THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NOE LEZAMA, Defendant and Appellant.
G062075
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 4/22/24
Patrick H. Donahue, Judge.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF0527). Affirmed.
OPINION
Rhonda G. Norris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Alan Mann and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Noe Lezama, who was originally charged with murder and who later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in mid-2019, appeals from the trial court‘s summary denial of his petition for resentencing (Petition) under
FACTS
A 2017 felony complaint charged defendant and Alfredo Quiroz-Muniz with one count of murder (
In June 2019, the prosecution and defendant reached a plea agreement. The original information was amended by interlineation to add one count of voluntary manslaughter (
In April 2022, defendant filed the Petition seeking resentencing pursuant to
The trial court appointed counsel and the parties filed briefs. The People argued defendant was not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law because his guilty plea occurred after the Legislature amended the murder statutes via Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1) (Senate Bill 1437). It reasoned that if defendant did not enter a guilty plea and the matter instead went to trial, prosecutors would not have been able to pursue a natural and probable consequences or other imputed malice theory. Thus, the plea was not a product of a potential imputed malice murder theory.
conjunction with his plea evidenced he was not eligible for resentencing relief.
Defendant disagreed with both aspects of the People‘s position. He maintained he met all three eligibility requirements set forth in
The trial court held a hearing and found defendant ineligible for resentencing. In a later issued written order, it explained the two bases for its conclusion. First, it construed the language of
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts the court‘s summary denial of the Petition was error because he made the requisite prima facie showing to necessitate an evidentiary hearing. The statutory language and defendant‘s record of conviction lead us to conclude otherwise.
Senate Bill 1437, which took effect January 1, 2019, was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished that purpose by substantively amending sections
188 and 189, and adding what later became section 1172.6. Pursuant to the statutory amendments, eligible defendants who could not be convicted under the law as amended could apply for retroactive resentencing relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.)
Based on language in the original enactment, some courts confronted with eligibility questions concluded resentencing was limited to those who had
Before the issue could be resolved by the Supreme Court, the Legislature acted. Believing the attempted murder or manslaughter eligibility determinations being made by courts to be contrary to legislative intent and the purpose behind the statutory amendments, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775). (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, p. 5 (Sen. Floor 3d Reading Analysis).) Effective January 1, 2022, it made amendments to, inter alia, “[c]larif[y] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
The amended statute specifies, in relevant part, that a person convicted of manslaughter may file a resentencing petition to have their “conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [] (1) [a] complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person‘s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [[] (2) [t]he petitioner was convicted of... manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder[;] [1] (3) [t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (
Beginning with the last of the three criteria, we find the statutory language to be ambiguous. The notion that someone could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made by Senate
With at least these two reasonable interpretations of the statutory language, we must look beyond the words to determine the Legislature‘s intent. (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) We turn to extrinsic aids such as “the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, ... and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” (Ibid.) “Ultimately[,] we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the
lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)
Statements in a variety of California Senate and Assembly reports are illuminating. A Senate Committee on Public Safety report summarizing the purposes of Senate Bill 775 states the statutory revisions clarify “that a person . . . who was convicted of manslaughter when the prosecution was allowed to proceed on a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine[] [may] apply to have their sentence vacated and be resentenced.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3; accord, Sen. Floor 3d Reading Analysis, supra, p. 3 [same].) It also explains the impetus behind the legislation and elaborates on the impact it would have: “[Senate Bill] 1437 (Skinner) has left California in a peculiar situation. While it may seem obvious that persons who have pled or been convicted of manslaughter or attempted murder at trial under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory should be entitled to the same relief as persons convicted of more serious offenses of first and second degree murder some courts have ruled that they are not. This bill seeks to clarify that obvious inequity in the law. If this bill passes, people who are serving a sentence of manslaughter or attempted murder that were prosecuted under a felony murder theory or a natural and probable consequences theory will be able to have their sentences recalled under the same standards as people who have been convicted of first and second-degree murder.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 7; accord, Sen. Floor 3d Reading Analysis, supra, p. 5.)
A Senate Appropriations Committee report echoes a similar purpose: “This bill would allow a person . . . who was convicted of manslaughter when the
allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.)
Perhaps most informative to the construction of the “because of changes” language in
These consistent statements of legislative intent reveal the Legislature‘s aim in the manslaughter context was to make relief available to defendants who were convicted by plea or trial at a time when the prosecution could have pursued a murder charge, but the only way of doing so would have been a now invalid theory of imputed malice. Thus, in the manslaughter plea context, the most reasonable reading of the third criterion for establishing resentencing eligibility is that at the time of conviction i.e.,
the time the plea was entered the only way to a murder conviction was through an imputed malice theory. As a matter of law, this cannot be true for a person, like defendant, who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time when imputed malice theories had already been statutorily eliminated.2 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying the Petition.
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.