*1 (No. 87116.
THE PEOPLE OF THE ILLINOIS, STATE OF Appel-
lee, WRIGHT, v. JOHNNIE Appellant. 17, Opinion February rehearing on denial filed 2000. Modified rehearing October 2000. Further denied November 2000. *2 FREEMAN, J., specially concurring.
MILLER, J., HARRISON, C.J., joined by concurring part in dissenting part. in BILANDIC, J., concurring part dissenting part. also *3 Pelletier, Defender, Michael J. and Michael H. Deputy Orenstein, Defender, Assistant of the Office of Appellate Defender, Chicago, appellant. the State of Appellate Ryan, General, James E. of and Attorney Springfield, (William Devine, Attorney, Richard A. of Chicago State’s Browers, General, Attorney Chicago, L. Assistant of Goldfarb, T. McCurry Renee G. Kenneth T. and Jean McGuire, counsel), for the Attorneys, Assistant State’s People. of the opinion
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered court:
Defendant, Wright, Johnnie was the owner of J&J Scrap Auto an auto Wrecking Company, parts recycling 25, 1996, January business. On auditors from the Secre- tary business, of State’s office arrived at defendant’s office, reviewed documents his business and took an inventory of the vehicles in the lot surrounding the of- audit, fice. As a result of this defendant was under placed arrest and charged possession with two counts of of a (see 103(a)(1) (West stolen motor vehicle 625 ILCS 5/4 — (see 1996)), 27 counts of failure to keep records ILCS (i) (West 1996)), 401.2(a), and 25 of posses- counts 5/5 — sion of title (see complete assignment without 625 ILCS 104(a)(2) (West 1996)). 5/4 — trial, the circuit Following bench court of Cook found defendant County guilty not of the of a possession stolen motor vehicle and not charges guilty two counts failure to records. The circuit court found keep defendant guilty of the of failure to remaining charges keep possession records of title without as- complete signment.
On appeal, appellate court reversed defendant’s convictions because it found that the circuit court had failed to consider the mental state to establish the offenses of failure to records and possession title without court complete assignment. appellate nonevidentiary ordered the cause remanded for a limited hearing for the circuit court apply appropriate mental existing state record. 302 Ill. 3d 128. App. granted We for leave to petition appeal. 177 315(a). Ill. 2d R.
We hold that defendant’s convictions for possession complete assignment of title without must be reversed because the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish *4 for a violation of section the mental state 104(a)(2). for convictions defendant’s We also reverse find that section because we failure to records Code is unconstitutional of the Illinois Vehicle 5—401.2 grounds. process on due
BACKGROUND Hoekstra, an auditor trial, Russell At defendant’s Secretary Special office, of the of State’s Audit Team January 25, 1996, he and two other that, on testified Wrecking Scrap an audit at J&J Auto auditors conducted (J&J) Company Island, Illinois. When the audi- Blue they spoke a.m., at about 9 tors arrived at the J&J office defendant, identified himself as the owner who they defendant that were business. Hoekstra informed inspection an of his business. He asked there to conduct any police license, book, and other defendant for his provided police Hoekstra with his records. Defendant could not find the titles book. He told Hoekstra that he secretary be for his vehicles but that his would able find them she returned from an errand. Defendant when gave license, him as also Hoekstra a 1995 which listed only his 1996 owner J&J. When asked about applied license, defendant stated that he had for it but that he had not received it or could not find it. inventory that an
Hoekstra then informed defendant would be taken of all of the vehicles the J&J lot and paperwork de- that the vehicles would be matched to the provided. According Hoekstra, fendant the south by marked north boundaries of the J&J lot were each approxi- row of truck trailers. These boundaries were mately apart. near the front of 225 feet The office was by marked railroad the lot and the rear of the lot was tracks 600 or 700 feet behind the office.Hoekstra about acknowledged 1995 license indicated by only feet, he that the size 50 feet but lot was defendant had told him that the were stated that trailers boundary inspection lot. An the north of the J&J *5 Secretary of State’s office and defendant’s 1996 license described the property size as four acres.
During of course their inventory and inspection records, defendant’s the auditors discovered several ir- regularities. Hoekstra testified they learned that two of the vehicles included in their inventory had been reported stolen. One of these vehicles, a 1987 blue Ford Taurus station wagon, was located approximately 150 yards behind the J&J office and 20 feet from the trailers marking south boundary of the lot. The other car, a white Escort, 1987 Ford was located approximately 20 yards behind and 40 to 50 feet north of the Taurus.
Hoekstra asked defendant whether all of the vehicles in the J&J lot were his. Defendant responded that one car, his employee’s car, did not belong to him. According Hoekstra, defendant did not tell him that any of the vehicles in his lot belonged to James Crumb. When Hoek- stra specifically inquired about the vehicles, stolen defen- dant told Hoekstra that a towing company had brought the Taurus and the Escort to the lot. Defendant gave Hoekstra a name of the towing company, but Hoekstra did not try to contact the company. Hoekstra did not remember defendant calling someone named Jim from Night and Day Towing.
At approximately a.m., 11:30 secretary gave Hoekstra 217 vehicle titles. After comparing the titles to the lot, vehicles the J&J Hoekstra found that only 18 of the titles matched the 101 vehicles in the lot. He asked defendant whether he had any documentation for the other vehicles. Defendant responded that he did not. The assignment portion of 173 of the 217 titles Hoekstra examined was not completed. addition, auditors observed that defendant’s police book failed to indicate the disposition of 189 is, vehicles. That there were 290 entries in the book showing the acquisition but no disposition vehicle, of a yet there only were did not addition, defendant lot. In in the J&J vehicles that he sold. the parts book to record have a parts or scrapped if defendant Hoekstra, According disposition to record this car, he was crushed po- that defendant’s Hoekstra testified book. police he had a few of the vehicles indicated that lice book did Defendant or crushed. had scrapped been acquired documents, as a uniform invoice such not, however, have had certificate, disposed that he showing or junk way. vehicles this on the the stolen vehicles discovery on the
Based Dur- Police. the Illinois State lot, Hoekstra contacted J&J 25, 1996, Agent January Special the afternoon ing Blair, and other Illinois State *6 Jeffrey Lemming, Sergeant to search defen- a warrant officers arrived with Police that told the officers dant’s business. Defendant December in the lot since Taurus had been J&J months. in lot for about six had been and the Escort and that the north south Hoekstra, Like Blair testified marked a row of J&J lot were each of the boundaries Blair, were to the boundaries According truck trailers. 100 feet apart. approximately J&J, at he that, he arrived testified when
Lemming him the Hoekstra, police and Hoekstra gave to spoke from defen- he had received 199 of the titles book and Police of- the other State secretary. Lemming and dant’s They found defendant’s the J&J office. ficers searched to the had not been sent which application, 1996 license office. Secretary of State’s Lemming to defendant. When also
Lemming spoke vehicles had been that two stolen informed defendant man named lot, that a replied in the J&J defendant found had towed both vehicles Day Towing and Night Jim from the office and Jim from the lot. Defendant called into no Lemming heard Lemming, to but handed the receiver for Night a card seeing recalled Lemming one on the line. Day and a Towing with and the telephone number name Jim on it. days get Several later Lemming attempted to the telephone number Night Day Towing. The had telephone company listing business, no for this Lemming was unsuccessful in his attempt get number from one employees. of defendant’s late in
Lemming day arrested defendant on Janu- ary 25, arrest, 1996. Following Lemming questioned defendant further. Defendant explained recycling his auto He Lemming. business stated that he placed advertise- ments the Chicago offering Sun-Times to buy junk from vehicles Defendant used tow people. his truck tow these vehicles lot. J&J Defendant told Lem- that he ming partner had named James Crumb but that defendant day-to-day handled the operations business, and defendant only was the J&J employee who purchased vehicles and received titles According for J&J. to Lemming, defendant also said that he auto sold parts from the J&J lot.
Defendant told he Lemming that had heard that yard, only Escort and the Taurus were in his he but had seen the Defendant Escort. stated that he did not know these cars were stolen. said he Defendant also knew book, police these cars were not but this was secretary because his had probably forgotten to enter them into the book. With to the number of respect titles office, that, found in his he defendant stated if had a title vehicle, it without meant that he had sent the vehicle *7 to the “shredder.”
According to in order for title to a vehicle Lemming, transferred, to be seller properly sign the must the back title, of his her then buyer’s or the for the name space that, and address testified completed. Lemming must be of respect with to nine the vehicle titles recovered from office, no there had been on the assignment the or of back of titles to defendant J&J. On the back had been titles, assignment for spaces these the three of indi- entity to an or the was assignment but completed, for as- spaces than or defendant. vidual other J&J six titles were blank. the of the other on back signment re- in the J&J lot. With nine were of these vehicles None in defendant’s titles found to 16 of the other vehicle spect had signed the vehicles office, some of the sellers of to the assignment for titles, spaces but the back of one of the On the back buyer incomplete. were ad- but there was no titles, buyer, was listed as the J&J remaining On the assignment. dress for J&J or date of None buyer. listed as a 15, neither J&J nor defendant was po- had entered into defendant’s of these 25 titles been lice book. Paul Bernatek testified that October
Detective which during he had a conversation with defendant received the title that, he told defendant when defendant vehicle, he to have the seller write required was title, on the after which defen- or her name and address read- it, it, dant date and write the odometer sign was that auto parts on the title. He also told defendant ing to maintain a book with records recyclers required were vehicles, identity including of their acquisitions date, style. make and the seller, year, body that, a recycler Bernatek also informed defendant when date of vehicle, he was to list the disposed In January and the of the vehicle. destination disposition had conversation with defen- 1989, Bernatek another of these dant, he informed defendant during again which recyclers. for auto record-keeping requirements parts these conversations were acknowledged Bernatek recorded in the he reports prepared. not Dawkins, employee, pre-
Defendant and his Jesse of the events of sented a different version completely addition, description their January 1996. from that differed significantly
dimensions of the J&J lot of the State’s witnesses. *8 Dawkins,
According to when the auditors arrived at 9 a.m., Dawkins told them that only defendant’s secretary in office, was and defendant was not there. Defen- dant and Dawkins testified that defendant did not arrive at the J&J lot until 11 or 11:30 a.m. on January 25, 1996. time, At that Hoekstra told defendant they were there to his lot investigate but did not ask for his police book. Hoekstra also did not ask defendant for any vehicle titles, and defendant did give not him any titles or re- cords.
As the auditors performed their inventory, defendant and Dawkins saw them record the serial numbers of cars in lot, the J&J as well as in the two lots north of defendant’s. These two lots were owned James Crumb Dixon, who, defendant, Charles like were in the auto wrecking business. Although defendant told Hoekstra the vehicles on those lots his, were not Hoekstra told him that the vehicles would be considered his because he was the only one with a license.
Dawkins and defendant testified that the south boundary of the J&J lot was marked by trailers, truck but there were no trailers along boundary north the lot. According defendant, the dimensions of the lot J&J were feet by 887 feet. There private was a 51V2 residence on the front half of the property. The property extended behind the office to the railroad tracks.
Defendant testified that he began J&J in operating January time, 1995. Prior to that the J&J lot was used an as auto wrecking yard by Dixon and Crumb. Accord- ing defendant, he and Crumb were partners, and the of their purpose partnership was to rent. He split acknowledged, however, that the 1995 license for J&J listed only defendant as the proprietor of J&J. Defendant and Dixon had a bad and did not relationship associate at all. defendant,
According began when he operating J&J, to Dixon and Crumb belonging vehicle titles in a file cabinet. Defendant never remained the office and, January looked in the file cabinet after Crumb Defendant and Dixon continued use cabinet. police Crumb also shared the desk in the office and the desk, book. Defendant had two drawers and Crumb *9 that, had in the Defendant two drawers desk. stated vehicle, when he a he would the title for purchased place office, secretary the vehicle on the in and desk his his supposed would enter it into the book. Crumb was police book, defen- to enter his own vehicles into the and police dant that had so doing respect knew Crumb been with some of the he Under their purchased. vehicles partner- arrangement, only defendant was the one who could ship purchase car and a title on accept behalf J&J. Likewise, bought own, Crumb vehicles on his and defen- dant had no control over the purchased. vehicles Crumb With to the respect book, vehicles listed in the de- police fendant said that some of them had been taken to a scrap processor and in others were the J&J lot. He did not know whether any the vehicles that the police book indicated had been taken to a scrap processor were his vehicles.
Defendant and Dawkins testified that not all of the titles in the office to defendant. belonged Defendant did not know many office, how of his titles were in the but he had in 50 or 60 the desk that belonged drawer to him. As office, searched police defendant saw them removing items from the file cabinet. When he told the that police his, the cabinet was not the police responded in the everything cabinet was considered his. He had never seen the 25 titles on which the possession title without complete assignment charges was based. defendant, According only the titles with his name on him; them belonged to the titles assigned to J&J were Crumb’s.
Similarly, and Dawkins defendant testified that not all of the on cars the J&J lot belonged to defendant. De- fendant that, stated at the time audit, he had only seven Or eight cars and three trucks. The other vehicles on his Crumb, lot belonged who had failed to move these cars his own lot.
Defendant testified that he told that he Lemming did not know anything about the Escort and the Taurus, except they had been towed into the area Jim Stroud from Night Day and Towing. Dawkins testified that he had seen Jim tow cars before, into the J&J lot but did not see him tow the Escort and the Taurus. De- fendant testified that Dawkins had told him that Jim had towed these cars to the J&J lot. Defendant also stated that Jim was planning to sell the Taurus to him.
Dawkins and that, defendant testified while the State Police office, were the J&J defendant placed call to Jim of Night Day Towing and broadcast the call on speaker telephone the office. Jim identified himself on the telephone, defendant asked him to bring *10 paperwork for the to cars J&J. When the police attempted Jim, to talk to he ended the defendant, call. According he gave Lemming a card from Night and Day.
Dawkins testified that the Escort was a few feet on one side or the other of the line property between lot and the lot north of defendant’s. Defen- dant testified that he told that Lemming the Escort was on Dixon’s lot. At one point he testified that he did not know where the Taurus was because he never He saw it. testified, however, later the Taurus was on his prop- erty.
Defendant did not remember whether Detective Ber- natek informed him in 1989 about the necessity completing on the assignments back of titles or about the record-keeping requirements. Defendant denied that that, Bernatek told him an as auto he parts recycler, had records of the keep acquisition disposition vehicles. rebuttal,
In the State offered two certified copies conviction. These documents showed that defendant had been convicted in March possession 1990 of of title with addition, he incomplete assignment. was convicted February 1990 of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of a vehicle with its identification number removed.
At the conclusion of the presentation evidence, of this the circuit court found defendant guilty not charges possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The court stated that there was conflicting testimony as to whether the Escort was on defendant’s lot. With respect pos- Taurus, session of the the court also found defendant not guilty because it found defendant’s explanation he did not see this car credible. The court also found defen- dant guilty not of the charges of failure to records keep related to these two vehicles. The circuit court found de- fendant guilty of the other charges of failure to re- keep cords and possession of title with incomplete assignment. The circuit court sentenced defendant to three years’ imprisonment based on the convictions for failure to records and one year of imprisonment for possession of titles with incomplete assignment, to run concurrently.
The appellate court reversed defendant’s convictions. 302 Ill. 3d App. court, 128. In that defendant argued that (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by (2) his counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress; evidence was insufficient guilt beyond establish his (3) reasonable doubt of records; failure to keep for possession convictions of titles without complete as signment must be overturned because the circuit court failed to find that he acted with the mental state required *11 for that offense. The appellate rejected court defendant’s ineffective assistance of argument. counsel 302 Ill. App.
3d at 132-35. The court reversed defendant’s convictions for failure to records and keep possession of title without however, complete assignment, agreed because it with defendant that the circuit court had failed to find that defendant possessed the mental state necessary for these offenses. 302 Ill. 3d at App. 135-40. Tolliver,
The appellate
in People v.
that,
court noted
(1992),
For the appellate same court reversed defendant’s convictions for failure to records. It keep rejected argument the circuit court’s finding guilt respect with to these offenses was incon sistent with its decision to defendant on other acquit However, 302 Ill. 3d at 140. charges. App. the appellate determined court the circuit court had failed to find the existence of the mental state for the offense records. Based on Tolliver of failure to other *12 discussing required decisions the mental state for viola appellate tions of other the Code, sections of Vehicle the knowledge purpose court concluded that with criminal an element of a violation of section 5—401.2 of the Vehi appellate cle Code. The that, remand, court held on the findings circuit court should also reconsider its with re spect charge keep light to the of failure to in records App. Tolliver. 302 Ill. at 139-40.
ANALYSIS In the briefs court, defendant filed with this defen- argued only appellate dant that the court in erred order- ing nonevidentiary hearing a limited rather than a new applying trial because of the circuit court’s error possession mental state for the offenses of complete assignment keep title without and failure to re- petition rehearing, In cords. for defendant raises a argument respect new with to his convictions for failure According petition, records. to defendant’s sec- process permits tion 5—401.2 violates due because it subject felony individuals to its terms to be convictedof a culpable modify absent intent. We have decided to our original opinion in this case to address defendant’s challenge. constitutional begin,
We however, with a discussion of the defen- arguments concerning charges possession dant’s complete assignment. argues title without Defendant appellate ordering that the court erred in a limited non- evidentiary hearing rather than a new trial after revers- ing According his convictions. defendant, a new trial is required when a defendant is tried under an incorrect theory by failing require of law. He that, asserts prove knowledge plus State to that he acted with crimi- purpose, nal the circuit court tried him under an incor- theory rect hearing of law. Defendant contends that the limited appellate
ordered court is unfair because require perform it would the circuit court to a new cred- ibility assessment “on a cold record and distant memo- ry” may and because the circuit court’s error have af- strategy. fected defense request cross-relief, State has filed a which appellate it contends that the court should have affirmed (1) defendant’s convictions because the circuit court’s possessed indicate that it found defendant comments 104(a)(2) necessary mental state under section 4— (2) Code, Vehicle even if the circuit court failed to apply state, the correct mental the evidence established beyond provi- a reasonable doubt that he violated this argues alternative, sion. the State that a limited hearing appropriate rather than a new trial was the relief *13 application for the of an incorrect mental circuit court’s at state defendant’s trial. by considering
Before the issues raised defendant’s necessary argument appeal, it is to address the State’s regard- affirmed, that defendant’s convictions should be any necessary application less of erroneous mental appellate If state the circuit court. court erred reversing convictions, we need not decide the propriety a limited of its decision to remand his case for nonevidentiary hearing. argues that, erred
The State even if the circuit court by failing to find the existence of the mental state 104(a)(2), required a of section to establish violation 4— we affirm defendant’s convictions because the ev should guilt beyond doubt, a reasonable idence established any reviewing may affirm a circuit court on and a court rely record, in the even if the circuit court did not basis grounds. Ill. 2d on those See 179 Caballero, People v. (1997). replies cannot affirm his Defendant that we insufficient evidence at convictions because there was mental under section trial of the state 104(a)(2). 4— defen- was sufficient to convict
Whether evidence 104(a)(2) depends dant of on ele- violating ments of the offense under 4—104 provision. Section part: states pertinent
“(a) Chapter It is a violation of this for: person possess any
2. A certificate manufacturers certificate, salvage certificate, origin, junking of certifi- title, display complete cate of certificate without as- signment[.]
(b) Sentence:
* *
[*]
person
1. A
convicted
a violation
of
of subsection
(a)
or 2
paragraph
guilty
Section
of a
this
is
Class
(West 1996).
4 felony.” 625 ILCS 5/4 —104
Although
statutory
describing the of
provision
fense of
possession
assignment
title without complete
state,
contains no mental
this
has
supplied
court
mental
in previous
state
cases
this
People
statute. In
involving
Gean,
(1991),
modified the 104(a)(2) Vehi under section requirement state 4— in Tolliver had filed a motion The defendant .to cle Code. that section him on the basis charge against dismiss 104(a)(2) court denied The circuit unconstitutional. 4— this violating provi guilty found him motion and concluding reversed after court appellate The sion. 104(a)(2) it because was unconstitutional section 4— innocent punish and would mental state no required Tolliver, Ill. 2d at 399. behavior. of section constitutionality upheld
This court
104(a)(2).
that, under
The Tolliver
court observed
4—
as an
knowledge
Gean,
prove
was
the State
104(a)(2).
found,
It
of section
of a violation
element
4—
104(a)(2) could be
Gean,
that,
section
however,
under
4—
if a
example,
For
innocent
behavior.
to punish
used
car, the wife signed
owned a
jointly
and wife
husband
to the
took the title
husband
seller,
and the
title as
to have
be considered
dealer,
would
or
the husband
buyer
Tolliver, 147 Ill.
title.
incomplete
an
knowingly possessed
court,
this
the Tolliver
under
According to
2d at 400-02.
of a
guilty
be found
scenarios,
could
offenders
and other
intent.
any
lacked
criminal
they
felony
though
even
conduct,
knowing
innocent but
stated,
“[s]uch
court
intent,
or devious
of criminal
wholly devoid
which is
Tolliver,
felony.”
of a
guilty
a person
not render
should
Tolliver court
decided
Therefore,
at 402.
147 Ill. 2d
that,
such
Gean
expanded
should be
holding
104(a)(2),
the State
of section
a violation
establish
4—
an
with
knowledge
or
knowledge
“criminal
prove
must
Tolliver,
147 Ill.
a crime.”
or commit
intent
to defraud
mental state
also described
This court
2d at 400-01.
104(a)(2)
“knowledge
as
under section
requirement
Tolliver,
An examination of the at presented evidence of of an offense under sec- light necessary the elements 104(a)(2), tion us leads to the conclusion there 4— was insufficient evidence at trial to find defen- presented dant with guilty possession incomplete assign- title ment. In reviewing the sufficiency sup evidence to “ conviction, ‘whether, a the is
port proper inquiry after the viewing evidence most light favorable to prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable ” omitted.) (Emphasis doubt.’ People Howery, v. 178 Ill. (1997), 2d quoting Virginia, Jackson 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 560, 573, 61 L. Ed. 2d 99 S. Ct. (1979).
2788-89 After carefully evidence considering at defendant’s trial presented light most favorable State, to the we cannot conclude that a rational trier fact could have found there was criminal purpose with associated of title possession without complete assignment. Tolliver,
Our conclusion supported by Tolliver. this court reversed the defendant’s conviction under sec- 104(a)(2) tion no after evidence criminal finding 4— Like the us, defendant in the case before purpose. charged
Tolliver defendant was under 104(a)(2) with possession of title without as- complete of a signment. charge resulted from defendant’s sale vehicle to Thomas Murphy. noticed that the Murphy title defendant was he had received from the vehicle that rather than Hayes named David by an individual
signed
sign
asked defendant
Murphy
defendant. When
Murphy
it himself.
title,
just sign
told him to
defendant
office, and defendant
Secretary
of State’s
contacted
of title without
with
charged
possession
was subsequently
*16
Tolliver,
The State fails posses- defendant’s have motivated activity might that asserts that merely The State of titles. incomplete sion inferred from may be purpose criminal general some this argument, of support at trial. presented evidence not give circuit court did that the State observes titles some of the argument to defendant’s credence by owned the auditors were by examined and vehicles however, not defense, does this rejection The of Crumb. argues also State purpose. of criminal suffice as proof from defendant’s may inferred criminal be purpose that a of recycler auto and his awareness parts as an experience 104(a)(2). these of section While requirements 4— indicate of title without possession facts that defendant’s they do not assignment knowing, was show complete similar defendant acted with a criminal For purpose. reasons, disagree with the State’s assertion that we of possessed complete number titles defendant without he without possessed number titles assignment circumstantial cars on his lot is evidence a criminal number in defen purpose. irregularities While dant’s record a viola keeping may prove knowledge it tion, does not the reason To prove violation. conclude that these were a crimi violations the result of nal scheme rather than or record poor disorganized keep ing defendant would pure speculation. be Given the insufficient evidence of criminal purpose behind of title possession without complete assign ment, hold, Tolliver, we as we did that defendant’s 104(a)(2) convictions under section must be reversed. DePalma, See also People App. Ill. 3d *17 (1994) (finding insufficient evidence of criminal purpose); (1992) Jones, People App. Ill. 3d 919-20 (same).
We now turn to challenge defendant’s to the constitu- tionality of his for convictions failure to keep records under section 5—401.2 of the Vehicle Code. Section 5—401.2 requires certain individuals licensed under the Vehicle Code to maintain relating records to the acquisi- tion and disposition of vehicle and parts years for three (West 401.2(a) at their place of business. 625 ILCS 5/5 — 1996). Section 5—401.2 further provides “[a]ny that person who knowingly to keep required fails the records by this Section or who knowingly violates this Section (625 shall be guilty 2 felony” Class ILCS 5/5— 401.2G) (West 1996)).
Despite the in section language 5—401.2 describing offense of failure state for the as the mental
knowledge held, that sponte, court sua records, the keep appellate to for violations Tolliver prescribed the mental state 104(a)(2) failure to the offense of applies also section 4— on the 5—401.2. Based records under section keep at the conclusion of comments circuit court’s had the circuit court court found that trial, the appellate It, mental state. the existence of this failed to find under section defendant’s convictions therefore, reversed circuit court to the cause for the and remanded 5—401.2 the evidence assessing mental state apply proper at defendant’s trial. had presented that been in this filed this court In opinion originally section convictions under case, affirmed defendant’s we terms of that, according express 5—401.2. We held viola- 401.2, for a the mental state section 5— found that knowledge. We provision tion of this ev- state, and the mental proper circuit court applied guilty that defendant was its decision supported idence records. keep of failure however, defendant rehearing,
In petition uncon- 5—401.2 is first time that section for the argues to him. Defendant face and as applied on its stitutional process violates due section 5—401.2 contends that records keep of failure to it a conviction permits because knowledge, thereby potentially based on mere to be addition, he asserts innocent behavior. punishing not a rea- behavior is felony for such penalty imposing of section purpose accomplishing means of sonable Further, application argues defendant 5—401.2. due because process him violates 5—401.2 to associated purpose no criminal demonstrates evidence Instead, testi- defendant records. his failure with re- the required to keep not know how fied that he did *18 to do so. secretary on his cords and relied petition defendant’s the State to answer ordered We 23 (see 367(d)) respond 155 Ill. R. and directed it to to 2d (1) we should address his defendant’s that arguments his failure raise it challenge constitutional despite (2) section petition rehearing, his for prior filing its face applied 5—401.2 is unconstitutional on and as defendant. The did not discuss waiver in its answer. State With challenge, to defendant’s constitutional respect does due argues State 5—401.2 not violate State, to the have process. According legislature could reasonably determined that failure the records keep so important section 5—401.2 was to control felony auto-related offenses that a penalty necessary was to punish recyclers, vehicle dealers those even without a criminal After purpose. reviewing defendant’s answer, and the State’s we have petition decided to modify the filed in this case. We reverse opinion now convictions for failure to records because we find that section is on due 5—401.2 invalid process grounds.
Generally, may argue not new in a parties points pe tition for rehearing. 341(e)(7); See 2d R. 177 Ill. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367(b); Dow v. Center, Columbus-Cabrini Medical (1995). 653, 274 find Ill. 3d 659 App. Nevertheless, it we appropriate this case to address the merits defen dant’s due process challenge to section 5—401.2 despite his failure it to raise until rehear fifing petition for In ing this court. its answer to defendant’s petition the State did rehearing, argue not defendant from precluded making a constitutional to sec challenge tion 5—401.2 because of his failure to raise this issue addition, previously. this has a chal court held that lenge to the aof criminal constitutionality may statute raised any See, People Wooters, be at time. e.g., Ill. (1999) 2d of stat (considering constitutionality ute raised for the first time in appellate briefs); People v. (1989) Bryant, 2d (same); 128 Ill. People v. *19 24 (1973) constitu
Sarelli, 169, (considering 2d 171 55 Ill. raised for the first time tionality post- of statute Indeed, if, sec argues, as defendant petition). conviction unconstitutional, would be tion 5— 401.2 is it convictions. See fundamentally uphold unfair (1988) (if Zeisler, 42, 125 Ill. 2d 46 a statute v. People unconstitutional, is it is considered creating an offense initio). ab void of the merits of defendant’s constitutional
Our review by following principles. familiar challenge guided constitutional, and a chal party are presumed Statutes of a statute has the burden constitutionality lenging Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d invalidity. its v. establishing People (1999). 243, power, Pursuant to its police 254 for discretion to establish penalties has wide legislature is limited offenses, but this discretion criminal may not be person guarantee constitutional K.C., of law. In re liberty without due process deprived (1999). not af 542, does legislation 186 Ill. 2d 550 When the test right, constitutional fect a fundamental due with substantive complies whether it determining People test. v. is the rational basis requirements process (1992). test, a Under this Hamm, Ill. 2d 216 if a reasonable relation it “bears upheld statute will be served, the means to a interest be ship public of accomplishing are a reasonable method adopted Adams, 144 Ill. 2d objective.” People desired (1991). section 5—401.2 enacting legislature’s purpose In of the Vehicle Code. in section 5—100—1
can be found inter findings, its expressed provision, legislature this of vehicle enterprise the criminal alia, that “essential or thieves to transfer sell ability is the operations theft com- through legitimate their parts vehicles or stolen for sale to the channels, them available making mercial dealers, scrap proces- industry” and “vehicle automotive and rebuilders repairers sors, recyclers, automotive parts who comprise the vast majority persons engaged in the automotive business in this State are frequently exposed pressures and influences from motor vehicle (West 1996). thieves.” 625 ILCS addition, 5/5 —100—1 section 5—100—1 that, contains a statement in enacting section 5—401.2 and related provisions, the legislature intended “to system establish a of mandatory licensing and record keeping which will prevent or reduce the transfer or sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within (West 1996). this State.” 625 ILCS 5/5 —100—1 401.2(a) To achieve this purpose, section requires certain individuals licensed under the Vehicle Code to records, including year, make, *20 the and model of a part vehicle; or the style and color of a vehicle; the date of acquisition of part vehicle; a or the name and address of the person from whom the part or vehicle was acquired; the date of disposition vehicle; of the part or the name and address of the person with whom the part or vehicle was disposed; and the of the number uniform invoice the reflecting disposition the or part vehicle, if 401.2(a) (West applicable. 1996). 625 ILCS The fail- 5/5 — ure to any record of this specific information constitutes a 401.2(b) (West failure to keep records. 625 ILCS 5/5 — 1996). agree
We
with defendant
that section 5—401.2 can
not withstand scrutiny under the rational basis
In
test.
cases,
analogous
this court and courts in other jurisdic
tions have held that criminal statutes
that potentially
punish innocent conduct violate due process principles
they
because
are not reasonably
designed
achieve their
purposes.
In People Wick,
26 Unlike injured.
fireman or on the scene was policeman statute, arson statute did not aggravated arson to another or damaged belong require property occur with the intent to defraud an damage that, the aggravated insurer. This court found because arson statute did not of an unlawful require proof it innocent conduct. purpose, potentially punish could injured For if a or fireman were as a example, policeman result of a farmer fire to his own deteriorated setting barn, X subject felony the farmer would be to a Class Wick, aggravated conviction under the arson statute. Ill. 2d at 66. that, if purpose ag
This court concluded
of the
a
gravated
impose
punish
arson statute was to
severe
injured
ment
for arsonists whose acts
a
or
policeman
fireman,
it
not
related to its
reasonably
purpose
was
addition,
it
not
limited to arsonists.
because
was
a
X
with no
imposing
penalty
Class
individuals
intent
not a
culpable
punishing
reasonable means
if
injure
policemen. Similarly,
arsonists who
firemen or
from
purpose
discourage laymen
statute was
structures,
fire
a
X
setting
“imposing
penalty
Class
not
injury
penalty
case of
but no
otherwise would
be
ensuring compliance
reasonable method of
with such
Wick,
Thus,
In State v. 489 So. 1986), 2d 1125 Florida Supreme Court held that a statute making it a crime to knowingly possess credit card embossing machine violated due process because it could potentially punish innocent activities. In support decision, of its court reasoned: “ ‘In order to meet constitutional police limitations on
regulation, prohibition, this against possession i.e. objects having a common widespread use, lawful must previous under our decisions be reasonably “required as accomphshment incidental to the primary purpose of the Act.” There is little doubt that penalty against possession of such equipment simplify problem will enforcing the primary prohibition Expediency, however, ***. test, is not and we conclude that convenience of enforcement does not warrant the broad restriction ” imposed by Saiez, [the statute].’ quot- 489 So. 2d at (Fla. 1963). ing State, Delmonico v. 155 So. 2d 369-70 to the According court, Saiez the statute at issue was not reasonably related to its purpose of preventing credit card fraud because it interfered with the rights of individuals who used the machines for noncriminal activities. The Saiez court concluded that the broad scope of the statute necessary was not and held it invalid on due process grounds. Saiez, 1129; 489 So. 2d at see also
28
Rasdan,
Akron v.
105
3d
As the State may we not read a mental state of knowledge plus criminal into purpose section 5—401.2. In Tolliver, we were able to imply the mental state of knowledge plus criminal purpose as an element of sec 104(a)(2) tion because that provision contained no 4— mental state. After determining that the legislature did not intend to create an offense, absolute liability therefore, this court was free to choose an appropriate mental state and to imply this mental state as an ele (West ment of the statute. See 720 1996); ILCS 5/4—9 (1992). People Anderson, v. 15, 148 Ill. 2d 23-24 Unlike 104, section section 5—401.2 does not lack 4— 401.2(i) a mental state element. Section expressly provides the mental state for the offense of failure to keep records is knowledge. When a statute is unam it biguous, must be enacted, enforced as and a court may not depart from its plain language by into it reading exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. People Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d (1997). The responsibility for the wisdom or justice of legislation rests with the legislature, and may courts not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of orderliness and public policy. Kozak v. Retirement Board the Firemen’s & Annuity Fund, 95 Ill. Benefit (1983). 2d Consistent with these principles, Zaremba, Wick, Hamm, we did not read the mental state of knowledge criminal plus into the purpose they provided expressly knowl- at issue because
statutes edge Instead, we held that these as the mental state. must the same in this case. statutes were invalid. We do met hold that defendant has his burden We establishing that 5—401.2 is unconstitutional and reverse his convictions for failure records. mandatory system providing effective rec- Because an keeping prevent ord or reduce the or sale of transfer laudatory goal, parts is a encour- stolen vehicles and we remedy age legislature defect this constitutional at' possible the earliest time. facially in- we that section 5—401.2 is
Because hold process grounds, due we need not address valid on defendant’s claim that this statute is unconstitutional as par- applied addition, to him. In we need not address the appellate arguments regarding propriety ties’ non- remand the cause for limited court’s decision to evidentiary necessary hearing. No remand is for the the evidence of defendant’s circuit court reevaluate light possession assignment complete of title without *24 because, stated, of Tolliver as the evidence is insufficient permit with a conclusion that defendant acted holding mental Our that defendant’s Tolliver state. under 5—401.2 must reversed convictions be obviates the this statute is unconstitutional also because Accordingly, need a we need not decide for remand. appellate have a whether the court should ordered new hearing. trial rather than a limited
CONCLUSION ap- judgment reasons, we For these reverse pellate remanding eviden- this cause for limited court pos- tiary hearing. convictions for Wereverse defendant’s assignment complete under session of title without 104(a)(2) Code and failure to of the Vehicle section 4—
31 401.2(a). records under section Defendant’s sen- tences are vacated. reversed.
Judgments FREEMAN, concurring: specially JUSTICE I I of this case. agree majority’s disposition with merely prior write to note defendant’s separately convictions could have been offered as substantive evi dence of his intent on the of title charges possession Oaks, 169 Ill. complete assignment. People without See v. (1996) (“[ejvidence 409, 2d 454 of other is admis crimes if it prove operandi, sible tends to modus design, motive However, or knowledge”). record reveals that at trial offered only State convictions for prior impeachment purposes, not as direct evidence of guilt. in this case Accordingly, defendant’s prior convictions cannot be considered as direct evidence of intent. See (1998) v. People Hope, 184 Ill. 2d (arguments not raised at may State trial not be raised on appeal); (1989) Adams, People Ill. 2d (refusing State, allow as appellee, argue theory on appeal admissibility of evidence which was not raised in trial court). It is thus unnecessary speculate whether the prior convictions could have constituted sufficient evi dence of intent to uphold defendant’s convictions for pos session of title without in complete assignment instant case. MILLER,
JUSTICE concurring in part dissent- ing part:
I agree with the-majority that the defendant’s convic- tions for the offense of possession without title 104(a)(2) complete assignment, violation of section 4— (625 104(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code ILCS 5/4 — (West 1996)), cannot *25 I however, stand. do not with agree, the majority’s conclusion, further in to the response for that petition rehearing, the defendant’s records, in of sec- violation for failure
convictions (625 401.2(a) Code ILCS tion of Vehicle 5/5— 5 — 401.2(a) (West The defen- 1996)), must also be reversed. that majority agrees, and the now argues, dant now innocent offense defining might punish statute that unconstitutional. I believe that conduct and is therefore 401.2(a) valid; I dissent from accordingly, section 5 — denial as modified on majority opinion, portion adhere to the conclu- of and I would instead rehearing, case, in this filed Feb- original opinion sion found in our found the 17, 2000, judge properly the trial ruary charges. of those guilty defendant 5—401.2 section record-keeping requirements in V of the chapter are of a of statutes part group found dealers, licensed automobile regulate Vehicle Code that in wreckers, As a dealer and rebuilders. transporters, article the defendant was licensed under used auto parts, to automotive applicable III of that which is chapter, and rebuild- repairers, parts recyclers, scrap processors, 401.2, the defendant was to section ers. Pursuant 5 — detailed records to maintain extensive of automobiles acquisition disposition regarding of his business. ad- and automobile the course parts subject dition, operations periodic the defendant’s were State, office is au- Secretary whose inspections by the record-keeping with compliance thorized to ensure of the Vehicle Code. ILCS requirements 5/5 —403 (West 1996). majority recognizes, legislative purposes
As the are statutory expressed this scheme 625 ILCS of the Vehicle Code. 5—100—1 5/5 —100—1 (West 1996). by the findings After a number stating of motor theft vehicle regarding problems legislature sec- repairs, motor vehicle sales and and the business of therefore, concludes, is, the intent 5—100—1 “It tion of manda- system Assembly to establish the General *26 or prevent and record which will tory licensing keeping stolen or their reduce the transfer or sale of vehicles within this State.” parts yard that the records that readily apparent scrap
It is like the defendant are required and licensees operators an integral part under section 5—401.2 represent defendant, statutory of this scheme. The as a licensee in Code, highly under the Vehicle is a participant industry, reasonably and the has regulated legislature determined that extensive record is a keeping responsibil- ity of licensees under the Code. Despite legislature’s intent, majority clear and statement findings that the in concludes offense found section 5—401.2 does not bear a rational to the evil it relationship designed is to address. Specifically, majority concludes what, might majority’s view, statute in the is punish wholly innocent conduct. I disagree. of section record-keeping requirements 5—401.2
apply only to licensed under persons provisions of chapter V of the Vehicle Code. I that the legisla- believe ture may define offenses in this manner and on impose persons who in certain engage occupations trades the duty to and maintain records of their compile busi- The pertinent ness. constitutional in cir- question these cumstances is not whether there an might be innocent for a explanation knowing licensee’s failure to keep records, certain as the majority suggests, but whether the record-keeping by the requirements imposed legisla- ture are rationally related to the evils the legislation designed remedy. The second question must be affirmative, answered in the in of the obvious rela- light between the of sec- tionship record-keeping requirements tion 5—401.2 and the legislature’s goal reducing in traffic stolen automobiles and automobile parts.
Given the state’s
interest
significant
regulating
dealers,
the business of
recyclers
parts
automobile
and the corresponding
necessity
for extensive
record
keeping
operators,
licensed
I believe that
the present
case is much different
from the cases cited by
major
ity, which challenged offenses might
irrationally
crimi
nalize conduct
legitimately performed without a criminal
(see
People
Zaremba,
v.
purpose
(1994);
The present appeal does not involve circumstances remotely similar to those cases. The defendant is licensed under V of the chapter Code, Vehicle and pursuant to section 5—401.2 he is keep certain records regarding duty business. The imposed on the defen- dant aas licensee under the Code is rationally related to the of goals the legislation, and I would therefore conclude that section 5—401.2 is constitutional.
CHIEF JUSTICE joins HARRISON in this partial concurrence and partial dissent. BILANDIC,
JUSTICE also in concurring and part in dissenting part:
I agree majority with that defendant’s convic- for possession tions of title without complete assignment 104(a)(2) (625 under section of the Vehicle Code ILCS 4 — 104(a)(2) (West 1996)) However, must be I reversed. 5/4 — agree with Justice partial Miller’s dissent that defen- dant’s convictions for failure to keep records under sec- 401.2(a) (i) (625 tions and of the Vehicle Code ILCS (i) (West 1996)) 401.2(a), should be I affirmed. write 5/5 —
35 finding rationale for my separately express 5—401.2 constitutional. to declare and define is legislature empowered crime, to determine and constituting
conduct Steppan, punishment. People nature and extent of (1985). a crim satisfy process, Ill. To due 2d remedy reasonably designed inal statute must be constitute a legislature evils that has determined health, safety general threat to the and welfare. public (1999). K.C., Ill. 2d 550-51 V of the Chapter re (West (625 1996)), Code ILCS et seq. Vehicle 5/5 —100 dealers, automotive wreck regulates transporters, which rebuilders, ers and and under which defendant licensed, detail the findings sets forth considerable mandatory its purpose underlying licensing record-keeping provisions: (1) Assembly involving
“The General finds that: crimes parts steadily the theft of and their vehicles have risen past years, resulting over the with a loss of millions of dol- (2) State; lars to the the crim- residents this essential to enterprise operations ability inal theft vehicle is the parts thieves to transfer or sell stolen vehicles or their channels, through legitimate making commercial them (3) industry; available for sale to the automotive vehicle dealers, scrap processors, parts recyclers, automotive repairers comprise majority and rebuilders who vast persons engaged in the automotive business this frequently exposed pressures State are and influences *28 (4) thieves; organized from motor vehicle elements of crime constantly attempting are to influence businessmen engaged repair the sale and of motor vehicles so as to (5) interests; further their criminal and close and own dealers, government regulation scrap strict of vehicle processors, parts recyclers, repairers and re- automotive provide system tracking builders will the flow of parts significantly and their and vehicles essential therefore reduce the numbers of vehicle-related thefts in this State. is, therefore, Assembly to It the intent of the General es- system mandatory licensing keep- and record tablish a ing prevent which will or reduce the transfer or sale of parts stolen vehicles or their within this State.” 625 ILCS (West 1996). 5/5 —100—1 record-keeping requirements The of 401.2(a) inextricably rationally are linked and related 5— sought statute, i.e., to the evils to be remedied the parts.” “the transfer or sale of stolen vehicles or their The failure to maintain the records facilitates easy disposal thereby thwarting vehicles, of stolen purpose the clear purpose, of the statute. Consistent with this record-keeping penalty provisions and expressly only applicable section 5—401.2 are to certain persons required chapter to be licensed under V:new and (625 (West used vehicle dealers ILCS 5—102 5/5— (like 1996)); defendant), parts recyclers automotive (625 (West repairers and rebuilders ILCS 5/5—301 (625 1996)); salvage buyers and out-of-state vehicle ILCS (West 1996)). (i) (West 401.2(a), 625 ILCS 5/5—302 1996). Significantly, application an for a license as parts automotive dealer must include a statement that applicant chapters through I understands V of the 301(b)(7)(West 1996). Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS See 5/5 — applicant supply The must also detailed information on 301(b)(3) ownership of the business. 625 ILCS 5/5 — (West 1996). applicant must aver under oath that principals in the have not committed in the business past years any any three one violation of one of the fol- (625 lowing acts: the anti-theft laws of the Vehicle Code (West 1998)); seq. et ILCS the “Certificates 5/4—101 (625 Title” laws of the Vehicle Code ILCS et 5/3—100 (West 1998)); seq. Against Registration the “Offenses (625 of Title of the Code Certificates Laws” Vehicle (West 1998)); seq. “Dealers, ILCS et 5/3 —701 Transporters, Wreckers Rebuilders” laws Ve- (625 (West 1998)); seq. hicle Code et sec- ILCS 5/5—100 tion 21—2 of the Criminal Code of entitled “Grim-
37 (West (720 1998)); ILCS inal to vehicles” trespass 5/21—2 (35 ILCS et Tax Act Occupation Retailers’ or the 120/1 (West 1996). 301(b)(4) 1998)). (West 625 ILCS seq. 5/5 — under oath that must further aver The applicant any committed in have not in the business principals one or more any or more violations of year calendar three (111. Finance Act Rev. following acts: Consumer Act 17, by Pub. 1983, par. seq., repealed ch. 5601 et Stat. 1, 1985); the Consumer 1004, 9,§ eff. November (West (205 et seq. Loan Act ILCS Installment 670/1 (815 Act ILCS 1998)); Sales the Retail Installment 405/1 (West Installment 1998)); the Motor Vehicle Retail et seq. (815 (West 1998)); Inter- et seq. Act ILCS Sales 375/1 (815 (West 1998)); the Il- et seq. est Act ILCS 205/0.01 (740 et seq. Act ILCS Wage Assignment linois 170/.01 (West XII of Civil 1998)); 8 of article of the Code part (735 Procedure, ILCS “Wage entitled Deductions” 5/12— (West 1998)); or the Consumer Fraud seq. 801 et (815 et seq. Act ILCS Deceptive Business Practices 505/1 (West 1996). (West 1998)). 301(b)(5) 625 ILCS 5/5 — the applicant Finally, part application process, as if applicant an to determine investigation “authorizes so, if disposi- a crime and has ever been convicted of (West ILCS tion of those convictions.” 625 5/5 —105 1996). forth above statutory provides scheme set they into which industry notice that
licensees with
scrutiny
regulation.
subject
to close
entering
are
in the
development
unexpected
not a recent and
This is
in Il
industry
automotive parts
The automobile and
law.
regulation.
of extensive
long
subject
linois has
been the
(1989),
235,
citing
246
Krull, 126 Ill. 2d
People
See
1072,
Sales,
Fahner,
F.2d
&
Inc. v.
721
Bionic Auto Parts
(7th
1983).
1934,
has required
Since
the state
Cir.
(see Krull, 126 Ill.
dealers
parts
licensure of automotive
and,
record-keeping
has
246),
imposed
2d at
since
(see
Sales,
requirements
Inc.,
Bionic Auto Parts &
1079).
F.2d at
the legislature adopted measures
to provide criminal sanctions for the failure maintain
See
adequate
Krull,
records.
In Zaremba, we held following that provision the theft statute offends due process: person
“A knowingly: commits theft when he
* * * (5) or in property Obtains exerts control over custody any agency explicitly law enforcement which is represented by any him any to law enforcement officer or acting individual in behalf of a law enforcement as agency 1(a)(5). 1989, being 38, par. stolen.” Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 16 — 1(a)(5) A violation of involving section property 16— in felony valued excess was a offense. See Ill. $300 1(b)(4). 1989, 38, Rev. Stat. par. ch. 16— Unlike provisions statute, other of the theft 1(a)(5) neither that the control over 16— unauthorized, was nor that there intent property was an permanently deprive subject to owner of rightful 1989, 38, 1(a)(1), See Rev. Stat. property. pars. Ill. ch. 16— (a)(4). 1(a)(5) (a)(2), (a)(3), Section could have thus 16— been to conduct that to applied was unrelated the purpose section, this effec- statutory being provide an fencing operations. breaking up For method of tive 1(a)(5) applied example, could have been section 16— wholly of an evi innocent conduct authorized and lawfully possession of dence technician who obtained arresting goods In these circum from an officer. stolen culpable mental state rendered stances, the absence of a 1(a)(5) unconstitutional. of the theft statute section 16— 38-39, 2d at 42. Zaremba, 158 Ill. guided by this court’s
Our decision in Zaremba was (1985). People Wick, Wick, Ill. 2d 62 decision (Ill. aggravated held that the arson statute Rev. Stat. we 1.1(a)(3)) par. was unconstitutional ch. relationship to its because it did not bear a reasonable severely purpose, punish i.e., to more the conduct of personal injury police officers arsonists results firefighters. aggravated arson did not and incorporate statute simple
the elements of arson and did not provide culpable otherwise for a mental state. Rather applying aggravated arsonists, than arson statute *31 anyone knowingly any applied damaged who structure by explosive police firefighter fire or a officer or is where injured. Accordingly, lawfully a farmer who demolished by resulting injury fire, deteriorated barn in to a fire aggravated fighter, arson, have been liable for would felony. aggravated Thus, X arson Class we held that swept broadly punishing too innocent as well statute culpable setting Wick, in Ill. 2d at as conduct fires. 66. subject irrationally Wick, In statutes Zaremba and parties of innocent not criminalized lawful conduct scope of the statutes. intended to fall within the rationally Code contrast, section 5—401.2 of the Vehicle only participating in the conduct of licensees criminalizes industry, only the automotive and that conduct which legitimate obviously closely linked to the state’s preventing the transfer and sale of stolen interest vehicles and their There parts. is no potential statute will reach beyond its intended target. Thus, a knowing violation of the record-keeping requirements 401.2(a) is not the type innocent conduct that was at Zaremba and Wick. issue
In light of the I foregoing, would hold that section 5— 401.2 of the Vehicle Code is reasonably designed to achieve its purpose, that defendant has failed to overcome the presumption the statute is constitu- I tional. would thus affirm defendant’s convictions failure to keep records.
(No. 87382.
(No. 87434. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ILLINOIS, OF Appel
lant, v. ANTHONY LOFTON, W. Appellee. — THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appel lant, v. RICHARD STEWART, Appellee.
Opinion November 2000. filed