THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DARREN CHARLES WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.
B333816
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
December 18, 2024
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. A763191. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Judith Kahn and Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The offenses and trials
On August 31, 1984, police found 58-year-old Ebora Alexander dead in her Los Angeles home from multiple gunshot wounds to the head. Alexander apparently had been shot while sitting at her kitchen table having breakfast. Police also discovered the bodies of Alexander‘s 24-year-old daughter Dietria and two of Alexander‘s grandsons, ages 13 and eight. All three had been shot execution style in their beds.
The People charged Williams with four counts of first degree murder. At trial, Ida Moore testified that Williams and Horrace Burns arrived at her house in the early morning of August 31, 1984. Williams directed Burns to leave the house to pick up Tiequon Cox. Burns and Cox returned 20 or 30 minutes later.
Williams asked Moore if she would drive him to the house of a woman who owed him money. Moore agreed. Moore, Williams, Burns, Cox, and Moore‘s girlfriend—DeLisa Brown—got into Moore‘s van. Williams directed Moore where to drive,
Moore heard gunshots a minute or two later, and Williams returned to the van holding a pistol. He twirled the gun and remarked that he had one bullet left. Moore described Williams‘s demeanor as “cool and natural.”
Cox returned to the van about three minutes later. Cox was holding a rifle and said he “blew a bitch‘s head off.”
Williams directed Moore to drive them to a nightclub called the Vermont Club. Moore parked the van outside the club. Williams told Moore he was going to pay her for gas. He got out of the van along with Cox and Burns.
Moore saw Williams later that day. He gave her a $50 bill and told her to buy hair products for him. Williams also told her she better ” ‘not be talking,’ ” otherwise ” ‘somebody is going to get hurt.’ ” Williams made similar warnings two more times. Williams instructed Moore not to drive the van and said he would have it repainted.
DeLisa Brown largely corroborated Moore‘s testimony. According to Brown, while she was in the van, she heard someone say something about “killing everybody in the house.” Williams showed Brown a piece of paper with an address written on it. He told Moore to park the van a few houses down the street from that address.
Williams and Cox got out of the van and walked down the street. A few minutes later, Brown heard a lot of gunshots and saw Williams running toward the van, holding a pistol.
The People also presented evidence of statements Williams made to the police.3 Williams said a club owner offered Cox and Burns $50,000 or $60,000 to kill a woman who was suing the club. Williams admitted driving to the house with Cox, and he noted that Cox had ” ‘been doing murders all his life.’ ” Williams claimed he ran away when Cox went up to the door.
The People‘s evidence showed that a woman named Valarie Taylor sued the Vermont Club a few months before the killings. Taylor‘s lawsuit alleged she suffered injuries after she was shot inside the club. Taylor lived two houses from the Alexander residence, on the same side of the street.
The People also presented evidence that on September 1, 1984—the day after the killings—Williams purchased a sportscar from a dealership. Williams paid $1,500 for the car in large bills. A week or two earlier, Williams‘s wife had tried to purchase a cheaper car from the same dealership, but she was not able to obtain financing.
The trial court instructed the jury that a person who aids and abets a crime is “liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged.”
The jury convicted Williams of four counts of first degree murder. But the jury failed to reach a verdict on the special circumstance allegation of multiple murders. In 1987 the
2. The appeals and habeas petition
The California Supreme Court set aside the jury‘s finding on the special circumstance, reversed the judgment of death, and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 647 (Williams I).) On remand, the trial court sentenced Williams to four consecutive terms of 25 years to life. A different panel of this court affirmed the judgment and sentence (People v. Williams (Nov. 18, 1999, B120766) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams II)), and the Supreme Court denied Williams‘s petition for review (People v. Williams (Mar. 1, 2000, S084630) [nonpub. opn.]).
In November 2016, Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking to have his first degree murder convictions set aside based on People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155. In January 2018, the superior court granted Williams‘s petition, reduced his first degree murder convictions to second degree murder, and resentenced him to four consecutive terms of 15 years to life. Williams appealed and a different panel of this court affirmed. (See People v. Williams (Nov. 29, 2018, B287899) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams III).)
3. Williams‘s petition for resentencing, the trial court‘s decision, and the appeal
On February 14, 2019, Williams filed a petition for resentencing under
While Williams‘s appeal was pending, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), went into effect. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1(a).) Based on Senate Bill 775‘s changes to the law, a different panel of this court reversed the order denying Williams‘s petition and remanded for the trial court to hold a new evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Williams (June 30, 2022, B310320) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams IV).) We explained that, “both at the evidentiary hearing and in its written memorandum of decision, the trial court did not cite or refer to any specific testimony at trial, or any exhibit or other evidence. In acting as the factfinder, the court appears to have relied heavily—if not exclusively—on the Supreme Court‘s factual summary and factual conclusions in Williams‘s direct appeal. After Senate Bill 775‘s changes to the statute, this is no longer permissible.” (Ibid.)
4. The proceedings on remand
On remand, the People filed a brief responding to Williams‘s petition. The brief summarized the evidence at trial, citing the trial transcripts. The People argued, despite the
Williams, through appointed counsel, filed a response to the People‘s brief. He argued that, because he had been convicted of second degree murder, the trial court could not consider other theories of murder to determine his eligibility for relief under
The court considered the petition at a hearing on July 12, 2023. Williams suggested the evidence shows he realized he was at the wrong house and walked back to the van before Cox killed the victims. He asserted the People did not try him under a felony murder theory because they could not prove he entered the house or had the intent to kill. According to Williams, the prosecutor accepted a reduction in his convictions from first degree to second degree murder—rather than retrying the case—for the same reason.
The court took the matter under submission at the end of the hearing. The court later issued a written order denying Williams‘s petition for resentencing. After summarizing the evidence presented at trial, the court found Williams planned
Based on these factual findings, the court concluded the People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams is guilty of four counts of murder under multiple theories. According to the court, Williams is guilty because he acted with implied or express malice and “conspired, planned and led, [and] directly aided and abetted the group of codefendants.” The court stated Williams also is guilty under a felony murder theory because he was a major participant in the underlying crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life.5
DISCUSSION
1. Resentencing under section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) took effect on January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
Under the law as amended, a defendant is guilty of murder under a felony murder theory only if: (1) the defendant was the actual killer; (2) with the intent to kill, the defendant aided or abetted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (
2. Remand is not required for the trial court to consider Williams‘s youth
Williams argues the case must be remanded for a new hearing because the trial court failed to consider his youth at the time of the offenses—24 years old—when determining whether he possessed the requisite mental state for murder.
Williams‘s argument fails for several reasons. First, Williams forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. Generally, an appellant may not raise an issue on appeal unless he raised it below. (See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653 [defendant “forfeited this claim by failing to raise this issue below, when the trial court could have remedied the alleged shortcoming“]; Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670 [” ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal.’ “].) As Williams seems to concede, he never argued—in his papers in support of his petition or orally before the trial court—his youth was relevant to whether he possessed the requisite mental state for murder. By failing to raise the issue below, Williams has forfeited it on appeal.
Williams argues his failure to raise the issue below is excusable because, at the time of the hearing on his petition, no cases had held a court must consider a petitioner‘s youth when determining his culpability at a
In Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 939, for example, the court reversed a summary denial of a resentencing petition, noting “given [the petitioner‘s] youth at the time of the crime, particularly in light of subsequent case law‘s recognition of the science relating to adolescent brain development [citations], it is far from clear that [the petitioner] was actually aware ‘of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants.’ ” (Id. at pp. 944–945, 960.) About six months later, in August 2021, the court in Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, went “one step further” and explicitly held “a defendant‘s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 454.) Several cases followed—Ramirez in November 2021, Harper in March 2022, Keel in October 2022, and Jones in December 2022—that discussed the relevance of an offender‘s youth in the context of resentencing petitions. (See Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 987; Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 470; Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562; Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088, fn. 7.) Given the state of the law at the time of Williams‘s hearing, we decline to excuse his failure to raise the issue in the trial court.
Williams contends People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400 (Pittman)—decided in October 2023—was the first case to hold a trial court must consider a petitioner‘s youth when
Williams‘s reliance on People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994 is misplaced. In Jimenez, the trial court denied a resentencing petition in 2021 after finding the defendant could be found guilty of implied-malice second degree murder. The defendant filed a second petition in 2023, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage on the ground that there was no legal basis to revisit its prior ruling. (Id. at pp. 999–1000.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for reconsideration. (Id. at pp. 997–998.) The court explained that “since the time of the trial court‘s original ruling of August 2021, there have been significant changes in the law relating to the culpability of defendants who were young adults in their teens or early 20s at the time of their crimes.” (Id. at p. 997.) Given
Here, in contrast, the most significant changes to the law occurred well before the hearing on Williams‘s petition. As we noted above, by the time of the hearing in July 2023, at least six published cases had held a defendant‘s youth is relevant to a
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject Williams‘s arguments on the merits. As a general rule, we presume the lower court was aware of, and followed, the law while performing its duties. (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.) Given this presumption, in “the usual case, the fact that a court did not specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that the court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (Ibid.) Instead, we presume the lower court “duly considered the evidence presented to it.” (Ibid.)
Here, there is nothing in the record that affirmatively demonstrates the court failed to consider Williams‘s youth before denying his petition. Therefore, we may presume the court was aware of the numerous cases holding a petitioner‘s youth is a relevant factor when considering whether to grant relief under
Even if we assumed, for the sake of argument, that the court failed to consider Williams‘s youth, remand still would not be required because any error was harmless. The parties seem to agree that this type of error is subject to the Watson6 harmless error standard. (See Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 417–418; Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489, fn. 8.) Under that standard, we ask whether it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [Williams] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.)
Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 466 is instructive. In that case, a jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder after his accomplice killed a man during a drug-related robbery. (Id. at pp. 470–471.) While planning the robbery with the defendant, the accomplice said he would kill the victim if the victim was alone. (Id. at p. 472.) The defendant and accomplice later met the victim in person, telling him they wanted to purchase $60,000
A few decades later, the defendant filed a petition for resentencing under what is now
The Court of Appeal held remand was not required because, even if the trial court should have considered the defendant‘s youth, any error was harmless. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) The court explained that an offender‘s age is “just a proxy for maturity.” (Id. at p. 490.) The defendant was 23 years old at the time of the murder, and “the presumption of immaturity weakens as a defendant approaches 26.” (Id. at p. 489.)
The court also pointed to the lack of evidence showing the defendant‘s behavior was motivated by impulsivity or vulnerability to peer pressure, which are the two primary areas that differentiate youthful offenders from their adult counterparts. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) The record showed the defendant participated in the robbery despite being aware his accomplice planned to kill the victim if the opportunity arose. The court also noted the lack of evidence that the defendant felt compelled to assist his accomplice. (Ibid.) The court concluded the defendant “made an intentional and volitional choice to take a calculated risk. That risk failed
Here, too, there is no reasonable likelihood the court would have reached a different conclusion had it focused on Williams‘s youth. Williams was 24 years old at the time of the killings, which is older than the defendant in Oliver. Accordingly, the presumption of immaturity is even weaker than in that case.
More importantly, as in Oliver, the circumstances of the killings do not reveal the sort of impulsivity or susceptibility to peer pressure that are the hallmark characteristics of youth. The trial court found the murders occurred during the execution of a murder-for-hire scheme that Williams masterminded. Williams recruited several people to help him execute his plan, including Cox, whom Williams acknowledged had ” ‘been doing murders all his life.’ ” Given the nature of the plan, it is reasonable to infer Williams chose Cox for that reason, not despite it.
The court also found Williams took on a leadership role on the day of the killings. Among other things, he instructed Burns to pick up Cox, directed Moore where to drive, and told Burns to stay in the van once they arrived at their destination. Williams then accompanied Cox into the house while both men were armed. After the killings, Williams directed Moore to a nightclub, where he collected on the contract.
The trial court‘s findings—which find ample support in the record—demonstrate that Williams engaged in substantial planning activity prior to the killings, refuting any suggestion
3. We decline to remand the case for a Franklin hearing
Williams argues his case must be remanded for the trial court to conduct a Franklin hearing so he has the opportunity to make a record of evidence that may be relevant at a future youth offender parole hearing. (See
On April 1, 2022—while Williams‘s first appeal of the denial of his resentencing petition was pending in this court—Williams filed a pro per request for a Franklin hearing. The court found Williams had made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to such a hearing. The court requested additional briefing and appointed counsel—Fay Arfa—to represent Williams in connection with the hearing.
Sometime later, we decided Williams IV and remanded the case for a new hearing under
A few weeks later, on August 31, 2022, the People filed a concession letter acknowledging that Williams is entitled to a Franklin hearing. After receiving the letter, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer to set the matter for a status conference related to the Franklin hearing.
On May 22, 2023, the trial court granted Williams‘s request to appoint an expert to examine him, prepare a report, and testify on his behalf at a Franklin hearing. The record does not contain further references to the Franklin hearing.
The Attorney General concedes Williams is entitled to a Franklin hearing. Nevertheless, he contends Williams forfeited his opportunity for a Franklin hearing in connection with these proceedings by failing to object below. According to the Attorney General, Williams‘s remedy is to file a motion under
Unlike the parties, we see no connection between Williams‘s
We affirm the order.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.