People v. WallacePeople v. Wallace
In March 2015, the Solano County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant with possession of a baton in violation of
At the hearing, the officer who аrrested defendant, Michael Ambrose of the Fairfield Police Department, was the only person who testified. Officer Ambrose said that at 9:47 a.m. on March 18, 2015, he heard defendant‘s name broadcast over the police radio as someone stopped by another officer, Sergeant Reeves, in Fairfield for having “false tabs” on his vehicle. Ambrose knew defendant was wanted for a domestic violence incident that had occurred a night or two before. Ambrose went to the traffic stop and spoke to Reeves by Reeves‘s own vehicle. The two then went up to defendant‘s vehiclе, removed defendant from the vehicle, placed him in handcuffs and searched his person. Asked what happened next, Ambrose said, “I then put [defendant] in the back of my vehicle, and went back and searched his vehicle.”
In response to the prosecutor‘s further questioning, Ambrose testified no one else was in defendant‘s vehicle and no one was in the area to take custody of defendant‘s vehicle. He further testified that the Fairfield Police Department had a policy that required officers to have a vehicle towed and inventoried when no one was present to take сustody of it. Asked if this was the situation in defendant‘s case, Ambrose replied, “In this case, the subject also had no license, . . . and Sergeant Reeves was citing him for that as well. So there was [sic] a couple of different reasons to get in and search his vehicle: One being inventory search, and one being incident to the arrest that I was making.”
Ambrose also testified that the purpose of the department‘s inventory search policy was “to ensure if there is [sic] any items of high value in the vehicle, that we are to
Ambrose then said he searched defendant‘s vehicle after placing defendant in the back of the patrol car: “I went up to the vehicle. I started on the open driver‘s side door that was still open from when I removed him. I started to go into the vehicle, and as I did, I noticed a red handle sticking up between the center console аnd the driver‘s seat. [¶] I reached down and pulled out, from grabbing the handle that was exposed, about a 24-inch long brown wooden baton with red tape on the end where the handle would be.” He saw the red handle of the baton when he “actually entered the vehicle.” Ambrose did not see any non-violent purpose for the baton, particularly in light of the red tape handgrip that prevented the baton from slipping when swung. He considered the baton to be a deadly weapon based on his training and experience, and its presence in the vehicle was an additional basis for his arrest of defеndant. After finding the baton, Ambrose said, he continued to search the vehicle. He did not locate anything of value.
Ambrose further testified that he was not sure if defendant‘s vehicle was towed or not because he left with defendant while Reeves stayed behind with the vehicle. Ambrose said it was standard procedure to fill out a “California Highway Patrol 180 Form” (CHP 180 form) if a vehicle was towed, and acknowledged that the form contained a field in which one could inventory the items that were found in the towed vehicle. However, he said, he had nothing to do with the traffic stop or anything to do with filling out such a form, if one was filled оut. He also testified that he did not note in his own police report what kind of vehicle defendant was driving because “[t]he vehicle had nothing to do with why I was there.”
After hearing argument, the court denied defendant‘s suppression motion. It stated about Ambrose‘s search of defendant‘s vehicle, “This was not a search incident to an arrest; it was a search that [was] based upon the normal practice to once this individual
“Officer Ambrose was arresting him for the circumstаnces that he discovered once the object was seen, and it wasn‘t his responsibility to tow the vehicle; it was to take [defendant] into custody. And what happened to the vehicle and the circumstances afterwards is not really known as a process as much as whether or not he had a basis to be where he was when he saw that object that he did; and therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.
“It was part of the community caretaking function when this person was placed under arrest, to inventory the vehicle and prepare it for towing so that the officer and the agency doesn‘t incur any other liability.”
Subsequently, defendant moved under
In May 2016, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant entered a no contest plea to the weapon charge and was convicted on that charge. He preserved his right to raise the denial of his suppression motion on appeal.
The court subsequently sentenced defendant to three years in county jail pursuant to
Defendant filed a timely appeal based on the court‘s denial of his suppression motion.
DISCUSSION
Defеndant contends we must reverse the judgment because Officer Ambrose‘s warrantless search of his vehicle violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. He argues the trial court erred in rejecting his suppression motion because there was no evidence that Ambrose‘s search came within the “inventory search” exception to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches. The People assert only that we should affirm the judgment because police inevitably would have discovered the baton, which defendant argues also is not suppоrted by substantial evidence. We agree with defendant.
I.
Standard of Review
When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court determines the facts, selects the rule of law, and applies the rule to the facts “in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated.” (People v. Gonzales (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 284.) “On appeal from a section 995 review of the denial of a defendant‘s motion to suppress, we review the determination of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing.” (People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.) We review the magistrate‘s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (Gonzales, at p. 284.) We defer to the magistrate‘s factual findings “when supрorted by substantial evidence, and view the record in the light most favorable to the challenged ruling.” (People v. Smith (2011) 190 Cal.App.4th 572, 576.) We may affirm the magistrate‘s ruling if it “is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling was made for an incorrect reason.” (McDonald, at p. 529.)
II.
There Is Not Substantial Evidence That Ambrose Conducted an Inventory Search.
Defendant argues there is not substantial evidence that Officer Ambrose‘s search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search pursuant to standardized department procedures. We agree.
Both the
“Warrantless sеarches are presumed to be unreasonable ’ “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” ’ ” (People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742.) These are ” ‘exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate‘s warrant for search may be dispensed with.’ ” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) “[T]he burden of proving the justification for the warrantless search or seizure lies squarely with the prosecution.” (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723.)
Courts have recognized an exception to the warrant requirement when the police take “an inventory of the contents of a vehicle” in the course of impounding it (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126), commonly referred to as an inventory search. (See South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373–374 (Opperman).) Inventory searches are typically performed in the course of police impounding a vehicle “[i]n the interests of
However, courts have “recognized the risk that police might use an inventory of this kind as a pretext for searching a vehicle for contraband or other evidence.” (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) A purported inventory search must not be a “pretext concealing an investigatory police motive” (Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 376) or “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence . . . . The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.’ ” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 (Wells).) In order to prevent such pretext searches, police discretion in performing an inventory search must be “exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 375.) “[A] valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.” (Williams, at p. 138 [citing Wells, at p. 4].) Further, “[t]he policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.” (Wells, at p. 4; Williams at p. 126, quoting Wells.)
California courts have rejected claims of purported inventory searches where the evidence does not show the search was conducted in accordance with an established policy or practice governing such searches or indicates the search was conducted for another purpose. (See Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 123, 138 [prosecution failed to meet burden of showing search was valid inventory search where prosecution failed to establish policy concerning search of closed containers and officers failed to complete inventory, questioning why need to inventory truck “mysteriously evaporate[d]” once
In Williams, the defendant, Williams, moved to suppress evidence of drugs that two deputies, Hunt and Oliver, found during a search of Williams‘s truck that the deputies conducted after Hunt stopped Williams for making an illegal turn. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 124.) The drugs were contained inside closed leather bags on the front bench seat of Williams‘s truck. (Id. at p. 123.) The record indicated that the sheriff‘s department had a policy requiring deputies to inventory the contents of a vehicle before towing it, but there was no evidence the department had a policy about the opening of closed containers. (Id. at pp. 126–127.) Based on Wells, the court held that the prosecution was required to show that the deрuties “were following some ‘standardized criteria’ or ‘established routine’ when they elected to open the containers [citation], and the record [there] fail[ed] to do so.” (Williams, at p. 127.)
The primary issue in Williams was whether Williams‘s motion to suppress was specific enough to afford the prosecution notice of the grounds for the motion. But the court also elaborated on the prosecution‘s failure to meet its burden of proof and the importance of requiring it to do so. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 138–139.) The facts of the case, the court wrote, “underscore forcefully the reason behind [the] rule [that a valid inventory search must adherе to a preexisting policy or practice]. Deputy Hunt was surveilling defendant on suspicion of drug-related offenses and had called Deputy Oliver for assistance before defendant made the right turn without signaling. Deputy Hunt was likely looking for an opportunity to search defendant‘s truck. If he and Oliver truly intended to take an inventory pursuant to a preexisting policy or practice rather than
Here, Ambrose testified it was standard police department policy for an officer to have a vehicle such as defendant‘s towed and inventoried when no one was present to take custody of it, it was standard procedure to fill out a CHP 180 form if the vehicle was towed, and the CHP 180 form contained a field in which one could inventory the items that were found in the towed vehicle. However, Ambrose did not testify that he was complying with these policies when he searched defendant‘s vehicle.2 He simply testified that after placing defendant in the police car, he searched defendant‘s vehicle. He did not testify that either he or Sergeant Reeves, or the two of them jointly, had decided to have defendant‘s vehicle towed before he searched it. He did not testify that either of them arranged to tow the vehicle. And he testified that he did not know whether the vehicle was in fact towed or whether a CHP 180 form was ever prepared. He admitted he did not fill out a CHP 180 form, and no such form was offered in evidence by the prosecution, suggesting that no policy-compliant inventory search was ever completed. Nor was evidence offered that Ambrose referred in his police report to his having conducted an inventory search of defendant‘s vehicle or that his search had yielded nothing of value, even though the department‘s inventоry search policy required
On this record, there is no substantial evidence that Ambrose conducted an inventory search in accordance with standardized policies and procedures of the Fairfield Police Department. With no evidence that the officers had considered whether, or decided, to impound defendant‘s vehicle, and if so the reasons for impoundment, the police‘s “community caretaking functions” were not implicated.4 Given the absence of this evidence and, further, given Ambrose‘s disclaimer of any responsibility for the vehicle, the traffic stop or the CHP 180 form, as well as the lack of evidence that he referred in any way to his search in his police report, there is no basis for inferring that Ambrose‘s search of defendant‘s vehicle was undertaken for the purpose of preparing an inventory. As the United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have stated, “[t]he policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to
III.
There Is No Substantial Evidence That Police Inevitably Would Have Discovered the Baton.
The People do not argue that Ambrose conducted an inventory search of defendant‘s vehicle. Instead, they contend we should affirm the judgment because, as the prosecutor argued below in the alternative,5 the police inevitably would have discovered the baton in the course of an inventory search conducted after defendant‘s vehicle was towed. We conclude there is not substantial evidence to support the People‘s contention.
“[E]vidence that has been illegally obtained need not always be suppressed . . . .” (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441.) “[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative
“The prosecution must establish inevitable discovery without resort to speculation, for ‘inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Corbett) (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 682, quoting Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 444, fn. 5.) Further, “[t]he inevitable discovery exception requires the court ’ “to determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” ’ ” (People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.)
The People point out that defendant “does not contend that he would have maintained control over his vehicle after the stop, or that the vehicle would not have been impounded.” Further, “no one else was available to take the vehicle, so it is apparent that the car would have been towed and inventoried, and the baton would have been eventually found. The community caretaking function of keeping unlicensed drivers off the road, and of removing cars without drivers from the street, is clear.” After noting that the baton was visible inside defendant‘s vehicle, the People conclude, “Thus, if Officer Ambrose had not detected the baton, personnel inventorying the car at the impound lot eventually would have.” The People also emphasize Ambrose‘s testimony that department policy required officers to have a vehicle such as defendant‘s towed and inventoried and to note and place in custody for safekeeping any items of high value found in a vehicle.
The People‘s inevitable discovery argument fails because it requires us to build speculative inference on top of speculative inference. (See People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 890 [finding “these layers of inference far too speculative to support” a conviction].) First, as already discussed, the record is silent as to whether anyone even
Second, there is no indication that the vehicle was actually towed. As we have discussed, Ambrose‘s testimony indicates that he was unaware of any decision to tow the vehicle, that he had nothing to do with considering such a question, and that he did not know whether or not the vehicle was ever towed. In light of this testimony, it would also be speculation to conclude the vehicle was actually towed.
It is possible that defendant‘s vehicle was towed but, again, a mere possibility does not rise to the level of substantial evidence. (People v. Ramon, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 851; see People v. Evans, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [rejecting the People‘s inevitable discovery argument when, other than an impound manager‘s “oblique reference” to the usual practice of filling out a CHP 180 form, “there was no evidence presented regarding when, or whether, a separate inventory would have been conducted by police, or what the scope” of it would have been].) Therefore, we cannot affirm the trial court‘s order based on the People‘s inevitable discovery theory.
For the reasons we have stated, there is no substantial evidence to support the court‘s denial of defendant‘s suppression motion. The court should have granted the
The court‘s error “is by its nature prejudicial” in this circumstancе, where defendant pled no contest after the court‘s erroneous denial of his suppression motion. (People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856, 864, citing People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1, 13.) Therefore, he must be allowed, if he so chooses, to withdraw his no contest plea.
In light of our conclusions, we do not need to, and do not, address the remainder of the parties’ arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to (1) vacate the order denying defendant‘s suppression motion and enter a new order granting the motion; (2) permit defendant to withdraw his no contest plea; (3) determine, if defendant does withdraw his plea, whether the Peоple intend to retry the case; and (4) make such other orders as are necessary and appropriate.
STEWART, J.
We concur.
KLINE, P.J.
MILLER, J.
People v. Wallace (A149049)
Trial Judge: Hon. E. Bradley Nelson
Counsel:
Anna Dorn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.