People v. SheehyPeople v. Sheehy
CODRINGTON, J.—
I
INTRODUCTION
The People challenge sentencing imposed under the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (
The People contend the trial court erred in finding defendant eligible under the Realignment Act to serve his state prison sentence locally. The People assert that under subdivision (h)(3)(C) of section 1170, part of the Realignment Act, defendant is not qualified to serve his sentence locally because he is required to register as a sex offender under section 290. We agree.
Regardless of whether a defendant is required to register as a sex offender based on a current or prior sex crime conviction, the plain languаge of
II
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant committed a string of drug-related crimes, for which he was prosecuted, pled guilty, was convicted, and was granted probation in the following cases:
(1) RIF1105737 (felony possession of methamphetamine; misdemeanor being under the influence of methаmphetamine);
(2) RIF1202860 (felony possession of methamphetamine; misdemeanor being under the influence of methamphetamine);
(3) RIF1204943 (possession of Vicodin); and
(4) RIF1206319 (possession of methamphetamine).
Subsequently, on December 28, 2012, the Riverside County District Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint, case No. RIM1217643,2 charging defendant with annoying a child under the age of 18 (
On January 30, 2013, the district attorney filed a complaint charging defendant with felony petty theft with a prior (
On March 1, 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant on all convictions in every case pending against him as follows. The court sentenced defendant in case No. RIF1300157, for petty theft with a prior, to three years. As to the four other felony cases (RIF1105737, RIF1202860, RIF1204943, аnd RIF1206319), the court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of two years for the felony convictions in each of the four cases, and concurrent sentences of 365 days for the misdemeanor convictions in cases Nos. RIF1105737 and RIF1202860. The trial court ordered that defendant serve his sentence, as to all convictions, in a county jail under
III
THE REALIGNMENT ACT
The sole issue here is whether the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to county jail under
The legislative intent underlying the Realignment Act is codified in
The parties in the instаnt action dispute the meaning of paragraph (3)(C) of the Realignment Act. “[S]tatutory interpretation begins by examining the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning and considering them in the context of the statutory framework . . . .” (People v. Kelly (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 297, 303 [154 Cal.Rptr.3d 898] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) “[I]f statutory language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction or to resort to external indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” (Ibid.) “In interpreting a statute, a court‘s objective is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] To do so, we look first at the statutory language. If it is clear
Applying these standard principles of statutory construction, we conсlude the language in paragraph (3)(C) is clear and unambiguous. Contrary to defendant‘s view, his reading of the statute does not plausibly account for its language and therefore he has not tendered an ambiguity so as to trigger the “rule of lenity.” (See People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1271 [139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 274 P.3d 456] [rule of lenity not applied unless two interpretations stand in relative equipoise].) Here, there is no “egregious ambiguity” or uncertainty in which “‘the court cаn do no more than guess what the legislative body intended . . . .‘” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1].) “[W]e presume that the Legislature meant what it said, rendering further inquiry into legislative intent unnecessary.” (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 749 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 365].) Therefore no further effort is required beyond looking at the statutory language of paragraph (3)(C) itself to discern the meaning of the exclusion.
Under paragraph (3)(C), part of the Realignment Act, defendant is required to serve his sentence in state prison, rather than county jail, because he is required to register as a sex offender in case No. RIM1217643. The fact that defendant is required to register as a sex offender based on a prior sex crime conviction, rather than a current conviction, does not preclude application of the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion. The paragraph (3)(C) exclusion is conditioned solely on a defendant‘s status оf being required to register as a sex offender. No mention is made that registration must arise from a current conviction.
The fact that a defendant must register as a sex offender demonstrates that he poses a significant risk to society, regardless of whether he is required to register based on a prior or current conviction. This court cannot disregard the plain language of paragraph (3)(C) and rewritе the provision to narrow its scope to encompass only defendants who are required to register based on a current conviction for a sex crime. (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 10 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829].) If the Legislature intended such a condition, the Legislature could have easily included it in the statute. Since the Legislature did not restrict application of paragraph (3)(C) to registration based on current sex crime convictions, we will not read such a condition into the statute.
Defendant argues that construing paragraph (3)(C) to encompass registration based on prior and current sex crime convictions leads to an absurd, unjust result in that such construction could lead to confining a defendant in
Defendant‘s contention that the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion must arise from a current sex crime conviction is contrived and absurd. Defendant argues the use of the verb “is,” which is in the present tense, supports his construction of the statute that the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion only applies to current convictions for sex crimes. But contrary to defendant‘s argument, the word “is” in paragraph (3)(C) does not refer to the current act of the court ordering a defendant to register as a sex offender. “Is” refers to the current requirement that defendant is required to register. It makes no difference whether the court ordered the registration during the current proceedings or in the past based on a prior conviction. The risk is the same, whether the conviction that led to sex offender registration was a prior or current conviction for a sex crime. Construing the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion as simply excluding those defendants who are required to register as sex offenders, regardless of when the court ordered registration, is consistent with the purpose of the Realignment Act, of “Realigning low-level felony offenders who do not have prior convictions for serious, violent, or sex offenses to locally run community-based corrections programs.” (
Defendant further argues that because “prior” appears in other exclusions from the Realignment Act but not in the part of the statute pertaining to sex offender registrants, the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion only applies to defendants ordered to register based on a current conviction for a sex crime. We disagree. The other provisions exclude persons who have “a prior or current” serious or violent felony or a “prior” foreign conviction that would be sеrious or violent if committed in California. The paragraph (3)(C) exclusion refers to a person‘s status, which might arise from a current or prior conviction in California or elsewhere, provided that such conviction triggers sex offender registration. (See
The trial court‘s order allоwing defendant to serve his state prison term locally under the Realignment Act violates the plain language of the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion of the Realignment Act. Therefore defendant‘s sentence is reversed and he must serve his sentence in state prison. Defendant does not qualify for local confinement under the Realignment Act because he is required to register as a sex offender. (Par. (3)(C).)
IV
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant alternatively argues the People failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing that the paragraph (3)(C) exclusion of the Realignment Act applies. Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he was convicted of a sex crime and ordered to register as a sex offender under
During the sentencing hearing on March 1, 2013, in case No. RIM1217643, the trial court noted that defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of annoying and molesting a child (
After the parties met during a recess in the sentencing hearing, defendant‘s attorney informed the court that defendant would plead guilty to the new charge, depending on the likely sentence. The court stated that it was inclined to impоse a three-year term under the Realignment Act, with the sentences on all defendant‘s other cases to be served concurrently. The court further noted that defendant‘s misdemeanor conviction in case No. RIM1217643 required registration as a sex offender. Defendant signed a felony plea agreement, which advised him that one of the consequences of pleading guilty in case No. RIF1300157 was that the cоurt would impose a two-year concurrent sentence under the Realignment Act.
After advising defendant of his constitutional rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, defendant waived his rights and pled guilty to the theft charge in case No. RIF1300157. The court then sentenced defendant in all of
The record shows that it was undisputed defendant was convicted by trial of a sex crime in case No. RIM1217643 and was required to register as a sex offender under
The reporter‘s transcript and clerk‘s transcript establish there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant was convicted of a sex crime and wаs required to register as a sex offender. Furthermore, nothing in the record calls into question defendant‘s status as a sex offender registrant and this was undisputed at the time of sentencing.
V
CASE NO. RIF1300157 GUILTY PLEA
The parties agree that, in the event this court holds that the Realignment Act does not apply, defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea solely in case No. RIF1300157, because one of the agreed-upon consequences of dеfendant‘s guilty plea in case No. RIF1300157 was that he would be sentenced under the Realignment Act and thus serve his two-year concurrent sentence imposed in case No. RIF1300157 in local jail. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929-930 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 715, 188 P.3d 649].) The People assert that, although defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in case No. RIF1300157, the remaining misdemeanor and felony probation violations and the three-year prison sentence should remain unaffеcted.
We disagree as to sentencing. Revocation of probation in cases Nos. RIF1105737, RIF1202860, RIF1204943, and RIF1206319 was not contingent upon defendant being convicted of theft in case No. RIF1300157. Probation revocation was based on defendant‘s conviction in case No. RIM1217643. However, the two-year sentences imposed in each of the four cases are concurrent sentences, with the three-year term imposed in case No. RIF1300157 serving as the principal term. Since defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in case No. RIF1300157, this matter must be remanded for resentencing as to cases Nos. RIF1105737, RIF1202860, RIF1204943, and RIF1206319.
VI
DISPOSITION
The provision in defendant‘s sentence allowing defendant to serve his sentence locally under
In addition, as to case No. RIF1300157, judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court to allow defendant, if he choоses, to withdraw his guilty plea solely in case No. RIF1300157.
This case is also remanded for resentencing in cases Nos. RIF1105737, RIF1202860, RIF1204943, and RIF1206319, since the principal term was the three-year sentence imposed in case No. RIF1300157, with concurrent two-year terms imposed in the other four cases. In all other regards, judgment is affirmed as modified.
Ramirez, P. J., and Miller, J., concurred.
Respondent‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 23, 2014, S218643.
Notes
As amended by the Realignment Act, the pertinent portion of section 1170, subdivision (h), now provides as follows:
“(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for the term described in the underlying offense.
“(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), where the defendant . . . (C) is required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Chapter 5.5 (commencing with Section 290) of Title 9 of Part 1, . . . an executed sentence for a felony punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be served in state prison.”