THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CESAR LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
No. A139203
First Dist., Div. Two.
Aug. 18, 2015.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 18, 2015
240 Cal. App. 4th 436
Cynthia D. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
KLINE, P. J.—Cesar Lopez appeals from a conviction of stalking. He contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he made a true threat or that he intended to instill fear in the victim. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information filed on February 13, 2013, with one count of stalking. (
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 8, 2013.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Angie Rizzo met appellant at the Mission Library when she was 16 years old and he was about 26. Rizzo would go to the library after school on Tuesdays to do homework; appellant would help her with her Spanish homework and she would help him with his English. He referred to himself as “Cesar Cold.”
Rizzo saw appellant outside the library on a few occasions: Once they went to the Golden Gate Bridge and walked around the surrounding areas, and once they had lunch at a cafe. Shortly after Rizzo turned 18, they agreed to meet at a bus stop and go to a movie together. Appellant arrived with flowers and wine for Rizzo and she realized he thought it was a romantic date, which was not what she had anticipated. The movie they went to see was “extremely graphically sexual in nature” and throughout, appellant was kissing Rizzo and trying to grope her. She went along with it because she was
After that night, she did not return to see him at the library and did not make any other effort to see him. He called her at her home repeatedly; she tried to avoid his calls. He stopped calling and began sending e-mails several times a week that were angry in tone and “had some sort of accusatory statements along with manifesto like writings,” most of them several thousand words long. The e-mails made Rizzo feel uncomfortable and angry. She did not respond and stopped reading them, and hoped they would end when she left for college.
Rizzo left for college in Los Angeles, but the e-mails did not stop. During her first semester, appellant e-mailed that he was coming to Los Angeles to see family and wanted to get together and talk. She agreed because he was her friend and she wanted to talk to him about the e-mails, to find out “what was going on with him.” When they met, appellant was “different,” “much more distant” and “very quiet.” He did not have much to say about the e-mails and referred to “a lot of esoteric and intellectual concepts” that she felt were of “his own making” and she did not understand. She decided to cut off all communication with him.
About a year later, appellant began sending packages to Rizzo‘s mother‘s address, doing so once or twice a year for five or six years. Rizzo did not know whether he continued to e-mail her because she changed e-mail accounts and eventually stopped checking the one appellant used.
In April 2012, when Rizzo turned 26, she received a birthday card containing a fresh flower in the mail from appellant. In early 2012, she began receiving messages on Facebook from “Crystal Snow Lovestar” that she ignored because she did not know anyone by this name and thought they were spam. In July, however, she opened one of these messages because it had the word “Bernal” on it, which was where she lived. The message included a picture of a labyrinth made of small rocks in the image of Rizzo‘s face. Rizzo recognized the location of the labyrinth as about five blocks from her home, a place where she ran almost daily. It was “extremely large” and the image looked very similar to a portrait appellant had painted of Rizzo back when they were meeting at the library. The picture was labeled “artwork and picture by CSR Cold,” which Rizzo recognized as appellant‘s name, and wording on the labyrinth read “H&M, NG‘s Labyrinth.” Rizzo knew it had to do with her because “NG” sounded like her name, Angie. She did not know what H&M referred to, but later learned it was “heart and mind.”
Rizzo went back to look at the messages she had received from Crystal Snow Lovestar previously. One had an image of flowers near the Golden Gate Bridge, commemorating Rizzo and appellant meeting 10 years before. Looking at the public profile for the Facebook account of Crystal Snow Lovestar, Rizzo saw a picture of appellant. Rizzo also looked at a blog, the link for which had been included in the letter she found on the labyrinth. The blog was about her, with so much content that it took her “pretty powerful” computer “a while” to load, including audio files “about songs with girls with green eyes,” an archive of multiple letters appellant had written to Rizzo, pictures of the “flower commemoration” which appellant was calling an “‘Angiesary‘” commemorating a 10-year anniversary. Rizzo felt “really, really scared and freaked out.” She sent appellant a message on Facebook saying “‘Hi, Cesar. I do not know what you want from me, but what you are doing is making me feel uncomfortable and not safe. Please stop. Why are you doing this?‘”
Two days later, Rizzo received a package from appellant at her mother‘s home that included a “lengthy” letter, several CDs, the Golden Gate Bridge flower picture and some pictures of the labyrinth. The letter began, “‘It has been a long while since the last time I wrote to you. A hobby that I love doing and you dislike reading. I‘m sorry in advance about this one.‘” Asked how she felt reading this, Rizzo testified, “I‘ve gotten so many of these letters that it—for me, it‘s like, here we go again, because almost all the letters are somewhat the same in terms of him just reliving and recounting every single time we ever met. And, again, going into these spiritual-and-manifesto like ramblings.” The letter stated, “Everybody has fears. How about yours? Perhaps one of your fears is reaching—is me reaching or writing you from the distant time space, that is to say, getting back in touch with you. Well, it just became real! What are your [sic] going to do about it, denial, run and
Appellant responded to Rizzo‘s Facebook message asking him to stop contacting her with a message in which he “dismisses the fact that I said I was scared” and “goes on about not stressing myself and . . . should just enjoy how beautiful it is, and how happy he is to hear from me. And he says that he‘ll be there that following weekend at 2:00 p.m.” She did not respond to this message, then received another in which appellant said, “‘You and me will perform a special ceremony at H&M labyrinth to cleansing [sic] any remaining past emotional and psychological harm that we might have caused one another.‘”2 He asked Rizzo to “‘dress all in white, if possible.‘” At this point, Rizzo was “really scared” and, on July 22, she contacted the police. She was only able to provide appellant‘s first name, however, as she did not know where he lived or his phone number.
In early August, Rizzo took her neighbor to see the labyrinth. About 100 yards from the labyrinth, she saw a hooded figure and realized it was appellant. Rizzo grabbed her neighbor‘s arm and they walked away as fast as they could; looking back, Rizzo saw appellant watching them. A few hours later, she got a Facebook message from Crystal Snow Lovestar saying he had seen her with a friend and wanted to talk to her but decided not to. The message said, “‘But should I let die my heart‘s dream to find peace and reconcile us, or do you elect Chestees (phonetic spelling) idea on how to work it out?‘”3
On August 21, appellant sent Rizzo a package containing a CD, a postcard of Vincent Van Gogh with a note on the back, a playlist, a handmade card, and a letter that referred to the police department‘s involvement and indicated he was going to stop contacting her because he wanted to make her feel “happy and safe.” She felt hopeful that he would stop. The letter referred to Rizzo having blocked him from contacting her on Facebook, although she had not done so.
On August 31, Castillo e-mailed appellant again, saying he hoped appellant had moved on and stopped contacting Rizzo and again asking for appellant‘s real name and birth date. Appellant replied that he had apologized to Rizzo and never intended to harass or stalk her. He said that he and Rizzo lived in the same neighborhood and attended “‘similar places,‘” and that he “‘shouldn‘t move over somewhere just because she feels uncomfortable. Besides, I have not committed any crime and I have no intentions to do so.‘”
On September 24, around dinnertime, San Francisco police officers went to the area of the labyrinth at Bernal Hill and contacted appellant. Appellant was “odd and evasive.” He gave his name as Noland Avery and gave a phone number that turned out to not work, then gave another number. He gave his address as 2699 24th Street. Appellant was detained briefly. About 8:00 p.m. that evening, Rizzo was walking home from the house of a friend who lived near 18th and Mission Streets. As she was about to walk under some scaffolding at the corner of Mission and Cesar Chavez Streets, appellant stepped out. They said hello and Rizzo said, “I just want to let you know that what you‘ve been doing has been frightening me and scaring me, and that‘s why I got the police involved. But I haven‘t charged you with anything.” Appellant looked upset and said, “‘well, I just got arrested.‘”
On October 8, Rizzo was talking on her phone at a bus stop at 30th and Mission, a block and a half from her home. She felt someone standing behind her and turned to see appellant, two or three feet behind her, “just looking” at her. She ran home in tears.
On October 9, Rizzo received a letter in an envelope on which the address was handwritten in appellant‘s handwriting. The return address was “Crab Club” in Santa Clara. The letter began, “‘This is my last personal message, the farewell letter. I had to send it to end all the troubles I caused you. I ultimately wanted to personally apologize and try to end our differences and all the issues generated from my messages and say definitely good-bye as we want it.‘” The envelope also contained a second letter, a copy of a “previous good-bye letter from 2010.” Rizzo testified that as much as she hoped appellant could move on, it was “very, very apparent that he couldn‘t.” She was “beyond frustrated” and “suffering from severe anxiety every time I received a letter or even had to go outside.” She worked from home and left the house infrequently, sometimes preparing to go out and meet a friend and then being unable to go outside for fear he would be there. She testified, “I didn‘t know if he was following me or what. But at this point, I ran into him [on] so many occasions so close to my house.”
On November 5 or 6, Rizzo was sitting in the back of a bus coming home when she saw appellant sitting in the front. She got up and stood with her back toward him, intending to disembark before there could be any kind of confrontation between them. She felt two hands “put rather roughly” on her shoulders and heard appellant say something like “Angie, it‘s me.” The bus stopped and she got off, telling appellant, “I don‘t want to talk to you, please don‘t touch me.” She was “very shaken and ran home and having an anxiety attack and crying.” Rizzo later clarified that she did not think appellant meant to be rough when he put his hands on her shoulders on the bus but it was “very startling” and felt rough to her.
On November 13, returning from a class about 9:00 p.m., Rizzo again saw appellant at 30th and Mission. She had resolved to confront him the next time she saw him and try to make him understand that he was scaring her. She told
On November 24, Rizzo saw appellant about two blocks from her house, on a street uphill from her house toward Bernal Hill. She smiled, waved, said hello and tried to move past him but he stopped her and asked to talk. She said she did not want to talk to him; he pleaded that he did not understand why they could not be friends. “Almost frantic,” she told him again that his conduct was stressing her and she did not want anything to do with him. He listened to her at first, then became “frustrated” and started shifting from one foot to the other, “huffing and puffing a little bit” and trying to interrupt her with statements like “you are letting your fears rule you, and why can‘t you just, like, show your love” or “embrace the loving side of yourself.” He told her, “‘You are not the same as you used to be,’ also referring to a 16-year-old me.” He also told her that he forgave her for calling the police on him. She reiterated that he had to leave her alone and he finally said, “‘so, it‘s over?’ and act[ed] like we were breaking up.” She thought if she played along with him he might “get it” and “get over the obsession” and so said, “Yes, it‘s over.” Appellant said, “‘No, I can‘t accept it. I cannot accept that it‘s over.‘” Rizzo felt hopeless, that there was nothing she could do to make him stop.
On December 5, Rizzo received a red envelope addressed to her in appellant‘s handwriting. The top line of the return address was a link to a blog, “love forgiven.blogspot.com.” The envelope contained a CD of songs and a napkin with drawings and words in appellant‘s handwriting on it. On one side there was a heart with arrows pointing toward it, on the other was a “swirly” and a link, inside was a snowflake and something else. Words on the side of the heart read, “Bernal Hill, 12-8-12, 4:30 P.M.” Rizzo felt disappointed and knew appellant was inviting her to meet him at Bernal Hill at the specified date and time. She went to the link and found a long letter in blog form, with more pictures of the labyrinth and “some other famous drawings.” In this letter, appellant invited her to meet him for another “healing ceremony” on that date. Rizzo was “really, really fed up . . . and just feeling like it was never going to stop, and—yeah, just that he didn‘t care that I was scared.” Knowing that appellant insisted on continuing despite the police being involved and Rizzo begging him to stop left her feeling “intense anxiety and fear and a sense of hopelessness in the situation.” Her “only hope was that the police could help in some way.”
Rizzo contacted the police inspector assigned to the case, and appellant was arrested at Bernal Hill on December 8. When initially detained, appellant
Police Inspector Keane testified that had received an e-mail from Castillo stating that on August 19 Castillo had confirmed with Rizzo that she did not believe appellant would harm her and had never threatened to harm her. In an e-mail to Keane about the September 24 incident, Rizzo said, “I don‘t think he understands how his actions are disturbing me.” Keane testified that Rizzo told him she was afraid of appellant‘s conduct and it was affecting the way she lived her life, but not that he had ever threatened her. Rizzo, asked on cross-examination about telling Castillo she did not think appellant would harm her, testified, “At that point, I believed that it was true that he wouldn‘t harm me, but now I can‘t say that.”
Rizzo testified that she told her family and friends about the situation with appellant because she was “afraid for myself” and “needed people around me to know what was going on. . . . I didn‘t know what was going to happen and I felt in fear for my safety.” She told people at work because she had to take time off to deal with the situation. She cut her hair in the hope that appellant would not recognize her if she ran into him. She acknowledged that she never saw appellant following her and he never explicitly threatened her with violence.
DISCUSSION
I.
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. He maintains that there was no evidence his conduct communicated an intent to use unlawful violence and, absent such intent, his conduct was protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, he urges there was no evidence he intended to instill fear in Rizzo.
The statute defines “credible threat” as “a verbal or written threat, including that performed through the use of an electronic communication device, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated statements and conduct, made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family, and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat.” (
“Claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a judgment are generally reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Under that standard, ‘“an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find [the elements of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.“’ (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931], quoting People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450]; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) ‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.“’ (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996], quoting People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 702 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].)” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630–631 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007] (George T.).)
Appellant contends, however, that because his insufficiency of the evidence claim was based on his conduct being protected by the First Amendment, this court must engage in independent review, deferring to the trier of fact‘s credibility determinations but independently examining the record, including
The Attorney General offers no response to appellant‘s invocation of the independent review standard, simply reciting the usual rule of substantial evidence review. George T., as indicated above, was concerned with a criminal threat under
With respect to the content of his communications, appellant argues that the only speech that can be excluded from First Amendment protection is a “true threat.” He relies upon Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 359 [155 L.Ed.2d 535, 123 S.Ct. 1536] (Black), which he describes as holding that “[e]xpressive conduct is protected by the First Amendment as long as it does not threaten the use of unlawful violence.” Black, which was concerned
Appellant argues that his public art and writings—the labyrinth and blogs—were expressive conduct that did not communicate an intent to commit a violent act and were covered by the First Amendment. He offers In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 193] (Ryan D.), and George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th 620, as examples of more threatening expressive works that have been found within First Amendment protection. In Ryan D., for an art project, the minor turned in a painting depicting him shooting an officer who had arrested him a month earlier, blowing away pieces of her flesh and face. (Ryan D., at p. 857.) Reversing the juvenile court‘s finding that the minor made a criminal threat (
Ryan D. and George T. both involved offenses alleged under
Appellant acknowledges that the “credible threat” required for conviction under
In essence, appellant concedes that the evidence showed he harassed Rizzo but maintains there was no evidence he communicated a willingness to use violence against her. In appellant‘s view, the cases that have found a threat implied by a course of conduct involved communication of a threat to commit violence that the evidence in the present case did not demonstrate. He points first to People v. McPheeters (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 124 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 607], in which the defendant had a history of domestic violence against the victim, violated no-contact orders, moved to an apartment next door to the victim‘s, contacted her 40 to 50 times in a month, bragged about beating people up and told her someone should beat her up, told her to be careful or something was going to happen to her, and told her the police could not keep him away from her. (Id. at pp. 135–136.)
In People v. Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 176] (Halgren), the defendant called the victim repeatedly, insisting that she talk to him, after she clearly told him she was not interested, told her she would be sorry she had been rude to him and, later, that she would pay for her rudeness and he would “‘fix her‘” or “‘fix this,‘” and positioned himself where he could watch people leave the building where she worked. (Id. at p. 1233.)
Uecker, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 583, involved two victims. For months, the defendant expressed his interest in going out with the first victim by leaving
The defendant contacted the second victim, a real estate agent, multiple times a day in the guise of looking for a property but never provided the information she pressed him for to help him qualify for a loan; he told her she had a “‘really cool voice‘” and he could “[p]robably talk to [her] all day,” hinted she should take him to look at properties “in the boonies,” became irate when she did not return a call, and after she told him she was leaving the residential real estate market, insisted he wanted to “‘finish this with [her],‘” wanted her to “‘handle [his] issues,‘” and he wanted “‘out of Dodge and by now, [she] probably kn[e]w why.‘” (Uecker, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588, 596.) The last of these comments indicated he knew the victim had learned he was a sex offender. (Ibid.) The court found that the “unrelenting conduct over the course of three weeks that toward the end became hostile and demanding, perpetrated by someone who is a sex offender and had no legitimate interest in real estate,” was sufficient to demonstrate a credible threat. (Uecker, at p. 596.)
In People v. Falck (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624] (Falck), the defendant sent the victim a dozen black roses and wrote her two or three letters a day discussing astrology and how they were meant to be together for eternity. After being arrested and put on probation, he mostly stayed away from the victim for 12 years, at which point he began to call her home and, after her husband told him a police report had been filed and the victim changed her phone number, sent her letters that included pictures of the victim and himself, pornographic pictures from magazines that he indicated represented her, astrological references, discussions of sexual acts he wished to experience with her and his intention to marry her, as well as a list of his
People v. McPheeters, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pages 135–136, involved an express threat—telling the victim someone should beat her up and she should be careful or something was going to happen to her. Halgren and Falck involved all-but-direct ones—in Halgren, the defendant told the victim she would be sorry she had been rude to him, she would pay for her rudeness and he would “‘fix her‘” or “‘fix this‘” (Halgren, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233) and in Falck, the defendant described his desire to be with the victim for eternity and his proficiency with an automatic rifle (Falck, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 298). In Uecker, the facts that the Realtor victim knew the defendant was a sex offender and was not actually interested in purchasing property increased the apparent seriousness of his conduct. (Uecker, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 596.) None of these cases, however, suggest their particular facts set the floor for a course of conduct constituting an implied threat.
The communications of the defendant to the first victim in Uecker, as in the present case, did not contain overt suggestions of violent intent. As in that case, appellant‘s stated purpose was to have a relationship with Rizzo or, at least, to reconcile their differences. While the defendant in Uecker contacted the victim daily and appellant‘s contacts with Rizzo were less frequent, appellant continued to contact Rizzo for many years after she attempted to cut off contact with him, escalating his conduct between April and December 2012, to a relentless pursuit despite her repeated attempts to avoid him and pleas for him to stop and despite intervention by the police. That the defendant in Uecker was following the victim was obvious from his appearance at her car at its different locations and his positioning himself to watch the entrance to her place of employment. But the evidence that appellant was maintaining his sights on Rizzo was also strong: He constructed the labyrinth at a location only blocks from Rizzo‘s home, where she ran on an almost daily basis, and specifically drew it to her attention; he made sure she knew he had seen her there after Rizzo went to the labyrinth with her neighbor; he sent letters and packages to Rizzo‘s home; he appeared at the bus stop a block and a half from her home, on a corner where she went “probably every day,” and on a street two blocks above her house toward Bernal Hill; and, on
Appellant maintains that he lived in the same neighborhood as Rizzo and emphasizes that their in-person contacts occurred in public places and he never went to her home despite knowing where she lived. But the evidence showed that appellant did not live in the Bernal Heights neighborhood where Rizzo lived, yet he repeatedly appeared in locations very close to her home—not only Bernal Hill Park itself, but the bus stop she used and a street within two blocks of her home. His appearance from under the scaffolding on a building as Rizzo was walking home on the night of appellant‘s detention is particularly telling: Unlike the bus stop, for example, this was apparently not a location at which Rizzo would be found regularly, as she had been visiting a friend. While it is of course possible appellant happened to be on that street, under the scaffolding, at just the time Rizzo was walking by, the fact that this incident occurred only hours after appellant was detained raises an obvious inference that it was not a coincidence.
The evidence demonstrates that appellant was obsessed with Rizzo over a period of many years, contacted her repeatedly despite her efforts to stop him directly and through involving the police, and made clear both that he knew where she lived and where she went, and that he would not accept her ending what he perceived to be their relationship. After Rizzo stopped communicating with appellant during her first year of college, he maintained a presence in her life, sending packages to her at her mother‘s address once or twice a year for five or six years. In April 2012, appellant‘s contacts became more frequent and obtrusive. He sent Rizzo a birthday card containing a fresh flower, and multiple messages on Facebook in the name “Crystal Snow Lovestar.” He sent pictures of flowers near the Golden Gate Bridge as a commemoration of the 10-year anniversary (“Angiesary“) of his meeting her. Appellant constructed, and sent Rizzo pictures of, an “extremely large” labyrinth in the image of Rizzo‘s face in a public park near Rizzo‘s home, where she ran “almost daily.” A letter placed on the labyrinth referred to Rizzo‘s “dreams, desires, ideas, memories, ego, subconscious” and getting “to know her mind and conquer her heart of stone,” and provided a link to a blog containing audio files about songs with girls with green eyes, pictures of the “flower commemoration,” and an archive of letters appellant had written to Rizzo.
When Rizzo responded to all this with a message on Facebook telling appellant he was making her feel “not safe” and asking him to stop, he sent her a long letter, CDs, the Golden Gate flower picture, and pictures of the labyrinth. The letter acknowledged that Rizzo did not want his attentions, describing his letters as a “hobby” he “love[d] doing” and she “dislike[d]
The absence of overt threats in appellant‘s communications notwithstanding, the course of conduct in which he engaged constituted a credible threat within the meaning of
Appellant‘s argument that the evidence showed only that he had knowledge he was scaring Rizzo, not that he intended to scare her or to hurt her, is also unpersuasive. “‘[T]he element of intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.’ (People v. Kuykendall (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 642, 645 [285 P.2d 996]; see also People v. Lyles (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 482, 486 [319 P.2d 745].)” (Falck, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) Appellant not only ignored Rizzo‘s increasingly impassioned pleas to stop contacting her because he was scaring her, he responded with further contacts, continuing even after the police became involved. There can be no question appellant knew he was causing Rizzo fear. When contacted by the police in August, appellant acknowledged that his messages or artwork might have “upset” Rizzo, and he told her after he talked to the police that he would stop contacting her because he wanted her to feel “happy and safe.” Rizzo told him in September that she had contacted the police because he was frightening and scaring her, and told him again at the bus stop in November that he was scaring her; on the latter occasion, appellant told her he was sorry for scaring her. Appellant maintains that despite his knowledge, he had no intent to instill fear in Rizzo, that he only wanted to reconcile with her. But his persistence in the face of Rizzo‘s efforts to avoid him and make him understand the degree of fear he was causing her, including going to the police to stop him, amply supports the inference that he intended the result he caused. (Falck, at p. 299 [“it can be inferred that appellant intended to cause fear in the victim from the fact that he insisted on maintaining contact with her although she clearly was attempting to avoid him, and although he had been warned away by the police, the court and the victim‘s husband“]; People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 578 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 653] [sufficient evidence of intent to cause fear despite absence of express threats and evidence of defendant‘s affection and concern for victim].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Richman, J., and Stewart, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 18, 2015, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant‘s petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied December 9, 2015, S230107.
Notes
Police Inspector Keane investigated the return addresses on some of the letters Rizzo received from appellant. The address on the letter mailed August 21, 2012, 2966 24th Street, Mailbox 12, was a storefront with electronic equipment displayed in the front and an insurance business in the back. Keane testified that he was not able to confirm that appellant owned this business, but he believed appellant had “an association” with the place. The address on the envelope Rizzo received on December 5, 2922 Mission Street, was a business consisting of a laundromat and a connected store, with mailboxes for rent.