well as to assure their humane treatment. See
The USDA also has discretion to investigate or inspect a licensee‘s facilities as it “deems necessary” for violations of the AWA or USDA regulations.
An application to renew a license must be filed within 30 days prior to the license expiration date. See
2.
PETA argues that the USDA‘s interpretation of the AWA to renew licenses despite outstanding violations of the Act at the time of renewal should not receive Chevron deference because the term “issue,” as used in
3.
PETA‘s argument cuts against principles of statutory construction. To begin, as a basic principle, we look to the statutory text, and absent a different definition, we interpret statutory terms “in accordance with their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013). Here, the word “renew” does not appear in the AWA but the word “issue” does, though it is undefined. But the plain meaning of each of these terms leads to the conclusion that the term “issue” does not encompass “renew” as used in the AWA. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States Dep‘t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2015) (using Webster‘s Dictionary while examining the AWA to find that “issue” is defined as “to come out, go out” and renew is defined as “to make new again, to restore fullness or sufficiency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4.
PETA also looks to the USDA regulatory actions, particularly those promulgated in 1989, to argue that we need not proceed to step two of Chevron. In particular, PETA contends that the USDA at one point supported PETA‘s argument that the term “issue” applies to both license issuance and renewal. Before 1989,
PETA overstates the significance of this point. Critically, the relevant language of
C.
Chevron: Step Two
Given the plain language of the AWA, it is clear that it does not specifically address the renewal question at issue here. The Act is not only silent as to renewal, but is also ambiguous as to whether the term “issue” refers to license issuance and renewal. As a result, we move to step two of the Chevron analysis -- whether the USDA‘s interpretation of the renewal process is a permissible one.
A permissible interpretation is one that an agency has promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, and is one that is reasonable. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 267. Whether the USDA‘s interpretation here is reasonable requires us to determine whether the USDA‘s “understanding” of the AWA “is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment” for that of the agency. Chem. Mfrs. Ass‘n. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). Critically, we are also mindful that “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
Reasonable Interpretation
Having determined that the USDA‘s interpretation of the renewal process was promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking, we turn to whether that interpretation is reasonable. As previously stated, the reasonableness inquiry requires us to determine whether the USDA‘s “understanding” of the AWA “is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment” for that of the agency. Chem. Mfrs. Ass‘n, 470 U.S. at 125. In this regard, we are mindful that, pursuant to
PETA questions the reasonableness of the USDA‘s interpretation, contending that the licensing regime undermines the purpose of the AWA to ensure the humane treatment of animals. According to PETA, any infraction at the time of renewal should result in license denial, if not revocation. PETA‘s premise is that
1.
Enforcement of the Act
First, on the enforcement front, PETA‘s proposed interpretation could actually result in a more inhumane renewal regime. The USDA conducts spot checks of licensees throughout the year. This encourages year round compliance by licensees. If, however, the USDA only inspected at the time of renewal, that could motivate licensees to clean up their act closer to the renewal date while relaxing compliance throughout the rest of the year.
Further, PETA overlooks the fact that under the current USDA regime, though a licensee may falsely certify that it is in compliance when applying for renewal, that does not mean the USDA turns a blind eye to future compliance. As the USDA acknowledges, certifying compliance on a renewal application does not act “as an alternative means of ascertaining compliance or as a substitute for inspections.” Animal Welfare, Licensing and Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 13893, 13894 (Mar. 15, 1995). The USDA retains discretion to investigate licensees “as [it] deems necessary,”
2.
Discretion to the USDA
Whether PETA agrees with the USDA‘s renewal process or not, the authority to implement the renewal process is a policy decision that Congress has delegated to the USDA. Indeed, the AWA is rife with examples of Congress granting the USDA significant discretion with regard to the issuance of licenses, when and how to determine whether a violation occurred, and how to reprimand violators. See, e.g.,
D.
Finally, it is worth noting that this case is almost identical to Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Dep‘t of Agriculture, 789 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2015). Though we are not bound by the law of other circuits, we are aware of the “importance of maintaining harmony among the Circuits on issues of law” where feasible, Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 278 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), particularly in cases that could affect long-standing, nationwide regulatory schemes.
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the appellant, as PETA does here, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the USDA for renewing a license even though the licensee had violated the AWA. See id. at 1212. In that case, the district court granted summary judgment to the USDA, concluding the USDA‘s interpretation should be accorded Chevron deference. See id. at 1212–13. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Under step one of Chevron, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Congress had not spoken to the issue, relying on a dictionary definition of the terms and the fact that the term “renew” neither appears nor is defined in the AWA. See id. at 1216. Turning to step two, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted the fact that Congress expressly delegated authority to the USDA to interpret
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held, the “AWA licensing regulations embody a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policy interests Congress has delegated to the USDA” and “are entitled to Chevron deference.” Id. We agree.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.