People v. BergPeople v. Berg
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A jury convicted defendant Andrew Marshall Berg of knowingly possessing methamphetamine in the Monterey County Jail (
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
When defendant was searched in the Monterey County Jail almost two days after his misdemeanor arrest, a sheriff‘s deputy noticed plastic wrapping in between defendant‘s buttocks that was later found to contain methamphetamine. Defendant was charged with one felony count of knowingly possessing methamphetamine in jail. (
A. PRETRIAL MOTIONS
In the felony case, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude testimony about defendant‘s intoxication at the time of his arrest for the underlying misdemeanor, citing
In support of the motion, the prosecutor argued that because the methamphetamine was discovered almost two days after defendant entered the jail, “common knowledge” dictated that defendant had “sufficient time to be aware of what [was] going on” such that defendant‘s intoxication when he entered the jail was irrelevant. Defense counsel argued that the intoxication evidence was relevant to defendant‘s ability to be aware of the presence of contraband and that the jury should be allowed to determine how intoxication might affect his knowledge. The court granted the motion and excluded evidence of defendant‘s intoxication, reasoning that intoxication two days before the methamphetamine was found was minimally relevant to the issue of defendant‘s knowledge that he possessed the contraband when it was discovered.
Citing People v. Low (2010) 49 Cal.4th 372, 384 (Low), defendant requested the following special jury instruction: “The Defendant knew of the substance‘s presence and had the opportunity to voluntar[il]y relinquish it before it was located by law enforcement.”
B. TRIAL
The jail classification sergeant appeared as the custodian of records for the jail. He testified that defendant entered the jail at around 2:00 p.m. and was placed in a “safety cell.” A safety cell has padded walls to prevent inmates from hurting themselves, contains no furniture, and has no toilet other than a hole in the ground covered with a grate. After about 24 hours, defendant was moved to a single-occupancy cell with a sink and a toilet. The sergeant testified that a notation on a jail intake questionnaire stated defendant was uncooperative and refused to answer questions when he was moved to the single cell.
A sheriff‘s deputy testified that he encountered defendant roughly 48 hours after defendant entered the jail. Defendant was in the same single cell he had been transferred to 24 hours earlier. The deputy explained that inmates are placed in a single cell if there is “some kind of circumstance going on . . . in which they need to be by themselves, or . . . a mental issue or he‘s just being difficult upon intake.”
The deputy escorted defendant to the booking area, where inmates change out of their civilian clothes and are given jail clothing after a visual strip search. As defendant changed out of his civilian clothes, he reached toward his “anus” and started “[d]igging, trying to push or pull something.” The deputy noticed plastic wrapping between defendant‘s buttocks. Defendant eventually threw the plastic package onto the floor. The deputy recalled that when defendant was asked what was in the plastic, defendant sarcastically answered “to the effect of, ‘Something not readily available at your local 7-Eleven.’ ”
The deputy unwrapped the plastic, which had feces on it, and found a bindle containing a clear crystalline substance that the deputy believed was methamphetamine based on his training and experience. The substance weighed approximately 0.2 grams, was the size of a “big pea,” and looked to the deputy like it contained enough material to allow someone to snort it. A criminalist testified as an expert in controlled substance testing and confirmed that the substance contained methamphetamine.
The jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of two years for possessing a controlled substance in jail, finding that due to his former military service defendant had a mental
II. DISCUSSION
To prove a violation of
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of his intoxication when he entered the jail, which he argues was relevant to whether he knowingly possessed a controlled substance in jail. We review a trial court‘s decision to exclude evidence under
A. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND GENERAL INTENT CRIMES
Defendant concedes that ”
1. General Intent Crimes and Specific Intent Crimes
The Supreme Court explained the history of differentiating between general and specific intent crimes in People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444 (Hood). Before the 19th century, “the common law refused to give any effect to the fact that an accused committed a crime while intoxicated.” (Id. at p. 455.) “[A]pparently troubled by this rigid traditional rule,” judges began to consider whether intoxication might negate intent when intent was an element of a crime. (Id. at pp. 455–456.) But to keep that exculpatory doctrine from consuming the traditional rule entirely—because “some form of mens rea is a requisite of all but strict liability offenses“—courts began to draw a distinction between “so-called specific intent and general intent crimes.” (Id. at p. 456.) Thereafter, voluntary intoxication was admissible regarding specific intent crimes, but not admissible regarding general intent crimes.
The Hood court acknowledged that specific intent and general intent “have been notoriously difficult terms to define and apply,” but described general intent as: “When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence.” (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 456–457.) By contrast, when the “definition refers to defendant‘s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.” (Id. at p. 457.) To illustrate the difference, the court explained that “a drunk man is capable of forming an intent to do something simple, such as strike another,” but “[w]hat he is not as capable as a sober man of doing is exercising judgment about the social consequences of his acts or controlling his impulses toward anti-social acts.” (Id. at p. 458.) The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the “basic framework that Hood established in designating a criminal intent as either specific or general for purposes of determining the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication has survived.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 82 (Atkins); People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1128 (Mendoza).)
2. Admissibility of Voluntary Intoxication Evidence (§ 29.4)
As the Supreme Court explained in Hood, classifying a crime as one of general intent or specific intent is historically linked with whether evidence of voluntary intoxication will be admissible.
A ” ‘statute‘s plain meaning controls the court‘s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126 (Gonzalez).) Applying the plain meaning of
If a statute is ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic information, such as legislative history, the statute‘s purpose, and public policy. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) To the extent there is any ambiguity in the phrase “required specific intent” in
3. Section 4573.6 is a General Intent Crime
Interpreting
As the foregoing demonstrates,
Defendant paraphrases People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 (Reyes) to argue that “classification of a crime as one of general intent has nothing to do with the required element of knowledge, a specific mental state,” and that evidence of his intoxication had “obvious relevance” to his ability to understand that he possessed a controlled substance. Reyes involved a prosecution for receiving stolen property (
On appeal from his conviction for receiving stolen property, Reyes argued that the expert testimony was admissible under former section 22. (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 982.) At the time of Reyes‘s trial former section 22, subdivision (b), provided: ” ‘Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.’ ” (Reyes, at p. 982, italics omitted.) The Reyes court concluded that “with regard to the element of knowledge, receiving stolen property is a ‘specific intent crime,’ as that term is used in section 22, subdivision (b).” (Reyes, at p. 985.) The Reyes court relied on People v. Foster (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 649, 655 (Foster), noting that the Foster court found evidence of intoxication admissible in a narcotics possession prosecution because ” ‘[i]ntoxication has obvious relevance to the question of awareness, familiarity, understanding and the ability to recognize and comprehend.’ ” (Reyes, at p. 983.) The Reyes court also quoted a Court of Appeal opinion (that was later disapproved by the Supreme Court) for the proposition that ” ‘the criteria of specific intent for [the purpose of section 22] are not necessarily the same as the criteria of specific intent as a measure of the scienter required for an offense.’ ” (Reyes, at p. 984, quoting People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 696, fn. 10, disapproved by Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 90, fn. 5.)
We respectfully disagree with Reyes to the extent it determined that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to cast doubt on the scienter element of a general intent crime like
Defendant argues that evidence of voluntary intoxication “may be introduced by a defendant in order to raise a reasonable doubt regarding a specific mental state, such as knowledge, that is an element of a general intent offense.” But that argument is contradicted by the plain language of
Defendant presses that because “knowledge is an element of the offenses described in
B. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Our conclusion that evidence of defendant‘s voluntary intoxication was inadmissible due to
Defendant argues the “issue presented by the evidence was whether having already brought the drugs into the jail unknowingly due to his significant level of intoxication upon entry, was Mr. Berg‘s continued possession in jail committed with the necessary requirements of knowledge and willfulness?” But defendant did not argue in the trial court or on appeal that he was still intoxicated when authorities discovered the methamphetamine nearly two days later. The lengthy interval between arrest and discovery supports the trial court‘s conclusion that defendant‘s intoxication when he entered the jail was irrelevant to the knowledge required to be convicted under
Defendant cites Low, supra, 49 Cal.4th 372 and People v. Gastello (2010) 49 Cal.4th 395. In Low, the defendant argued unsuccessfully that
Defendant argues that the rationale of Low supports his position because the critical fact emphasized in that case, “the defendant‘s opportunity to decide whether to purge himself of hidden drugs before entering jail, or whether to bring them inside and commit a new crime, presupposes the defendant knew he possessed the drugs when he entered the jail.” (Underscoring omitted.) Again,
Defendant contends that his case is no different from a situation where a person, “due to a recent head injury or a seizure, or illness,” unintentionally enters jail with a controlled substance. But those are all examples of involuntary impairment. A defendant charged under those facts would be entitled to an instruction regarding the effect of unconsciousness on the ability to form any mental state. (E.g., CALCRIM No. 3425 [“The defendant is not guilty of [the charged crime] if [he or she] acted while unconscious.“]; see People v. James (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 794, 809 [“A state of unconsciousness from whatever cause at the time of committing an alleged crime vitiates both specific and general criminal intents.“].) The Legislature has made the reasonable choice to create different rules for those who suffer involuntary unconsciousness versus individuals like defendant whose altered mental state was due to voluntary behavior.
Defendant claims his inability to introduce evidence of intoxication converted
Defendant argues lastly that the purpose of
The superior court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment showing that the court imposed the low term for the
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
Premo, Acting P. J.
Elia, J.
H043511 – People v Berg
| Trial Court: | Monterey County Superior Court, Case No.: SS151835A |
| Trial Judge: | Hon. Andrew G. Liu |
| Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent The People: | Xavier Becerra Attorney General of California Gerald A. Engler Chief Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey M. Laurence Senior Assistant Attorney General Eric D. Share Supervising Deputy Attorney General . Ronald E. Niver Deputy Attorney General |
| Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant Andrew Marshall Berg: | Seth Flagsberg Attorney at Law Under Appointment by the Court of Appeal |