People v. CrenshawPeople v. Crenshaw
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Knecht, Harris, Steigmann
OPINION
¶ 1 This case comes to us on the motion of the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to withdraw as counsel on appeal on the ground no meritorious issues can be raised in this case. For the reasons that follow, we grant OSAD‘s motion and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
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¶ 3 On October 20, 2009, the trial court found defendant, Michael E. Crenshaw, guilty of criminal sexual assault (
¶ 4 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant also filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (
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¶ 6 In January 2013, Judge Robert K. Adrian denied defendant‘s motion for a substitution of judge, finding defendant failed to show Judge Diane M. Lagoski was biased. In June 2013, the State filed a motion to dismiss the successive postconviction petition for failure to seek leave to file it. Judge Lagoski granted the State‘s motion, and defendant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for a hearing. The State then filed a motion to have defendant‘s petition deemed frivolous and to order defendant to pay costs. Defendant filed a second motion for a hearing. In September 2013, Judge Lagoski granted the motion to reconsider and set the matter for a hearing.
¶ 7 Also in September 2013, defendant filed a second petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition and an amended successive postconviction petition. The amended successive postconviction petition alleged, inter alia, postconviction counsel (1) was ineffective for failing to comply with
¶ 8 In February 2014, defendant filed a motion for a hearing and a motion for substitution of judge, seeking a substitution of Judge Lagoski. The motion for substitution of judge was denied by Judge Adrian in April 2014.
¶ 9 In August 2014, defendant filed a “motion to vacate, void judgment” under
¶ 10 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, listing “motion for substitution of judge, motion of void judgment” as the order appealed. Defendant listed OSAD as his attorney on appeal.
¶ 11 OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as defendant‘s counsel on appeal, citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and asserted it had thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded any request for review would be without merit. OSAD argues defendant‘s claims relating to a “miscarriage of justice,” plain error, and ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be brought in a section 2-1401 petition and are meritless. OSAD further argues defendant‘s claim relating to the substitution of Judge Lagoski and Judge Adrian is likewise meritless, despite the fact the motion for substitution of judge was ruled upon by a judge named in the motion.
¶ 12 On its own motion, this court granted defendant leave to file additional points and authorities by October 31, 2016, but defendant filed none. We grant OSAD‘s motion and affirm the trial court‘s order denying defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition.
II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 14 In Finley, the Supreme Court held prisoners do not have a constitutional right to counsel when collaterally attacking their convictions; however, the Court noted, if a state chooses to offer appointed counsel for this type of relief, it has “substantial discretion to develop and implement programs to aid prisoners seeking to secure postconviction review.” Finley, 481 U.S. at 559. The Illinois Supreme Court held, when a defendant is appointed postconviction counsel who seeks to withdraw citing Finley, appointed counsel must provide an explanation why the defendant‘s claim is without merit. People v. Kuehner, 2015 IL 117695, ¶ 21, 32 N.E.3d 655.
A. Defendant‘s Section 2-1401 Petition
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¶ 16 Defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment under
¶ 17 We review de novo the denial of a petition for relief from judgment under
“Under Illinois law, a party may challenge a judgment as being void at any time, either directly or collaterally, and the challenge is not subject to forfeiture or other procedural restraints. [Citation.] Void judgments thus occupy a unique place in our legal system: to say that a judgment is void or, in other words, that it was entered without jurisdiction, is to say that the judgment may be challenged in perpetuity. For this reason, as Belleville Toyota observed, ‘[l]abeling the requirements contained in statutory causes of action “jurisdictional” would permit an unwarranted and dangerous expansion of the situations where a final judgment may be set aside on a collateral attack.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, only the most fundamental defects, i.e., a lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Belleville Toyota warrant declaring a judgment void. [Citation.]” LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38, 32 N.E.3d 553 (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 341, 770 N.E.2d 177, 188 (2002)).
Defendant does not argue the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction in the underlying criminal proceeding. Because defendant does not challenge jurisdiction, we need not consider whether the judgment is void.
¶ 18 Though defendant‘s motion only attacks the judgment as void, we nonetheless conclude defendant‘s arguments do not entitle him to relief under section 2-1401.
“A section 2-1401 petition for relief from a final judgment is the forum in a criminal case in which to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition. [Citations.] A section 2-1401 petition, however, is not designed to provide a general review of all trial errors nor to substitute for direct appeal. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 566, 802 N.E.2d 236, 243 (2003).
Additionally, “section 2-1401 proceedings are not an appropriate forum for ineffective-assistance claims because such claims do not challenge the factual basis for the judgment.” Id. at 567, 802 N.E.2d at 244.
¶ 19 Notwithstanding the fact defendant filed his section 2-1401 petition well outside the two-year limitations period, defendant has not presented any facts unknown to the trial court at the time of the original judgment. Rather, defendant seeks a general review of his case, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, judicial bias, and various evidentiary issues—all matters that should have been, and some of which were, presented on direct appeal or in a postconviction petition. Section 2-1401 is not the proper forum for such a review. We thus conclude OSAD has provided an adequate explanation why defendant‘s section 2-1401 petition is meritless.
B. Defendant‘s Motion for Substitution of Judge
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¶ 21 Defendant sought a substitution of judge as a matter of right under
¶ 22 OSAD disagrees, citing Niemerg v. Bonelli, 344 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464-66, 800 N.E.2d 86, 89-91 (2003). In Niemerg, the Fifth District concluded, “[a]lthough a section 2-1401 proceeding may be a ‘new action’ for some purposes, such as pleading sufficiency and service of process, it is not a new case for purposes of section 2-1001(a)(2).” Id. at 465, 800 N.E.2d at 90. The appellants in Niemerg made an identical argument to defendant‘s. The Fifth District, while recognizing the logic of the argument, nonetheless concluded:
“[I]t is clear to us that to allow a substitution of judge in a section 2-1401 proceeding would defeat the policy behind the rule requiring a motion for substitution to be presented before the judge has ruled on any substantial issue in the case: to preclude litigants from ‘judge-shopping’ after having formed an opinion that the judge may be unfavorably disposed toward the litigant‘s cause.” Id.
We agree and adopt this holding and conclude defendant was not entitled to substitute Judge Lagoski as a matter of right under
III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 24 We grant OSAD‘s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel and affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
¶ 25 Affirmed.