The People of the State of Colorado v. Ricardo Valdez
No. 24CA0540
Colorado Court of Appeals
March 5, 2026
SUMMARY
March 5, 2026
2026COA9
No. 24CA0540, People v. Valdez — Crimes — Sexual Assault — Submission Through Actual Application of Physical Force
A division of the court of appeals determines, for the first time in a published Colorado appellate case, the meaning of the phrase “causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force,” as provided in section 18-3-402(4)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0540
Weld County District Court No. 22CR1526
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ricardo Valdez,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Lipinsky and Taubman*, JJ., concur
Announced March 5, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Christopher Gehring, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and
I. Background
¶ 2 The jury heard evidence from which it could reasonably have found the following.
¶ 3 The victim, K.E. — who was fifteen years old at the time — was living with her father and two roommates, one of whom was Valdez. Valdez — who was forty-one years old — and the other roommate used separate bedrooms in the basement.
¶ 4 One day, Valdez had been entrusted with looking after K.E. while her father was out of town. That evening, Valdez gave K.E. alcohol while they watched a movie in the living room, and K.E.
¶ 5 Valdez told K.E. to sit down on his bed, and she lay down on the bed near the headboard. Valdez put his finger in K.E.’s vagina and then went to put on a condom. When he returned, Valdez told K.E. to “scoot down” — i.e., to move away from the headboard. She did not move, so he “scooted [her] down” the bed. Valdez then sexually penetrated K.E. During the assault, Valdez was on top of K.E., with his chest and stomach touching her chest and stomach. Afterward, Valdez got K.E. dressed and helped her to her bedroom. A few days later, K.E. disclosed the incident to her father and to a family friend. K.E.’s father called the police.
¶ 6 The State charged Valdez with three offenses: (1) sexual assault (ten-year age difference) with a sentence enhancer that he caused K.E.’s submission through physical force or physical violence; (2) sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust; and (3) contributing to the delinquency of a minor. At trial, Valdez admitted to sexually assaulting K.E. but argued that he did not cause her submission through the actual application of physical force and that he was not in a position of trust with respect to her.
The trial court sentenced Valdez to a controlling sentence of eighteen years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.1
II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review
¶ 7 As relevant here, a person commits sexual assault if they “knowingly inflict[] sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim,” and, “[a]t the time of the commission of the act, the victim is at least fifteen years of age but less than seventeen years of age and the actor is at least ten years older than the victim and is not the spouse of the victim.”
III. Analysis
¶ 9 Valdez contends that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he caused K.E.’s submission through the actual application of physical force. We disagree.
¶ 10 Initially, we note that, at trial, the prosecutor argued that two of Valdez’s actions qualified as applying the requisite force:
A. Physical Force
¶ 11 The sexual assault statute does not define “force.” One thing, however, is clear: contrary to Valdez’s apparent position, it does not require evidence that Valdez “grab[bed], carr[ied], hit, or choke[d] [K.E.]” or that K.E. suffered injuries. The force applied does not have to rise to the level of full-blown violence because the statute is
¶ 12 As to what constitutes “physical force,” notwithstanding the lack of a statutory definition, we are not writing on a blank slate. Divisions of this court have held that, in the context of sexual assault, “physical force” simply means “force applied to the body.” E.g., Keene, 226 P.3d at 1143. Moreover, “‘[f]orce’ is understood as a common term.” People v. Garcia, 2017 COA 1, ¶ 31, aff’d, 2019 CO 64. And force commonly means “strength or energy exerted or brought to bear”; “cause of motion or change”; or “active power.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/67W6-76XV.
¶ 13 Here, there was evidence that Valdez exerted energy against K.E.’s body and caused it to move or change location. K.E. was
¶ 14 Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Valdez applied physical force to K.E.’s body.
B. Cause Submission
¶ 15 “Cause submission” is also an undefined term in the sexual assault statute. Moreover, Valdez does not cite — and we are not aware of — any case clearly defining the phrase as used in section 18-3-402(4)(a). Indeed, Valdez makes no attempt to define the phrase.
¶ 16 Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit definition, we find guidance in the case law. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of the phrase in the context of a different, subsequently amended portion of the statute. Until a recent statutory amendment, the sexual assault statute provided that a defendant could commit sexual assault “by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission
¶ 17 While the concept of causing submission is no longer found in section 18-3-402(1)(a), we see no reason why these cases would not inform the meaning of the concept where it is still found — in section 18-3-402(4)(a). Thus, we conclude that the phrase “causes submission” in the sentence enhancer language found in section 18-3-402(4)(a) connotes the means by which the defendant
¶ 18 The prosecution presented evidence that K.E. clearly expressed to Valdez that she did not want to have sex with him. She then placed herself at the top of the bed near the headboard. And she did not move away from the headboard and down the bed when Valdez told her to do so. Notwithstanding K.E.’s expressed wishes and her evident lack of cooperation, Valdez moved her down the bed so that he could accomplish the assault.
¶ 19 Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Valdez caused K.E.’s submission by the actual application of physical force.
IV. Disposition
¶ 20 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.