People v. EvansPeople v. Evans
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Thomas, Kilbride, Freeman, Garman, Karmeier, Theis, Burke
Held
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
Where statute provides that, by operation of law, every Class X sentence includes as though written therein a three-year term of mandatory supervised release, or MSR, and where an offender who was convicted of aggravated batterywith a firearm claimed that he had not known about MSR until after the denial of his initial postconviction petition, he did not assert the “cause” element of the cause and prejudice test for when leave to file a successive postconviction petition may be granted; but the legislature was invited to enact a more complete statutory framework for successive postconviction petitions.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Garman, Karmeier, and Theis сoncurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Burke dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether the circuit court of Cook County erred in denying defendant George Evans’ pro se motion for leave to file a successive petition for relief under the Post-Conviction HearingAct (Act) (
BACKGROUND
¶ 2
¶ 3 In March 2005, defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm (
¶ 4 In February 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the trial court summarily dismissed. The appellate court affirmed that dismissal in an
¶ 5 In December 2009, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconvictiоn petition. See
“The information about the M.S.R. was not yet discovered to me yet. And when I did learn about it more research need to be done. Also it was still being decided in appeals court, so no case were able to be used as evidence. Basically I Petitioner just discovered this.”
Defendant further alleged that he would suffer prejudice if he were unable to assert this claim because, in violation of his due process rights, he was being made “to serve more time than the judge imposed.” The trial court denied defendant‘s request for leave to file the successive petition, noting that defendant was “ignoring the fact that this was not something that he had bargained for.” Rather, it was “a sentеnce after a trial and conviction and mandatory supervised release term is not something the Court has any control over.”
¶ 6 Defendant appealed, arguing that his motion for leave to file the successive petition should have been granted because it stated the “gist” of a claim for cause and prejudice—that is, it stated “an arguable claim” of cause and prejudice. In support, defendant cited People v. LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d 914 (2006), aff‘d on other grounds, People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (2007). In LaPointe, a panel of our appellate court held that, because “[a] motion under
¶ 7 The appellate court below rejected defendant‘s argument for two reasons. First, the court noted that, in People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008), this court stated, albeit in a different context, that the cause and prejudice standard is “more exacting” than the simple “gist” standard. According to the appellate court, “[t]he reasonable inference to bе drawn from that statement is that the ‘gist’ standard applicable to first-stage petitions is, contrary to the appellate court‘s holding in LaPointe, a lower standard than that befitting the cause and prejudice [standard].” 2011 IL App (1st) 100391-U, ¶ 13. Second, the appellate court held that, regardless of the applicable standard, defendant “failed to assert an arguable сlaim of cause” because, “[b]y operation of law, every sentence includes a term of mandatory supervised release in addition to the term of imprisonment imposed.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing
¶ 8 Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed.
DISCUSSION
¶ 9
¶ 10 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a means by which a criminal defendant can assert that “in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.”
¶ 11 Here, defendant raises two arguments relating to the evaluation of cause and prejudice claims, one relating to the timing of that evaluation and one relating to the standard governing that evaluation. First, defendant argues that, under the Act, the sufficiency of a cause and prejudice claim is to be evaluated in conjunction with, rather than prior to, first-stage postconviction proceedings. According to defendant,
¶ 12 Important as these arguments are (infra ¶ 18), we need not address either of them in this case. This is because, in his motion for leave to file the successive petition, defendant asserts as “cause” something that, as a matter of law, can never be “cause.”
¶ 13 This court has made very clear that “all citizens are charged with knowledge of the law” and that “[i]gnorance of the law or legal rights will not excuse a delay in
“The information about the M.S.R. was not yet discovered to me yet. And when I did learn about it more research need to be done. Also it was still being decided in appeals court, so no case were able to be used as evidence. Basically I Petitioner just discovered this.”
Thus, thе only excuse that defendant proffers for not raising the MSR claim sooner is that he only “just discovered” that he would be subject to a three-year term of MSR following his release. But at the time defendant was sentenced, as well as at the time of both his direct appeal and his initial postconviction proceeding, the Unified Code of Correctiоns expressly provided that, by operation of law, every Class X sentence “shall include as though written therein a [three-year term of MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment.”
¶ 14 When asked about this matter at oral argument, defense counsel responded that ignorance of the law is not a factor in this case because, in a 2006 decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a statutorilymandated term of supervised release is unenforceable if not expressly imposed by the sеntencing court. See Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006). According to defense counsel, “assuming [Earley] is correct, then no matter what the statute says, [defendant] never had an MSR term until sometime later the Illinois Department of Corrections put that in on its own.”
¶ 15 There are at least two problems with this argument. First, decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals construing New York law have no power to enjoin the enforcement of Illinois statutes. Thus, even assuming that Earley was correctly decided, that decision has absolutely no consequence in Illinois unless and until a court of this state endorses its analysis and then applies that analysis to
¶ 16 Second, Earley was decided on June 9, 2006, some 15 months after defendant was sentenced. Thus, whatever reason defendant now has to believe that he cannot be made to serve the statutorilymandated MSR term, he had no reason to believe that when his sentence was actually imposed. Or to put it another way, defendant cannot claim that a decision handed down 15 months after sentencing somehow excuses his ignorance of the law at the time of sentencing. At that time, defendant was expected to know, and in fact is charged with knowing, that his term of years would include an additional three-year term of MSR “as though written
¶ 17 Consequently, we hold both that the circuit court of Cook County properly denied defendant‘s pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition and that the appellate court properly affirmed that denial.
¶ 18 Before concluding, we wish to speak briefly to the issues that defendant sought to raisе in this court. Although we do not have cause to reach them in this case, these issues highlight important deficiencies in the Act. When it enacted
CONCLUSION
¶ 19
¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
¶ 21 Affirmed.
¶ 22 JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting:
¶ 23 We granted defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal in this case in order to settle a split of authority in the appellate court with regard to the legal standard applicable to a pro se petitioner‘s motion seeking leave to file a suсcessive postconviction petition. The majority chooses not to resolve the split of authority, instead holding that defendant‘s motion for leave to file his successive petition fails because he “asserts as ‘cause’ something that, as a matter of law, can never be ‘cause.’ ” Supra ¶ 12. There is no reason why this court should not address the impоrtant legal questions raised in this appeal. For this reason, I dissent.
¶ 24 In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant requests that this court resolve the clear split of authority among the appellate court districts on the legal standard to be applied to a motion under
¶ 25 Today the majority declines to resolve the split of authority in the appellate court on an issue squarely raised in this appeal, the issue which prompted this court to grant defendant‘s petition for leave to appeal. Instead, the majority “invite[s] the legislature to seize the window of opportunity that this case provides and, sometime before the next such case arrives on our docket, enact a more complete statutory framework for successive postconviction practice.” Supra ¶ 18. The legislature will not have time to act before the next such case arrives, however, because there are currently a number of cases on our docket being held for the resolution of this case. See, e.g., People v. Hunter, No. 113132; People v. Staple, No. 113919; People v. Edwards, No. 114084; People v. Thompson, No. 115006; People v. Lee, No. 115020.
¶ 26 Further, the majority‘s invitation to the legislature is contraryto the function of this court. It is this court‘s role to interpret statutory language, particularly where the appellate court districts disagree about the meaning of that language. See Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill. 2d 318, 334-35 (2006) (“[T]he legislature‘s role is to make the law and the judiciary‘s role is to interpret the law.“); Roth v. Yackley, 77 Ill. 2d 423, 429 (1979) (“[I]t is the function of the judiciary to determine what the law is and to apply statutes to cases.“).
¶ 27 Thus, I disagree with the majority‘s decision to avoid the issue raised in this appeal by pleading to the legislature to clarify its intent. There is no need to wait for the next case to arrive on our docket. Those cases are already here. We should address the issue which the parties in this case have taken time to raise, brief, and argue before this court. Today‘s decision allows the uncertainty in the appellate court to continue indefinitely. Therefore, I would address the pleading standard issue.