People v. SchullerPeople v. Schuller
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He maintains substantial evidence demonstrates he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self-defense that was not entirely delusional. We agree but find the error harmless.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Prosecution‘s Case
The night of the murder, W.T.‘s daughter, who lived in a separate upstairs unit with her kids, heard banging sounds like metal hitting metal coming from W.T.‘s residence. She tried calling W.T. and then heard a very loud noise that shook the house.1 She then saw defendant‘s car speed off. Her father did not answer her phone calls.
A neighbor testified he heard gunshots coming from W.T.‘s residence — a first set of multiple gunshots, “six, ten” and a couple minutes later, a second set of three. He then heard and saw defendant‘s car speeding off. Seeing smoke coming from the house, the neighbor went inside and found W.T.‘s body. After extinguishing the fire, he called 911.
Police dispatched to a report of a drunk driver, ultimately saw and pursued defendant‘s car for an hour, over a span of 38 miles, running red lights and reaching
W.T. sustained nine gunshot wounds to the left side of his face and head and post-mortem burns.2 Some of the nine head wounds were “quite closely grouped.” Thirteen shell casings were found on the floor in the vicinity of the body.3 A gun case, empty magazine, gas can, and large kitchen knife were found on the kitchen table. There was blood spatter on the walls and floor, but not on the knife. A cell phone belonging to W.T. was found under the table. There was a bullet hole in the phone. The neighbor testified that when he went inside, he could smell gas, the oven door was open, and “the gas was on full,” and the burners were on as well.
The neighbor also testified that around January or February, W.T. said he did not want defendant to come around, but did not say why. At some point after that, defendant told the neighbor he was gay and coming out of the closet and he thought his father would be mad at him.4 The neighbor did not believe W.T. was gay.
The defense introduced evidence through defendant‘s own testimony, the testimony of his sister and two police officers who briefly detained him that he was experiencing delusions and hallucinations while in Nebraska and travelling back to California in the weeks before the murder. These included that he was being shot at and attacked with Ninja stars, but was protected by “the light.” During his testimony, defendant explained that “the light” was a gift from God that protected him from harm and, when shared with others, would make them better. He also testified that demons were trying to steal the light and misuse it.
Defendant testified that when he returned to California, he went straight to W.T.‘s house. Defendant testified that after arriving there, they each drank two or three beers5 and a couple of shots and took a couple of hits of concentrated THC, while defendant told W.T. about his trip. At one point, defendant shared the light with him. Defendant testified that W.T. looked surprised and said to people outside the window, “Yes, it is him.”
Defendant testified that he then took a shower and, while showering, heard five “subtle” gunshots and saw a misty figure. He subsequently asked W.T. if he had shot at him, but W.T. seemed confused and ignored the question.
Later, W.T. brought out a gun and put it in a case by the kitchen table. It was defendant‘s gun that he had been storing at W.T.‘s house. W.T. asked defendant to take it with him when he left, and defendant planned to do so.
W.T. then asked defendant to share the light again. Defendant testified that W.T. expressed a fondness for children and defendant thought the light would “cleanse” that evil out. Normally when defendant would share the light it would return to him. On this
Defendant testified W.T. then got a knife from a kitchen drawer. Defendant tried to leave through some French doors, but they wouldn‘t open. He then ran to the kitchen table to put something between him and W.T. Defendant testified that W.T. then approached and “went to stab at me,” but “when he was in the air he couldn‘t get any closer” apparently because there was a large white angel there protecting defendant. Defendant grabbed the gun from the table, pointed it at W.T., and said, “ ‘Tell me right now. Are you Lucifer?’ ” W.T. nodded yes. Defendant said he put the gun down and said sarcastically something like, “ ‘Yeah, right dude. . . ha, ha, You‘re not Lucifer.’ ”
Defendant testified, “[a]s soon as I set the gun down he went for the gun and raised the knife and tried like that[6] and I remember just picking it back up and taking a step or two back and pulled the trigger.” Defendant testified he fired just one shot, striking W.T. in the head. W.T. fell to the floor and the knife fell out of his hand. Defendant testified he was in fear for his life when W.T. came at him with the knife.
Defendant testified, “I remembered walking, saw him at the side of the table.” He asked W.T. why he did that. W.T. pushed himself up and said something to defendant like “You f‘d up” or “You f‘er.” Describing W.T.‘s movement defendant said, “It was all like one motion like push yourself up, getting to your knees, grabbing something at the same time.” (RT 1141) Defendant testified, “I don‘t remember if he grabbed the knife and somehow it got back on the table but he was like pushing himself up.” At that point, defendant jumped back and shot W.T. five more times in the head.
Defendant testified he sat on a chair, confused about what had just happened. He then tried to use W.T.‘s house phone to call 911, but it was not working. Next, he tried to
Defendant testified he heard a gasp and W.T.‘s dentures then flew out of his mouth. That scared defendant and he “jumped back in the chair and pulled the trigger three more times,” but he did not see the bullets hit W.T.‘s head. Defendant noticed the slide on the gun was back. He testified, “I remember dropping the magazine out, putting another one in and letting the slide slide forward one more in the chamber.”
Defendant testified he continued to try to use W.T.‘s cell phone, but it would not stop ringing, so he shot it. He recalled shooting at it three times and hitting it on the third shot.
As he was about to leave, defendant testified he saw W.T.‘s body convulsing with demons swirling around it. He started to run out the door and noticed a gas can by a weedeater. He decided to “kill the demon or Lucifer [and] send it to hell” by setting the body on fire. He doused the body with gasoline, lit a cigarette, took a few “drags” from the cigarette and then set the body on fire.7
Defendant then drove away, planning to go Monterey, which is where he had planned to go after leaving W.T.‘s house. He eventually noticed a helicopter and police cars chasing him. He testified that when he was surrounded by police, he shared “the light” with himself, and voluntarily surrendered since he believed the police could not get any closer.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that when he first pointed the gun at W.T. and asked if he was Lucifer, W.T. was holding the knife to his side. Defendant testified that he put the gun on the table and he began to walk toward the front door in the
Also on cross, when the prosecutor asked if the killing had something “to do with some type of gay issue,” defendant responded, “Absolutely not.” He denied it had anything to do with W.T. rebuffing his advances. He also denied being gay, and having told a neighbor he was gay. When asked if he had initially told police he shot W.T. “out of some kind of delusional, crazy self-defense,” defendant acknowledged he had not. He also acknowledged he told the police the shooting had something to do with W.T. being gay and coming on to him — though he testified that was a lie. During further cross-examination on the next day‘s court session, defendant testified that overnight he thought about what his thinking might have been about what he had told the police and claimed he lied about that because he thought “the gay thing” would have been “more justifiable for what happened. . . . I thought it would be justifiable. That is why I told them the gay thing.”
The Prosecution‘s Rebuttal
Defendant‘s jail calls were monitored, and a detective testified that in his initial conversations, defendant appeared lucid and normal. But once it became clear defendant was going to pursue a mental health defense, defendant‘s conversation changed. From then on, defendant‘s conversation exhibited “conspiracy theory type language” involving the government and law enforcement framing him and “angels and demons [were] effecting things in his every day life.”
A forensic psychologist opined that defendant was “exaggerating or feigning psychiatric distress.” This opinion was based on a variety of reports he read
Another forensic psychologist testified that, while defendant claimed to be hallucinating, he described the shooting as a response to W.T. attacking him with a knife while trying to grab the gun, suggesting he acted in self-defense. He told her he took the gun with him when he left the house in case he needed it to have a shootout with the police or kill himself. In her experience, the hallucination of seeing demons is unusual for people with mental health issues and it caused her to be suspicious. She also noted that in one of defendant‘s jail phone conversations shortly after defendant was booked in the jail, he talked about his case, but made no mention of psychiatric symptoms, hallucinations, seeing demons or any of the problems defendant described to her during interviews. She concluded defendant was malingering and his efforts to destroy the body and flee from police demonstrated he knew what he did was wrong.
Defense Request for an Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction
During the guilt phase, the defense requested an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. The trial court denied the request. While noting that actions based solely on delusion cannot form the basis for imperfect self-defense, the court examined the evidence to determine whether defendant‘s delusions could be separated from his testimony of being attacked by W.T. It concluded that in defendant‘s case all the “statements and the conduct which defendant attributes to [W.T.] are all . . . part of and arise out of defendant‘s delusions and hallucinations.” It noted, “[T]here was no light being shared . . . There wasn‘t a light that [W.T.] held onto and wouldn‘t give back. [W.T.] is not Lucifer.”
Based on that reasoning, the trial court concluded there was no basis to support an imperfect self-defense instruction.
Verdict, Sanity Phase, and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (
After the sanity phase, the jury was unable to reach a decision and was discharged. A second jury later found defendant legally sane at the time of the shooting.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense. He argues that despite making many delusional claims at trial, he testified to a relatively straightforward claim of self-defense: W.T. attacked with a knife and he shot in self-defense.
We agree defendant was entitled to the instruction, but find the error harmless.
I. Delusions, Hallucinations, and Imperfect Self-Defense
When there is substantial evidence that the defendant killed in imperfect self-defense, the trial court must instruct on this theory of voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 134 (Elmore); People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) In this context, substantial evidence is “ ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[]’ ” that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.” (Breverman, at p. 162.) “ ‘[S]ubstantial evidence to support instructions on a lesser included offense may exist even in the face of inconsistencies presented by the defense itself.’ ” (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137 (Millbrook).) “In deciding whether there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense, courts should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (Breverman, at p. 162.) That is a task for the jury. (Ibid.) We review the trial court‘s refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense de novo and, in so doing, consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 501 (Campbell); People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 (Brothers); Millbrook, at p. 1137.)
As our high court in Elmore explained, “unreasonable self-defense involves a misperception of objective circumstances, not a reaction produced by mental disturbance alone.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 134-135.) “ ‘[U]nreasonable self-defense ‘is based on a defendant‘s assertion that he lacked malice . . . because he acted under an unreasonable mistake of fact—that is, the need to defend himself against imminent peril of death or great bodily harm.’ ” (Id. at p. 136.) And “because unreasonable self-defense is ‘a species of mistake of fact [Citation] . . . it cannot be founded on delusion.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, “unreasonable self-defense, as a form of mistake of fact, has no application when the defendant‘s actions are entirely delusional. A defendant who makes a factual mistake misperceives the objective circumstances. A delusional defendant holds a belief that is divorced from the circumstances.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 136-137, italics added.)9 But the Elmore court was careful to note: “[a] defendant who misjudges the external circumstances may show that mental disturbance contributed to the mistaken
So, in deciding whether substantial evidence supports an instruction on unreasonable self-defense, where must a court draw the line? The Elmore court explained: “The line between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective correlate.” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 137, italics added.) For example, “[a] person who sees a stick and thinks it is a snake is mistaken, but that misinterpretation is not delusional. One who sees a snake where there is nothing snakelike, however, is deluded.” (Ibid.) Given the Elmore court‘s distinction between “misperceive[ing] objective circumstances,” and holding a belief that is “divorced from the circumstances,” and its snake example, we understand the reference to “an objective correlate” to relate to the presence or absence of objective circumstances supporting a claim of imperfect self-defense.
So, who may testify about the objective circumstances and what type of proof is required? As the court noted in People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393 (Ocegueda), in a slightly different context, no corroborating evidence is required beyond a defendant‘s statement or testimony. (Id. at pp. 1409-1410 .) It is for the jury to decide whether a defendant is credible. (Id. at p. 1409.) Thus, a single witness, including the defendant, can provide evidence establishing the objective circumstances necessary to support the instruction. (Id. at pp. 1401, 1409.) We apply these principles here.
II. Analysis
We conclude the refusal to instruct on imperfect self-defense here was error. While defendant‘s testimony included evidence of delusion, his account pertaining to the actual shooting was not entirely delusional and thus provided substantial evidence of an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.
Here, the parties and the trial court struggled with the lack of published authority covering a situation such as presented here. No published case has addressed a court‘s refusal to give an imperfect self-defense instruction where a defendant‘s story is that a real person attacked him, but there are delusional components to the defendant‘s description of what happened.
Ocegueda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, however, provides some guidance. Applying Elmore, the Ocegueda court held that the trial court erred by precluding the
Relying on Elmore, the Attorney General in Ocegueda argued that even if the defendant had a genuine belief in the need to defend himself, the belief must have been purely delusional because no other witness saw the victim move as defendant described and no weapon was found. (Ocegueda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) To this, the Ocegueda court wrote: “We do not read Elmore as precluding imperfect self-defense in any case where mental disabilities affect the defendant‘s beliefs or perceptions. The key distinction identified in Elmore is the ‘absence of an objective correlate.’ ” (Ibid.) The court continued: “Based on defendant‘s statements, the jury reasonably could have inferred that [the victim] actually made some threatening motion or pulled out a metallic object, such as a cell phone, from his waistband. Whether defendant‘s statements were sufficiently credible or his beliefs purely delusional were questions of fact for the jury to decide. Elmore does not establish a heightened evidentiary standard requiring corroborating evidence independent of defendant‘s statements to show his beliefs were not purely delusional.” (Id. at pp. 1409-1410, italics added.)
Indeed, we think it important that although defendant questioned whether W.T. was Lucifer just before the shooting, he dismissed the idea. He did not testify that Lucifer was trying to kill him or that when he pulled the trigger, he thought he was shooting Lucifer. Defendant testified it was W.T. he shot, not because he had taken “the light,” but rather because W.T. came at him with a knife. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we must conclude that despite whatever delusion his testimony suggests he was acting under, he was not entirely delusional.10
Thus, defendant‘s own testimony, even though uncorroborated and not otherwise credible, supported an instruction on actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. As the Ocegueda court noted, “a single witness, even if not inherently credible, may provide sufficient evidence to establish a fact” supporting the instruction and “Elmore does not establish a heightened evidentiary standard requiring corroborating evidence independent of [the] defendant‘s statements to show his beliefs were not purely
And even if such corroboration was required, it is present here. Beyond the circumstance that defendant knew it was W.T. he was shooting, there was the objective circumstance corroboration that a large knife was found on the kitchen table. Additionally, a gun case was on the table, which corroborated defendant‘s testimony that that was where the gun had been located just before he grabbed it.
Of course, the jury was free to reject defendant‘s self-defense testimony as unsupported or unreliable. (Ocegueda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) That the knife was found on the table, not the floor, and had no blood spatter on it were facts the jury could consider along with defendant‘s story. But the trial court erred in relying on those circumstances to conclude defendant was purely delusional.11 “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982), and a court is not permitted to concern itself with inconsistencies in the evidence (Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137), rather the court must “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” (Campbell, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 501; Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 30; Millbrook, at p. 1137.)
Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
Defendant argues the error was prejudicial because there was a reasonable chance the jury would have convicted him of voluntary manslaughter had it been instructed on imperfect self-defense. We disagree.
Failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is analyzed under the harmless error test in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195-196 (Gonzalez); Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 149.)12 “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been obtained absent the error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955.) “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (Beltran, at p. 956.)
Here, a more favorable result was not reasonably probable given the overwhelming evidence that defendant was not acting in any form of self-defense. Defendant‘s account of the killing radically changed leading up to trial. Shortly after he
Two forensic psychologists testified that defendant appeared to be malingering. One testified that psychological testing designed to determine whether a person is malingering or exaggerating psychiatric symptoms supported this conclusion. The other testified that hallucination of demons is unusual for people with mental health issues. She also noted that in a recorded jail conversation shortly after defendant‘s arrest, defendant talked about his case without mentioning hallucinations or demons or any of the problems defendant described during interviews with her. Similarly, a detective testified that defendant seemed lucid in his earlier recorded jail phone conversations, only to later exhibit delusions about government conspiracies, angels, and demons after it “became clear” he would pursue a mental health defense. The testimony of the psychologists undercut the credibility of the claim he acted in self-defense, as well as the credibility of his claim he was suffering from delusions or hallucinating.
Defendant‘s attempt to destroy the body (and perhaps the house) and his flight also undercut his claim of self-defense. Indeed, there was an inherent contradiction in defendant‘s testimony that he tried to call the police after the shooting, only to be stymied by the ringing phone — yet, when police found him, rather than seek their help, he led them on a 38-mile pursuit, surrendering only after his car was rendered inoperable and an hour-long standoff had ensued.
Indeed, a reasonable jury likely concluded defendant had the opportunity to get help while he was at or near the house — if he really wanted it. Defendant testified he wanted to call 911 but had trouble unlocking W.T.‘s phone to do so. But when someone called (the daughter said she called numerous times after hearing noises), instead of
Other aspects of defendant‘s testimony undercut his credibility. Defendant testified he set the gun on the table, even though W.T. still had a knife in his hand. A reasonable jury would likely have found defendant‘s purported unilateral disarmament by setting the gun down to lack credibility. He testified on direct examination that “as soon as” he set the gun down on the table, W.T. went for it and raised the knife. Yet, on cross-examination the following day, he testified that after he put the gun on the table, he started to walk away toward the front door because “he just wanted to leave.” Aside from disproving his earlier testimony indicating W.T. immediately reached for the gun after he set it down, a jury could have reasonably found the claim that he started to leave without the gun to lack credibility because the purported plan had been for him to take the gun with him whenever he left; putting the gun on the table and then leaving did not square with that plan. This testimony further undercut his claim that shot W.T. in a self-defense scenario.
Finally, although there was substantial evidence for purposes of supporting an imperfect self-defense instruction, the physical evidence did not entirely align with his story. Again, the knife was found on the table — not the floor. And unlike the surrounding area, the knife had no blood on it. Further, that W.T. was shot nine times on the left side of his face and head, with some wounds “quite closely grouped,” suggested a personal motive, rather than panicked self-defense.
Again, our focus in a Watson review is “not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 956.) Given the evidence, we conclude there was no reasonable chance of a more favorable outcome had the jury received the requested instruction.
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
MURRAY, J.
We concur:
/s/
RAYE, P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.