THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VINCENT MEDRANO, Defendant and Appellant.
2d Crim. No. B324567
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SIX
Filing 1/22/24 (opinion on rehearing)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Super. Ct. No. CR28216) (Ventura County); OPINION ON REHEARING
In 1991 appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with a multiple-death special-circumstances finding (
In 2019 appellant filed his first
In the present appeal we conclude that the above holding is the law of the case and conclusively establishes at the prima facie stage that appellant is not entitled to resentencing based on his second
Our conclusion may be at variance with the holding of People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden): “[P]rior to [an evidentiary] hearing under
Facts
The following facts are taken from Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 179: Appellant and Carlos Vargas purchased a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Appellant “scored” the “tip” of the rifle‘s bullets in the belief that “the scoring would make the bullets more explosive.” As overt act No. 7 underlying the conspiracy charge, the jury found that appellant, Vargas, Edward Throop, and Joseph Scholle had “discussed among themselves committing a drive-by shooting.”2 Vargas drove them to Cabrillo Village in Ventura County. “Throop held the rifle and sat in the back seat next to
Senate Bill No. 1437 Eliminated the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine as a Basis for Murder Liability
Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437) became effective on January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) It “imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (
Section 1172.6 and Its Legislative History
Effective January 1, 2022,
After a
If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner‘s eligibility for relief. (
Our 2021 Medrano Opinion
In our 2021 opinion we noted that “[t]he jury [at appellant‘s trial] was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 182.) Despite this instruction, we concluded: “The prosecutor met his burden [at the evidentiary hearing] of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that [appellant] is ineligible for resentencing.’ (
Appellant filed a second
The People‘s Opposition and the Trial Court‘s Ruling
In opposition to appellant‘s second
The Law of the Case Doctrine
“‘The doctrine of the law of the case is this: That where, upon an appeal, the [reviewing] court, in deciding the appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and in any subsequent suit for the same cause of action . . . .’ The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters [citations] . . . .” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 786.) “We will apply the law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was ‘actually presented and determined by the court.’” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.) But “the doctrine will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a ‘manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice’ [citation], or the controlling rules of law
Applicability of the Law of the Case Doctrine at the Prima Facie Stage of a Section 1172.6 Proceeding
Appellant claims the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable at the prima facie stage of a
In an earlier appeal from Harden‘s judgment of conviction, the Court of Appeal had “determined [that at Harden‘s 2001 trial] there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Harden‘s role was anything other than that of [the] actual killer.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) The Court of Appeal concluded that this determination was not the law of the case. It credited Harden‘s argument, which was as follows: “[The] law of the case [doctrine] cannot be invoked where there is a ‘substantial difference in the evidence’ on retrial of the particular issue. [Citation.] . . . [I]f at [an evidentiary] hearing under subdivision (d) of
Appellant asserts, ”Harden precludes the court from invoking the law of the case doctrine at the prima facie stage because it is unclear what the evidence will be at an evidentiary hearing that has yet to occur. [Appellant] may present evidence at the evidentiary hearing that contradicts [this court‘s] conclusion [in our 2021 opinion] that [he] harbored an intent to kill.”
Unlike Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, in Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 177, we were not concerned with an appellate court‘s prior determination of the sufficiency of the evidence at appellant‘s trial. Instead, we were concerned with the effect of the jury‘s finding that appellant was guilty of both first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. We enunciated the following principle of law: “[S]ection [1172.6] relief is unavailable to a petitioner concurrently convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder where both convictions involve the same victim” because the “[c]onviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder shows, as a matter of law, that the ‘target offense’ is murder . . . .” (Id. at p. 179.) This principle of law necessarily applies where, as here, the petitioner has also been concurrently convicted of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder and both convictions involve the same victim.
At a
This principle of law was not altered by S.B. 775‘s amendment of
Each charge and conviction for a separate count stands or falls on its own. (People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1657.) Thus, even if there were some instructional error as to the murder and attempted murder counts, it could not be used to impeach the jury‘s finding of intent to kill as to the conspiracy count. This finding is as true today as it was in 1991 when the jury returned its guilty verdicts.
Appellant‘s Claim that Our 2021 Medrano Opinion Conflicts with Our 1994 Opinion
Appellant argues, “[T]he law of the case doctrine should not apply at all in this case [because we] rendered two irreconcilable opinions on the issue of whether the jury found that [he had] harbored the specific intent to kill.” The two opinions – our 2021 opinion and our 1994 opinion in appellant‘s direct appeal from the judgment of conviction – are not in conflict. In our 2021 opinion we rejected appellant‘s similar contention. We noted that in the 1994 opinion “[w]e did not consider whether, by convicting appellant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the jury necessarily found that he had harbored the specific intent to kill.” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 186.)
Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine Will Not Result in an Unjust Decision
Appellant has not shown that, by applying the law of the case doctrine, we would be shutting our eyes to a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice. As our Supreme Court observed: “[A]ll conspiracy to commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first degree murder.” (People v. Beck & Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641-642.) “[A] conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill . . . .” (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)
At our request, the parties filed supplemental letter briefs discussing the applicability of Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, to the issue of whether appellant made a prima facie case for relief. In his supplemental brief appellant asserts, “[T]he law of the case doctrine should not bar [him] from making a prima facie case for relief based on Curiel.” We disagree. Curiel is distinguishable.
In 2006 a jury convicted Curiel of first degree murder and found true a gang-murder special-circumstance allegation (
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal‘s judgment reversing the trial court‘s decision. The Supreme Court stated: “We hold only that under the jury instructions here, the findings the jury must have made are insufficient to conclusively establish that Curiel is liable for murder under current law. The jury could have relied on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to convict Curiel of murder, and the findings required under that theory—even when combined with the finding of intent to kill required by the gang-murder special circumstance—do not encompass all of the elements of any theory of murder under current law. These findings were therefore insufficient to rebut Curiel‘s allegation that he could not be convicted of murder under current law, and the trial court erred by denying Curiel‘s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471.)
The Supreme Court explained: “Although intent to kill is certainly blameworthy, it is insufficient standing alone to render a person culpable for another‘s acts. The aider and abettor must know the direct perpetrator intends to commit the murder or life- endangering act and intend to aid the direct perpetrator in its commission.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.) “Under the court‘s instructions, the jury was not required to make these findings. Because the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
Unlike Curiel, appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Thus, the target offense was not an underlying offense other than murder, such as assault with a firearm. The target offense was murder. Appellant and his accomplices formed a conspiracy to commit murder during a drive-by shooting. “The mental state elements of conspiracy require the prosecution to demonstrate the defendant had the specific intent both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the object offense.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 164.) As we stated in Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 184, “First degree murder was the object of the conspiracy, not the natural and probable consequence of an act committed to further the object of the conspiracy.” (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 123 [“For a conspiracy to commit murder, intent to commit the target offense means an intent to kill“].)
Accordingly, the jury must have found that appellant knew his co-conspirator, Throop, intended to commit murder and that appellant intended to aid Throop in committing murder. The jury was instructed, “‘A conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit the public offense of first degree murder and with the further specific intent to commit such offense . . . .’” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 185, fn. 4.)
Because the facts, jury instructions, and verdicts in the present case are different from those in Curiel, the Supreme Court‘s holding in Curiel is of no
Disposition
The order denying appellant‘s second
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
Michele M. Castillo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William Quest, Snr. Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.