People v. LawPeople v. Law
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Meredith S. White and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437), which, among other things, amended the definition of felony murder in
In this appeal, Law challenges the trial court‘s summary denial of his
I
FACTS
We take the facts from the unpublished opinion we issued in 2008, affirming Law‘s and May‘s convictions in case No. E041967. (People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1134, 1138 (Lewis), review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 [in determining the sufficiency of a
When the second defendant returned to the living room with the victim, he was holding two guns, his and the victim‘s. He ordered the victim to the floor, then began searching the rest of the house for money and marijuana while the first defendant stood guard in the living room. The second defendant found the safe in the victim‘s bedroom closet and came back to retrieve the victim. The victim refused to open the safe, so the first defendant brought R. into the room and ordered him to open it. When R. was unable to do so, the defendants ordered him to lie on thе floor in the hallway.
Frustrated with the victim‘s resistance, the second defendant (the one holding two guns) pistol whipped the victim. The victim then ran into the bedroom of another roommate, A., turned on the lights, and screamed that defendants were “tripping.” A. could tell the victim was panicked and scared. At that point, both defendants entered A.‘s room, brandishing their guns. The second defendant tried to hit the victim with one of his guns but dropped it when the victim blocked the blow with his arm. The second
Law‘s jury convicted him of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance described in
In 2018, Law filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking to have his finding on special circumstances vacated for insufficient evidence under Banks and Clark. We summarily denied his petition.
In January 2019, after SB 1437 went into effect, Law filed a
On April 12, 2019, the trial court denied Law‘s petition. It explained that it had reviewed its own records and determined that the jury, having been properly instructed on special circumstance robbеry-murder, found that he had been a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Such a finding prevented him from making the required showing to obtain relief under
II
ANALYSIS
Law makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the trial court had no discretion to review the record of conviction when determining whether he had stated a
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review de novo questions of statutory construction. (California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature‘s intent, giving effect to the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.‘” (Ibid.)
If the court issues an order to show cause, it must hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (
In short, a
B. Analysis
1. The court properly reviewed the record of conviction
Two opinions, Lewis and Verdugo, have already rejected the argument that a trial court is limited to the allegations in the petition when determining whether the petitioner has stated a prima facie claim for relief under
The Lewis court reasoned: “Allowing the trial court to consider its file and the record of conviction is also sound policy. As a respected commentator has explained: ‘It would be a gross misuse of judicial resources to require the issuance of an order to show cause or even appointment of counsel based solely on the allegations of the petition, which frequently are erroneous, when even a cursory review of the court file would show as a matter of law that the petitioner is not eligible for relief. For example, if the petition contains sufficient summary allegations that would entitle the petitioner to relief, but a review of the court file shows the petitioner was convicted of murder without instruction or argument based on the felony murder rule or [the natural and probable consequences
2. The court properly denied Law‘s petition
Nеxt, Law argues that even if the trial court could look beyond his petition to the record of conviction, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life under Banks and Clark. The People argue that Law falls squarely into the definition of a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Because Law was convicted before Banks and Clark, he is correct that he is entitled to a determination of whether the trial evidence is sufficient to support the
In Banks, the California Supreme Court described what is often referred to as the Tison-Enmund spectrum. “At one extreme” are people like Enmund—“the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 800.) “At the other extreme [are] actual killers and those who attempted or intended to kill.” (Ibid.)
Our high court articulated several factors intended to aid in determining whether a defendant falls into this middle category, such that
The defendant in Banks was convicted of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance based on his having acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which his codefendant Banks and others participated, and in which Banks shot and killed one of the robbery victims while esсaping. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 796-797.) Considering the defendant‘s involvement in the robbery against the factors just enumerated, the Court “placed [him] at the Enmund pole of the Tison-Enmund spectrum.” (Ramirez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 397.) As a result, the Court concluded “the jury‘s special-circumstance true finding cannot stand.” (Banks, at p. 811.)
Law argues his case is like Banks because there was no evidence he or May intended to kill the victim, “[r]ather, like in Banks, the killing here appeared to be a spontaneous response to unexpected resistance from the victim.” But the Court‘s conclusion Banks was not a major participant who acted with reckless indiffеrence to human life did not focus on the spontaneity of the shooting. Instead, what the Court found significant was the defendant‘s role as the getaway driver who was not aware his
Law, in contrast, was willingly involved in the violent manner in whiсh his and May‘s robbery took place. He and May not only broke into the victim‘s house armed, but they used the guns to threaten the victim and his roommates throughout the duration of the robbery. Even if we gave Law the benefit of the doubt and assumed he was the “first defendant” in the evidence the jury heard, he still watched without intervening when his accomplice pistol whipped the victim once and tried to do it again. Being at the scene of the shooting, he could have tried to stop his accomplice‘s violent behavior or to help the victim once he had beеn shot, but he did neither. We agree with the People that this sort of conduct easily meets our state‘s standard for what constitutes being a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Indeed, we are not aware of a single case that concludes a defendant who personally committed a robbery, used a gun, and was present for the shooting did not meet the standard in
Although the trial court erred by concluding the special circumstance finding, on its own, rendered Law ineligible for relief—that is, the court erred by failing to determine whether Law qualified as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life under Banks and Clark—we conclude the error was harmless because the record demonstrates the answer tо that question is yes. As a result, we conclude the denial of Law‘s petition was proper. (See People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 419 [concluding that because “[t]he language of the special circumstance tracks the language of Senate Bill 1437 and the new felony-murder statutes,” a jury‘s true finding on
3. Any error in failing to appoint counsel for Law was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Law also argues the court erred by not appointing him counsel to aid in the court‘s determination of whether it should issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. We need not address this issue because even if it were error for the court not to appoint counsel at that stage in the petitioning process, the error was harmless. Given the trial evidence, counsel would not have been able to demonstrate in a reply brief or otherwise that Law was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Law‘s petition.
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
The request for publication of the opinion filed on April 27, 2020 is GRANTED. The opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). It is ORDERED that the opinion filed in this matter on April 27, 2020, be certified for publication.
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MENETREZ
J.