THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. TERRY LLOYD, Appellant.
No. 113510
Supreme Court of Illinois
April 18, 2013
2013 IL 113510
Held (Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.) Where a middle-aged defendant did not dispute that he sexually penetrated a girl he knew was 13 years old, but was charged under a statute requiring proof that he knew of her inability to understand the nature of the act or give knowing consent (which historically has been construed to apply only to victims who are typically severely mentally disabled, highly intoxicated, unconscious or asleep), his jury convictions were reversed where this was not proved.
Decision Under Review Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, the Hon. Charles G. Reynard, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Circuit court judgment reversed. Convictions and sentences vacated.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Ronald Dozier, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Justices JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Freeman, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Thomas specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Kilbride and Justice Karmeier.
OPINION
¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County, defendant, Terry Lloyd, was convicted of seven counts of criminal sexual assault under
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On January 9, 2009, the State charged defendant with seven counts of criminal sexual assault pursuant to
¶ 4 The following evidence was adduced at defendant’s jury trial. P.V. was 13 years old at the time of the incidents and lived with her mother, older sister, and her aunt, Brenda, among other relatives. Defendant had been a family friend whom P.V. had known almost her entire life. Brenda had previously dated defendant and, at the time of trial, was married to defendant’s half-brother.
¶ 5 P.V. testified that when she was younger, she had enjoyed spending time with defendant. They would listen to music together, make jokes, and do “normal stuff.” Around September 2008, defendant hugged P.V. in a way that made her feel uncomfortable. He lifted her up in the air and when bringing her back down slid his hand across her buttocks. Defendant then asked her for another hug and when she complied, he again lifted her up and touched her buttocks for a few seconds.
¶ 6 Approximately one or two weeks later, P.V. returned home with her mother following a basketball game. She noticed defendant’s van parked in the driveway and that defendant and her aunt, Brenda, were inside the van. She entered the vehicle and sat behind her aunt, who was in the front passenger seat. P.V. was wearing a basketball jersey tucked into her shorts and had sweatpants over the shorts. At some point while defendant and Brenda were talking, defendant reached back from the driver’s seat, which was reclined, and placed his hand on her knee. He rubbed her knee and then slowly moved his hand up her leg two or three inches. Defendant later placed his hand in P.V.’s sweatpants and began rubbing her “private” over her shorts. She testified that she was kind of scared and felt weird. Brenda subsequently got out of the van. Defendant then told P.V. that she was beautiful and sexy. She felt awkward and laughed because she thought he was joking. Defendant then rubbed her thigh and pulled her sweatpants down a little. At defendant’s request, she untucked her basketball jersey and he rubbed her “private part” on top of her underwear. Defendant then placed his hand in her underwear, touched the part of her private area that “has the hole,” and moved his finger up and down in that area. When P.V. saw a light go on in the house, she told defendant that someone was coming. Defendant stopped touching her, and she put her pants back on.
¶ 7 A second incident occurred approximately one or two weeks later when defendant was again visiting P.V.’s aunt. P.V. got into defendant’s van to listen to music, and he joined her a few minutes later. He sat in the driver’s seat and asked her whether she had enjoyed herself the last time. He told her that she was beautiful and that he wanted her to be “his girl.” He began touching her leg and then her “private” in a circular motion over her clothes. Defendant told her that she had too much clothing on so she walked into the house and changed. She returned to the van in sweatpants, an undershirt, and a sweatshirt. P.V. changed because she thought that defendant wanted to do the same thing that he did the last time. Defendant did not tell her what to take off. P.V. testified that she “already kinda knew what [she] was supposed to do.”
¶ 8 After she returned to the van, defendant told her to sit in the back passenger-side seat. P.V. complied and she pulled down her sweatpants. Defendant began rubbing her “private part” on top of her underwear. He then placed his hand inside her underwear and “put his
¶ 9 A third incident occurred about two weeks later when defendant was visiting P.V.’s mother and Brenda. P.V. got into defendant’s van again to listen to music. Defendant walked out of the house shortly thereafter and got into the van. After some small talk, he asked her if she wanted to do it again. She initially said no, but after defendant asked her a third time, almost begging, she agreed. She told him that it was going to be the last time. P.V. testified that she felt stupid for not “sticking with what [she] was saying.” Defendant began rubbing her leg and she helped defendant pull down her pants. Defendant inserted his fingers into her vagina and performed oral sex for approximately five minutes. She testified that she hoped something would happen or that someone would come out. Defendant then asked her if she had ever “kissed a dick before.” She responded that she had not. Defendant asked her if she wanted to try, and she declined. She pulled her pants up and got out of the van. Defendant again asked her not to tell anyone and told her that she makes him nervous. She agreed not to say anything because she did not want to get anyone in trouble. Later that evening, defendant called her for the first time and asked her why she was acting weird around him. She responded that she did not know and ended the conversation.
¶ 10 A fourth incident occurred less than a week later when Brenda told defendant to take P.V. to the gas station to purchase potato chips. P.V. got into defendant’s van and thought the two of them were headed to one of the nearby stations. Instead, defendant drove for what “felt like 30 minutes” and parked the van in a secluded location. He then instructed P.V. to get in the back of the van. Once there, he pulled down her pants and began rubbing her “private” over her underwear. He then pulled down her underwear and began rubbing her vagina. He inserted his fingers into her vagina and stated that it seemed like she could take “good dick” or “big dick.” Defendant twice asked her if he could put his “private” inside her, and she told him that she could not. After defendant performed oral sex for about 10 minutes, P.V. told him that her aunt would wonder where they had gone. She told defendant that she wanted to stop, and he complied. During the subsequent drive to the gas station, defendant asked her not to tell anyone. A few days later, P.V. decided to tell her older sister about what defendant had done, and then P.V. told her mother.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, P.V. testified that she had received education on “good touches” and “bad touches” since sixth grade. P.V. testified that she did not report defendant’s behavior earlier because she wanted him to do what he did the first time and thought it was supposed to happen that way, based upon what her friends had told her. She also did not want to damage her family’s relationship with defendant. She further testified that she “wanted to have the experience, just not with [defendant].”
¶ 12 Brenda testified that she had known defendant since 1992 and had dated him at one time.
¶ 13 Michael Burns, a detective with the Bloomington Police department, testified that he interviewed defendant after meeting with P.V. Burns learned during the interview that defendant was born on February 28, 1966. Defendant admitted to Burns that he listened to music with P.V. in the van, but denied ever being alone with her in the van or anywhere else. He also denied ever calling P.V. on her cell phone. Telephone records were admitted into evidence at trial which indicated that someone using defendant’s home phone had called P.V.’s cell phone on two occasions.
¶ 14 Defendant did not present any evidence at trial.
¶ 15 Consistent with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.56 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th), the jury was instructed that to sustain the charge of criminal sexual assault the State must prove, in pertinent part, the following: “First: That the defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon [P.V.]; and Second: That the defendant knew that [P.V.] was unable to understand the nature of the act or give knowing consent to the act. ***.”
¶ 16 The jury convicted defendant of all seven counts of criminal sexual assault. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to an aggregate term of 44 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argued that his convictions must be reversed because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he knew P.V. was unable to understand the nature of the charged acts or give knowing consent to those acts, as required to sustain his convictions under
¶ 18 The appellate majority concluded, however, that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant knew P.V. was unable to consent because he had known the victim her entire life, had the same birthdate as hers, and, therefore, would have known that she was in her early teens, which was “well below the age of consent.” Id. The appellate majority also relied upon evidence that defendant told P.V. after the second incident that she could not tell anyone because he would get “45 to life” and told her again after the third and fourth incidents that she could not tell anyone. Id. ¶ 35. The appellate majority found such actions
¶ 19 Justice Steigmann dissented from the majority opinion because he concluded that the court was obligated to reverse outright all seven of defendant’s convictions. Id. ¶ 50 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). He wrote that although defendant engaged in felonious criminal conduct, the crimes charged against him were not the crimes committed. Id. He noted that no published opinion had done what the appellate majority did here, which was to affirm a conviction under
¶ 20 This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 I
¶ 23 At issue is
“(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent; or
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member; or
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to the victim.” (Emphasis added.)
720 ILCS 5/12-13(a) (West 2008) .
Therefore, pursuant to
¶ 24 Defendant does not dispute that the State met its burden of proof concerning the element of sexual penetration. Instead, he argues the State failed to show that he knew of some fact, other than P.V.’s age, which prevented her from understanding the nature of the charged acts, or from giving knowing consent to them. Defendant contends that in the absence of such evidence his convictions must be reversed. His challenge requires us to consider the proper construction of the terms “unable to understand the nature of the act” and “unable to give knowing consent.”
¶ 25 It is well settled that issues of statutory construction are questions of law subject to de novo review. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. When construing a statute, this court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the subject the statute addresses and the legislative purpose in enacting it. People v. Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 11. This court has repeatedly held that statutes should be read as a whole and construed so that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous. E.g., People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 26. In doing so, we may consider the statute’s context, reading the provision at issue in light of the entire section in which it appears, and the Act of which that section is a part. People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2005); In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 20.
¶ 26 In order to understand the issue before us, it is necessary to consider the statutory framework defining sex offenses in Illinois.
¶ 27 This state, like every other state in the country, recognizes that a person must reach a certain age to be able to consent to sexual activity. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 DePaul J. Health Care L. 109, 119 (2004). The age of consent is fixed by the legislature and reflects a judgment about the maturity of minors in matters of sexual conduct. Beul v. ASSE International, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 2000). “Although juveniles may factually consent to intercourse, the law *** treats them as incapable of giving legal consent.” Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, The Paradox of Statutory Rape, 87 Ind. L.J. 505, 515 (2012). Age of consent laws primarily serve to protect juveniles from the exploitation of older, more experienced sexual predators, and also serve to protect juveniles from themselves because they lack a sufficient understanding and appreciation of the risks and harms of intercourse. Id. at 515-16.
¶ 28 Consistent with this reasoning, our legislature has adopted certain age-based sex offenses which specify the victim’s age, the age of the accused, and the type of sexual contact that must be proven. The following serve as three examples of such age-based sex offenses found in our Code.
¶ 29 The penalties for violating these aged-based statutes fluctuate significantly based upon the offense. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (
¶ 30 As illustrated by the above offenses, the prescribed age of consent in Illinois is 17, although in a few instances where the accused is a family member or a person in a position of trust or authority, the age of consent is 18 (e.g.,
¶ 31 The State urges us to conclude that the accused’s knowledge of a victim’s status as a minor alone is sufficient under
¶ 32 For several reasons, the State’s suggested construction of
¶ 33 First, the proper inquiry in a prosecution under
¶ 34 The State’s construction would place before the trier of fact the question of whether a particular defendant knew that a minor victim may not legally give knowing consent to an act of sexual penetration. In other words, the trier of fact would decide whether a defendant knew the victim was under 17 and that such a minor could not legally consent to an act of sexual penetration. Where, as in this case, the defendant knew the victim was a minor, the only defense under the State’s interpretation would apparently be the accused’s ignorance of the law. Of course, ignorance of the law is no defense. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 34. Thus, the State’s interpretation would lead to an absurd result.
¶ 35 The State also fails to recognize that under the manner it prosecuted defendant in this case, there would be nothing to prevent a jury from acquitting a defendant if it concludes that he or she did not know the minor victim was unable to understand the nature of the act, or give knowing consent, because it found the victim to be a willing participant or unusually knowledgeable or sophisticated about sexual activity, despite the victim’s young age. The Code instructs us, however, that it is of no concern how advanced, knowledgeable, or willing a particular minor might be about sexual activity because he or she is incapable of giving legal consent. The legislature has set the prescribed age of consent in this state to protect minors under that age because it has determined that they lack the maturity and judgment to give consent to sexual activity. We refuse to interpret the Code in a manner that would derail that determination and could harm the very minors that our legislature has intended to protect.
¶ 36 Second, the State’s construction of the Code has the unacceptable consequence, as occurred in this case, of requiring a minor victim to answer questions at trial as to his or her motivation or willingness to engage in sexual activity with the accused, as well as questions about his or her sex education and knowledge about “good touches” and “bad touches.” A minor victim such as P.V. should not be subjected to such questioning because, as we just recognized, it is of no concern how knowledgeable or willing such a minor might be about sexual activity, because he or she is incapable of giving legal consent.
¶ 37 Third, the State’s construction would render virtually superfluous other sections of the Code, including two other subsections of the criminal sexual assault provision. As cited above, ¶ 38 Fourth, the State’s construction would cause havoc to our statutory scheme by allowing, for example, the State to prosecute under the criminal sexual assault provision a 17-year-old girl who has sexual intercourse with her willing 16-year-old boyfriend, assuming that the State could prove, as it most certainly could, that she knew his age. This offense would constitute a Class 1 felony ( ¶ 39 Finally, the criminal sexual assault provision under which defendant was convicted was added to the Code in 1984, and the language contained therein has never been amended. Compare ¶ 40 For all these reasons, we hold that in order to meet its burden under ¶ 41 II ¶ 42 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, our function is not to retry the defendant. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Rather, our inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 43 (2009). This means that we must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). ¶ 43 The State asserts that given the totality of the evidence in this case, even if P.V. was not “automatically” unable to understand the nature of the acts or give knowing consent based upon her age, a rational juror could have concluded that defendant knew she could do neither. The State argues that the evidence demonstrated that defendant knew that whatever consent P.V. gave was unknowing and invalid because the evidence indicated that she was immature, confused, and provided ambivalent responses to his advances. The State suggests that P.V.’s descriptions of her encounters with defendant also highlight her immaturity in that she felt uncomfortable using terms such as vagina or penis. The State also relies upon evidence that defendant knew the acts were illegal. ¶ 44 The record before us is completely devoid of any evidence to support a determination that defendant knew the victim was unable to understand the nature of the acts or give knowing consent to them to support his convictions under ¶ 45 The State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse. See ¶ 46 We reiterate that the criminal sexual assault provision under which defendant was convicted has existed in Illinois for close to 30 years, and there is no prior reported case in which a defendant was prosecuted under ¶ 48 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the appellate court judgment and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. We reverse defendant’s convictions on all seven counts of criminal sexual assault and vacate the sentences. ¶ 49 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. ¶ 50 Circuit court judgment reversed. ¶ 51 Convictions and sentences vacated. ¶ 52 JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: ¶ 53 I agree with Justice Theis’s conclusion in her lead opinion that proof of the young age of the victim, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove a violation of ¶ 54 In this case, the State raised alternative arguments. First, the State maintained that even if the jury heard evidence proving only the victim’s young age and defendant’s knowledge of that age, then under the plain language of ¶ 55 I agree with Justice Theis’s holding that “in order to meet its burden under ¶ 56 Justice Theis, on the other hand, states that it is of “no concern” whether the minor victim was immature or unknowledgeable about sexual activity because minors cannot consent in the first place to such sexual activity because, under ¶ 57 First, the statutory language, which is the best indicator of legislative intent, contains no such restriction. Instead, ¶ 58 Vaughn upheld the defendant’s conviction based on the theory that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act, relying on the victim’s young age of 14 as one factor, even though there was no indication that she was mentally impaired, stating as follows: “We recognize that this theory of liability is often raised where the victim had a mental impairment; however, we are reminded that the trial court assessed the victim during her testimony and concluded that she was unable to understand the nature of the sexual acts.” (Emphasis added.) Vaughn, 2011 IL App (1st) 092834, ¶ 38. Vaughn then concluded that the “[d]efendant has not demonstrated that, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence was so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt that [the victim] was unable to understand the nature of the sexual acts.” Id. ¶ 59 The lead opinion lumps Vaughn into a category of cases that have applied ¶ 60 In Blake, Justice Theis herself wrote the opinion of the appellate court that reached the same result as Vaughn on similar facts. Blake, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 488. There, Justice Theis specifically noted in her analysis reviewing the evidence presented that the victim was 13 years old and the defendant was 30 years old, thus strongly suggesting that the young age of the victim is one factor that may be taken into account in determining whether the victim understood the nature of the act. Id. at 493. In Blake, there was no evidence whatsoever presented that the victim was severely mentally disabled, highly intoxicated, unconscious or asleep. There was some evidence that the victim had a learning disability and was enrolled in special education classes. But there was no evidence presented as to the victim’s cognitive level; the victim’s mother testified only that the victim’s learning disability “sometimes affected her ability to articulate her feelings.” Id. Nonetheless, Justice Theis in Blake affirmed the trier of fact’s verdict that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act. Id. ¶ 61 I believe that Vaughn and Blake support my view that the State should be allowed to prove a crime under ¶ 62 Second, while I too sympathize with any minor victim having to endure questioning about his or her understanding of the nature of the sex act or acts in question, I note that both the victim and the State (not to mention the public and the legislature) might well prefer such questioning over the alternative the lead opinion imposes of automatically limiting the prosecution to only charging a lesser, Class 2 felony under ¶ 63 Finally, the lead opinion’s worry about the age-of-consent protections in ¶ 64 I do agree, however, that if the State’s argument based on age alone (the legal age of consent being 17) were accepted to prove a charge under ¶ 65 CHIEF JUSTICE KILBRIDE and JUSTICE KARMEIER join in this special concurrence.