People v. GuilloryPeople v. Guillory
Under recent changes to the Penal Code, participants in a felony that results in a killing can be found guilty of felony murder only if they were an actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (
We disagree. There were viable bases for murder liability independent of the rejected special circumstances allegation. In such circumstances,
BACKGROUND
A.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437), effective January 1, 2019, changed the law relating to accomplice liability for murder to better align punishment with individual culpability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b), (f).) To that end, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as to murder and narrowed the felony murder exception to the malice requirement. (People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 862.)
As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended
If the petition makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner satisfies these requirements, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing at which the prosecutor is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under current law. (
B.
The factual and procedural background is drawn from our opinion affirming Guillory’s direct appeal from her conviction (People v. Guillory (April 24, 2007, A108688) [nonpub. opn.]), the record on that appeal (which we judicially notice as necessary), and the record on her resentencing petition.
Guillory and her boyfriend Josh Burton decided to lure Curtis to Guillory’s home to rob him and steal his car. Late one
When Curtis walked into the apartment and greeted Guillory, Burton attacked him from behind, held him in a chokehold with the knife to his neck, and directed Guillory to tie his hands with a telephone cord. After the two took Curtis’s money, car keys, and other belongings, they put on latex gloves and left the apartment with Guillory’s baby and the still-bound Curtis. Burton got in the driver’s seat of Curtis’s car; Guillory got in back with Curtis and the baby.
As Burton drove, Curtis struggled and attempted to escape. Guillory stabbed him in the head with two screwdrivers at least 13 times, using enough force to gouge his skull; clubbed him on the knee with a car-lock device; and hit him on the head with a can of baby formula.
Curtis knocked the baby’s car seat over as he struggled. Burton pulled over, moved the baby to the front, and beat Curtis with his fists. Curtis begged for his life and offered money, but to no avail. With Guillory grasping Curtis to prevent his escape, Burton drove on until Curtis recommenced struggling. Burton stopped the car again and told Guillory to strangle Curtis with a cord he handed her. She attempted to comply, but when Curtis fought her off Burton took over and strangled him as Guillory watched him slowly die. The pair then dumped Curtis’s body, dropped the baby off with a friend, and took Curtis’s remaining valuables from his car.
C.
The jury was instructed on theories of malice murder, felony murder, and aiding and abetting. It convicted Guillory of first degree murder, first degree robbery, kidnapping for purposes of robbery, kidnapping for purposes of carjacking, simple kidnapping, carjacking, and child endangerment. The jury also
D.
In 2019, Guillory petitioned for resentencing pursuant to the then newly-enacted section 1170.95 (now
The court further found that the not-true finding on the kidnapping allegation did not change this result. First, it concluded, Guillory could be convicted of felony murder under current law based on the robbery and carjacking special circumstances allegations, which were not foreclosed by the negative finding on the kidnapping allegation. Second, she could be convicted of murder on an aiding and abetting theory independently of the felony murder rule. It therefore denied her petition.
DISCUSSION
A.
Guillory contends the not-true finding on the kidnapping allegation entitles her to resentencing as a matter of law under
If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, in most cases the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to vacatur and resentencing, as the trial court did here. (
Although the point is the subject of some legal dispute, we will assume arguendo that the jury found Guillory did not act with reckless indifference or was not a major participant in the kidnapping because it rejected the kidnapping allegation, which incorporated the reckless indifference/major participant elements. (See
But we cannot construe
Guillory asserts the language of
This is such a case. Under Guillory’s construction, where a jury finds one or more special circumstances allegations to be not true but deadlocks on others,
Guillory’s theory contravenes the Legislature’s decision to limit relief to offenders who could not be convicted of murder under current law (
The cases Guillory relies on are consistent with this conclusion. In People v. Ramirez, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 926-927, a court had granted habeas corpus in a prior proceeding after vacating a true finding on a sole special circumstances allegation that apparently provided the only basis for murder liability. The habeas corpus ruling constituted a “prior finding” requiring vacatur and resentencing under
Guillory’s remaining arguments focus primarily on whether, as she asserts, a not-true finding on a special circumstances allegation constitutes a finding that the petitioner did not act with reckless disregard for life or was not a major participant in the felony (see Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 614-615; People v. Harrison, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439-442; Clayton, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 154-158) or, rather,
Finally, Guillory asserts the mistried special circumstance allegations are “legal non-entities” that, since the original prosecutor declined to retry them, did not “form[] a constituent part of the judgment.” As such, she maintains, the
B.
Guillory, a minor when she helped kill Curtis, argues the issuance of the order to show cause pursuant to
Proposition 57 applies retroactively to all cases in which the judgment was not final when the proposition went into effect. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 303-304.) After briefing was completed in this case, our Supreme Court held in People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 162-163 that a final judgment becomes nonfinal for purposes of Lara retroactivity when the sentence is vacated on collateral attack (there, a petition for habeas corpus). This is so, Padilla indicates, because at that point the trial court regains jurisdiction to consider the appropriate punishment and the defendant regains the right to appeal the new sentence. (Id. at pp. 161-162.) Conversely, filing a collateral attack does not make a judgment nonfinal. (Id. at p. 162.)
An order to show cause under
The order denying the petition is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
We concur:
JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.