THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. GABRIELLA L. FALBE et al., Appellees.
No. 87900
Supreme Court of Illinois
January 21, 2000
Rehearing denied April 3, 2000
189 Ill. 2d 635
Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, and Lawrence J. O‘Neill, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Mt. Vernon, for appellees.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, Gabriella L. Falbe and Marzeal Marshall, were charged in the circuit court of Marion County with violations of section 401(c)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (
Since neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is contested, the constitutional issue having come before the circuit court on stipulated facts, a purely legal question is presented for which de novo review is appropriate. See Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1996); People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 309 (1998).
According to the facts stipulated, on April 3, 1998, the Centralia police department received information that defendants, Marzeal Marshall and Gabriella Falbe, had in their possession a large quantity of cocaine at their Centralia residence. Officer Brian Atchison placed the residence under surveillance while other officers were obtaining a search warrant. However, before the officers arrived to execute the warrant, defendants left the residence in a motor vehicle. Atchison followed them and, in the vicinity of the 300 block of West Nollman, observed defendants’ vehicle exceed the speed limit. He stopped the vehicle, according to the stipulation, on a public way within 1,000 feet of a church. Both defendants were subsequently arrested, and a search of Gabriella Falbe resulted in the discovery of more than 70 grams of cocaine. Defendants acknowledged that Marshall had
In that entry, the court recited the stipulated facts in the form of findings, and went on to hold the statute “unconstitutionally vague with regard to the given facts.” The court found, “based on the facts in this case, the compelling state interest to enhance the penalty for drug delivery in specified protected zones is neither promoted or served.” In so finding, the circuit court attributed dispositive significance to the traffic stop which resulted in the discovery of drugs on Falbe‘s person, holding that proximity to a church was “the direct result of police activity in a traffic stop without any showing that defendants started, stopped or ever intended to stop in the protected zone.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the circuit court reasoned, the “purpose” of the statute was not served when applied to these defendants.
It is our duty to affirm a statute‘s constitutionality and validity if reasonably possible. People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (1995); People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489, 499 (1992). The statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality (People v. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (1999)), and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law in question (People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995)). Since the circuit court apparently based its ruling upon a perceived due process violation, we first address principles applicable to due process analysis.
The determination of whether a statute is void for vagueness must be made in the factual context of each case. Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 174 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1996); People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182, 189 (1985). Due process demands that a statute must not be so vague
Insofar as due process principles limit the legislature‘s authority in the first instance to enact statutes in furtherance of the state‘s police power, they prohibit only arbitrary or unreasonable use of that power. People v. Brown, 98 Ill. 2d 374, 380 (1983). To constitute a legitimate exercise of the police power, a legislative enactment must bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired result. Brown, 98 Ill. 2d at 380. In other words, the statute must be reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare. People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). It is not our role to determine whether the legislature has chosen the best or most effective means of resolving the problems addressed by this statute. Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d at 254.
Arguing in support of the circuit court ruling, defendants reiterate that court‘s observation that the record is devoid of evidence defendants would have stopped in the protected zone around the church, or delivered drugs in the vicinity, had Officer Atchison not stopped them within the zone. They argue “because the subjective motivation of Atchison and not defendants’
First, the statute is not vague. Section 401 of the Act proscribes four separate acts, making it “unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled or counterfeit substance or controlled substance analog.”
To read the statutes so as to require an intent to actually consummate a delivery within the protected zone would entail insertion of language into the statutes which the legislature has not seen fit to include. The legislature could have specified that a defendant who possesses a controlled substance with intent to deliver must intend to actually deliver it within the protected zone; however, the legislature apparently chose a different course. That the legislature did choose a different course is evident when we examine the remaining proscriptions of the statute—the ones defendants have conveniently ignored. In addition to delivery and possession with intent to deliver, section 401 also prohibits “manufacture” and “possession with intent to manufacture.” Those offenses can also be committed within the protected zone without any intent to actually deliver within the zone. If the legislature meant only to punish those who have delivered within the zone, and those who have a present intent to conduct drug transactions there, the prohibitions against manufacture and possession with intent to manufacture would seem to be superfluous, since the mere presence of drug traffickers and quantities of drugs would not inevi-
We cannot say that the legislature‘s determination in this regard is irrational. To the contrary, it follows logically that the presence of drug traffickers and quantities of drugs in these areas is likely to result in an increase of drug transactions with all their attendant evils. Nor can we say that the decision to single out certain areas for protection is arbitrary because each of the protected zones specified in section 407 appears to correspond to a segment of our society which may well be considered particularly vulnerable and less able to protect itself from the incursions of drug trafficking. Generally speaking, schools, public housing, parks, places of worship, nursing homes, assisted-living centers, and senior citizens facilities are frequented by those who may be least able or willing to deal with drug trafficking and the crimes associated with it. Whether by virtue of the recklessness and inexperience of youth, the deprivations and disappointments of poverty, the lowering of defenses associated with relaxation and recreation, the beliefs and ideals of worship, or the infirmity of age, each of the groups normally associated with the protected zones may be less able or willing to protect itself. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the legislature‘s use of the police power to protect those citizens most vulnerable and in need of protection.
Nor do we find the “locus” of the traffic stop in this case in any way relevant to the constitutional issue that confronted the circuit court. If, as alleged, defendants possessed cocaine with intent to deliver, at a time when they passed through the protected zone, then the
Defendants argue that the police could “deliberately arrange a drug transaction within 1000 feet of a ‘safety zone‘, in order to effect an enhanced penalty.” However, these defendants do not contend that they were lured into the zone. From the facts stipulated, it appears that they entered voluntarily without the encouragement of law officers. The defendants’ conduct brought them within the express terms of the statute, not within the hypothetical posed. Thus, they do not have standing to challenge the statute as it might be applied to others in different circumstances. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 232 (1995); People v. Blackorby, 146 Ill. 2d 307, 320-21 (1992). Section 407 affords these defendants fair warning of what conduct is prohibited; it provides adequate standards for law enforcement officers and triers of fact in the application of its provisions; and it constitutes a le-
Defendants, noting that it is the correctness of the circuit court‘s ruling, not its reasoning, which must be reviewed (People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1996)), raise an alternative theory in support of that ruling. They argue that section 407(b)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the establishment clauses of both the first amendment to the United States Constitution (
The establishment clause of the first amendment (
In determining whether government action offends the establishment clause courts have continued to apply the essential elements of the tripartite test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997)), notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court‘s professed “unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion” (Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984)), and its periodic criticism of the test itself (see Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Lamb‘s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)). Nonetheless, it is obvious from a reading of Agostini that the United States Supreme Court has not abandoned Lemon. The parties in this case cite Lemon as the applicable test and we find it both applicable and useful in lieu of a viable, structured, alternative analysis. Under Lemon, to pass constitutional muster, a statute‘s legislative purpose must be secular, its principal or primary effect cannot advance or inhibit religion, and it must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23; Pre-School Owners Ass‘n of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 119 Ill. 2d 268, 279 (1988).
Defendants first argue that the statute does not serve a legitimate secular purpose. They arrive at that conclusion having begun from a snippet of “legislative history,” a brief discussion among four state representatives during which one indicated that religious leaders and mayors in his district were concerned about drug trafficking around churches, another asked if studies had been done on the efficacy of an analogous enactment, the “Safe School Zone Law,” in deterring crime in the vicinity of schools, a third suggested that enactment of that measure had not deterred crime in school zones, and a fourth
Consideration of the statutory scheme of section 407, and its component parts, belies defendants’ contention. As touched upon earlier, in the due process segment of our analysis, we find section 407‘s enhanced penalty provisions are obviously intended to protect segments of our society which may well be considered particularly vulnerable and less able to deal with the incursions of drug trafficking and its related evils. The unifying factor is vulnerability, not religion. The secular purpose of the statute is to “deter narcotics activity” (Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 503), protecting those the legislature deemed in need of protection through harsher punishment for drug traffickers who commit certain offenses within close proximity of sensitive areas where the vulnerable population may be located. As noted in People v. Carter, 228 Ill. App. 3d 526, 534-35 (1992), “Places of worship reach out and extend an invitation to the public; doors are unlocked; security is relaxed.” The very ideals of those who worship there can make them vulnerable in the same sense that school children, the poor, and the aged may be
Defendants claim that the statute violates the second prong of the Lemon test because its primary effect is to advance religion. We disagree. Defendants surely argue tongue in cheek when they state: “The statute confers a benefit on an explicitly religious basis by extending to clergy and worshippers governmental protection given to no other class of people, save students, teachers, and public housing residents.” (Emphasis added.) Defendants omit school bus drivers, anyone out for a stroll through a public park, senior citizens, residents in nursing homes, and workers in all of the aforementioned facilities. Defendants’ assertion is baseless. Neither the purpose of the statute nor its primary effect is the advancement of religion. Defendants’ contention that the statute is meant to protect religious-related structures, buildings and real property is no more convincing for similar reasons.
Defendants attempt to meet the third prong of the Lemon test by claiming that uncertainty over the definition of a “place of worship,” as used in the statute, may create excessive governmental entanglements between church and state. Defendants suggest that courts may have to decide what constitutes religious worship.
Defendants pose an interesting hypothetical wherein pagan worshipers gather in an abandoned barn to sacrifice a cat while a defendant delivers cocaine to an
Defendants have not met the standards of the Lemon test and, consequently, have not shown that the statute violates the establishment clause. Since we have already determined that the circuit court erred when it ruled that the statute fails to comport with due process, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.
JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting:
This court has no jurisdiction to hear the State‘s appeal. This appeal should therefore be dismissed, and the cause should be transferred to the appellate court.
In Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504, 508-09 (1992), this court noted that a circuit court order holding only that a statute is unconstitutional “as applied” in a particular case is not directly appealable to this court under Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1). In People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 8-10 (1999), a majority of this court overruled Rehg and determined that this court has jurisdiction over all appeals from circuit court orders holding statutes unconstitutional, even if the circuit court declares the statute unconstitutional only as applied to that case. I dissented in Fuller, and I continue to adhere to the rationale set forth in that dissent. See Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d at 21-24 (Bilandic, J., dissenting). Here, the circuit court declared section 407(b)(1) to be “unconstitutionally vague with regard to the given facts, to wit: the triggering of the enhanced penalty do [sic] solely to police action in selecting the locus of the offense by a traffic stop.” Because the circuit court held only that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to defendants in this case, the circuit court‘s order is not directly appealable to this court, and we therefore do not have jurisdiction over the State‘s appeal. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, also dissenting:
To deal effectively with its case load, this court must husband its time and resources properly. The majority ignores these realities. Its continued invocation of jurisdiction, where none exists, imposes an undue burden upon this court, and severely curtails the role of our appellate court in constitutional review. Jurisdiction is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, I must dissent.
Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603) provides:
“Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid and appeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit courts imposing a sentence of death shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court.”
Thus, with the exception of cases in which a defendant has been sentenced to death, the jurisdiction of this court in criminal cases is limited to appeals in which a statute of the United States or of Illinois has been held invalid.
In the case at bar, a police officer observed defendants’ vehicle exceed the speed limit, and stopped the vehicle on a public way within 1,000 feet of a church. The officer searched defendant Gabriella Falbe and found more than 70 grams of cocaine on her person. Unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver is a Class 1 felony.
In the trial court, defendants argued that section 407(b)(1) was unconstitutional as applied. The trial court
The trial court declared section 407(b)(1) unconstitutional as applied, not invalid on its face. Indeed, in People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489 (1992), this court upheld the constitutionality of section 407(b)(1) (
As Justice McMorrow observed in her dissent in People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 27-28 (1999) (McMorrow, J., dissenting), Rule 603 and Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)) are:
“based on the premise that some types of cases are of such pressing importance that, upon review, they should bypass the normal appellate process and proceed directly to this court. Rehg [v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504 (1992) (overruled in part by Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, and by Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306 (1996))] determined that circuit court decisions holding a statute facially unconstitutional rise to this level of importance.
Implicitly, Rehg recognized that holding a statute facially invalid attacks the power of the legislature to enact the statutory provision itself, and therefore, that as a general matter, such a holding will be of sufficient importance and general applicability to warrant direct review in this court.”
On the other hand, a decision of the circuit court holding a statute unconstitutional as applied affects only the particular litigants and not the public at large. Such a decision is not infused with the sense of urgency and public importance which justify bypassing the normal appellate review process. I, for one, have faith in the ability of our appellate court judges to deal effectively with their jurisdictional case load. To invoke direct appellate jurisdiction, as the majority does in the present case, is to effectively curtail participation of the appellate court in the constitutional review process.
In his dissent in Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d at 22, Justice Bilandic observed:
“because this court has a limited amount of time and resources, we must be able to decline to hear those rulings that are not publicly significant.” Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d at 22 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
Justice McMorrow elaborated:
“Each year this court receives thousands of petitions for leave to appeal from decisions of the appellate court under Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). Because this court has a finite amount of time and resources, many of these petitions must be denied, despite the important issues they raise. Viewed in this context, providing mandatory direct appellate review to appeals brought under Rule 302(a)(1) or Rule 603 is justifiable when the cases are of public importance, but it is clearly not justifiable when the issues are of significance to only a single litigant. Inevitably, as a result of the majority‘s decision today, important appellate court decisions appealed under Rule 315 will not be reviewed by this court.” Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d at 30 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
The majority is not justified in invoking jurisdiction in
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.