THE PEOPLE v. EDUARDO GODOY GONZALEZ
G062473
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE
Filed 8/21/25
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EDUARDO GODOY GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
G062473
(Super. Ct. No. 19HF0174)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Terri K. Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher P. Beesley and Caelle McKaveney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
We reject each contention. First, the evidence showed defendant moved the victim to a more secluded location, away from possible escape or detection, to facilitate a sexual assault. That satisfied the asportation element. Second, the court in People v. Ledesma (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 830 (Ledesma) already rejected the void-for-vagueness argument Gonzalez raises here, and we find the Ledesma analysis persuasive. Finally, even assuming some prior-acts evidence should have been excluded, any error was harmless in light of defendant’s admissions and the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE ATTEMPTED RAPE
In the early morning hours of February 6, 2019, Jane Doe was working at her overnight job as a cleaning person in an office building in Irvine. Doe was vacuuming a room near the entrance, which had a transparent glass wall, when she was saw Gonzalez come into the building. Gonzalez checked to see if the victim was alone and briefly looked around the
Gonzalez pulled Doe down the hallway into another room, which did not have a transparent wall, and where they were no longer visible from the hallway. He “just wanted to have sex with her” and intended to do so regardless of her consent.
Doe attempted to defend herself from the attack while being dragged down the hall. Once Gonzalez and Doe had entered into the second, side room, he started to pull his pants down and attempted to pull Doe’s pants down as well.
Doe was eventually able to remove the vacuum strapped to her back and grab the gun from Gonzalez. Doe, now in possession of the gun, threatened to kill Gonzalez, but he laughed and informed her the gun was fake. She then ran from the room to which Gonzalez had dragged her, back towards the front room, and to her coworker in an adjacent building for help. Upon hearing Doe’s screams for help, appellant fled the scene in attempts to avoid arrest.
Police later recovered and identified that “gun” as a replica of a Glock semi-automatic firearm. As a result of Gonzalez’s attack, Doe sustained a torn shoulder muscle in addition to various scratches, bruises, and soreness on her face, elbows, and breasts.
II.
THE CHARGES AND THE TRIAL
By way of amended information, Gonzalez was charged with kidnapping to commit a sex offense (count 1,
At trial, the People put on evidence of two prior incidents pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).
The first incident occurred on January 13, 2019, a few weeks before Gonzalez attempted to rape Doe. Shortly before 7:00 p.m., Maria G. left the gym where she had been working out and was walking through a
He went back to the Carl’s Jr. but then came back to Maria again on a skateboard. She turned and walked toward him, telling him she had already called the police and he responded, “So what? What [are] the police . . . going to do to me?” Maria was afraid because they were in an isolated area, so she engaged him in conversation, and asked him why he was doing this when he was so handsome and should not have to pay for sex, and invited him to walk with her. He walked with her toward Edinger Avenue, and he invited Maria to dinner and asked for her phone number. Maria gave him her phone number, and had him call the number so she had his number.
He told her his name was Eduardo and that he was a member of the same gym. They walked together to a more well-lit area, and she told him goodbye, and he stopped following her. After she got home she received a text from him.
Maria told her boyfriend about the incident, and he used the phone number to confirm the man was actually a member at their gym. Maria identified a photo on the gym’s computer as being the same person. A few weeks later, Maria contacted the police after seeing a news story about the incident in Irvine, and she recognized a photo of Gonzalez shown on the news.
At trial, Gonzalez testified and admitted essentially everything Doe had testified to. During closing argument, Gonzalez’s counsel made no argument as to counts 2 through 5 and instead focused entirely on the aggravated kidnapping charge (
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Gonzalez waived his right to a jury on the aggravating factors, and in a bench trial on March 24, 2023, the court found each of the allegations to be true. The court then imposed a term of life with parole for count 1 and ordered the upper terms for counts 2 through 4 imposed and stayed pursuant to
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE ASPORTATION FINDING
Gonzalez first contends there was insufficient evidence to support the asportation element of the kidnapping charge. We review that contention for substantial evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577.)
The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1203, which required proof of: (1) intent to commit rape; (2) taking or detaining another by force or fear; (3) moving the person a substantial distance by force or fear; (4) movement beyond that merely incidental to rape; (5) intent to commit rape prior to the movement; and (6) lack of consent. It defined “substantial distance” as “more than a slight or trivial distance” that “must have increased the risk of harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the rape,” and it directed the jury to consider “all the circumstances” in deciding if the movement was substantial.
The California Supreme Court in Rayford explained that in determining whether the movement is merely incidental to the commission of the underlying crime, the jury considers the “ ‘scope and nature’ of the movement,” as well as the “context of the environment in which the movement occurred.” “This includes the actual distance a victim is moved.
On the increased risk of harm, People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1152, instructed: “The essence of aggravated kidnapping is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim caused by the forced movement. [Citation.] We have articulated various circumstances the jury should consider, such as whether the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the attacker’s opportunity to commit additional crimes.” And importantly: “The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased.” (Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 14.)
People v. Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164 upheld the asportation element of kidnapping to commit rape where a defendant moved the victim only nine feet into a back room. The defendant argued the movement was insubstantial. “But ‘a rape . . . does not necessarily require movement to complete the crime.’ [Citation.] Where a defendant drags a victim to another place, and then attempts a rape, the jury may reasonably infer that the movement was neither part of nor necessary to the rape.” In such cases, “[t]he critical factor” is whether the defendant “secluded or confined the victim,” thereby “decreas[ing] the odds of detection.” (Id. at pp. 169-170.)
Gonzalez argues that: The distance was minimal; the movement occurred during the sexual assault and was inseparable from it; and Doe was never moved far enough from potential help to increase her risk. In arguing these factors require reversal, Gonzalez draws heavily from cases involving
We disagree with Gonzalez and find the robbery cases distinguishable. Unlike the robbery cases, where the movement within the confines of a building was necessary to reach the property to be stolen and did not significantly increase the risk of harm to the victims, it was not necessary to move Doe in order to commit rape. As the Shadden court noted, rape is an assault on the person and thus no movement is necessary. As such, it was not incidental to the crime to drag her into another room. Indeed, Gonzalez testified that there were couches in the room where he initially confronted Doe and that he could have raped her there. Moreover, there was substantial evidence that the room where Gonzalez dragged Doe was more secluded in that it did not have a glass wall like the front entry where Gonzalez first confronted Doe. It was also farther from Doe’s means of escape. Because the movement reduced the likelihood of detection, made escape more difficult, and thereby increased the opportunity for further assault, the movement was substantial.
II.
SECTION 209 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Next, Gonzalez contends
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in due process. It requires penal statutes to give “ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes” and prohibits statutes that are “so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 595.) A statute is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it requires interpretation; “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 110.) Rather, a statute fails for vagueness only if it is so indeterminate that it both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 595.)
Only a reasonable degree of certainty is required, and there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1107.) “[L]egislative enactments ‘must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.’” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143.)
In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court considered the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandated enhanced sentences for offenders with three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The statute defined “violent felony” to include certain enumerated offenses or any offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” (
The Court concluded this framework was impermissibly vague for two independent reasons. (Johnson, supra, 576 U.S. at p. 597.) First, there was no reliable way to choose between competing accounts of what the ordinary case looks like in the abstract, making the inquiry inherently speculative. (Ibid.) Second, the clause offered no yardstick for how much risk qualified as “serious potential risk,” creating “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony . . . .” (Id. at p. 598.) The combination of an abstract, hypothetical offense and an imprecise risk standard rendered the residual clause too unpredictable and arbitrary to satisfy due process. (Ibid.) Importantly, the problem in Johnson was not simply that a court had to think hypothetically; it was that the hypothetical was divorced from any real-world facts and thus left the analysis unmoored from objective criteria. “As a general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct . . . .” (Id. at pp. 603-604.)
In Ledesma, the Court of Appeal considered — and rejected — the same void-for-vagueness challenge Gonzalez raises here. The defendant argued that the asportation element in
We agree with Ledesma’s analysis. The analysis called for under
ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING PRIOR-ACTS EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS
Gonzalez contends the evidence of Gonzalez’s encounters with two women prior to the attempted rape invited the jury to draw an impermissible inference of criminal propensity in violation of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), and that the limiting instruction was insufficient to dispel this prejudice. He cites cases cautioning against the “inflammatory” nature of sexual-misconduct evidence, particularly when the prior conduct is similar to the charged offense.
Assuming, without deciding, that the court committed error in admitting the evidence, we conclude the error was harmless. The principal harm Evidence Code section 1101 seeks to prevent is an inference of guilt based solely on a defendant’s character or disposition. Here, Gonzalez admitted to nearly all of the conduct underlying the charged offenses, and the defense’s case contested only whether the movement satisfied the asportation element of aggravated kidnapping. The prior-acts evidence did not bear on that discrete issue in a way that could have affected the verdict.
Moreover, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 375 that it could not consider the evidence for propensity, but only for the limited purposes identified. We presume jurors follow such instructions. (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.) Given Doe’s testimony, the corroborating physical evidence, Gonzalez’s admissions, and the video surveillance, there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict had the prior-acts evidence been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Even under the more stringent Chapman standard urged by Gonzalez, any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
The judgment is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.