THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC SANCHEZ LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
G063854 (Super. Ct. No. 13NF2674)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
March 20, 2025
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS. California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Beatriz M. Gordon, Judge. Affirmed.
No Appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Eric Sanchez Lopez appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing.
We appointed counsel to represent Lopez. Counsel informed us in his declaration he conducted an analysis of potential appellate issues, and that the case was also reviewed by a staff attorney at Appellate Defenders, Inc. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to the procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) (and consistent with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738). While not arguing against his client, counsel set forth the facts of the case and asked this court to conduct its own independent review of the appellate record, which we have done. Counsel also directed our attention to this possible issue: “Did the trial court improperly deny appellant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6?”
Counsel advised Lopez of his right to file a written argument on his own behalf; he has not done so. We nonetheless exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
After reviewing the entire record de novo, we affirm the trial court’s determination that Lopez is ineligible for the sentencing relief he seeks.
FACTS
In 2015, Lopez pleaded guilty to attempted murder (
Lopez executed the standard Tahl2 form at the time he entered his guilty pleas. That form included this factual basis for the attempted murder plea: “In Orange County, California, on August 3, 2013, I did unlawfully, and with the specific intent to kill, attempt to murder John Doe, a human being.”
In July 2023, Lopez filed a petition pursuant to
The trial court appointed the Public Defender to represent Lopez. The Associate Defender was thereafter appointed due to a conflict. The District Attorney filed a written response to the petition. The Associate Defender filed a reply. The trial court then conducted a hearing in February 2024. The court denied the petition in a written ruling.
Lopez appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order.
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Sente Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Senate Bill 1437) to limit the scope of the traditional felony-murder rule; the new legislation also eliminated the natural and probable consequences theory for murder. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Pursuant to that legislation, murder liability can no longer be “‘imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, [who] did not act with the intent to kill, or [who] was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Lewis, at p. 959). Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, extended the same restrictions to attempted murder and manslaughter.
In the factual basis for his guilty plea, Lopez admitted that when he “attempt[ed] to murder John Doe,” he harbored “the specific intent to kill” his victim. A defendant who acts with the intent to kill is among those expressly excluded from the Legislature’s new sentencing guidelines. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) “If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) So it is here. The trial court correctly found that Lopez is statutorily ineligible for resentencing relief.
After reviewing the entire record, we have found no other arguable appellate issue.
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
I CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIC SANCHEZ LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
G063854 (Super. Ct. No. 13NF2674)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
March 20, 2025
I agree with the majority that the outcome of this appeal hinges on whether the record of conviction conclusively establishes defendant Eric Sanchez Lopez is ineligible for resentencing relief under
A guilty plea is “a judicial admission of every element of the offense charged.” (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.) It “is the equivalent of a conviction,” and by pleading guilty a defendant waives a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. (People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574; In re Troy Z. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1170, 1180–1181.)
Relevant here, attempted murder is generally comprised of two elements, namely “(1) a specific intent to kill and (2) a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 605.) Unlike murder, because attempted murder requires express malice, it “cannot be proved based upon a showing of implied malice.” (Ibid.)
After legislative changes to the murder statutes which took effect in January 2019, the natural and probable consequences doctrine may no longer be used to convict someone of attempted murder, among other crimes. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) In contrast, direct perpetrator and direct aider and abettor theories of liability remain viable. (See Curiel, at p. 462; Coley, at p. 548.)
By including in his factual basis that he acted “with the specific intent to kill,” Lopez made a factual admission of possessing a specific intent to kill. This was sufficient to conclusively establish one element of attempted murder. (See People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 466.) It removes any possibility that his admitted liability was premised on imputed malice.
But, contrary to the majority’s position, “an intent to kill finding does not itself conclusively establish that a petitioner is ineligible for relief” under
Lopez’s record of conviction does not conclusively establish the actus reus element of a still-valid theory attempted murder. In the factual basis, he admitted he “attempted to murder [the victim].” Unlike the word “kill,” the word “murder” is a legal term of art. (See
Under the second meaning, Lopez did not necessarily factually admit he performed a direct but ineffectual act toward the killing. Likewise, he did not necessarily make a factual admission of any act directed toward the killing, as opposed to a target offense, that would have qualified him as a direct aider and abettor. Thus, the record does not rule out the possibility that Lopez simply admitted to an act that made him an aider and abettor on a natural and probable consequences theory. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262 [natural and probable consequences aider and abettor commits act that aids or encourages commission of target crime]; c.f. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467 [in natural and probable consequences situation, act that aids or encourages target crime cannot be said to necessarily also aid or encourage nontarget crime].)
For these reasons, I believe the record of conviction does not conclusively establish all elements of attempted murder under a still-valid theory (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463), and I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Lopez’s resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.
DELANEY, J.