People v. Evans
2013 IL 113471
| Ill. | 2013Background
- George Evans was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm in 2005 and sentenced to 12 years; his direct appeal and an initial pro se postconviction petition were unsuccessful.
- In 2009 Evans moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, claiming he only later discovered that a three-year mandatory supervised release (MSR) term automatically attaches to Class X sentences and that enforcement of MSR would violate due process because the court never mentioned it at sentencing.
- Section 122-1(f) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act requires leave to file a successive petition by showing cause for not raising the claim earlier and resulting prejudice.
- Evans argued the leave motion need only plead the “gist” of cause and prejudice (citing LaPointe) and that his late discovery satisfied cause; he also noted a Second Circuit decision (Earley) suggesting unenforceability of unmentioned supervised-release terms.
- The trial court denied leave; the appellate court affirmed, holding ignorance of the statutory MSR (which attaches by operation of law) cannot be objective cause. This Court granted leave and affirmed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Evans showed cause to obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) | Leave should be granted because Evans only later discovered the MSR and thus pleaded the gist of cause and prejudice | Evans argued his late discovery of the MSR term (and Earley) constituted cause and prejudice preventing earlier raising of the claim | Denied: ignorance of a statute that automatically attaches MSR cannot be "cause"; citizens are charged with knowledge of the law |
| Applicable pleading standard for motions under §122-1(f) | The motion need only state the "gist" of a meritorious cause-and-prejudice claim (as in LaPointe) | The Court need not decide here; appellate decisions conflict and a stricter standard may apply | Not decided: Court avoided resolving the split in standards because Evans’ claim failed as a matter of law |
| Whether federal Second Circuit decision (Earley) excused failure to raise MSR claim earlier | Earley suggests statutorily mandated supervised-release terms unenforceable if not explicitly imposed, so Evans had reason to believe no MSR existed | Earley is not binding in Illinois and was decided after Evans’ sentencing; it does not excuse ignorance of Illinois law | Rejected: Earley has no force in Illinois and postdated sentencing, so it cannot supply cause |
| Whether enforcement of MSR when not mentioned at sentencing violates due process | Evans argued enforcing a three-year MSR increases total punishment beyond the orally pronounced sentence | State argued MSR attaches by statute and is part of the sentence as a matter of law | Court did not reach merits because cause failed; concluded MSR attached by operation of law and Evans’ ignorance is not excusing cause |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577 (Illinois 2005) (ignorance of law does not excuse delay)
- People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (Illinois 2007) (discussing pleading standards for pro se postconviction filings; appellate panel language on "gist")
- People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132 (Illinois 2008) (observing that cause-and-prejudice standard is more exacting than a mere "gist" standard)
- Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006) (held supervised-release term unenforceable if not expressly imposed under New York law; discussed but found inapplicable in Illinois)
- People ex rel. Scott v. Israel, 66 Ill. 2d 190 (Illinois 1977) (statutory attachment of MSR to sentences discussed)