THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAN T. WALLS, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 4-24-1263
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
October 2, 2025
2025 IL App (4th) 241263-U
Honorable Katherine S. Gorman, Judge Presiding.
NOTICE This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County No. 14CF378
Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not err by dismissing defendant‘s postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings where he failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
¶ 2 In February 2015, a jury found defendant, Sean T. Walls, guilty of first degree murder (
¶ 3 On аppeal, defendant asserts his postconviction petition made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel‘s failure to (1) impeach three of the State‘s witnesses and (2) investigate whether the victim had a connection with 818 South Greenlawn Avenue in Peoria, Illinois. Alternatively, defendant claims the petition made a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of counsel‘s alleged errors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In June 2014, a grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of first degree murder (
A. Jury Trial
¶ 5 In February 2015, the matter proceeded to a jury trial.
1. Britiss Burks
¶ 6 Britiss Burks testified she had been friends with the victim since her freshman year of high school. She saw the victim with some of his friends across the street at a house on the corner of South Greenlawn Avenue and invited him to the party. Britiss testified that, later at the party, defendant asked the victim to sell him cannabis, the victim refused, and defendant immediately bought cannabis from someone else. She saw the victim pull out hundreds of dollars in cash from his pocket in front of defendant.
¶ 7 Britiss left the party and went for a walk. When she returned, she walked past defendant and the victim arguing on the front porch. Britiss witnessed dеfendant grab the victim
2. Jasmine Burks
¶ 8 Jasmine Burks, a relative of Britiss, testified, as she was walking into the house, she saw defendant and the victim arguing on the porch. She also saw defendant‘s girlfriend, Lakisha Hinkle, on the porch. Jasmine heard defendant say “[s]omething about some money.” She went into the house for “no less [than] three or five seconds,” and as she ran back out, she heard the victim say, “You‘re not going to get my money.” Jasmine then saw defendant had a gun, and he shot the victim in the chest. When asked where defendant pulled the gun from, Jasmine indicated defendant did not pull the gun out from anywhere because “he already had the gun.” Jasmine did not personally know the victim.
¶ 9 Jasmine admitted she initially gave police a false last name because she had an active warrant in a traffic case. She later served five days in jail for that case. She did not receive anything from the State in exchange for her testimony. Jasmine told the police she saw defendant shoot the victim. She identified defendant from a photo lineup. On cross-examination, Jasmine admitted, when she was speaking on a “jail line,” she said that she did not see anything. She testified that she made that statement because she was scared.
3. Tracina Jones
¶ 10 Tracina Jones testified she was friends with defendant and the victim. Defendant complained to Jones that the victim was being funny about his cannabis and that “[the victim] was supposed to have weed and he would give nobody 2 for 15, wouldn‘t give nobody no play
¶ 11 As Jones was walking out the front door, she saw defendant on the porch, and it appeared there “was this small little commotion going on, a little argument.” Defendant and the victim were “more than an arm‘s length” from each other, “but not super far away.” According to Jones, defendant “went to grab” the victim and the victim fell. Jones testified she did not see a gun in defendant‘s hand. She saw a flash from gunfire and defendant and the victim fell down. Defendant then got up and ran away. At the time the shooting occurred, Jones stated Hinkle and Breanna Kelly were inside the house.
4. Latisha Bailey
¶ 12 Latisha Bailey testified she was playing cards in the dining room with Kelly and Angela Warfield. Hinkle was also in the room. Bailey saw Hinkle hand defendant a purple Crown Royal bag containing a small black gun.
¶ 13 Bailey saw defendant speaking with the victim twice in the living room and heard defendant say, “Something about two for 15.” The victim responded he “wasn‘t going to keep giving out deals,” and defendant walked back into the kitchen. Bailey testified she heard a gunshot approximately 45 to 90 seconds later. She immediately ran out to the porch and saw a man with a build similar to defendant running from the sсene, and she fired shots at him. Bailey was on probation at the time she testified, but her probation status was not revealed to the jury.
¶ 14 On cross-examination, Bailey admitted she had given two to three different
5. Warfield
¶ 15 Warfield testified she was playing cards in the living room with Bailey and others. Hinkle was sitting in the chair next to Warfield. Hinkle was holding a Crown Royal bag in her hand. Defendant approached Hinkle, said, “‘Let me get that,‘” and Hinkle handed him a black handgun from the bag. Warfield heard the shooting approximately two minutes later. She testified Hinkle and Kelly were in the living room at the time of the shooting. Warfield was familiar with defendant and had met the victim for the first time that night.
6. Dr. John Denton
¶ 16 Dr. John Denton, the forensic pathologist who performed the victim‘s autopsy, testified the victim had a gunshot wound mid-chest, about 15 inches from the top of the head in the midline. The entrance wound, which was slightly oval-shaped, was surrounded by a “rim of abrasion,” which was “angled up towards [the victim‘s] right shоulder.” According to Dr. Denton, this corresponded with the path of the bullet, which he determined to travel from “front to back, right to left, and fairly sharply downwards by about 11 inches.” A 9-millimeter bullet was recovered from the victim‘s body. The victim also had smaller, superficial scrapes on the back of his elbow, forearm, and knee, which were consistent with collapsing after being shot. Dr. Denton did not find any bruising consistent with a struggle on the victim‘s body.
¶ 17 Dr. Denton stated there was no evidence of soot or gunpowder stippling on the
“Usually, when I see evidence of close range firing, the distance of the muzzle to the skin or thе outer layer of clothing is 2 feet or greater away. So if I do not see things that come out of the barrel with the bullet such as that cloud of smoke or soot or particles of gunpowder that come out burning or unburned gunpowder that are smaller projectiles, usually a muzzle that‘s within 2 feet of the entrance wound or the shirt, then I will see those particles or that smoke or soot. I did not see that on [the victim].”
Based on the lack of soot or stippling, Dr. Denton opined the gun was fired more than two feet from the victim‘s body.
¶ 18 The State asked whether the evidence supported a hypothetical situation where the victim pulled out a gun, the othеr individual grabbed the gun, and there was a struggle over the gun when it went off. Dr. Denton responded, “[T]he main thing that does not support that is the evidence of no close range firing, so there‘s no soot or stippling on the T-shirt or on the skin.” He opined that “struggling over a gun [was] inconsistent with what [he] found.” Dr. Denton indicated that knowing the muzzle had to be two feet away and knowing the trajectory of the bullet, the gun would have had to been fired up by the ceiling to achieve the angle of the bullet that traveled through the victim‘s body if they were in a physical struggle over the gun. He indicated the trajectory of the bullet was also consistent with the victim attempting to duck and run away.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Dr. Denton testified it was possible that if a weapon was extremely clean, there might be no evidence of soot or stippling if the gun was fired within 24 inches but at least 18 inches from the body or clothing. He agreed the trajectory of the bullet
7. Hinkle
¶ 20 Hinkle testified she had been dating defendant for around five years. Hinkle described the victim‘s demeanor the night of the party as, “[l]oud, obnoxious, *** he seemed a little highly intoxicated.” Hinkle denied giving defendant a Crown Royal bag with a gun in it. Hinkle testified, when she was standing on the porch, she saw the victim go across the street to a house on the corner of South Greenlawn Avenue. The victim quickly returned to the party with his hand in his pocket. The victim approached defendant on the porch. Defendant said to the victim, “You all right, little dude? Woo woo.” According to Hinkle, the victim “just snapped out” and said, “F you, n***.” The victim pulled a gun from his pocket. Defendant and the victim wrestled over the gun and a gunshot went off.
8. Kelly
¶ 21 Kelly, Hinkle‘s sister, testified that she saw the victim go to a house “[c]atty-corner by the stop sign” prior to the shooting. When he returned, the victim seemed “kind of angry” and had his hands in his pockets. According to Kelly, she and Hinkle were on the porch when Kelly saw the victim pull out a gun. Kelly watched as the victim and defendant got into a “tussle” over the gun. She then heard a loud “pop” and saw the victim hit the ground. She testified she never saw a Crown Royal bag with a gun in it. On cross-examination, Kelly denied telling police she saw the victim retrieve something from a car, rather than a house, prior to the shooting. She acknowledged her initials on a document depicting an “X” in the street to indicate where the car was located, but she denied having made the “X” during the police
9. Defendant
¶ 22 Defendant testified the first time he met the victim was at the party. He and the victim bumped into each other and briefly argued. He recalled the victim was “being extremely mouthy” to him. When defendant was outside on the porch, he saw the victim leave the party and go into a house across the street. Defendant later saw the victim exit the house and walk back toward the party carrying what he believed to be a gun. The victim confronted defendant on the porch and pulled out a gun. They struggled over the gun, and it went off. Defendant testified Hinkle and Kelly were standing on the sidewalk out front when the shooting occurred.
¶ 23 Defendant admitted he ran away after the shooting and broke into an abandoned building, where he was “laying low.” He testified that he burned the clothes he was wearing and kicked them down a sewer. He also admitted that he cut his hair before turning himself in to the police. During his police interview, defendant indicated he saw the victim go across the street from the party to a house with an enclosed porch and retrieve a gun.
10. Linda Thomas
¶ 24 Linda Thomas testified as a rebuttal witness for the State. Thomas testified that she lived at 816 South Greenlawn Avenue, the house that defendant told police he saw the victim enter to retrieve a gun. On the night of the party, Thomas locked both her front door and the door to her enclosed front porch beforе going to bed. She did not unlock the doors until she heard police knocking after the shooting. Thomas indicated she did not know the victim, and there was no reason he would ever be in her home.
11. Laharold Washington
¶ 25 Laharold Washington, a jailhouse informant, also testified as a rebuttal witness
¶ 26 Washington testified the State dismissed “one case of unlawful possession of a controlled substance” in exchange for his testimony in defendant‘s case. However, at the time Washington came forward, he was charged with four drug offenses in two separate cases. He pleaded guilty to one of the charges, but the other three, including the two most serious charges, were dropped. Trial counsel did not correct Washington on cross-examination and did not explain to the jury that the two most serious charges were dropped.
¶ 27 The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder.
B. Sentencing and Direct Appeal
¶ 28 The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years’ imprisоnment. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Walls, 2017 IL App (3d) 150481-U, ¶ 130.
C. Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 29 In December 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Relevant here, defendant alleged trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) impeach Dr. Denton with a 2006 article he coauthored on gunshot wounds, (2) impeach Bailey with the fact she was on probation at the time of trial, and (3) investigate whether the victim had a connection to 818 South Greenlawn Avenue, the house Hinkle told police she saw the victim enter shortly
¶ 30 In March 2019, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court found the trial court erred in dismissing the petition, as defendant adequately stated the gist of a constitutional claim. Walls, 2023 IL App (3d) 190178-U, ¶ 45. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Walls, 2023 IL App (3d) 190178-U, ¶ 50.
¶ 31 On remand, the trial court appointed postconviction counsel to represent defendant. In January 2024, counsel filed an amended postconviction petition. The amended petition incorporated by reference the assertions and arguments from the pro se petition. The amended petition realleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Dr. Denton with the 2006 article and Bailey with her probation status. Postconviction counsel added a new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to impeach Washington with the full details of his plea agreement in exchange for his testimony at defendant‘s trial. The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition.
¶ 32 In August 2024, the trial court conducted a second-stage hearing. Following the arguments of the parties, the court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 33 In September 2024, the trial court entered a written order dismissing the amended petition. The court found trial counsel “aggressively challеnged” Dr. Denton‘s opinions. The court further found the allegations relating to the failure to investigate and the failure to impeach did “not pass 2nd stage muster.”
¶ 34 This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his amended
¶ 36 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (
¶ 37 Once a petition moves to the second stage, the trial court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant and the State may answer the petition or file a motion to dismiss. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17. At this stage, the court determines “whether the postconviction petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 17. The court does not engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). Instead, all well-рleaded facts that are not affirmatively rebutted by the record are taken as true. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. If defendant makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the petition proceeds to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34.
¶ 38 In this case, the State filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the amended petition. We review de novo the court‘s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. People v. Carroll, 2024 IL App (4th) 231207, ¶ 48.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 39 Defendant alleges the petition made a substantial showing that trial counsel
¶ 40 The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
1. Failure to Impeach
¶ 41 Defendant asserts his petition made a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to confront Dr. Denton with a 2006 article he coauthored. Generally, the decision whether to impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy that will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 730. This court strongly presumes that counsel‘s action or inaction was the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 130, 138 (1995). “[N]either mistakes in strategy nor the fact that another
¶ 42 Dr. Denton‘s 2006 article, titled “Practical Pathology of Gunshot Wounds,” states, in relevant part:
“The principle [sic] indicator of close range fire is stippling, that is, a pattern of tiny, punctuate abrasions in the skin surrounding the entrance wound. *** The presence of stippling indicates that the muzzle of the gun was within 2 feet of the victim‘s body when it was discharged. Contact range firing occurs when the muzzle of the gun is in contact with the skin at the time of discharge. *** These wounds are often characterized by а dense pattern of combusted gunpowder residue or soot within and around the wound margin. *** A muzzle imprint is not an uncommon finding and is virtually pathognomonic of a contact range gunshot wound. As noted earlier, stellate patterns of tearing, especially over bony surfaces, are not unusual.
Distant range gunshot wounds, that is, wounds inflicted when the muzzle of the gun is more that [sic] 2 feet away, will show no evidence of soot or stippling. It is absolutely critical that the forensic pathologist recognizes that the absence of soot or stippling does not absolutely mean that the wound [sic] was not fired from close range. Intermediate targets and clothing cаn screen out stippling and soot even when the muzzle of the gun is pressed up against the clothing.” J. Scott Denton, MD; Adrienne Segovia, MD; James A. Filkins, MD, JD, PhD, Practical Pathology of Gunshot Wounds, 130 Archives of Pathology & Laboratory Medicine 1283, 1286 (September 2006) (hereinafter Pathology of
Gunshot Wounds).
¶ 43 At trial, Dr. Denton opined the gun was fired more than two feet away from the victim due to the absence of soot or stippling on the victim‘s body or clothing. He testified “the main thing” that did not support a struggle over the gun was the lack of evidence of close-range firing. He testified the angle of the entry wound, the trajectory of the bullet, and the lack of bruising on the victim‘s body also indicated there was no struggle over the gun.
¶ 44 The record demonstrates trial counsel‘s сross-examination of Dr. Denton on this issue was not deficient, as counsel vigorously questioned Dr. Denton‘s opinion that the gun was fired from at least two feet away. In fact, Dr. Denton eventually agreed with counsel that it was possible the gun could have been fired between 18 and 24 inches from the victim. Counsel also elicited testimony from Dr. Denton that, assuming certain conditions, the gun could have been fired during a struggle with the victim.
¶ 45 Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel‘s performance was deficient, defendant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced. A full reading of the article reveals it supported Dr. Denton‘s testimony. The article states the “principle [sic] indicator” of clоse range firing is soot or stippling, but the absence of soot or stippling is not conclusive evidence that it was not. Pathology of Gunshot Wounds, supra, at 1286. In those instances, the article encourages pathologists to consider intermediate targets, such as clothing. At trial, Dr. Denton testified he did just that—he examined the victim‘s body and then examined an intermediate target—in this case, the victim‘s T-shirt. He was also careful to qualify that soot and stippling is “usually” present in close-range firing. Dr. Denton then concluded a struggle over the gun was inconsistent with what he found. He relied on several items of evidence other than the lack of soot or stippling to support this conclusion, including the angle of the entry wound, the trajectory of the
¶ 46 Defendant next contends the petition made a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Bailey with the fact she was on probation at the time she testified. Because the decision whether to impeach is almost always immune from ineffective assistance claims, a defendant cannot establish deficient performance unless he can demоnstrate counsel completely failed to use significant impeachment evidence. People v. Salgado, 263 Ill. App. 3d 238, 246-47 (1994). “[A] court of review will not upset a verdict by a jury on the possibility, not probability, that with a little bit more impeachment, the witness would have been found totally incredible.” People v. Douglas, 2011 IL App (1st) 093188, ¶ 47.
¶ 47 At defendant‘s trial, counsel extensively cross-examined Bailey and impeached her credibility in three ways. First, counsel elicited that Bailey gave two or three different versions of the events at the party. Second, Bailey admitted she fired her own gun on the night of the shooting and the State had not charged her or offered her a deal relating to that conduct. Third, counsel impeached Bailey with her convictions for felony forgery in 2009, felony manufacture and delivery of a controlled substance in 2009, and misdemeanor retail theft twice in 2005 and once in 2006. Thus, counsel thoroughly impeached Bailey and called into question her credibility based on her changing stories and criminal conduct. See People v. Costic, 2025 IL App (4th) 241041-U, ¶ 101 (“A defendant cannot make a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel by noting counsel‘s failure to impeach a witness more.“).
¶ 48 Even if we were to conclude trial counsel‘s failure to impeach Bailey with her probation status was objectively unreasonable, defendant has not demonstrated he was
¶ 49 Finally, defendant argues the petition made a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit testimony concerning the full details of Washington‘s agreement with the State. Specifically, he contends counsel should have made the jury aware of two felony unlawful manufacturing and delivery charges against Washington, which the State dismissed in exchange for his testimony. Defendant‘s argument essentially amounts to the same argument he put forth as to Bailey—that Washington was “not impeached enough.” See Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 730. In this case, the Stаte had already elicited testimony from Washington that he was in jail when he spoke with defendant, the State was dropping a drug-related case against him in exchange for his testimony, and he was incarcerated at the time he testified. The jury was thus fully aware of Washington‘s potential bias and incentive to implicate defendant in the shooting.
¶ 50 Accordingly, defendant‘s allegations fail to make a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to impeach, and the trial court properly dismissed these claims.
2. Failure to Investigate
¶ 51 Defendant next argues the petition made a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the victim had a connection to 818 South Greenlawn Avenue, the house that Hinkle told police she saw the victim enter prior to the shooting. Specifically, he alleges counsel failed to discover that the victim was Facebook friends with one of the residents of 818 South Greenlawn Avenue, Willie Breedlove, a known gang member who was linked to a March 2012 exchange of gunfire with a rival gang. In support of this claim, defendant attached to his pro se petition a screenshot of Breedlove‘s Facebook friends list and three news articles describing instances of Breedlove being involved in various drug and firearm offensеs. One of the articles, dated April 9, 2015, stated that Breedlove was sentenced to 22 months in federal prison after spending more than a year in custody.
¶ 52 “Trial counsel has a professional duty to conduct ‘reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.‘” Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 38 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate is determined by the value of the evidence that was not presented at trial and the closeness of the evidence at trial. People v. Jarnagan, 154 Ill. App. 3d 187, 194 (1987). “Attorneys have an obligation to explore all readily available sources of evidence that might benefit thеir clients.” People v. Morris, 335 Ill. App. 3d 70, 79 (2002). “A strong presumption exists that trial counsel acted effectively in investigating a case.” People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 150203, ¶ 29.
¶ 53 On this record, defendant cannot make a substantial showing of ineffectiveness based on counsel‘s purported failure to investigate. First, defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel‘s performance was the result of reasonable trial strategy. By
¶ 54 Ultimately, the evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly implicated defendant in the shooting. Britiss and Bailey saw the victim refuse to sell сannabis to defendant. Defendant complained to Jones about the victim refusing to sell him cannabis. Bailey and Warfield witnessed Hinkle giving defendant a gun in a purple Crown Royal bag. Jones also observed Hinkle carrying a Crown Royal bag at the party. Bailey, Warfield, and Jones testified Hinkle and Kelly were inside the house when the shooting occurred and not outside as they had claimed. Defendant described the victim as being “mouthy” toward him during the party and acknowledged they had a brief argument. Jones confirmed that defendant and the victim were standing more than an arm‘s length away from each other when the shooting occurred. Jasmine saw defendant shoot the victim in the chest. Britiss and Jasmine identified defendant as the shooter in a police photo lineup. Dr. Denton opined the gun was fired at least 18 to 24 inches away from the victim based on the lack of stippling or soot on the body or clothing. He also concluded a struggle over the gun was inconsistent with the angle of the entry wound, the trajectory of the bullet, and the absence of bruising on the victim‘s body. Washington testified
¶ 55 Accordingly, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on the failure to investigate.
B. Cumulative Prejudice
¶ 56 Finally, defendant argues he made a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of counsel‘s errors, depriving him of a fair trial. Having individually reviewed and rejected each claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his cumulative prejudice claim must necessarily fail. Therefore, a cumulative prejudice analysis is unnecessary.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 58 Affirmed.