THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TODD L. LAWS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 4-14-0995
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District
October 25, 2016
2016 IL App (4th) 140995
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Turner and Appleton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County, No. 14-CF-232; the Hon. Scott H. Walden, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel: Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Akshay Mathew, of State Appellate Defender‘s Office, of Springfield, for appellant. Jonathan H. Barnard, State‘s Attorney, of Quincy (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain, of State‘s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor‘s Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, Todd L. Laws, had a 2010 conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. He now appeals his November 2014 conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 During a stipulated bench trial on November 13, 2014, defendant was found guilty of one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors in violation of
¶ 4
“Whenever any person pleads guilty to, is found guilty of, or is placed on supervision for an offense under this Act, in addition to any other penalty imposed by the court, no such person shall thereafter knowingly purchase, receive, own, or otherwise possess any substance or product containing a methamphetamine precursor as defined in Section 10 of this Act, without the methamphetamine precursor first being prescribed for the use of that person in the manner provided for the prescription of Schedule II controlled substances under Article III of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.”
Id.
A person convicted under section 120(a) is guilty of a Class 4 felony.
¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant challenged the constitutionality of
¶ 6 The State countered defendant‘s constitutional argument by analogizing
¶ 7 The stipulated facts presented at the trial follow. The National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) indicated that, on November 18, 2013, defendant purchased 12-hour Sudafed, a product containing pseudoephedrine, at a drugstore in Adams County. Surveillance footage showed a man purchasing the Sudafed, and Officer James Brown of the West Central Illinois Task Force would have identified defendant as the man in the surveillance footage. An employee of the drugstore would have testified if a person had a doctor‘s prescription to purchase a product containing pseudoephedrine, or any other methamphetamine precursor, the purchase would not appear in the NPLEx logs, which indicates defendant did not have a prescription to purchase Sudafed on November 18, 2013. Finally, the State would have introduced a certified copy of defendant‘s October 2010 conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine in violation of
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, defendant expressly states in his reply brief that he does not challenge the constitutionality of section 120(a), but argues that the statute must be read to require “criminal knowledge” because interpreting the statute to require mere knowledge could subject wholly innocent conduct to criminal punishment. Defendant also argues that the proper construction of the statute requires both knowledge of possession and knowledge that the substance contains a methamphetamine precursor. Defendant argues that this dual-pronged knowledge requirement would satisfy a showing of the criminal knowledge he asserts is required by the statute. Defendant claims, because the stipulated facts did not establish he had a criminal purpose for the Sudafed or actual knowledge that Sudafed contained a methamphetamine precursor, the State did not meet its burden to convict under the Act. Finally, defendant argues that our court system disfavors interpreting statutes to impose absolute liability absent a clear intention by the legislature, which he asserts supports his argument that the Act requires criminal knowledge rather than mere knowledge. According to defendant, interpreting the
¶ 10 The State argues that the court should enforce the statute as written when the legislature clearly provides a mental state. The statute here expressly prohibits “knowingly purchas[ing], receive[ing], own[ing], or otherwise possess[ing]” a methamphetamine precursor. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 11 Defendant maintains that we must read into the statute criminal knowledge as opposed to applying the mental state expressly provided by the legislature. Defendant asserts that we need not reach a constitutional analysis because the statute can be construed so as to preserve its constitutionality by requiring criminal knowledge, which would, in turn, require both knowledge of possession and knowledge the substance contains a methamphetamine precursor. Defendant appears to muddle his arguments. Reading the requirement of criminal knowledge into the statute is not the same as construing the express language of the statute to require the dual-pronged knowledge for which he advocates. Criminal knowledge is a mental state requiring both knowledge and criminal or devious intent. People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397, 400-01, 589 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1992)infra, the instances where criminal knowledge has been read into a statute are those where the court is preserving the constitutionality of the statute in question. Thus, despite defendant‘s contentions to the contrary, we conclude he has presented two separate arguments: (1) a statutory construction argument and (2) an argument to read criminal knowledge into section 120(a) of the Act, which is a constitutional argument.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 13 Questions of law, statutory construction, and constitutionality are reviewed de novo. People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 508, 857 N.E.2d 209, 217 (2006). Statutes are presumed constitutional and should be interpreted so as to uphold constitutionality where possible. Id. Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts should attempt to resolve cases on nonconstitutional grounds before considering constitutionality. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 863 N.E.2d 231, 234 (2006). Accordingly, we will consider defendant‘s statutory construction argument prior to proceeding to his argument asserting that section
B. Statutory Construction
¶ 15 We begin our analysis by considering whether section 120(a) of the Act requires knowledge of both possession and the presence of a methamphetamine precursor or merely knowledge of possession.
1. Construction of Section 120(a)
¶ 17 Our supreme court has explained:
“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section. [Citation.] If legislative intent can be ascertained from the statute‘s plain language, that intent must prevail without resort to other interpretive aids. [Citation.]” Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177, 688 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1997).
¶ 18 The purpose of the Act “is to reduce the damage that the manufacture, distribution, and use of methamphetamine are inflicting on children, families, communities, businesses, the economy, and the environment in Illinois.”
¶ 19 Turning to the plain meaning of the relevant word chosen by our legislature, our supreme court has stated “knowledge,” as a criminal mens rea, means conscious awareness of facts making a person‘s conduct unlawful. People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 288, 573 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1991). We note the meaning assigned does not require awareness that one‘s conduct is unlawful; the meaning requires only awareness of the facts.
¶ 20 Defendant argues the proper construction of the statute requires the State to show both knowledge of possession and knowledge that the substance contains a methamphetamine precursor. To support this argument, defendant cites Tolliver and People v. DePalma, 256 Ill. App. 3d 206, 627 N.E.2d 1236 (1994), which discuss the constitutionality of the statutes in question, not the construction of the plain language contained in those statutes. Defendant also asserts that failure to require knowledge that the substance contains a methamphetamine precursor would render the statute an absolute liability offense because it would create the potential for criminal punishment of wholly innocent conduct. However, defendant‘s assertion regarding the potential punishment of wholly innocent conduct is a constitutional argument, not a statutory construction argument. The potential punishment of wholly innocent conduct does not render a statute an absolute liability crime; it would render the statute overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. “An absolute liability offense is one which does not require a culpable mental state as an element.” People v. Studley, 259 Ill. App. 3d 556, 559, 631 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1994). Section 120(a) undoubtedly requires knowledge, a mental state, as an element; therefore, this argument is without merit.
¶ 21 The State argues that the proper construction of the statute only requires knowledge of possession. In support, the State cites People v. Ivy, 133 Ill. App. 3d 647, 479 N.E.2d 399 (1985), People v. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d 598, 921 N.E.2d 445 (2009), and People v. Wright, 140 Ill. App. 3d 576, 488 N.E.2d 1344 (1986). In Ivy, the court considered whether the State was required to prove the defendant had knowledge of a weapon‘s illicit nature or character to convict the defendant of unlawful possession of a “sawed-off” shotgun (
“We are aware of no other case involving the issue of whether the knowledge element *** may be satisfied by showing knowledge of the presence of a weapon which later proves to be illegal or whether it is necessary to show that the defendant had knowledge of the status and character of the illegal weapon. As pointed out by the State, it is well settled that one is presumed to know the law and that ignorance of the law is no excuse. [Citations.] *** Since it is ‘knowing possession’ of an illegal object that is proscribed by statute, the State was not required to prove that the defendant knew her possession was illegal but only that she knew she possessed the object in question.” Ivy, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 652-53, 479 N.E.2d at 403.
Stanley upheld Ivy, concluding that the mens rea element only applied to the possessory element of unlawful possession of a “sawed-off” shotgun and not to whether the defendant actually knew the weapon was defaced or altered. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 607-09, 921 N.E.2d at 452-54; see also
¶ 22 We agree with these cases, which are consistent with interpretations of knowing possession throughout our jurisprudence as well as the definition of “knowledge” supplied by our supreme court in Gean. For example, with respect to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant knew he or she possessed and had control over the contraband; the State need not prove the defendant had knowledge of the substance‘s illegal nature. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 335, 934 N.E.2d 470, 484 (2010). With respect to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant knew he or she possessed a firearm and he or she had a prior felony conviction; the State need not prove that the defendant had knowledge he or she was prohibited from possessing the firearm because of the prior felony conviction. See People v. Hester, 271 Ill. App. 3d 954, 956, 649 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (1995). Requiring the State to prove that the defendant knew the illegal nature or character of his or her act is simply requiring the defendant to know the law, which is knowledge we impute to all defendants regardless of the crime in question. We determine section 120(a) of the Act (
¶ 23 An individual who purchases medication containing a methamphetamine precursor is on notice that the medication contains the precursor because the ingredients are listed on the box or bottle containing the medication. The argument that an individual is unaware a particular substance is a methamphetamine precursor is a mistake of law claim, which is no defense. Even if we interpreted the statute to require knowledge that a methamphetamine precursor is contained in the substance possessed, defendant‘s argument that he was unaware Sudafed contained pseudoephedrine or unaware pseudoephedrine was a methamphetamine precursor would necessarily fail.
2. Application of Section 120(a) to Defendant‘s Case
¶ 25 We determine that the stipulated evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for one count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine precursors in violation of
¶ 26 The stipulated facts at trial establish that, on November 18, 2013, defendant purchased 12-hour Sudafed, a product containing the methamphetamine precursor pseudoephedrine. By physically purchasing the Sudafed and taking it with him from the drugstore, we can infer that defendant was consciously aware he was in possession of the Sudafed. Additionally, the stipulated facts established that defendant had a prior conviction for methamphetamine possession in violation of
¶ 27 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State did not present evidence showing he knew Sudafed contained a methamphetamine precursor. However, notwithstanding the fact defendant should have known Sudafed contained pseudoephedrine, his argument fails because we have decided that knowledge that the substance possessed contains a methamphetamine precursor is not required by section 120(a). Accordingly, we find the State met its burden and decline to reverse the trial court‘s judgment.
C. Criminal Knowledge
¶ 29 Having first considered defendant‘s nonconstitutional arguments and determining those arguments do not afford defendant the relief he seeks, we now turn to defendant‘s argument asserting that criminal knowledge must be read into section 120(a) of the Act.
¶ 30 As previously stated, criminal knowledge has been read into a statute only where the court is preserving the constitutionality of the statute in question. Indeed, the two cases defendant
¶ 31 In Tolliver, the statute in question contained no express mental state, but the statute in DePalma did contain a knowing mental state. See
¶ 32 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016), points not argued in appellant‘s brief are forfeited, as are claims not fully analyzed. See Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 52, 13 N.E.3d 1216. Additionally, voluntary express relinquishment of an available right or argument constitutes waiver. Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co., 227 Ill. 2d 302, 320 n.2, 882 N.E.2d 525, 536 n.2 (2008). While defendant has provided law and analysis on the issue of overbreadth and constitutionality, an issue properly preserved for appeal at the trial, defendant expressly maintains he is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute and has waived the issue.
¶ 33 Defendant asserts his argument that to read criminal knowledge into the statute does not require a constitutional analysis. However, defendant‘s argument rests on the premise that criminal knowledge is required to prevent criminal punishment of wholly innocent conduct—the exact constitutional argument outlined in Tolliver and DePalma. As discussed, the courts in Tolliver and DePalma only reached the conclusion that criminal knowledge was required after first finding the statute unconstitutional as written. Because defendant has waived the issue of constitutionality, we will not conduct the analysis necessary to consider whether the conclusion he desires is warranted.
¶ 34 Nonetheless, defendant‘s reliance on Tolliver and DePalma is misplaced. Rather, this case would be controlled by Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 888 N.E.2d 105, and Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 740 N.E.2d 755. According to Carpenter and Wright, where the express language of a statute provides a mental state, the court may not read into the statute a different or additional culpable mental state. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d at 270-71, 888 N.E.2d at 117-18; Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 29-30, 740 N.E.2d at 769. The Wright court specifically distinguished Tolliver by stating: “In Tolliver, we were able to imply the mental state of knowledge plus criminal purpose as an element of section 4-104(a)(2) because that provision contained no mental state.” Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 29, 740 N.E.2d at 769. The statute here expressly requires knowledge, which is a mental state, as an element. Even if defendant had not waived the issue, we could not have read criminal knowledge into section 120(a) regardless of whether we determined the statute was constitutional as written. We also note our supreme court‘s decisions in Wright and Carpenter call into doubt the validity of DePalma because the DePalma court read criminal knowledge into that statute despite the statute‘s express inclusion of knowledge as the requisite mental state.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
¶ 37 Affirmed.