In re A.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.V., Defendant and Appellant.
No. A148307
First Dist., Div. One.
May 12, 2017.
11 Cal. App. 5th 697
Sidney S. Hollar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Donna M. Provenzano and Christina Vom Saal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DONDERO, J.—
INTRODUCTION
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation: Whether, under
INTEGRATED STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In September 2014, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed a
A.V. admitted the truth of the allegations with the understanding the court would consider placing him on deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) probation. At disposition, the court placed A.V. on DEJ probation on the conditions, among others, that he complete 150 hours of community service work; write a 1,000-word essay about the effects of marijuana on the adolescent brain; refrain from using or possessing alcohol or drugs, particularly marijuana; and participate in and complete outpatient substance abuse counseling.
On March 2, 2015, probation filed a report indicating that A.V. was regularly attending school, passing all of his classes, had zero disciplinary referrals, was actively working towards completion of his community service
Then, on March 4 and 17, probation filed notices of noncompliance, alleging A.V. violated his DEJ probation by using marijuana and cocaine. On March 2, he tested positive for THC and cocaine. He also tested positive for THC on March 18. On April 1, 2015, probation reported that A.V. admitted he had smoked some marijuana he had acquired before he was placed on probation, because he was depressed about a medical diagnosis he had received. He was unsure why he tested positive for cocaine, because he did not use cocaine. His mother confirmed the medical diagnosis and depression. In other respects, A.V. was in compliance with his probation. He had completed the drug and alcohol offender class through California Offender Program Services, had submitted the essay as directed by the court, and had begun interactive journaling.
On April 9, 2015, the court vacated DEJ, imposed judgment, declared A.V. a ward of the court, and placed him on juvenile probation on the same conditions of probation, including additional fines and DNA testing. The court, Judge Hardcastle presiding, stated: “[Y]ou still have an opportunity to successfully complete probation. If you do that, you will then have to petition the court for a sealing of the records at the appropriate time. It won’t be done automatically, as it would have been done before. So it’s not the end of the world. You still have a chance, as I say, to get it sealed, but that depends on 100 percent compliance.”
On April 20, 2015, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation (
On April 21, 2015, A.V. admitted a probation violation. On May 5, 2015, the juvenile court reinstated probation on the condition, among others, that A.V. spend 30 to 45 days in juvenile hall.
On November 18, 2015, probation reported that since October 20, 2015, A.V. had followed his court-ordered conditions of probation and abided by his parents’ directives. He was helpful around the house and respectful to his parents. He was a junior in high school, was passing all of his classes, and did not have any tardies, unexcused absences, or behavioral referrals. He had completed interactive journaling, and spent most of his summer break successfully completing 150 hours of community service. He had competed three weekends of weekend work crew and was attending drug and alcohol counseling once a week. He had submitted two chemical tests since October 19; both showed diminishing levels of THC.
On November 23, 2015, the court, Judge Hardcastle presiding, commended A.V. on his progress. “All right. [A.], this is the kind of report we want to see. This is great. I’m glad to see you’re doing so well at school, getting tested, testing clean. You’ve done your community service and everything else we’ve thrown at you. Now we want a period of no violations.” “If you continue the good behavior you had from the last VOP to this date going forward, I think you will end up with a dismissal in February. But you have to show us you can do it for more than a couple months.” The court continued A.V. as a ward, reinstated his probation, with all prior orders remaining in effect, and continued the matter to February 2016 for review.
In February 2016, probation reported on A.V.’s progress. A.V. had completed all of his conditions of probation, including 150 hours of community service, interactive journaling, and substance abuse counseling. A.V. spent his free time with his girlfriend and applying for jobs. His mother described his behavior at home as “exceptional.” Since A.V.’s last hearing in November 2015, he had submitted five chemical tests, all of them negative for intoxicating substances. He had no disciplinary issues or unexcused absences at school. However, his grades had suffered. He had one A, three Ds and was failing English and algebra. On February 19, 2016, the court expressed overall satisfaction with the report but continued the matter to April for evidence of improved grades.
On April 25, 2016, probation reported that A.V. had brought his F in English up to a D. He now had one C, four Ds and an F in algebra. A.V. reported he was working toward improving his grades so he could return to his high school of choice in the fall. He had no disciplinary issues or unexcused absences. Mother continued to find A.V. well behaved and helpful
On April 29, 2016, A.V.’s attorney asked the court to follow probation’s recommendation to dismiss the petition and requested the sealing of A.V.’s records. The court, Judge Gnoss presiding, agreed to dismiss the proceedings. The court asked for the People’s and the probation department’s “position regarding [section] 786. And what the Court would have to find is he, substantially, complied with the conditions of his Probation.” The court officer from probation did not oppose sealing, saying, “Your Honor, we’ll leave it to the discretion of the Court.” The prosecutor objected, given the fact that A.V.’s DEJ was “lifted” and A.V. then sustained two probation violations. The court agreed with the prosecutor and refused to seal the records, advising A.V., “I’m not trying to . . . say that you didn’t do well on Probation. And as soon as you turn 18, you can petition the Court under [section] 781 to have this record sealed. It’s not the automatic sealing under [section] 786. [¶] . . . [¶] So but the proceedings are dismissed today though; okay.”
DISCUSSION
At the
We apply the usual rules of statutory construction to answer this question. “[O]ur primary task is to determine the lawmakers’ intent. [Citation.] . . . To determine intent, ‘“The court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.”’ [Citation.] ‘If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) . . . .’” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 [268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934].) “We give the
Legislative History of Section 786.
According to the bill analysis, Senate Bill No. 1038 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) was enacted to address a “serious shortcoming of our juvenile justice system.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 2014, p. 7.) Because existing procedures under current law required the participation of the probation department, the district attorney, and the court, the process for sealing juvenile records often involved “lengthy delays as well as significant costs . . . .” (Ibid.) In addition, “many youth are unaware of their right to seal their juvenile record, or are unable to complete the process due to procedural, logistical or financial barriers.” (Ibid.) Senate Bill No. 1038 sought to remedy the problem by “streamlining the process for sealing a juvenile’s record . . . .” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1038, supra, as amended Mar. 28, 2014, p. 7.) “In doing so, this bill will further the dual purposes of the juvenile justice system: rehabilitation and reintegration, by better ensuring that juveniles have a clear pathway to clearing their records, when in compliance with existing statutory and probationary requirements. The bill recognizes the established role of California’s Juvenile Courts as institutions of reform, not punishment, and will help individuals with juvenile records to find and hold jobs, and become fully functioning members of society.” (Id. at p. 7; see Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 666 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 9, 2015, p. 7.)
The Assembly committee report included comments by Commonweal, the bill’s sponsor, expressing support for “‘better guidance to courts in determining what constitutes “satisfactory completion” of probation or supervision under Section 786.’” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 666, supra, as amended Apr. 9, 2010, p. 6.) As relevant here, Commonweal recommended that “‘“satisfactory completion” be defined utilizing two criteria. First (drawing from . . . Section 781, the “older” sealing statute) that the individual not have been adjudicated or convicted for a new felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of supervision. Second, that the person did not fail substantially to comply with the reasonable orders of probation that were within his or her capacity to perform. This latter criterion is viewed as providing a “passing grade” standard for “satisfactory” completion. Many probation orders in delinquency cases are checklists of conditions that are difficult or impossible for many adolescents to perform at an “A” grade level . . . . On occasion, children on probation backslide by perhaps failing a drug test or skipping an appointment—but this does not mean that they cannot or do not rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance. . . . [¶] Our goal, after all, is to support the re-entry, rehabilitation and employability of juveniles having justice system histories, and not to impose lifetime barriers to success based on probation performance criteria that are too rigid or unrealistic from an adolescent
The Language of Section 786 Does Not Permit the Juvenile Court to Use Two Different Standards to Dismiss and Seal.
“When referring to the completion of probation, judges and litigants often use the terms ‘successful’ and ‘satisfactory’ interchangeably. But the terms are not always interchangeable and even the same term can have different statutory definitions. Differing statutes require that care be taken to identify the statute at issue, use the correct statutory term, and apply the definition specific to that statute to avoid confusion as to the nature of the court’s finding and its effect.” (In re J.G. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 521, 525 [207 Cal.Rptr.3d 633].) For example, successful completion of probation, for purposes of dismissal under
“
The language of
It is noteworthy also that
Our conclusion is supported by the legislative purpose evidenced by the legislative history. The procedure adopted in
In this case, the court dismissed the petition based on its implicit conclusion that A.V.’s performance on probation, while not perfect, was sufficient to justify the court’s exercise of discretion in A.V.’s favor. That performance included both failed chemical tests (four of them) early on and, as probation wore on, 14 passed chemical tests; good grades and bad ones; completion of 150 hours of community service and a drug and alcohol program; exemplary behavior at home and gainful employment after school. Clearly, in the court’s discretionary estimation, A.V. had “substantially complied” with the essential requirements of his probation, such that he had demonstrably achieved the rehabilitative goals of probation. That implied finding was fully supported by substantial evidence; it was not irrational or capricious on these facts, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
However, no greater showing under the statute was required to support the sealing of A.V.’s petition. In other words, under
The juvenile court’s order is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to issue an order under
Humes, P. J., and Margulies, J., concurred.