People v. LawPeople v. Law
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Slough, Ramirez, Menetrez
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Meredith S. White and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2001, appellant Terrell Law and his codefendant Brett May committed a home invasion robbery, during which one of them shot and killed one of the residents. In 2006, Law and May were tried jointly before two separately empaneled juries who found them both guilty of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance described in
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437), which, among other things, amended the definition of felony murder in
In this appeal, Law challenges the trial court‘s summary denial of his
I
FACTS
We take the facts from the unpublished opinion we issued in 2008, affirming Law‘s and May‘s convictions in case No. E041967. (People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1134, 1138 (Lewis), review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 [in determining the sufficiency of a
Around 4:00 a.m. on May 1, 2001, Law and May went to the victim‘s house and waited until one of his roommates left for work. Armed with guns and wearing ski masks, they entered the house and encountered R. (another roommate) sleeping on the couch. They woke R. up and ordered him to the floor. While the first defendant guarded R., the second defendant went to the victim‘s bedroom to wake him up. The victim owned a gun, but the second defendant grabbed it before he could get to it. As this was happening, the first defendant was ordering R. to hand over his jewelry.
When the second defendant returned to the living room with the victim, he was holding two guns, his and the victim‘s. He ordered the victim to the floor, then began searching the rest of the house for money and marijuana while the first defendant stood guard in the living room. The second defendant found the safe in the victim‘s bedroom closet and came back to retrieve the victim. The victim refused to open the safe, so the first defendant brought R. into the room and ordered him to open it. When R. was unable to do so, the defendants ordered him to lie on the floor in the hallway.
Frustrated with the victim‘s resistance, the second defendant (the one holding two guns) pistol whipped the victim. The victim then ran into the
Law‘s jury convicted him of first degree felony murder with the special circumstance described in
In 2008, in case No. E041967, we affirmed defendants’ convictions. In that appeal, neither defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to support the special circumstances robbery-murder finding. In 2015 and 2016, the California Supreme Court decided Banks and Clark, respectively, which discuss when
In 2018, Law filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking to have his finding on special circumstances vacated for insufficient evidence under Banks and Clark. We summarily denied his petition.
In January 2019, after SB 1437 went into effect, Law filed a
On April 12, 2019, the trial court denied Law‘s petition. It explained that it had reviewed its own records and determined that the jury, having been properly instructed on special circumstance robbery-murder, found that he had been a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Such a finding prevented him from making the required showing to obtain relief under
II
ANALYSIS
Law makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the trial court had no discretion to review the record of conviction when determining whether he had stated a prima facie claim for relief but was limited to the allegations in his petition. Second, he argues that even if the court could look beyond his petition to the record of conviction, the evidence is insufficient to support a
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review de novo questions of statutory construction. (California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.) “Our primary task ‘in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature‘s intent, giving effect to the law‘s purpose. [Citation.] We consider first the words of a statute, as the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.‘” (Ibid.)
If the court issues an order to show cause, it must hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (
In short, a
B. Analysis
1. The court properly reviewed the record of conviction
Two opinions, Lewis and Verdugo, have already rejected the argument that a trial court is limited to the allegations in the petition when determining whether the petitioner has stated a prima facie claim for relief under
In Lewis, the defendant argued “that the court could look no further than his petition in evaluating his prima facie showing and the court therefore erred when it considered [the] opinion in his direct appeal.” (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137.) In Verdugo, the defendant argued “the superior court lacked jurisdiction to deny his section 1170.95 petition on the merits” based on its review of the record of conviction “without first appointing counsel and allowing the prosecutor and appointed counsel to brief the issue of his entitlement to relief.” (Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 323.) Analogizing to the well-established and similar resentencing procedures under
The Lewis court reasoned: “Allowing the trial court to consider its file and the record of conviction is also sound policy. As a respected commentator has explained: ‘It would be a gross misuse of judicial resources to require the issuance of an order to show cause or even appointment of counsel based solely on the allegations of the petition, which frequently are erroneous, when even a cursory review of the court file would show as a matter of law that the petitioner is not eligible for relief. For example, if the petition contains sufficient summary allegations that would entitle the petitioner to relief, but a review of the court file shows the petitioner was convicted of murder without instruction or argument based on the felony murder rule or [the natural and probable consequences
doctrine], . . . it would be entirely appropriate to summarily deny the petition based on petitioner‘s failure to establish even a prima facie basis of eligibility for resentencing.’ (Couzens et al., Sentencing Cal. Crimes, [(The Rutter Group 2019)], ¶ 23:51(H)(1), pp. 23-150 to 23-151.)” (Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138.) We agree with this view and therefore conclude the court did not err by looking to the record of conviction and reviewing the attachments to the People‘s opposition (i.e., our opinion in Law‘s direct appeal or the jury instructions from his trial) in evaluating his petition.
2. The court properly denied Law‘s petition
Next, Law argues that even if the trial court could look beyond his petition to the record of conviction, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life under Banks and Clark. The People argue that Law falls squarely into the definition of a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Because Law was convicted before Banks and Clark, he is correct that he is entitled to a determination of whether the trial evidence is sufficient to support the
“The Tison court pointed to the defendant in Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund) as an example of a nonkiller convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule for whom the death penalty was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Enmund was the driver of the getaway car in an armed robbery of a dwelling whose occupants were killed by Enmund‘s accomplices when they resisted. [Citation.] In deciding the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids imposition of the death penalty ‘on one such as Enmund’ . . . , the high court emphasized that the focus had to be on the culpability of Enmund himself, and not on those who committed the robbery and shot the victims [citation]. ‘Enmund himself did not kill or attempt to kill; and, . . . the record . . . does not warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder. . . . [T]hus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the [victims]. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.‘” (Ramirez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 394.)
In Banks, the California Supreme Court described what is often referred to as the Tison-Enmund spectrum. “At one extreme” are people like Enmund—“the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 800.) “At the other extreme [are] actual killers and those who attempted or intended to kill.” (Ibid.)
categories“—people like the Tison brothers, who were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with a reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.)
Our high court articulated several factors intended to aid in determining whether a defendant falls into this middle category, such that
The defendant in Banks was convicted of first degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance based on his having acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which his codefendant Banks and others participated, and in which Banks shot and killed one of the robbery victims while escaping. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 796-797.) Considering the defendant‘s involvement in the robbery against the factors just enumerated, the Court “placed [him] at the Enmund pole of the Tison-Enmund spectrum.” (Ramirez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 397.) As a result, the Court concluded “the jury‘s special-circumstance true finding cannot stand.” (Banks, at p. 811.)
Not long after Banks, the Court revisited this issue in Clark, also concluding the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant‘s robbery-murder special circumstance findings. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) The defendant in Clark planned a burglary of a computer store to occur after the store was closed. According to the plan, his codefendant was to carry out the burglary and carry an unloaded gun. However, his codefendant ended up carrying a gun loaded with one bullet and fired that bullet when he unexpectedly encountered a store employee, killing her. (Id. at pp. 612-613.) Our high court concluded there was insufficient evidence Clark acted with reckless indifference to human life because (a) Clark was not physically present when his codefendant killed the employee and was therefore unable to intervene; (b) there was no evidence Clark knew his codefendant was predisposed to be violent; and (c) Clark planned for the robbery to take place after the store closed, and the gun was not supposed to be loaded. (Id. at pp. 619-622.) In sum, the court believed there was “nothing in [Clark‘s] plan that one can point to that elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery.” (Id. at p. 623.)
Law argues his case is like Banks because there was no evidence he or May intended to kill the victim, “[r]ather, like in Banks, the killing here appeared to be a spontaneous response to unexpected resistance from the victim.” But the Court‘s conclusion Banks was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life did not focus on the spontaneity of the shooting. Instead, what the Court found significant was the defendant‘s role as the getaway driver who was not aware his
codefendants were going to use guns during the robbery. Because he “did not see the shooting happen, did not have reason to know it was going to happen, and could not do anything to stop the shooting or render assistance,” the Court
Law, in contrast, was willingly involved in the violent manner in which his and May‘s robbery took place. He and May not only broke into the victim‘s house armed, but they used the guns to threaten the victim and his roommates throughout the duration of the robbery. Even if we gave Law the benefit of the doubt and assumed he was the “first defendant” in the evidence the jury heard, he still watched without intervening when his accomplice pistol whipped the victim once and tried to do it again. Being at the scene of the shooting, he could have tried to stop his accomplice‘s violent behavior or to help the victim once he had been shot, but he did neither. We agree with the People that this sort of conduct easily meets our state‘s standard for what constitutes being a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Indeed, we are not aware of a single case that concludes a defendant who personally committed a robbery, used a gun, and was present for the shooting did not meet the standard in
they were involved in the planning of the crime only). Law‘s conduct is clearly distinguishable.
Although the trial court erred by concluding the special circumstance finding, on its own, rendered Law ineligible for relief—that is, the court erred by failing to determine whether Law qualified as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life under Banks and Clark—we conclude the error was harmless because the record demonstrates the answer to that question is yes. As a result, we conclude the denial of Law‘s petition was proper. (See People v. Gutierrez-Salazar (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 419 [concluding that because “[t]he language of the special circumstance tracks the language of Senate Bill 1437 and the new felony-murder statutes,” a jury‘s true finding on
3. Any error in failing to appoint counsel for Law was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Law also argues the court erred by not appointing him counsel to aid in the court‘s determination of whether it should issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. We need not address this issue because even if it were error for the court not to appoint counsel at that stage in the petitioning process, the error was harmless. Given the trial evidence, counsel would not have been able to demonstrate in a reply brief or otherwise that Law was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Law‘s petition.
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MENETREZ
J.
THE COURT
The request for publication of the opinion filed on April 27, 2020 is GRANTED. The opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). It is ORDERED that the opinion filed in this matter on April 27, 2020, be certified for publication.
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
MENETREZ
J.