In re S.G. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Pearlie G., Appellee).
No. 80688
Supreme Court of Illinois
Opinion filed February 20, 1997.
Rehearing denied March 31, 1997.
175 Ill. 2d 471
Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Cheryl K. Lipton, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.
Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Lee Ann Lowder and Susan S. Wigoda, of counsel), for the minors.
JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, we decide whether
I. BACKGROUND
On February 27, 1991, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigated a report that Pearlie‘s boyfriend had sexually abused her daughter W.G. DCFS found evidence to support the report, but did not bring the family to the attention of the juvenile court. W.G. eventually recanted her allegations against the boyfriend, claiming that she fabricated the charges because she did not like the boyfriend and wished to estrange him from her mother.
On April 21, 1992, the Chicago police department began investigating reports of abuse that Pearlie‘s son K.G. made to the DCFS hot line. In these, K.G. reported that his mother had been sexually abusing him. S.G. reported that she witnessed one of the incidents of sexual abuse between K.G. and their mother. Pearlie was arrested and charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault. In the following days, both K.G. and S.G. recanted their allegations against Pearlie.
On April 28, 1992, the State‘s Attorney‘s office, on behalf of DCFS, filed separate petitions for adjudication of wardship for each of Pearlie‘s four children. The petitions alleged that there was sexual abuse in the home and that the children were neglected in that their environment was injurious to their welfare. Also on April 28, 1992, the public guardian‘s office was appointed to represent the children and the first of two temporary custody hearings was held. See
After being released, Pearlie was granted a second custody hearing where she was represented by the public defender‘s office. The second temporary custody hearing was held on June 22 and June 23, 1992. At this hearing, Assistant State‘s Attorney Adam Grosch testified that K.G. reported being forced by his mother to engage in sexual activity on two occasions. Grosch also testified that S.G. corroborated K.G.‘s account of the abuse.
W.G. also testified at the hearing. W.G. testified that she had fabricated the story of abuse by her mother‘s boyfriend because she disliked him and wished to prevent her mother‘s continued involvement with him. W.G. further testified that she believed that her accusation gave K.G. the idea to accuse their mother. K.G. declined to testify at the hearing. The trial judge declined to change his finding that there was probable cause for the charges and upheld his decision to award temporary custody of the children to DCFS.
At a hearing held on September 1, 1992, the circuit court entered orders of default against the respondent fathers who had been served by publication but failed to appear. At a hearing held on September 3, 1992, the trial judge and the attorneys for the parties acknowledged that the defaulting of the fathers on September 1 began the 90-day speedy-trial provision contained in
Also at the September 3 hearing, the trial judge granted the public guardian‘s motion to withdraw his representation of W.G. Attorney Mary Bird from the Legal Assistance Foundation then entered her appearance and was appointed guardian ad litem for W.G. The public guardian‘s office continued its representation of the remaining siblings.
On October 22, 1992, the assistant public guardian representing the three remaining siblings requested a continuance because she required surgery and would therefore be unavailable for the November 10 trial date. The trial judge recognized that the 90-day term was set to expire at the end of November, but he lamented that because of his crowded docket there was no other available court time to hold the hearing prior to the end of that term. The judge thereupon found that a continuance was in the best interest of the children and reset the adjudicatory hearing for December 15, 1992. Presumably the court was acting pursuant to
On December 15, 1992, the circuit court first held a pretrial hearing to dispose of several motions. Among them, the court granted W.G.‘s motion to be returned to the custody of her mother under an order of protection. Thereafter, the court heard opening statements from all parties and the testimony of one witness, Robert O‘Connor, who is an investigator with DCFS. After this sole witness, the court adjourned the hearing and sought to schedule the remaining court time necessary to conclude the adjudicatory hearing.
In trying to schedule the remaining time necessary for the adjudicatory hearing, the trial judge was
On December 17, the court did not have enough time at the end of the call to take any evidence. However, time was devoted to a motion filed that day by W.G.‘s attorney seeking to disqualify the public guardian‘s office from representing the remaining siblings. The motion alleged that the public guardian‘s representation of the remaining siblings presented a conflict of interest with W.G., a former client. The trial judge ordered a briefing schedule and the matter was continued for a hearing to be conducted on January 11, 1993.
On January 11, 1993, the court denied the motion to disqualify the public guardian‘s office, ruling that any further delays in the matter would not be in the best interest of the children. The court then again offered to hear the case on a piecemeal basis or alternatively to schedule the case in a block at some future time. A scheduling conference was again held off the record. The court scheduled the adjudicatory hearing to continue on March 8.
Pearlie‘s attorney subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the petitions for adjudication of wardship for all the children. The motion alleged that the petitions must be dismissed pursuant to the speedy-trial provisions contained in
Prior to resuming the adjudicatory hearing on March 8, the court ruled on the motion to dismiss the petitions. The judge did not dispute that the statutory time period for an adjudicatory hearing had expired, but denied the motion because he found that the dismissal of the petitions would not be in the best interest of the minors. The adjudicatory hearing was then conducted over the next several days, concluding on March 12.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that all the children were neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare. The court further found that W.G. had been sexually abused, but the court ruled that the evidence failed to establish that K.G. had been sexually abused. At a dispositional hearing held on April 12, the court adjudged the children wards of the court. The court found that it was in the best interest of W.G., S.G. and C.G. to be placed in the custody of their mother under an order of protection. The court further held that K.G. should remain in the custody of DCFS.
Pearlie appealed from the adjudication of wardship. The appellate court reversed. 277 Ill. App. 3d 803. The appellate court concluded that the plain language of
We granted the State‘s petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315). The public guardian‘s office, representing S.G., C.G. and K.G., has also filed a brief in opposition to the appellate court‘s construction of
II. ANALYSIS
The State first argues that the appellate court‘s construction of A court should avoid constitutional questions where the case may be decided on other grounds. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994). We therefore find it appropriate to first address whether as a matter of statutory construction the legislature intended for In interpreting a statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194 (1992). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 455 (1989). “(a) Purpose and policy. The legislature recognizes that serious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to the minor and the family and that it frustrates the best interests of the minor and the effort to establish permanent homes for children in need. The purpose of this Section is to insure *** that the State of Illinois will act in a just and speedy manner to determine the best interests of the minor ***. (b) When a petition is filed alleging that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent, an adjudicatory hearing shall be held within 90 days of the date of service of process upon the minor, parents, any guardian and any legal custodian. (c) Upon written motion of a party filed no later than 10 days prior to hearing, or upon the court‘s own motion and only for good cause shown, the Court may continue the hearing for a period not to exceed 30 days, and only if the continuance is in the best interests of the minor. When the court grants a continuance, it shall enter specific factual findings to support its order, including factual findings supporting the court‘s determination that the continuance is in the best interests of the minor. Only one such continuance shall be granted. A period of continuance for good cause as described in this Section shall temporarily suspend as to all parties, for the time of the delay, the period within which a hearing must be held. On the day of the expiration of the delay, the period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. The term ‘good cause’ as applied in this Section shall be strictly construed and be in accordance with (d) The time limits of this Section may be waived only by consent of all parties and approval by the court.” The State notes that in the context of the Juvenile Court Act this court has interpreted the term “shall” as directory, rather than mandatory. In In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d 102 (1974), this court construed a provision requiring that a petition “shall be set for an adjudicatory hearing within 30 days” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 704—2). This court concluded that the legislature did not intend a mandatory construction of the statute. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 105. In so finding, this court reasoned that dismissing a petition would not further the goals of the Juvenile Court Act to rehabilitate and protect minors. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 104. In addition, the court concluded that the language of the statute did not evince the legislative intent necessary for a mandatory construction. The court reasoned that unlike the familiar criminal speedy-trial provision, the legislature did not include a consequence for the failure to set the adjudicatory hearing within the time period. In re Armour, 59 Ill. 2d at 105. The provision at issue in In re Armour is readily distinguishable from The State also argues that the appellate court erred in construing We reject the State‘s interpretation. We agree with the appellate court that Our conclusion based upon the plain language of This conclusion is also consistent with the stated purpose of the statute to “insure” the speedy resolution of abuse and neglect cases. If we allowed a technical start of the hearing followed by an indeterminate period of delay to satisfy Applying the statute, the adjudicatory hearing was not timely. The public guardian‘s office argues that the adjudicatory hearing need not have been held within the statutory period because Pearlie waived her right to a prompt adjudicatory hearing. See The public guardian‘s waiver arguments represent a brazen distortion of the record. Throughout the entire proceedings, Pearlie‘s attorney repeatedly voiced Pearlie‘s frustration at the slow pace of the proceedings and her desire for a quick completion. After the beginning of the adjudicatory hearing on December 15, the court gave the parties the option either to have the case heard on a piecemeal basis at the end of the call each day or to schedule the case for a block of time in February. When Pearlie‘s attorney pressed the court on the scheduling issue, the court explicitly responded that if he was unwilling to waive the 90-day period and have The public guardian further argues that Pearlie again waived her right to a prompt hearing on January 11, 1993, by agreeing to have the case heard in a block of available time in March. In its effort to manufacture waiver, the public guardian‘s office again distorts the record. At no time during the January 11 hearing did the court or the parties even discuss a waiver of the statutory time period. Indeed, Pearlie‘s attorney at first rejected both hearing the case immediately on a piecemeal basis and hearing the case at a later block of time, suggesting instead that the court reschedule other cases and fit the case in the call over the next week or two. After hearing from the parties, the court ruled that the case would proceed in March when the court had a block of time available in its busy call. Our review of the record thoroughly undermines the contention that Pearlie ever waived her statutory right to a timely hearing. Last, the public guardian argues that the motion filed by W.G.‘s attorney to disqualify the public guardian‘s office tolled the statutory time period. The public guardian notes that in addition to the speedy-trial provision, a statutory right to counsel exists in the The State argues that a mandatory construction of At the outset, we note that “a strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to any legislative enactment and that the burden rests upon the challenger to demonstrate its invalidity.” Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 108 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1985). The separation of powers provision of the Illinois Constitution, contained in section 1 of article II, provides: “The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” Section 1 of article VI further provides: “The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.” The separation of powers provision does not seek to achieve a complete divorce between the branches of The constitution does not define the exact nature of the different governmental powers. However, this court has sketched the judicial power as including the adjudication and application of law and the procedural administration of the courts. People v. Bainter, 126 Ill. 2d 292, 302-03 (1989); DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth‘s Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 68 (1992). Where matters of procedure are at issue, this court has noted that the constitutional authority to promulgate procedural rules can be concurrent between the court and the legislature. O‘Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 112 Ill. 2d 273, 281 (1986); Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d at 61; People v. Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274 (1980). In determining whether a legislative enactment pertaining to judicial practice or procedure is constitutional, this court has looked to whether the statute conflicts with any court rules or unduly infringes on inherent judicial powers. Bainter, 126 Ill. 2d at 302-03; Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 474; Cox, 82 Ill. 2d at 274. The State does not suggest that The doctrine of parens patriae refers to duty of the government to care for infants, the insane and the infirm. County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378, 383 (1882). In order to satisfy this duty, the English courts of chancery became imbued with the jurisdiction to act on the behalf of those unable to care for themselves. “The source of this jurisdiction is quite uncertain” and it is unclear “[w]hether the power was originally a mere usurpation, or was legally delegated to the chancellor by the crown as parens patriae, or grew out of the practice of appointing guardians ad litem.” Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 364-65 (1911). In any event, this doctrine exists in our courts by its inheritance from the English courts of chancery, and this court has recognized that it provides the authority to appoint guardians independent of any authority granted by the legislature. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 63 (1993). Neither the doctrine of parens patriae nor our inherent guardianship powers provide a basis to judicially invalidate This court has also rejected the State‘s contention that because the Juvenile Court Act is merely a codifi- This court has also rejected a broad construction of the inherent guardianship powers our courts possess. In In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53 (1993), this court was presented with several cases where the trial judge sought to impose restrictions on a guardian‘s power to consent to an adoption. In each case, the trial judge found that it was in the child‘s best interest to retain contact with his or her biological parents. Therefore, the trial judges attempted to limit the guardian‘s consent to an adoption to instances where the adoptive parents had agreed to keep the child in contact with his or her biological parents. In rejecting this practice, this court acknowledged that the circuit court possesses the “inherent plenary power to appoint guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the courts by the legislature.” In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63. However, this court refused to give that power a broad construction because at common law the court‘s inherent guardianship power did not include the power to consent to an adoption. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63-66. Furthermore, this court reasoned that a court may not seize upon “the best interest of the child mandate” to enlarge its statutory powers. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 69-70. The responsibility to protect children rests upon all three branches of government, which have separate functions under our constitution. In order that our governmental system operate in harmony where functions are shared between branches, we have understood the “necessity to exercise sparingly the inherent powers of the judiciary” and recognized that “deference should normally be accorded the governmental branch having initial responsibility.” Knuepfer, 96 Ill. 2d at 293. The initial responsibility for setting public policy relating to the care and custody of minors rests with the legislative branch of government. For this reason, this court has routinely deferred to the legislature by acknowledging that the Juvenile Court Act is “a purely statutory creature whose parameters and application are defined solely by the legislature.” See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 223 (1991); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. Consistent with this view, this court has rejected challenges that provisions in the Juvenile Court Act violate principles of separation of powers. For example, this court held that the legislature can mandate the removal of a petition for adjudication of wardship from the juvenile to the criminal court. See P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 221-24. In addition, this court has held that the The State relies on In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), as the sole support for its position that a court can decline to dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship on timeliness grounds pursuant to its inherent powers. In In re J.J., the State’s Attorney argued that he had the exclusive right to dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship because of his role in the executive branch of government. This court rejected that view and determined that the circuit court had an independent duty to determine whether the State’s motion to dismiss was in the best interest of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9. The State suggests that the trial court can similarly refuse to dismiss a petition pursuant to This court’s decision in In re J.J. was not premised on any inherent judicial power to act in derogation of a statute where a court determines it is in the best interest of a minor. Instead, this court found that the We therefore hold that In closing, we reject the contention that our decision to apply the plain language of We conclude the legislature intended that the circuit court dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship pursuant to Appellate court judgment affirmed. JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: My colleagues today content themselves with a purely literal interpretation of The General Assembly enacted the The dispositive issue in this case is whether From a linguistic point of view, the majority errs in reasoning that the absence of the words “begin” or “commence” signifies an express legislative intent that the hearings must be “completed” or “concluded” within 90 days. The error in that reasoning stems from the fact Throughout its analysis, the majority focuses exclusively on the legislature’s goal of preventing serious delay in the adjudication of abuse and neglect cases. Noticeably absent from that analysis, however, is any mention of the overriding legislative intent to safeguard the best interests of the minors. See In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1991); see also “Each of the continuances that was had in this case was done with the best interest of these children in mind. Each was done out of necessity. And we certainly believe that the spirit of the statute has been followed. I would also state unequivocally that it would not be in the best interest of these children to dismiss these petitions at this time.” Ignoring Judge Smierciak’s finding, the majority today assumes, without explanation, that the speedy resolution of adjudicatory hearings, as contemplated by I take issue with the majority’s statement that its interpretation of The majority’s literal interpretation of “This case is unusual because of the substitution of attorneys, because of the great number of pretrial motions that were filed on behalf of the children and other parties as well as by the fact that the lawyers have suggested that there would be as many as 10 to 12 witnesses testifying in this case. In fact, I’ve blocked out this day and two subsequent days on this court’s calendar to hear this case because of its complexity and because of the adversarial stances that have been taken by the parties. With 4000 cases on the Court call, it’s just impossible to hear 10-, 12-witness cases and take 20 hours of court time to try them without scheduling in this manner.” The majority pays little heed to Judge Smierciak’s explanation as to why this case could not be resolved within 90 days of service of process. Had it done so, the majority would have been cognizant of the impractical consequences of its decision to require the dismissal of the present action. Assuming, as we should, that the State still has an interest in prosecuting this case, it must now return to the same congested court system from which the case is being dismissed. The State must refile without any guarantee that the system will be any less congested, or that the second action will produce a result any different from the first. Indeed, the majority offers little, if any, assurance that a refiled petition will not suffer the same fate as the original petition. Instead, the majority callously suggests that “the legislature has provided for a reasonable and adequate period of time, at least 90 days, for the exercise of In view of the foregoing, I do not share my colleagues’ confidence “that the trial judge can exercise sufficient control over the proceedings to prevent a party from obtaining a dismissal through purposeful delay.” 175 Ill. 2d at 483. Even if a trial judge suspected that a party was engaging in such tactics, it is not likely that the additional burden of disciplining the laggard party would have a positive impact upon the judge’s ability to try the matter in 90 days. If anything, taking the time to issue rules to show cause, hold contempt hearings It is well settled that “a court construing the language of a statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unjust result.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992), citing People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985). In addition, “‘[w]hen the literal enforcement of a statute would result in great injustice and lead to consequences which the legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that such consequences were not intended and will adopt a construction which it may be reasonable to presume was contemplated by the legislature. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 290 Ill. 142.’” People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 312-13 (1968), quoting Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 220 (1925). The majority’s literal interpretation of “We disagree with the S.G. court’s interpretation of the word ‘heard.’ Although the matter must be ‘heard,’ that is not synonymous with ‘concluded.’ Witnesses and parties may be ‘heard’ at a hearing on a matter which is not concluded. See Black’s Law Dictionary 721 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of ‘hearing’ [hold means “[t]o administer; to conduct or preside at; to convoke, open and direct the operations of“]). A hearing need not be concluded and the decision of the tribunal need not be made for the matter to be in the process of being ‘heard.’ It must be recognized that the number and availability of witnesses affects when the hearing will be concluded. The legislature could not have reasonably meant that a hearing, though commenced, must be halted and the cause dismissed because of the illness of one of the witnesses, or that the parties to the proceeding would simply be denied the opportunity to present witnesses who would not be available on time.” H.R., 283 Ill. App. 3d at 912. In addition, the court in H.R. further emphasized that the overall purpose of the I find the foregoing reasoning reflects the will of the General Assembly more accurately than the literal approach endorsed by my colleagues. The United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute [citations], ‘for literalness may strangle meaning.’” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710, 8 L. Ed. 2d 211, 215, 82 S. Ct. 1063, 1067 (1962). I would heed that warning in this case and hold, like the Fourth District appellate panel, that the only way to fully effectuate the mission of the legislature is to liberally construe the word “heard” so as to include the commencement of a hearing. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 59 Ill. 2d 402, 405 (1974) (holding speedy-trial provision (“[e]very person *** shall be tried *** within 120 days” (emphasis added)) satisfied by commencement of proceeding). Any other interpretation would lead to absurd consequences that could not possibly have been contemplated by our General Assembly. Finally, I realize that my voice is only that of a dissenter, and that the majority opinion speaks with the force of law. Accordingly, I call upon the legislature to act promptly in amending the Because I would affirm the order of the circuit court denying respondents’ motion to dismiss, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE and JUSTICE MILLER join in this dissent.A. Statutory Construction
B. Application and Waiver
C. Separation of Powers
I