H048315 (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 19CR007735)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
January 25, 2022
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Ernesto Rodriguez Orellana was charged with criminal threats. The trial court found a doubt as to Orellana‘s competency and suspended criminal proceedings. Orellana was treated at Patton State Hospital. He regained competence following treatment, and the parties entered into a plea agreement in which Orellana agreed to serve a prison term of two years. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence consistent with the terms of the plea agreement.
On appeal, Orellana contends the trial court‘s failure at sentencing to award him conduct credit for the period of time in which he was receiving treatment for restoration to competence in the state hospital violates Senate Bill No. 317 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 317). Orellana maintains that Senate Bill 317, which was enacted in October 2021 while his appeal was pending in this court and provides for such credits, retroactively applies to his case. He further argues that denial of conduct credits violates his right to equal protection of the law. The Attorney General asserts Orellana waived his appellate rights in the plea agreement, Senate Bill 317 does not apply, and he is not entitled to conduct credit based on principles of equal protection.
As explained below, we conclude Orellana‘s appellate waiver is invalid and does not bar this appeal. Nevertheless, based on the California Supreme Court‘s decision in People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 (Brown), we decide that Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively and the trial court‘s denial of conduct credit for the time
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In July 2019, the Monterey County District Attorney charged Orellana by felony complaint with two counts of criminal threats (
On July 30, 2019, after Orellana‘s arraignment, defense counsel expressed doubt as to Orellana‘s competence under
Pursuant to
he was being treated for restoration to competence at the state hospital is the central question at issue in this appeal.3
On May 26, 2020, the parties reached a negotiated disposition. Under the plea agreement, which was not reduced to writing, the prosecution moved to orally amend the complaint to add charges for felony false imprisonment (
After entry of the plea and prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion requesting that the trial court grant conduct credits for the time Orellana spent in treatment to restore competence at the state hospital, or alternatively for the time spent in state hospital custody once competent but before being transported. Orellana‘s motion asserted that equal protection principles required the court to award conduct credits under
custody credit and 318 days of conduct credit, for a total of 685 days of credit for time served.
Orellana filed a timely notice of appeal based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)), noting specifically the conduct credits issue and appellate waiver. The trial court granted a certificate of probable cause.
II. DISCUSSION
Orellana contends that Senate Bill 317 applies to his matter and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions entitle him to an additional 48 days of conduct credit for his treatment time in the state hospital. Before addressing these questions, we examine the effect of the oral appellate waiver, as it is potentially dispositive.
A. Appellate Waiver
The Attorney General asserts that Orellana‘s claim is not reviewable because he waived the right to appeal when he pleaded no contest to the felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor criminal threat charges. Orellana contends the appeal is cognizable.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
It is well settled that an express waiver of the right to appeal in a negotiated plea agreement is valid and enforceable, provided that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 393, 399-400 (Cisneros-Ramirez); see People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 278 (conc. & dis. opn. of Danner, J.) (Castellanos); People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1659 (Vargas).) “Just as a defendant may affirmatively waive constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to the privilege against self-incrimination, and to counsel as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement, so also may a defendant waive the right to appeal as part of the agreement.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 (Panizzon).) The form of the waiver, which “may be manifested either orally or in
writing” (ibid.) is not determinative. Rather, a valid and enforceable waiver of the right to appeal depends on the defendant having entered into the waiver knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (ibid.)
Deciding whether there has been a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver requires courts to examine “‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
“The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80.) The burden is on the party claiming the existence of the waiver to prove it by evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation. (Vargas, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.)
2. Forfeiture
We dispose at the outset with Orellana‘s assertion that the People in this case forfeited any argument on appeal concerning the appellate waiver by failing to oppose Orellana‘s request for conduct credit in the trial court on that basis. Orellana argues that because the prosecution contested his motion for conduct credit on the merits without
reference to the appellate waiver, it is precluded from raising the claim on appeal. While it is true that failure to raise an objection in the trial court can result in forfeiture of that claim on appeal, the doctrine is not absolute and we are “generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) As discussed in detail below, the oral appellate waiver
3. Plea Agreement Terms
We next consider Orellana‘s argument that his putative waiver of appellate rights was not valid or enforceable. Whether the appellate waiver extends to the issue on appeal and represents a bargained-for term of the negotiated plea agreement requires us to examine the terms of the plea agreement and waiver. As noted ante, we look to the totality of the circumstances pertaining to any waiver of the statutory right to appeal. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 189, fn. 18.)
As there was no written plea agreement nor signed waivers, the record of the plea agreement and related waivers is contained entirely in the transcript of the plea hearing on May 26, 2020.
At the hearing, the trial court first obtained the parties’ consent to remote appearances by videoconference (due to the COVID-19 pandemic) and reviewed the proposed amendment to the charges and the agreed-upon disposition with Orellana and counsel for both sides. The trial court set forth the parties’ agreement as follows. “[M]y understanding is that, Mr. Orellana, you‘re prepared to enter no contest pleas to the newly
added Count 4 and Count 5. The understanding would be that you‘re entering the no-contest pleas in return for a stipulated or agreed-upon sentence of two years, the middle term, as to Count 4. That is a sentence that you would serve in the county jail, pursuant to
The prosecutor and defense counsel each confirmed that the trial court‘s understanding as articulated on the record was correct. The trial court then addressed Orellana in the following colloquy. “THE COURT: Mr. Orellana, is that your understanding of what‘s going to happen with your cases? [¶] THE
After ascertaining that Orellana‘s change of plea was voluntary and that he understood the potential immigration consequences, the trial court conducted voir dire regarding Orellana‘s waiver of constitutional rights. That colloquy, which we examine more closely in our discussion of the validity of the appellate waiver, post, included the following exchange. “THE COURT: It‘s my understanding that you‘re giving up the right to appeal the conviction, judgment and any other orders previously issued by this Court. Is that correct? [¶] THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [¶] THE COURT: Do you give up your federal and state right to appeal in this matter? THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The trial court then summarized the maximum possible jail terms for counts 4 and 5, to which Orellana had agreed to plead, restitution, and the right to withdraw the plea at sentencing if the sentencing judge did not agree with the terms. The court asked Orellana, “Do you have any questions that you would like to ask your attorney or the Court before you enter your plea?” Orellana responded, “No, that‘s fine the way it is, that‘s perfect.” After giving counsel for both sides an opportunity to place on the record “any other admonitions or consequences applicable,” the court took Orellana‘s pleas of no contest to counts 4 and 5. Orellana‘s counsel joined in the waiver and the pleas and stated the factual basis for the pleas.
4. Validity of the Appellate Waiver
In order for us to consider on appeal his challenge to the trial court‘s calculation of credits, Orellana must demonstrate either that (1) the issue on appeal concerning conduct credit falls outside the scope of the appellate waiver, or (2) the waiver is invalid. (See People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 192 (Becerra).) For the reasons explained below, we conclude that under the particular facts of this case the waiver is invalid and does not bar our consideration of Orellana‘s substantive claims on appeal.
In analyzing validity, we take guidance from our Supreme Court‘s decision in Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 68. Panizzon involved a defendant‘s attempt to appeal a sentence that was agreed to as part of a negotiated plea deal. The high court interpreted the defendant‘s challenge to his agreed-upon sentence to be an attack on the validity of the plea agreement and held that the claim
appeal would not be reviewable because the terms of the waiver of appellate rights “specifically extended to any right to appeal” the negotiated sentence. (Id. at p. 86.) The Supreme Court rejected the defendant‘s argument that he had not been properly admonished regarding his waiver of the right to appeal, reasoning that even without a specific admonishment by the trial court, the written waiver and in-court-questioning of the defendant and counsel raised no doubts that the defendant understood his rights and the consequences of his no contest plea. (Id. at pp. 83-84.)
Courts since Panizzon have operated with the understanding that “[a]bsent something in the record raising a doubt [the] defendant understood and knowingly waived his appeal rights, a written waiver of those rights by [the] defendant, coupled with [the] defendant‘s and his attorney‘s attestations to the court that [the] defendant understood and voluntarily relinquished each right, is sufficient to establish a defendant‘s waiver of his right to appeal was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” (Cisneros-Ramirez, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 400, citing Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 83-84.)
Orellana submits that this case raises such a doubt because the record shows the appellate waiver was not part of the agreement negotiated by the parties but instead was a separate condition unilaterally imposed by the trial court. He points out that in reviewing the agreed-upon terms of the plea change with the parties and verifying “those [are] the terms and conditions upon which you‘re willing to plead no contest,” there was no mention of an appellate waiver. Only later in the proceeding did the court raise the waiver of appellate rights and state its “understanding” that Orellana was agreeing to give up those rights. Orellana likens this appellate waiver to “judicial plea bargaining” and argues that the court effectively imposed a condition on the defendant apart from the “give and take” agreed to by the parties during plea negotiations.
The Attorney General disputes this characterization and argues the record confirms the validity of the appellate waiver. According to the Attorney General, the trial
court‘s omission of the appellate waiver from its recitation of the terms and conditions of the plea agreement was “obviously an oversight,” and if the trial court had sought to impose a term of waiver that was not part of the plea-bargained agreement between the defense and the
The parties appear to agree that to be valid, Orellana‘s waiver of the right to appeal must be a term of the bargained-for agreement between the prosecution and the defense. Indeed, “[a]ppellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 186, italics added; see Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80 [reiterating that defendants may waive the right to appeal “as a consequence of a negotiated plea agreement“].) The bargained-for requirement relates closely to the predicate that a valid waiver comprises the “intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.” (Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.)
The analysis in Panizzon is illustrative. In ascertaining whether the defendant‘s waiver of the right to appeal was valid, the Supreme Court reviewed the record to determine whether the defendant had been properly informed of his rights and the consequences of his no contest plea. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 83.) The court noted that even in the absence of an admonishment by the trial court regarding the right to appeal, “the waiver and plea agreement signed by [the] defendant and his attorney contains defendant‘s representations . . . that he had discussed with his attorney both the paragraph specifying the sentence to be imposed and the paragraph containing the waiver of the right to appeal the sentence, and that he fully understood all matters set forth in the document without exception.” (Id. at p. 84.) The court additionally noted that the written
waiver and plea agreement reflected the defense counsel‘s representation “that he personally went over the document with [the] defendant and concurred in [his] decision to waive the rights specified in the document,” as well as the fact that at the in-court hearing, the defendant and his attorney both “attested to the document‘s valid execution” and responded to the court‘s questions, raising “no doubts as to [the] defendant‘s understanding of his rights and the consequences of his no contest plea.” (Ibid.) Our high court viewed this record as demonstrating an enforceable waiver of the right to appeal the sentence. (Ibid.)
The plea agreement and waiver of the defendant‘s right to appeal in Panizzon included several safeguards that—by comparison—are absent from the record in this case. Most notably, we proceed in our independent review of the record without the benefit of any written plea agreement or signed appellate waiver. The trial court‘s oral statement summarizing its understanding of the appellate waiver and obtaining Orellana‘s on-the-record assent
Although a written plea agreement is not required to establish an enforceable waiver, its absence under the circumstances of this case undermines any conclusion that the appellate waiver was indeed a fully informed, bargained-for term of the plea
agreement. We decline to draw that inference where, as here, the support in the record for the waiver of the right to appeal is limited to a short, oral colloquy between the defendant and the judge after the judge had already set forth the “terms and conditions upon which [Orellana was] willing to plead no contest to.” While it is true that the trial court thereafter invited Orellana to ask questions or state any concerns to the trial court or his counsel, Orellana‘s failure to do so does not affirmatively demonstrate a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the right.
In making this determination, we are mindful that the burden is on the party seeking to enforce the waiver to prove it was clearly established by evidence in the record. (Castellanos, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 272.) “[D]oubtful cases will be resolved against a waiver.” (Vargas, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662.) We conclude that the record in this case falls short of establishing the validity and enforceability of Orellana‘s appellate waiver.6 We therefore consider his appeal from the trial court‘s sentencing order rejecting his equal protection claim to additional conduct credit.
B. Conduct Credit
As he did in the trial court, Orellana contends he is entitled to an award of conduct credit under
1. Conduct Credit Eligibility During Treatment for Incompetence
Historically—that is, prior to the recent legislative changes discussed herein—
In Waterman, the California Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the denial of
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature in Senate Bill 1187 rejected in part this view by modifying the statutory framework governing conduct credit eligibility during incompetency treatment by amending
due to a commitment for mental incompetence. As amended,
Of particular relevance here, the amendment to
In October 2021, while Orellana‘s appeal was pending in this court but after he had been restored to competence and been sentenced, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 317, which, inter alia, further amended
The plain meaning of this provision is that, as of January 1, 2022, defendants undergoing treatment for incompetence in a state hospital are eligible for
Legislative Counsel‘s Digest for Senate Bill 317,7 the bill “extend[s] the application of conduct credits to persons confined in a state hospital or other mental health treatment facility pending their return of mental competency.” (Legis. Counsel‘s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 317 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2021, ch. 599.)
Having set out the statutory context, we now turn to Orellana‘s arguments that the trial court erred by failing to award him conduct credit under
Penal statutes are generally presumed to apply prospectively unless they expressly state otherwise. (See Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 287;
Nevertheless, under Estrada, “an amendatory statute lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final judgment as of the amendatory statute‘s effective date.” (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 Cal.4th 179, 184, citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744 (Estrada).) Estrada thus presents “an important, contextually specific qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate
prospectively.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 323.) “Whether a statute operates prospectively or retroactively is, at least in the first instance, a matter of legislative intent. When the Legislature has not made its intent on the matter clear with respect to a particular statute, the Legislature‘s generally applicable declaration in
The parties dispute the relevance of Senate Bill 317 to this appeal. Orellana contends that the new law applies to his case under Estrada as an ameliorative statute intended to address an unfairness in the awarding of conduct credits. The Attorney General argues it does not, citing the California Supreme Court‘s decision in Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th 314, which addressed a prior modification to
In Brown, the Supreme Court considered whether a former version of
p. 745, italics added) and the corollary inference that the Legislature intended the lesser penalty to apply to crimes already committed. In contrast, a statute increasing the rate at which prisoners may earn credits for good behavior does not represent a judgment about the needs of the criminal law with respect to a particular criminal offense, and thus does not support an analogous inference of retroactive intent. . . . [A] prisoner who earns no conduct credits serves the full sentence originally imposed. Instead of addressing punishment for past criminal conduct, the statute addresses future conduct in a custodial setting by providing increased incentives for good behavior.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. omitted.)
Moreover, the court in Brown squarely rejected the argument advanced here by Orellana that courts should infer legislative intent of retroactive application from a statute that equalizes credits among different groups of defendants. The court stated, “Defendant suggests the Legislature‘s desire to reduce punishment through former
We recognize that the California Supreme Court in recent years has expanded the scope of Estrada beyond the somewhat limited terrain described in Brown.8 However,
the California Supreme Court continues to cite Brown with approval when describing the principles of retroactivity. The
Brown thus remains authoritative, and we conclude it is controlling here. “The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329.) As in Brown, the language of Senate Bill 317 and relevant legislative history provide no indication of retroactive intent. (See Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Also, similar to Brown, the statutory amendment does not mitigate or lessen the penalty for a particular crime or offense but rather facilitates the accrual of conduct credits by extending
Orellana contends that Brown is distinguishable because instead of increasing the rate of the conduct credit award—a result the Supreme Court interpreted was intended to serve as a forward-looking incentive to encourage good behavior (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325)—Senate Bill 317 is “plainly intended to address an unfairness in the recent prior amendment to
Orellana‘s argument overlooks a distinction the California Supreme Court deemed critical in Brown—that between custody credits and conduct credits. As the court stated in Brown, citing Kapperman as one example,
for a particular crime’ (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, 745).” (Brown, at p. 326.) Brown‘s analysis of retroactivity and equal protection (which we explore further below) thus rested on the fundamental premise that
In denying the retroactive applicability of the changes to
Although Orellana contends here that the purpose of Senate Bill 317 is to address an unfairness in affording conduct credits to individuals
For example, the June 18, 2018, Assembly Committee on Public Safety‘s bill summary states that Senate Bill 1187 “[r]educes the maximum term for commitment to a treatment facility when a defendant has been found incompetent to stand trial (IST)” and “[s]pecifies that when a defendant has been found IST and is held in a county jail treatment center while undergoing treatment for restoration for competency, that person is entitled to custody credits in the same manner as any other inmate confined to a county jail.” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 2018, p. 1, italics added.)
The June 18, 2018 Assembly Committee analysis explained that Senate Bill 1187 “would ensure that an individual that has been found IST and continues to be held and treated in a county jail, earns credits in the same manner and at the same rate as an individual in a county jail that is not IST.” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 18, 2018, p. 5, italics added.) Or, as stated in an earlier Senate Committee on Public Safety analysis, Senate Bill 1187 “mandates equal credits-earning by committed incompetent persons who are detained in county jail facilities.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 19, 2018, p. 5, italics added.)
The summary of Senate Bill 317 by the author similarly states, “‘SB 317 ensures incompetent defendants are eligible for the same time served credit for good conduct as their competent counterparts, while receiving treatment in any treatment facility or as an outpatient, not just a county jail treatment.‘” (Sen. Bill No. 317, 3d reading Sept. 1, 2021, Assem. Floor Analysis (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) pp. 1-2, italics added.)
reach the same conclusion. We hold that Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively to Orellana, who had completed his restoration to competence in the state hospital long before enactment of this legislation.
Our analysis does not end with the determination that Senate Bill 317 applies only prospectively. Orellana asserts, independent of his Estrada claim for retroactive application of the statute, that the passage of Senate Bill 317 provides irrefutable support for his equal protection claim. He contends that by righting the disparity in entitlement to
We analyze the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and the California Constitution, which are substantially equivalent, in a similar fashion. (
“This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.‘” (Ibid., italics omitted.) For reasons similar to the retroactivity analysis set out above, we decide the California Supreme Court‘s decision in Brown forecloses Orellana‘s equal protection challenge.
The California Supreme Court in Brown rejected an equal protection challenge to the denial of custody credits at the increased rate under review for individuals who had served their time before enactment of the changes to
effect and could choose to modify their behavior accordingly.‘” (Id. at p. 329, quoting Strick, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 913.)
The California Supreme Court in Brown also expressly distinguished the decisions in Sage, supra, 26 Cal.3d 498 and Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d 542 (on which Orellana relies in this appeal) in reaching its conclusion that detainees who had already served their custodial time before the statute went into effect were not similarly situated to current detainees. As described above, Kapperman involved an equal protection challenge to custody—not conduct credits—and therefore was inapplicable. “Credit for time served is given without regard to behavior, and thus does not entail the paradoxical consequences of applying retroactively a statute intended to create incentives for good behavior. Kapperman does not hold or suggest that prisoners serving time before and after the effective date of a statute authorizing conduct credits are similarly situated.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 330.) The court in Brown rejected the relevance of Sage because the court in the latter case did not consider that “conduct credits, by their nature, must apply prospectively to motivate good behavior.” (Ibid.) “As cases are not authority for propositions not considered [citation], we decline to read Sage for more than it expressly holds.” (Ibid.)
We recognize that Orellana frames his equal protection argument differently from the analysis in Brown. He focuses not on any temporal distinction between defendants who received competency treatment in state hospitals prior to and after the passage of legislation extending conduct credits to that group, but instead on the purported absence of any rational basis for distinguishing between defendants whose treatment for restoration to competence takes place in county jails versus state hospitals. Orellana‘s comparison framework might be persuasive were we writing on a clean slate. However,
history that suggests the Legislature rejected the forward-looking nature of the incentive structure of
Under Brown, entitlement to conduct credits is directed at ”future conduct in a custodial setting” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325) and effectively precludes the court from deeming two groups similarly situated for purposes of earning conduct credits when the time in custody preceded the availability of incentive based credits. (Id. at pp. 325-328.) We therefore decline to adopt Orellana‘s position that, as a practical matter, presentence conduct credits are awarded in full unless the prosecution or probation authorities takes steps to reduce or eliminate the credits award. Instead, we conclude the Supreme Court‘s analysis of any constitutional basis for extending entitlement to
Orellana urges that given the changes under Senate Bill 317, this court should apply a similar analysis to that in Yanez, in which the court upheld an equal protection challenge to differential access to conduct credit for pretrial versus posttrial time spent in home detention under electronic monitoring. (Yanez, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.) However, Yanez did not analyze Brown in any detail and expressly decided that the Attorney General had waived any argument about retroactivity. The court stated, “we note that the People do not argue that pretrial conduct credits could not be applied retroactively to Yanez‘s sentence in any event, even if an equal protection violation were demonstrated. As that question is not before us, we deem it waived for purposes of this appeal and express no opinion as to the propriety of deeming an appellant retroactively eligible for conduct credits on the basis of an equal protection violation and assume for purposes here that such a disposition is warranted.” (Id. at p. 101.) Given this caveat, Yanez does not assist Orellana. Furthermore, inasmuch as the California Supreme Court‘s opinion in Brown addresses questions closely analogous to those presented here, we are bound to follow its dictates. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
Here, as in Brown, the statutory amendment at issue operates prospectively, as decided ante. For purposes of assessing whether that prospective application offends equal protection, we discern no practical difference between the expansion of conduct credits under
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
Greenwood, P.J.
Wilson, J.
H048315
People v. Orellana
Trial Court: County of Monterey
Trial Judge: Hon. Rafael Vazquez
Counsel: William Robinson, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Sixth District Appellate Program, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney, René Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
H048315
People v. Orellana
Notes
At the time of Orellana‘s sentencing in 2020, and as relevant to his motion for conduct credits,
In Kapperman, the California Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an expressly prospective statute that granted credit to felons for time served in local custody before sentencing and commitment to state prison. (Kapperman, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 544-545.) The court concluded that equal protection required the retroactive application of the statute to “eliminate the discriminatory classification . . . and thus extend the statutory benefits retroactively to those whom the Legislature improperly excluded.” (Id. at p. 545.)