Lead Opinion
Opinion
Defendant pleaded guilty to false imprisonment with violence or menace. (Pen. Code, §§ 236, 237.)
In asserting a right to presentence conduct credit, defendant relies primarily upon section 4019. His reliance is misplaced. Defendant is not entitled to conduct credit under section 4019 for the period of his treat
In the alternative, defendant bases his claim for presentence conduct credit upon section 2931. Again his reliance is misplaced. Section 2931 applies only to conduct credit earned while in prison. Finally, assuming arguendo that his claim is not supported by any statutory authority, defendant contends he is thereby denied equal protection of the laws.
While we uphold the Legislature’s refusal to allow presentence conduct credit for time served under an MDSO commitment, we conclude defendant’s еqual protection claim is meritorious as it relates to presentence jail time.
Sections 2900.5 and 4019
Under section 2900.5 a defendant receives credit toward his term of imprisonment for time in custody prior to commencement of sentence. Subdivision (a) of that section provides in pertinent part; “In all felony and misdemeanor convictions. .. when the defendant has been in custody ... all days of custody... including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order, and including days credited to the period of confinement pursuant to section 4019, shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment....” (Italics added.)
Section 4019 authоrizes good behavior and work performance credit for certain prisoners confined in city or county jails, industrial farms or road camps.
The credit provisions of section 4019 apply to three types of commitments. Subsection (1) of subdivision (a) deals with a term Under a judgment of imprisonment, while subsеction (2) concerns a term served as a condition of probation, and subsection (3) applies to a “definite” term of confinement for contempt.
Defendant does not contend that either subsection (2) or subsection (3) of subdivision (a) is applicable here.
The last clause of subsection (1) “under a judgment of imprisonment ...” modifies the introductory clause “When a prisoner is confined or committed...” This parallels the structure of subsections (2) and (3), both of which begin with the same introductory clause as subsection (1) but close with the qualifiers “as a condition of probation.. .” and “for a definite period of time for contempt...” respectively.
With exceptions not applicable here, a prisoner is confined in jail “under a judgment of imprisonment” only when sentenced in а misdemeanor proceeding. (See In re Haines (1925)
Section 2931
In the alternative, defendant relies on section 2931.
Moreover, defendant overlooks language in sections 2930, 2931 and 2932 clearly indicating that the Legislature contemplated the credits governed by these sections would be earned in prison. Section 2930 requires that an inmate be advised within 14 days of his reception in prison of the possibility of receiving credits, and be advised within 14 days of his arrival at the prison to which he is ultimately assigned of the programs offered there. Section 2931 provides in subdivision (a) that the inmate be given a document signed by a prison official at the time of compliance with section 2930 “outlining the conditions which the inmate shall meet to receive the credit,” and provides in subdivision (c) that one-fourth of the possible credit “shall be based solely upon participation in work, educational, vocational, therapeutic or other prison activities.” Subdivision (b) of section 2931 limits credit to four months for each eight months served “in prison.” Section 2932, subdivision (a), sets forth the procedure to be followed whenever the Department of Corrections seeks to deny credit because of misbehavior or failure to participate. That the department could not follow this procedure with regard to incidents occurring during presentence confinement in county jail is another indication that section 2931 does not grant credit for such periods.
Equal Protection
Regarding the period of his treatment as an MDSO, defendant’s equal protection claim is foreclosed by our recent decision in People v. Saffell (1979)
Under section 4019, a pretrial detainee eventually convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to county jаil, hereinafter referred to-as a “detainee/misdemeanant, ” receives conduct credit against that sentence for his presentence jail time. Under section 2931, a defendant who makes bail or is released on his own recognizance, then is tried, convicted of a felony and sentenced to state prison receives conduct credit against his full sentence. Only the presentence detainee eventually sentenced to prison, the “detainee/felon,” does not receive, conduct credit against his full sentence, because he is denied conduct credit for his presentence confinement. It is the distinction between the detainee/felon and the felon who serves no presentence time that raises equal protection problems.
In their petition for hearing the People seek to justify this distinction on three grounds: “First, pretrial detainees are presumed innocent, and as this Court observed, ‘[T]he state [cannot] presume to rehabilitate persons clothed in the presumption of innocence.’ [Citing People v. Olivas (1976)
Each of the grounds advanced by the People for denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/felons might also be given for denying such
In conclusion, the People have not suggested, nor has our independent research revealed, a rational basis for, much less a compelling state interest in, denying presentence conduct credit to detainee/felons.
Penal Code section 2900.5 imposes on the sentencing court the obligation to determine the number of days of custody and, in those cases
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
Statutory references are to sections of the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
According to defendant, 270 of the 327 days were spent in the state hospital and the remaining 57 days in the county jail. According to the People, defendant spent 275 dаys in the hospital and 52 days in jail.
Section 4019 provides: “(a) The provisions of this section shall apply in all of the following cases: [¶] (1) When a prisoner is confined in or committed to a county jail,
See also Welfare and Institutions Code section 6316.1, subdivision (a), providing thаt an MDSO’s maximum term of confinement is not to be reduced by conduct credit.
Section 2931 provides: “(a) In any case in which an inmate was sentenced to the state prison pursuant to Section 1170, or if he committed a felony before July 1, 1977, and he would have been sentenced under section 1170 if the felony had been committed after July 1, 1977, the Department of Corrections shall have the authority to reduce
McGinnis v. Royster (1973)
McGinnis is distinguishable on the ground that in California, unlike New York, conduct credit is not related to a discretionary grant of parole. Moreover, our Legislature has determined that conduct credit is to be awarded for some jail time served prior to commitment to prison, namely, time served as a condition of probation, regardless of whether jail rehabilitation programs are less adequate than those in state prison. However, the most significant ground upon which McGinnis should be distinguished is that the high court reviewed the equal protection claim in that case under the rаtional basis standard, whereas this court in Saffell applied the compelling state interest test. There is no reason to believe the high court would have upheld the New York statute had it applied the stricter standard.
Inasmuch as the same equal protection concerns as those underlying this court’s decision in In re Kapperman, supra,
The apparent purpose of the 1978 amendment to section 2900.5 extending the right to conduct credit to felons confined in jail was elimination of the disparity in total time served by those prisoners whо, because part of their custody was in presentence jail detention, could not earn conduct credit to reduce their full term. That purpose would not
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court except insofar as the rule announced today is given retroactive effect. The purpose of conduct credit is to foster good behavior and satisfactory work performance. (People v. Saffell (1979)
Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which endorses the government’s unequal handling of similarly situated individuals. The majority find there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution even though some mentally disordered prisoners are given credit for time served in state hospital custody and others are not.
Under the California Administrative and Penal Codes a “mentally ill, mentally deficient, or insane” prison inmate, who is transferred from prison to a state mеntal hospital for treatment, is eligible for behavior and participation credits for that portion of his term that is spent in a hospital.
Further, a “mentally disordered” person, who is in a county or city jail, is entitled to behavior and participation credits for time spent in an inpatient facility under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. (Pen. Code, § 4011.6. )
Citing People v. Saffell (1979)
In Saffell, this court held that the length of an MDSO’s initial commitment period was justified by “a dual compelling state interest in providing effective treatment for those disposed to the commission of [sex offenses] while, at the same time, assuring the safety of the public.” (People v. Saffell, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 232-233.) In particular, “the compelling state interest...[in] the effective treatment of MDSOs” justified the legislative determination not to apply behavior and participation credits to MDSO commitments. (Id., at p. 235.) However, that rationale does not apply to an MDSO, who is not amenable to treatment, is incarcerated in a state prison, and seeks reduction of his prison sentence.
The state can have no interest in the “treatment” of such a person since he is not amenable. The court in Saffell recognized this fact since it stated that “commitment as an MDSO is primarily for treatment,” for the law “contemplates that the only MDSOs who may be confined for the ‘maximum term of confinement’ [i.e., the longest term of imprisonment with no behavior and participation credits] are those whom the court finds ‘could benefit by treatment in a state hospital or other mental health facility.. ..’ (§ 6316, italics added.) The individual who is determined to be an MDSO but who is not amenable to treatment is to be returned to the criminal court for disposition of the charges against him.” (Id., at p. 229.)
This court in Saffell recognized that “‘[n]ot only is medical treatment the raison d’etre of the mentally disordered sex offender law, it is
Other mentally disordered inmates are not denied behavior and participation credits against their prison terms for postsentence time served in mental institutions. (Pen. Code, §§ 2684, 2685.) What compelling interest justifies such a distinction between presentence and рostsentence time spent in state hospitals? Even prisoners in the county jail are statutorily entitled to behavior and participation credits for presentence time spent in mental health facilities under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. (Pen. Code, §§ 2900.5, 4019, 4011.6.) What possible justification is there for this disparity of treatment between inmates of the county jail and those in state prison?
What possible compelling state interest is there in giving special inducement to MDSOs transferred from state prison to a state hospital to behave, while withholding the same inducement from MDSOs transferred from a state hospital to a state prison? What possible cоmpelling reason is there to grant participation credits to state prison inmates who are mentally unable to participate in specially designed “participation” programs, and to deny the same credits to MDSOs confined in state hospitals? Saffell does not provide the answers to these questions.
It is clear that there are no compelling state interests which would justify the disparate treatment of mentally disordered individuals who
In practice, a state prison inmate is given credit for good behavior shortly after his arrival at prison. He forfeits these credits only if he commits specifically enumerated acts of misbehavior. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 15, §§ 3005, subd. (c), 3323.) There is no provision for forfeiture of behavior credits for transfer to a state hospital. Further, every inmate is given credit for participating in a work, vocational, therapeutic, or educational program. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 15, §§ 3040, subd. (c), 3042.) These credits are forfeited if an inmate refuses or fails to participate. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 15, § 3043, subd. (a).) Participation credits, however, are not forfeited if failure to participate is due to “reasons which are beyond the inmate’s control." This would include “mental inability to participate.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 15, § 3043, subd. (c)(3).)
These credits for participation and good behávior are authorized by Penal Code section 2685, which provides that “[t]he time passed at the state hospital” by a prison
Appellant was committed to Patton State Hospital. This is one of the hospitals to which a mentally disordered state prison inmate may be transferred. (See Pen. Code, § 2684; see also Cal. Dept. of Corrections, Classification Manual, § 3205.)
Penal Code section 4011.6 permits the transfer of an inmate of a county or city jail to a mental health facility when it appears he may be mentally disordered. The statute specifically provides that “the time passed therein shall count as part of the prisoner’s sentence.”
Since the quoted language of seсtion 4011.6 is virtually identical to that in section 2685 (see ante, fn. 1), it follows that this section authorizes a county jail prisoner to receive as much credit for time spent in a mental health facility as he would have earned if he remained in the county jail where he does receive participation and behavior credits. (Pen. Code, §§ 2900.5, 4019; see also maj. opn., ante, at pp. 505-507.)
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the Chief Justice’s opinion, except that, as I indicated in People v. Saffel (1979)
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 30, 1980, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 1980. Bird, C.J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.