People v. SuazoPeople v. Suazo
OPINION
Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Erin Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jesus Suazo was convicted of second degree murder (
Defendant was sentenced on count 5 to the upper term of four years, and on count 1 to a term of 15 years to life. A lower-term sentence on count 2, and middle-term sentences on counts 3 and 4, were imposed and stayed. (
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder in light of his testimony that he drank alcohol without intending to drive afterward, then drove while unconscious. He additionally contends the trial court erred in failing to give, or his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request, instructions on unconsciousness
We accept the People‘s concession that remand is required for resentencing consistent with Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. We reject defendant‘s remaining contentions and otherwise affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Defendant, while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger, Anna Maria Solorio Zuniga (Solorio), was ejected from the vehicle and killed.
I. THE ACCIDENT SCENE
On May 13, 2017, at approximately 4:00 a.m., California Highway Patrol Sergeant N. Hunt was dispatched to a traffic collision on southbound Highway 99, just north of Avenue 200 in Tulare County. She was told that a vehicle had possibly rolled over and was unoccupied. Hunt was the first officer to arrive on scene at approximately 4:11 a.m. She observed a silver sedan in a grassy area on the west side of the highway, between a chain link fence and the edge of the roadway. The passenger door of the vehicle was detached and missing.
Hunt located an unresponsive female, who appeared to have been ejected from the vehicle, a few feet in front of the sedan‘s front bumper. She was deceased.2
Hunt began to survey the area, looking for other persons who may have been ejected from the vehicle. She noticed a chain link fence toward the passenger side of the vehicle was severely damaged. She determined that the vehicle must have gone through the fence into an area occupied by an adjacent tractor supply business.
Soon thereafter, additional units and emergency personnel arrived on scene and began looking through the yard of the agricultural equipment business. Hunt initially remained with the vehicle to preserve the blood evidence but, after about 20 minutes, joined the search. After a few minutes, Hunt spotted a shadow of an occupant sitting in the cab of a trailer about a hundred feet from the vehicle. The door of the cab was closed. Hunt walked up the steps to the cab and knocked on the door, announced herself as law enforcement, and told the occupant to come out. The occupant, who Hunt identified at trial as defendant, did not make eye contact and, using “the F word,” said he would not come out. Hunt opened the door and said, “If you don‘t come out, I‘ll have to physically remove you.” Defendant responded something to the effect of, “Go ahead, remove me.” Hunt said, “Okay,” and stepped into the cab, at which point defendant stood up. Hunt backed down the stairs and defendant came out on his own. Inside the cab, Hunt noticed a little bit of blood or blood residue on the seat and the steering wheel. Defendant had open wounds that were bleeding.
At that point, California Highway Patrol Officer B. Elliott took over the investigation. Elliott noticed that defendant‘s eyes were bloodshot and watery, his gait was unsteady and off balance, he walked slowly and with deliberate steps, and an odor of alcoholic beverage emitted from his breath while conversing. These signs were consistent with someone who is under the influence. Defendant denied any medical or mechanical issues that might have contributed to the collision. Defendant denied having any injuries, although he had lacerations on his forehead and seemed disoriented and confused. Defendant was aware and conscious during the interaction and his answers were responsive to the questions asked.
Defendant admitted driving the vehicle. He informed Elliott that he had come from his sister-in-law‘s birthday party at a restaurant in Tulare and was driving to Pixley. He acknowledged he had been drinking and said “they [had] two buckets” of beer. Defendant reported that he started drinking at 10:00 p.m. the night before and stopped drinking at 1:00 a.m. He reported he was no longer feeling the effects of alcohol by the time he was speaking with Elliott. He did not drink any more alcohol after the collision. When asked if he should have been driving, defendant responded, “No, I shouldn‘t have
Elliott performed field sobriety tests on defendant, which included the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the one-legged stand, and the finger count, before administering testing with a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device. On the horizontal gaze nystagmus, defendant‘s response indicated a blood-alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher. Defendant performed poorly on the one-legged stand, to the point that Elliott discontinued the test because he was concerned defendant would fall to the ground. Defendant also had difficulty understanding Elliott‘s instructions regarding the test. During the finger count test, defendant miscounted and fumbled every count, before discontinuing the test part way through and beginning to cry. Elliott performed two PAS tests on defendant. The first registered defendant‘s blood-alcohol level at 0.139 percent; the second registered 0.148 percent. Based on all of the foregoing, Elliott formed the opinion that defendant was unable to safely operate a motor vehicle because he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.
Elliott placed defendant under arrest. He found Solorio‘s identification card and cell phone in defendant‘s pocket. Another cell phone was found in the vehicle. Elliott transferred defendant to a hospital where he underwent a blood test. The blood sample was taken at 6:04 a.m. and revealed a blood-alcohol content of 0.14 percent.
II. INVESTIGATION
On Highway 99, Elliott observed tire friction marks leading into dirt tracks, and eventually through weeds or grass in a straight line directly through the fence into the agricultural equipment yard. The posted speed limit in this area of Highway 99 was 70 miles per hour. Elliott also observed a piece of agricultural equipment with vehicle parts attached to it and tire friction marks on it. There were no tracks or marks on the ground nearby, indicating to Elliott that the vehicle was airborne at the time it struck the equipment. He also located a bloody fingerprint and bloody palmprint on the top of the driver‘s side door, near the rear of the door. This indicated to Elliott that the driver had exited the driver‘s side door after the collision, eliminating Solorio as the potential driver. Elliott noticed that the passenger seatbelt was severed and removed from the vehicle.
The airbag control module of defendant‘s Ford Focus recorded that the vehicle was traveling just over 100 miles per hour four seconds prior to the crash and the accelerator was 64 percent depressed. Two seconds prior to the
Both the driver‘s side and passenger side seatbelts were in use just prior to and during the collision. Examination of the vehicle after the collision revealed that the passenger seatbelt buckle was still engaged with the latch plate, but the seatbelt itself was not attached.
III. PRIOR CONVICTION AND LICENSE SUSPENSION
Defendant had a prior conviction for driving under the influence, with an incident date of July 22, 2013, and a conviction date of June 9, 2014. In conjunction with his plea in that case, defendant acknowledged that being under the influence of alcohol “impairs [his] ability to safely operate a motor vehicle“; that “it is extremely dangerous to human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both“; and that if he continued to do so and someone was killed as a result of his driving, he could be charged with murder.
Additionally, a DMV record admitted at trial showed that defendant‘s driver‘s license was suspended at the time of the collision.
IV. DEFENSE CASE
Defendant testified in the defense case.
Defendant acknowledged that he pled no contest to driving under the influence in 2014. He continued to drive after that date because driving was his transportation to work. He drove often.
On the night of May 12, 2017, defendant got off work around 8:30 p.m. and went to his brother‘s home, where defendant also lived. Defendant was tired and did not have plans to go out. His brother called and invited him to go to a restaurant to celebrate defendant‘s sister-in-law‘s birthday. Defendant told his brother he did not want to go out. However, defendant decided to go to the party “for a little bit.” Defendant drove himself to the restaurant. He initially testified he did not have a plan for leaving. However, he later testified he planned to leave his car at the restaurant and get a ride home with his brother or someone else, as all the guests were going to his brother‘s house afterward.
When Solorio arrived at the party, she gave defendant a hug and they continued to spend the rest of the night together dancing. Solorio did not have a purse and defendant offered to hold her phone and her identification.
Defendant explained that the two buckets of beer he mentioned to Elliott had been for the whole table. Defendant purchased the buckets, but they were for everyone.
Defendant did not recall leaving the party or driving. The last thing he remembered prior to the collision was dancing and drinking. He then recalled walking toward the deputies and speaking with them, but did not recall the full conversation. He did not recall going to the hospital but recalled waking up at the hospital. He received staples in his head and, at the time of trial, he continued to have constant headaches as a result of his injuries. He did not find out Solorio had died until he was at the hospital.
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged he initialed a form when he entered his plea in 2014, but he did not recall filling out the form or going over it with his attorney. He acknowledged he did not have a valid driver‘s license at the time of the collision. He knew his driver‘s license was suspended due to a prior conviction for driving under the influence. He denied driving under the influence at any time after his conviction, other than on the night of the incident. However, he did drink alcohol during that time period and was familiar with the feeling of drinking both small and large amounts of alcohol. He did not, during that time period, ever drink to a point where he believed himself to be drunk or intoxicated.
Defendant acknowledged that he knew, both prior to and after his first conviction for driving under the influence, that it was dangerous to drive under the influence of alcohol. He knew people could die as a result of collisions when a driver is under the influence, and he had friends who had been killed by intoxicated drivers and also friends who had been the drivers in such incidents.
Defendant could not recall how much he drank on the night of the incident. He acknowledged that he planned to drink when he went to the party. He knew that it would not be safe for him to drive. At trial, he did not recall having a conversation with his brother at the restaurant. He was not aware of
DISCUSSION
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder because credible evidence establishes he drank without intending to drive, then drove while not conscious of doing so. According to defendant, the evidence thereby establishes he both lacked subjective awareness of the danger to life posed by his actions and did not act with deliberate and conscious disregard for life. We conclude substantial evidence supports the conviction.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is deferential[.]” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ” ‘we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Flores, at p. 411.) The conviction shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.)
B. APPLICABLE LAW
To support a finding of second degree murder based on implied malice, the evidence must establish that the defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of its danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger. (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 (Watson).) This conscious disregard for the danger to the life of another distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence, which involves “the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences.” (Id. at p. 296.) “Phrased in everyday
Watson is the leading case on vehicular murder involving implied malice. There, the defendant drove to a bar and consumed large quantities of beer. After leaving the bar, he drove through a red light and narrowly avoided a collision with another car. He then drove away at high speed, accelerating to 84 miles per hour before suddenly braking and skidding into an intersection where he collided with another car, killing two people. The defendant‘s blood-alcohol level one-half hour after the collision was 0.23 percent. An information charged him with two counts of second degree murder, but the trial court dismissed the murder counts. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 293-294.)
On the People‘s appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding there was sufficient evidence to uphold the second degree murder counts in the information.
(Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 301.) The court cited to the following evidence as sufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted with conscious disregard for life: the defendant‘s blood-alcohol level was sufficient to find him legally intoxicated; he drove to the establishment where he was drinking knowing that he had to drive later; he presumably was aware of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; he drove at high speeds on city streets, creating a great risk of harm or death; and he was aware of the risk, as shown by the near collision and his belated attempt to brake before the fatal collision. (Id. at pp. 300-301.)
Since Watson, appellate courts have upheld numerous murder convictions in cases where defendants have committed homicides while driving under the influence of alcohol. (E.g., People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673, 683 (Wolfe) [driver had blood-alcohol level of 0.34 percent, was aware of dangers of drinking and driving and had previously used a taxi service, drank with intention of driving home, and continued driving her damaged vehicle after hitting a pedestrian]; People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358-359 (Autry) [driver had a blood-alcohol level of 0.22 percent, was warned of the dangers of drinking and driving, drank and drove throughout the day, had three near misses, and continued
C. ANALYSIS
Defendant does not dispute that he drove with a blood-alcohol level well above the legal limit, knew the hazards of driving while intoxicated, and engaged in highly dangerous driving. Rather, he argues that the evidence does not support a finding of implied malice because his testimony suggested he did not have a predrinking intent to drive, and he thereafter drove while in an unconscious stupor.3
We first note that a predrinking intent to drive is not required before a jury may find implied malice. Rather, this is only one of the Watson factors that may be considered in determining whether a driver acted with implied malice. (Olivas, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at p. 988.) Regardless, substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant drove himself to the restaurant with the intent to drink there, and with no plan to avoid driving himself home. We acknowledge defendant‘s testimony that he planned to leave his car at the restaurant and ride home with another guest. However, defendant‘s testimony in this regard conflicts with his earlier testimony that he drove himself to the restaurant with no plan for getting home. Defendant testified that he “wasn‘t aware” of his brother being a designated driver, and he had no confirmed plan to get a ride home with any specific person. Furthermore,
Thus, when the whole record is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, it discloses substantial evidence that defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of its danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300.) Defendant drove himself to the birthday party with plans to drink and no plan to avoid driving himself home. He proceeded to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication without formulating a plan to avoid driving. He then engaged in highly dangerous driving with a blood-alcohol level well above the legal limit. In the aftermath of the collision, he expressed knowledge that he should not have been driving. He provided Elliott with coherent information regarding his whereabouts and actions prior to the collision, suggesting he was conscious when he engaged in this conduct and able to appreciate - and disregard - the attendant dangers. This evidence is sufficient to support defendant‘s conviction for second degree Watson murder.
II. UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Defendant concedes he was not entitled to instructions on voluntary intoxication or unconsciousness with respect to the murder charge. However, he contends the jury was permitted to consider his voluntary intoxication and unconsciousness, to the extent they bore on whether he had the knowledge required for violation of
In light of defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we address and reject his claims on the merits.4 (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1192.) We conclude neither voluntary intoxication nor unconsciousness was an available defense to count 5 or the enhancement allegation to count 2. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to instructions on these inapplicable defenses.
Violation of
B. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
“(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act.
“(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (Italics added.)
By its plain terms,
Nonetheless, defendant argues that “specific intent” as used in
i. History of Section 29.4
Former
Under this version of former
In Hood, the high court determined that voluntary intoxication was not pertinent to the offense of assault or assault with a deadly weapon. (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 457.) The court acknowledged that assault could be considered a specific intent crime under the prevailing definition requiring an “intention to do a future act or achieve a particular result,” inasmuch as assault requires an intent to commit a battery. (Ibid.) However, the court
In contrast, in People v. Foster (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 649 (Foster), the Court of Appeal determined that voluntary intoxication was relevant to the offense of unlawful possession of narcotics. (Id. at pp. 656-657.) The court noted that “[former] section 22 has been construed to mean that voluntary intoxication may not be considered when the crime charged is a ‘general intent’ crime, i.e., one requiring nothing more than the intent to do the proscribed act, but that it may be considered in determining whether a particular purpose, motive or intent actuated the accused.” (Id. at p. 654Id. at p. 655section 22. (Foster, at p. 655.)
Soon thereafter, in 1981, former
“(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act.
“(b) Whenever the actual existence of any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, evidence that the accused was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime is admissible on the issue as to whether the defendant actually formed any such mental state.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 2.)
“The broad references in subdivision (b) of [former]
“(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act.
“(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 2.)
It was this language that our Supreme Court interpreted in Whitfield. There, relying on Hood, the court held that evidence of voluntary intoxication was admissible to negate implied malice for the offense of second degree murder. (Whitfield, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 450.) The high court acknowledged that second degree implied malice murder was a general intent crime. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the court opined that “the element of implied malice that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of the danger to, and in conscious disregard of, human life, is closely akin to Hood‘s definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.” (Ibid.) Thus, the court surmised, “the phrase ‘when a specific intent crime is charged’ in [former]
In reaction to Whitfield, the Legislature again promptly amended former
intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.”5 (Stats. 1995, ch. 793, § 1.)“(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the
capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. “(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific
This version of former section 22 was at issue in People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 (Reyes), the case on which defendant primarily relies. Reyes involved a prosecution for receiving stolen property, in which the defendant claimed to have found the stolen property on a street curb. (Id. at pp. 979-981.) The defendant sought to introduce expert psychological testimony regarding his mental disorders and drug use to establish he lacked knowledge the property was stolen. (Id. at p. 981.) The trial court denied the request and, on appeal, the defendant argued the expert testimony was admissible under former section 22. The Court of Appeal held the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence concerning his voluntary intoxication and mental disorders as it affected the knowledge element of a crime. (Reyes, at pp. 984-986.) The court reasoned that, “with regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is a ‘specific intent crime,’ as that term is used in [former] section 22, subdivision (b).” (Id. at p. 985.)
In reaching this conclusion, Reyes relied in part on Whitfield. (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) The Reyes court acknowledged that former section 22 had been amended following the high court‘s opinion in Whitfield, but the court nonetheless concluded the Whitfield analysis “remain[ed] germane to the admissibility of evidence of intoxication to refute the element of knowledge in other types of crimes, such as receiving stolen property.” (Reyes, at p. 984, fn. 6.) Reyes also relied on People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 696, footnote 10, disapproved by People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 90, footnote 5, for the proposition that ” ‘the criteria of specific intent for [the purpose of section 22] are not necessarily the same as the criteria of specific intent as a measure of the scienter required for an offense.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) Finally, Reyes quoted Foster, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at page 655, for the proposition that evidence of intoxication is admissible in a narcotic possession prosecution because ” ‘[i]ntoxication has obvious relevance to the question of awareness, familiarity, understanding and the ability to recognize and comprehend’ ” (Reyes, at p. 983).
Thereafter, the high court declined to extend the holding of Mendoza to other general intent crimes. In People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 92-93 (Atkins), the high court held that evidence of voluntary intoxication was inadmissible to negate the mental state required for arson. (Id. at p. 93.) The court noted that arson merely requires “the general intent to perform the criminal act” (id. at p. 88), and was based on “relatively simple impulsive behavior” (id. at p. 91), to which voluntary intoxication does not apply based on the policy considerations articulated in Hood (id. at p. 92). Atkins also distinguished arson from the aiding and abetting addressed in Mendoza on the ground “the definition of arson does not refer to [the] defendant‘s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” (Id. at p. 93.)
More recently, our Supreme Court held that
“[A] belief that it is necessary to kill in self-defense does not involve the ’ “intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence.” ’ [Citation.] Rather, it involves judgment. Intoxication can distort a person‘s perception of the unfolding circumstances, and thereby impair the sound judgment that is needed when deciding to use lethal force in self-defense. Accordingly, voluntary ‘intoxication naturally lends itself to the crime‘s commission
because it impairs the sound judgment or lowers the inhibitions that might stop a sober individual’ from killing a perceived assailant.” (Id. at p. 977.)
The high court determined the Legislature intended former section 22, and thus current
Finally, the holding of Reyes has recently come under scrutiny. Reyes‘s conclusion that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to cast doubt on the scienter element of a general intent crime has been questioned on the ground Reyes is based on authorities that are either inapposite or no longer have precedential effect. (See People v. Berg (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 959, 968-969 (Berg).) As noted in Berg, ”Fabris and Whitfield are no longer binding because Fabris was disapproved by the Supreme Court and Whitfield was abrogated by the Legislature.” (Id. at p. 969.) Furthermore, Foster involved interpretation of a “much broader voluntary intoxication statute” and “does not support the admissibility of voluntary intoxication evidence under the more restrictive
ii. Analysis
We once again begin our analysis with the plain language of
The sole Supreme Court case to hold that voluntary intoxication evidence is admissible as to knowledge is Mendoza. However, the Mendoza court characterized its holding as “very narrow.” (Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) The holding was based on the specific nexus between an aider and abettor‘s knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator, and his or her intent to commit, facilitate, or encourage the commission of that offense. (Ibid.) In the absence of such nexus, the high court has declined to extend Mendoza to general intent crimes.6 (Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 92-93; Soto, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 974-981.) No such nexus exists under
Furthermore, to the extent our Supreme Court has suggested policy considerations guide our determinations regarding the extent to which voluntary intoxication may negate general intent, the policy considerations articulated in Hood, and later in Justice Mosk‘s separate opinion in Whitfield, counsel against permitting defendant to argue voluntary intoxication prevented him from possessing the knowledge necessary to violate
Fleeing the scene of an accident is an offense involving the perpetrator‘s judgment. To the extent voluntary intoxication “impairs the sound judgment or lowers the inhibitions that might stop a sober individual from” fleeing the scene of an accident, it should not be allowed to negate the perpetrator‘s general intent. (Whitfield, at p. 463 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
In sum, neither the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, nor the policy considerations underpinning the statute suggest a legislative intent to permit a defendant accused of fleeing the scene under
C. UNCONSCIOUSNESS
Unconsciousness generally is governed by
Defendant separately suggests the evidence supported giving an instruction on unconsciousness because he had a head injury and lacked memory of the collision. However, defendant did not present sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether he was unconscious due to a head injury. (People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1318.) There was no evidence to support a finding that defendant‘s head lacerations resulted in unconsciousness. Nor does defendant‘s testimony support such a finding. Defendant testified at trial that he did not recall leaving the party or driving. The last thing he remembered prior to the collision was dancing and drinking. If anything, this testimony suggests defendant‘s unconsciousness, if any, arose as the result of his voluntary intoxication prior to the collision. It does not raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the collision rendered him unconscious. Regardless, “[d]efendant‘s professed inability to recall the event, without more, was insufficient to warrant an unconsciousness instruction.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 888.)
III. SENATE BILL NO. 567 AND ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 124
Defendant contends the matter must be remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124. The People concede remand is required. We accept the People‘s concession.
A. SENATE BILL NO. 567
B. ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 124
Assembly Bill No. 124 added subdivision (b)(6) to
C. ANALYSIS
As the People concede, Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 are ameliorative changes in law that apply retroactively to defendant. (People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 902; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-746.)
Here, the trial court imposed an upper-term sentence on count 5, thus implicating Senate Bill No. 567. Additionally, defendant‘s statement in mitigation, submitted to the trial court at sentencing, suggests defendant may have a history of childhood trauma, including childhood abuse, thus potentially implicating Assembly Bill No. 124. Accordingly, the People concede the matter must be remanded for resentencing consistent with the changes made to
Defendant contends the trial court lacked statutory authority to order restitution to Garton, the agricultural equipment company whose property was damaged in the collision. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question before us is one of statutory interpretation, i.e., whether Garton may be considered a victim for purposes of victim restitution under
B. ADDITIONAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The probation officer‘s report recommended defendant be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $5,000 to Garton, pursuant to
C. ANALYSIS
In relevant part, the
“At the time Proposition 8 was passed, ‘victims had some access to compensation through the Restitution Fund, and trial
The Legislature‘s response is currently codified in
As relevant here,
With the
In Martinez, the court considered the circumstances under which restitution could be awarded for injuries to a victim of the offense of fleeing the scene of an injury accident, commonly referred to as “hit and run” (