THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. BRANDY M. ROWELL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 4-19-0231
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
April 10, 2020
2020 IL App (4th) 190231
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment and opinion. Presiding Justice Steigmann dissented, with opinion.
Illinois Official Reports. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Woodford County, No. 18-DT-43; the Hon. Charles M. Feeney III, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.
James E. Chadd, John M. McCarthy, and Sarah Inskeep, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, оf Springfield, for appellant.
Gregory Minger, State‘s Attorney, of Eureka (Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel, and Leslie N. Martin, law school graduate), for the People.
¶ 1 In January 2019, defendant, Brandy M. Rowell, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) in this case and endangering the life of a child in a companion case. In February 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant to 180 days in jail, 24 months of probation, 200 hours of public service work, and a $1000 fine pursuant to
¶ 2 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court incorrectly interpreted
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In July 2018, the State charged defendant with driving while having a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in excess of 0.08 (
¶ 5 In November 2018, defendant appeared in court and waived her right to a jury trial on all charges. Prior to accepting her jury waiver, the trial court admonished defendant the DUI was a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 364 days in jail and a maximum fine of $2500.
¶ 6 In January 2019, defendant entered a рlea of guilty to DUI and endangering the life of a child in the companion case. Before doing so, the trial court again informed her the DUI charge was a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 364 days in jail and a maximum fine of $2500.
¶ 7 The State presented the following factual basis for the charge: (1) defendant was behind the wheel of a vehicle on the side of the road, (2) she had a two-year-old child unrestrained on her lap, (3) she submitted to and failed standardized field sobriety tests, and (4) she submitted to a breathalyzer test, which showed her BAC was 0.205. The trial court did not admonish defendant her plea of guilty to the aforementioned DUI charge included a mandatory sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment. The court accepted defendant‘s guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation.
¶ 8 At defendant‘s February 2019 sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the presentence investigation report. The only evidence presented by the State was a stipulation defendant‘s BAC at the time of the offense was 0.205.
¶ 9 Defendant submitted six character letters and also called Amanda Sluga, a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) caseworker, who testified she believed defendant would comply with any conditions of сourt supervision the trial court ordered. Defendant testified on her own behalf, but the bystander‘s report does not summarize her testimony.
¶ 10 The State argued defendant should be placed on probation. The State made no recommendation for jail time. Defendant asked for court supervision. The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ probation, 180 days in jail, 200 hours of public service work, and a $1000 fine. The court explained it believed it was required to impose a sentence of six months’ imprisonment because of
¶ 11 In March 2019, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. In her motion, defendant disputed the trial court‘s conclusion
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by finding
¶ 15 At issue in this case is
¶ 16 The best way to determine the legislature‘s intent is to give the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 21. Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts should apply the statute as written. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 21, 984 N.E.2d 475. When trying to determine legislative intent, a statute should not be viewed “in isolation but [rather] as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶ 27, 128 N.E.3d 1105. Further, statutes should be read as a whole and construed so no part of the text is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 25, 987 N.E.2d 386.
¶ 17 When the language of a statutоry provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation the court may look to additional sources to determine legislative intent. People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 571, 782 N.E.2d 237, 242 (2002). “Such sources include the maxim of in pari materia, under which two statutes, or two parts of one statute, concerning the same subject must be considered together in order to produce a ‘harmonious whole.’ ” People v. Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26, 962 N.E.2d 444 (quoting Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555, 591 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1992)). Moreover, “[w]ords and phrases should be construеd, not in isolation, but in light of other relevant provisions.” Rinehart, 2012 IL 111719, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243, 800 N.E.2d 515, 519 (2008)).
¶ 18 In this case, both parties turn to the dictionary as an aid to resolve the meaning of the word “subject” as it pertains to the phrase “subject to.” We note this phrase is not defined in the statute. “When a statutory term is undefined we assume the legislature intended the word to have its ordinary and popularly understood meaning and that we may ascertain this meaning through the use of contemporary dictionaries.” Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 21. In оur view, the various definitions cited by the parties could support either an interpretation the 6 months of imprisonment is mandatory or permissive. For example, Black‘s Law Dictionary defines “subject,” in relevant part, as follows:
“2. Exposed, liable, or prone <a climate subject to extreme temperatures>. 3. Dependent on or exposed to (some contingency); esp., being under discretionary authority <funding is subject to the board‘s approval>.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “subject to” as follows: (1) “affected by or possibly affected by (something),” (2) “likely to do, hаve, or suffer from (something),” and (3) “dependent on something else to happen or be true.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/WX35-DVL2]. Although not argued by defendant, we note the dictionary definitions also support an interpretation
¶ 19 Defendant next argues neither the term “mandatory” nor “shall” is used in conjunction with the language “subject to 6 months of imprisonment,” in
¶ 20 According to defendant, the inclusion of the terms “mandatory” and “shall” in other statutory subsections would be superfluous if they are unnecessary to convey what penalties are required. According to our supreme court, “[w]hen the legislature uses certain languagе in one part of a statute and different language in another, we may assume different meanings were intended.” People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 193, 886 N.E.2d 964, 972 (2008).
¶ 21 The State counters defendant already faced the possibility of being sentenced to 364 days in jail, for a Class A misdemeanor conviction. Thus, the phrase “is subject to 6 months of imprisonment” would be entirely superfluous unless it is interpreted to require 6 months of incarceration. While this argument has appeal, we are reluctant to insert the word “mandatory” into the statute where it does not exist.
¶ 22 As noted earlier,
¶ 23 Because
¶ 24 The State maintains the legislative history of the statute supports its interpretation. According to the State, Public Act 94-110 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) was the genesis for legislating into law a six-month mandatory minimum sentence for offenders like defendant. The State argues the bill‘s sponsor, during floor debate in the House of Representatives, clarified the legislation
¶ 25 Public Act 94-110 amended
“(c-5) Except as provided in subsection (c-5.1), a person 21 years of age оr older who violates subsection (a), if the person was transporting a person under the age of 16 at the time of the violation, is subject to 6 months of imprisonment, an additional mandatory minimum fine of $1,000, and 25 days of community service in a program benefiting children. The imprisonment or assignment of community service under this subsection (c-5) is not subject to suspension, nor is the person eligible for a reduced sentence.
(c-5.1) A person 21 years of age or older who is convicted of violating subsection (a) of this Section a first time and who in committing that violation was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in bodily harm to the child under the age of 16 being transported by the person, if the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, is guilty of a Class 4 felony and is subject to one year of imprisonment, a mandatory fine of $2,500, and 25 days of community service in a program benefiting children. The imprisonment or assignment tо community service under this subsection (c-5.1) shall not be subject to suspension, nor shall the person be eligible for probation in order to reduce the sentence or assignment.” Pub. Act 94-110 (eff. Jan. 1, 2006) (amending
625 ILCS 5/11-501(c-5) ,(c-5.1) )
¶ 26 Section 11-501(c-5) of the Vehicle Code (
¶ 27 Thus, under the State‘s interpretation of “subject to” as used in
¶ 28 In analyzing
¶ 29 Because the phrase “subject to 6 months of imprisonment” in
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the finding of guilt but vacate defendant‘s sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.
¶ 32 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.
¶ 33 PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting:
¶ 34 Like my distinguished colleagues in the majority, I am troubled not only by the imprecise language the legislature used in
¶ 35 So, the real question before us is to determine as best we can whether the legislature really meant to impose such a penalty. After carefully considering this statute, I conclude that it did; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 36 Because the majority does a good job discussing the law applicable to statutory interpretation, I need not repeat that discussion. Instead, I will discuss the reasons for my disagreement with the majority.
¶ 37 In this case, we are tasked with giving effect to the legislature‘s intent. In doing so, this court must weigh several considerations, including (1) the plain language of the statute, (2) the lack of the normal terminology that the legislature uses to denote required minimum imprisonment, (3) various interpretations that might render particular portions оf the statute superfluous, and (4) the existence of other statutes that increase the minimum penalty of incarceration but still allow for probation.
A. Plain Language
¶ 39 Some cases can be resolved simply by looking at the plain language. Unfortunately, this is not one of them because “subject to” is not explicitly defined in the statute.
¶ 40 I agree with the majority that, contextually, “subject” can have different meanings and different dictionary definitions might lead to different results. A pоlitical speech that is subject to misinterpretation is not one that is always misinterpreted. Meanwhile, a corporation that is subject to the laws of Delaware is always under the jurisdiction of those laws. In the context of the statute at issue, “is subject to” is not sufficiently clarified by its context to make its meaning clear. So, other methods of statutory interpretation must be used.
B. The Terminology
¶ 42 When analyzing legislative intent based upon the terminology used by the legislature in this statute, we face two competing considerations. First, the legislature did not use language like “must” or “mandatory” or “shall” as it often does when describing mandatory imprisonment. See, e.g.,
C. Avoiding Superfluous Interpretations
¶ 44 No matter how one interprets the statute, portions of it are inevitably rendered superfluous. As defendant notes, if “subjеct to” means that the imprisonment is mandatory, then using the term “mandatory” elsewhere in the statute would be superfluous. See id. However, if “subject to” does not mean that the imprisonment is mandatory, then mentioning the possibility of a six-month sentence would be entirely superfluous because, as noted earlier, all Class A misdemeanors carry that possible penalty—and more. Applying the rule to avoid interpretations that render the legislature‘s language suрerfluous favors
D. Special Sentencing Ranges That Permit Probation
¶ 46 There are many crimes for which the legislature has seen fit to assign a special sentencing range. These crimes often carry a harsher penalty than would otherwise apply. Most of the crimes with harsher penalties do not permit probation as an alternative to imprisonment, but some do.
¶ 47 For example, aggravated DUI causing great bodily harm is a Class 4 felony, but unlike other felonies of that Class, it carries a possible penalty of 1 to 12 years in prison, instead of 1 to 3 years.
¶ 48 Another crime with a special sentencing range is reckless homicide in a construction zone causing the deaths of two or more pеople.
¶ 49 These statutes demonstrate that, when the legislature creates a special sentencing range in which probation is an option, the legislature commonly uses the phrase “if sentenced to a term of imprisonment” in order to leave the optiоn of a nonprison sentence available.
¶ 50 Unlike the above crimes, which expressly say “if sentenced to a term of imprisonment” before stating the special sentencing range, the statute at issue in this case provides no such qualification. It makes no mention of the possibility of a sentence involving no imprisonment. This omission indicates that
E. Conclusion
¶ 52 The legislature‘s usе of language that is uncommon or imperfect does not authorize this court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature notwithstanding any concerns we may have regarding the policy underlying the statute in question. I conclude that (1) the legislature intended to create a greater-than-normal penalty for DUI with a young person in the vehicle and (2) the interpretation that “is subject to” creates a mandatory imprisonment for 180 days for the offense is consistent with the legislature‘s intent. Accordingly, because I conclude that