People v. ChavezPeople v. Chavez
THE COURT:
It is hereby ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed on July 15, 2026, be modified as follows:
- On page 3, in the first complete sentence that begins “Owens backed up,” “CalReycle” is deleted and replaced with “CalRecycle.”
- On page 5, in the last sentence that begins “A swab” and continues onto page 6, the double quotation marks at the end of the sentence are deleted.
- On page 8, in the first sentence following the subheading “July 2021 Murder of Crystal Hernandez,” “Armondo Gonzales” is deleted and replaced with “Armando Gonzalez.”
- On page 9, in the second and third sentences of the third paragraph, “Gonzales” and ” ‘Nyatto’ ” are deleted and replaced with “Gonzalez” and “Nieto.”
- On page 10, in the third sentence of the third complete paragraph, “October” is deleted and replaced with “July.”
- On page 16, in the first sentence of the first full paragraph that begins “When the officers arrived,” “Gonzales” is deleted and replaced with “Gonzalez.”
On page 19, in the second paragraph under the subheading, “A. Relevant Procedural History,” the first sentence that begins “The defense” is deleted and replaced with the following sentence: The defense also moved in limine to sever counts 1 and 2 from each other pursuant to
Penal Code section 954 ,Evidence Code sections 352 and1101, subdivision (a) , and the Due Process Clause.- On page 20, in the second sentence of the indented second paragraph, “Deborah” is deleted and replaced with “[Debra].”
- On page 21, in the indented paragraph that begins “The argument,” “then” is deleted and replaced with “than.”
- On page 22, the first sentence of the first paragraph under the subheading “B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law,” is deleted and replaced with the following sentence:
“[
Penal Code] [s]ection 954 , in relevant part, permits the joinder of ‘two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.’ - On page 24, in the second paragraph under the subheading “a) Cross-admissibility of evidence,” in the sentence that begins “[T[he recurrence,” the first word of the sentence is deleted and replaced with “[T]he.”
- On page 25, in the sentence that begins “As the court noted” in the first full paragraph, the word “they” is inserted between the words “before” and “died.”
- On page 28, after the carryover sentence that begins “Under these circumstances” on page 27, the point page of the citation ”Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 125” is deleted and replaced with “p. 124.”
- On page 34, in the paragraph that begins “Here, there was evidence,” the period immediately following the citation ”People v. Isby (1947) 30 Cal.2d 879, 888” is deleted.
- On page 36, in the parenthetical to the citation ”Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27,” the word “reasonable” is deleted and replaced with “reasonably.”
- On page 37, in the parenthetical to the citation People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020, the quotation marks around the words “any rational trier of fact” are deleted and replaced with single and double quotation marks as follows:
’ “any rational trier of fact” ’
On page 37, in the first sentence of footnote 4 that begins “It bears worth noting,” the word “worth” is deleted so that the sentence begins “It bears noting.”
There is no change in the judgment. Except for the modifications set forth, the opinion previously filed remains unchanged.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
MEEHAN, J.
A jury convicted defendant Adrian Chavez (defendant) of premeditated murder of Marilyn Cuervo (
In this appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to sever the murder charges, and he argues joinder resulted in “gross unfairness.” He also argues insufficient evidence supports the premeditation and deliberation findings as to each count.
We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
October 2020 Murder of Marilyn Cuervo
On October 12, 2020, at approximately 8:00 a.m., a team of four people from CalRecycle were preparing to investigate a landfill in a dirt field near Daniels Lane in Bakersfield. The field was littered with waste and there were small homeless encampments and homeless people around. At some point, the team approached a concrete structure and noticed there appeared to be a person wrapped in a blanket asleep in the structure approximately 25 feet away; they did not disturb the individual.
Bakersfield Code Enforcement Officer Billy Owens arrived, and the group told him someone appeared to be asleep in the structure. Owens went to investigate. He “could
Officer Anthony Manriquez, one of the responding officers, testified he observed a person‘s head sticking out of the west wall. The face had blood on it and there were lacerations on the individual‘s forehead near the hairline. The individual appeared to have a black eye. The person was covered in a blanket and old carpets were stacked on top of the body. The person was not moving or breathing and, based on his training and experience, Manriquez presumed that the individual was deceased. The police ultimately identified the woman as Marilyn Cuervo. Cuervo‘s arms were crossed over her chest when she was found. Multiple videos were taken documenting the scene, surrounding debris, and Cuervo‘s body as it was found. The prosecution also introduced photographs of Cuervo‘s body after it was uncovered from “multiple debris.” Cuervo‘s shirt was pulled up and her pants were pulled partially down to midthigh. There was “[s]ome form of a rag” in her crotch area.
The police cordoned off the crime scene area and documented the shoe sizes of the individuals present from CalRecycle, Owens, and the police officers at the scene. The police photographed and seized items located at the scene including a piece of wood and multiple sticks with apparent blood on them, a white rock with apparent blood on it, cardboard with apparent blood spatter on it, a brick with apparent blood on it, a possible blood trail, blood on a blue plant, a beige and white pillow with apparent blood on it, a black wheelchair, a mattress and box spring, and brown cardboard with apparent blood and white clothing. They swabbed the stains on some of the items that appeared to have blood on them. An individual from the Kern County Sheriff‘s Coroner Office moved Cuervo‘s body. There was a wooden stick found underneath her with blood on it that the police thought could possibly have been used to create the lacerations on her body.
A sexual assault response team (SART) exam was conducted on Cuervo‘s body on October 12, 2020. Cuervo‘s body was examined from head to toe; buccal and vaginal swabs were taken; and her injuries were documented. Cuervo had abrasions to the left side of her hip and bruising to her left forearm and elbow and her right arm. There were three to four puncture wounds on her head near the hairline and her eyebrow. Cuervo also had abrasions on the back of her right thigh and the lower portion of her right leg. The exam did not reveal any injuries to the genitals or buttocks that were consistent with sexual assault.
Dr. Robert Whitmore conducted an autopsy on Cuervo‘s body on October 15, 2020 in the presence of members of law enforcement. He noticed parts of Cuervo‘s skin had a brown discoloration that is characteristic of being exposed to sunlight postmortem. There were lacerations, which refers to tearing of the skin resulting from blunt force trauma, on the top, back, and right sides of the scalp, around and on the ear, and on the
A brick found at the scene was processed for DNA. Defendant and Mariam were excluded as potential contributors to the DNA profile obtained from a stained portion of the brick, but Cuervo could not be excluded as a potential contributor to the DNA profile obtained from the stain on the brick. A swab of an unstained portion of brick with ceramic plating found at the scene revealed a partial Y-STR profile from which neither
Douglas S. testified he was homeless in October 2020. He knew Cuervo “from the park,” referring to Wayside Park in Bakersfield. Douglas would help Cuervo out with food and money because she was pregnant. He knew her for about six to eight months and stated he had “never seen her with anybody.” He heard about Cuervo‘s death from people around the park. He had seen her within days before hearing of her death. They were both trying to sleep near an auto parts store. When Douglas woke up, Cuervo was gone.
Douglas knew defendant from the “[n]eighborhood” and as the boyfriend of Crystal Hernandez. Douglas spoke to defendant at some point a few months after Cuervo‘s death and “right before” Hernandez‘s death, but he did not remember if it was a few days or a week prior. During their conversation, defendant told Douglas that he beat Cuervo up “for a shot of dope,” “a shot of crystal meth.” Cuervo “tried to keep it from
Patricia A. met defendant “on the streets” approximately five years before trial. Patricia knew Cuervo, whom Patricia referred to as “Whispers.” Patricia was at the park one day after Cuervo died with a group that included defendant. Defendant told Patricia that he misplaced a syringe full of drugs; he had made “one for him, one for [Hernandez], and one for [Cuervo], and ... he was upset because he couldn‘t find his.” Defendant told Patricia he kept asking Cuervo where it was and hitting her and she would not answer him. Defendant eventually found the syringe but was upset that Cuervo did not “just tell him.” Patricia did not tell the police about this story at the time because she did not realize its significance. Patricia testified that although she was unsure whether defendant was in a relationship with Cuervo, she believed that defendant was in a relationship with Hernandez for at least a year or more, including in October 2020.
Debra Vallejo, an investigating social worker with the Kern County Department of Human Services, testified she contacted Cuervo on October 2, 2020 at the hospital after Cuervo had a baby. Vallejo began her investigation and placed Cuervo‘s child in protective custody that day. Vallejo explained that, as part of her job, when she places a child in protective custody, she has to notify the parent to let them know the child is in custody and to explain the court process. Accordingly, she followed up with Cuervo late in the afternoon on October 9, 2020. Vallejo first went to the house of Cuervo‘s sister, April; April directed Vallejo to an area where she might find Cuervo. Vallejo observed
Alexis L. testified that she contacted police on September 28, 2020 to report concern about a woman sitting on the ground in front of a pizza restaurant off Union and Brundage. Alexis described the woman as Hispanic with brown hair in a ponytail, wearing a white shirt and red boxers, and no shoes on her feet, which appeared dirty. The woman was pregnant and appeared to be homeless. She identified herself as Marva Cuervo. Alexis took a picture of Cuervo and gave her water and pizza. She went back the next day, but Cuervo was gone. On October 12, 2020, a police detective contacted Alexis and asked her to identify Cuervo; Alexis sent the picture she took to the police.
July 2021 Murder of Crystal Hernandez
On July 26, 2021, defendant called 911 at 1:23 a.m. and identified himself as Armondo Gonzales. Defendant stated he needed police and an ambulance at the Desert Star motel, noting his “girl,” his “friend” was still breathing. When the operator asked defendant what happened, he said, “That‘s not important.” Then, he stated he did not know what happened, he “just came here” and found “her here like this.” Another individual, later identified as Daniel R., told the operator defendant borrowed his phone and defendant‘s girlfriend was sitting in front of the door and she was “unconscious,” “bleeding from her head,” “all beat up,” “unresponsive,” and it looked like her arm was broken.
When the officers arrived on scene, they saw a male pushing a female in a stroller; they identified the male on the scene as defendant and the female in the stroller as Hernandez. Resendez noticed “the victim laying in the stroller clearly needing medical aid,” so she went to render aid. Resendez testified that Hernandez had “major head injuries” and “major lacerations to her arms.” “She was covered in blood. She had bruising all around her body, little marks of lacerations in different places, abrasions everywhere. She just overall had major trauma to her person.” Resendez was unable to detect a pulse. Hernandez was not breathing and she was cold to the touch though it was a hot night. Hernandez was wearing blue jeans that were pulled down, exposing her underwear, and a blood-stained brown shirt.
Officer Eric Hearn spoke with defendant. Defendant initially identified himself as Armando Angel Gonzales. He stated he last saw his friend Hernandez in the morning. She was arguing with an individual named “Nyatto.” Defendant came home and there was a big mess. “She was laying right there ... in the beginning,” on her back. He reported that he had found Hernandez 10 minutes earlier and he picked her up. When asked if there was a pool of blood around her, defendant stated, “it was dark.” He stated he saw his friend “Critter” and asked to use his phone to call 911. When the police told defendant to have a seat in the car, he said, “I have nothing to do with this. I just came back f- home.”
Officer Jesse Perez processed the scene. He noticed a blood trail that led from Hernandez to a motel room that was close by. There was a large amount of blood in the room. Perez described the amount of blood as “significant,” noting it was in the room and on the ceiling. Perez testified “[i]t was obvious that an assault and the homicide had
Palm prints were lifted from the metal tube collected from the scene and the palm prints were found to match defendant‘s right palm. Latent prints lifted from a beer can at the scene also matched defendant‘s prints.
The crowbar taken from the scene tested positive for presumptive blood. “There was not enough statistical support to draw a conclusion as to whether or not [defendant] could be excluded” as a potential contributor from swabs taken from the silver metal tube and sledgehammer head retrieved from the scene. Hernandez could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA found on the tube or from the sledgehammer head. Hernandez could not be excluded as a contributor to a DNA profile taken from a reddish-brown stain on a piece of wood found at the scene and a stick with a rounded edge. There “was not enough statistical support to determine whether or not [defendant] or Daniel [R.] could be excluded as contributors to the DNA profile obtained from” the stick with the rounded edge found at the scene. Neither defendant nor Daniel R. were found to be known contributors to vaginal swabs taken from Hernandez.
Two videos of the scene taken by the police that night were shown to the jury. One video shows the scene on the exterior of the motel, including Hernandez in a stroller, and the second video documents the inside of the motel room to which the blood trail led. After the investigation at the motel was completed on October 26, 2021, the scene was no longer secured by the police. At some point thereafter, the motel was “burned.” “It was victim of an arson.”
A sexual assault examination was conducted on Hernandez‘s body. The nurse who conducted the exam did not observe injuries consistent with sexual assault.
Douglas S. testified he also knew Hernandez. They were friends and had known each other for almost five years. Hernandez was also homeless. Douglas knew defendant from the neighborhood and interacted with him on occasion “because of
When Douglas spoke to defendant at some point a few months after Cuervo‘s death, days before Hernandez‘s death, Douglas was concerned for Hernandez because she and defendant had come to Douglas‘s camp and Hernandez “looked like she had been roughed up.” She had teeth missing and her arm was swollen. Defendant was getting in Hernandez‘s face and yelling at her. “He would jump at her, and she would scream.” During his conversation with defendant, Douglas asked where Hernandez was; defendant said he did not know. When defendant was describing what “he did to her” (Cuervo), Douglas initially thought defendant was talking about Hernandez; when Douglas asked if he killed Hernandez, defendant replied, “no, silly. Whispers,” which was Cuervo‘s nickname.
Douglas also testified he saw defendant and Hernandez together the day before Hernandez was killed. They were arguing about Douglas; defendant was trying to convince Douglas to go to a motel with them. Defendant was grabbing Hernandez‘s arm and face and screaming at her; Hernandez was also screaming “the whole time.” Douglas walked with Hernandez “trying to talk to her to see if she wanted to go somewhere safe. She said no.”
Other Evidence
The police conducted three interviews with defendant—on July 26, 2021, July 29, 2021, and October 28, 2021. A portion of the October 28, 2021 interview was played for the jury. Defendant denied killing Hernandez or Cuervo or having sex with either of them. He stated he had not seen Cuervo in a long time. He denied that his DNA would be on the sticks and bricks used on Cuervo. He also denied touching the metal tube or the stick found in his room at the motel where Hernandez was beaten. He stated that none of it should have his DNA.
Defense Evidence
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He was homeless on October 12, 2020 and would break into stores for money. He met Cuervo, whom he referred to as “Whispers,” in 2010. Defendant could not recall how he met Cuervo, but he testified he was “pretty sure it had to do with drugs,” and they “probably ran into each other and met on the streets.” They would “smoke[]” and “just cross paths.” Defendant had sex with Cuervo
Defendant testified he last saw Cuervo on October 10, 2020, or three days before she died in the field where her body was later found.3 Earlier that day, defendant saw Cuervo with a Hispanic male in that field. Defendant approached them and they all smoked methamphetamine together. Then, defendant left to go to the store. He returned and gave Cuervo water, snacks, and a pipe and then left. At the time, defendant was living in an abandoned house near the train tracks. Defendant returned to the field later that night on his bicycle and he heard “some fussing.” He thought someone “was getting jumped,” or beat up. Defendant approached and “pushed this dude off of her, then ... started wrestling with the guy.” Defendant ended up on the ground and someone was kicking him; eventually, the individuals left. Defendant did not recognize them. Defendant did not realize he was bleeding that night but realized he was the next day. Defendant realized Cuervo was there and she had “a bunch of trash over her legs.” He “s[a]t her upright there by the concrete slab.” Cuervo said she was thirsty, so defendant left to get her water from a place that had a faucet near the Desert Star motel. Defendant brought Cuervo water and asked her if she wanted to go to his “spot,” referring to the abandoned building where he was staying. Cuervo did not want to go. Defendant went back to his abandoned house to get clothes for Cuervo. Two females arrived and defendant asked one of them to take his bicycle and take the clothes to Cuervo, but she did not. Two days later, defendant learned from a man named “Dre” that there were “a bunch of police in dead man‘s trail,” and they found Cuervo‘s body.
Defendant met Douglas S. at Wayside Park at the same time he met Hernandez. Defendant asked them for a lighter. Defendant liked Hernandez and asked her to “hang out.” After they knew each other for a few weeks, they “got together.” Sometime after meeting Douglas, defendant and Douglas had a conflict. They were hanging out at the house of defendant‘s drug dealer and a female there told defendant that Douglas was a child molester. Defendant told his friends, “let‘s go beat this dude up. He‘s a child molester.” So, they confronted Douglas. Defendant threw Douglas‘s bicycle to the ground and they “rushed him,” punching him without breaking a bone. Douglas was bleeding. Sometime after that, defendant saw Hernandez hanging out with Douglas outside. Douglas told defendant to “get the fudge out of here.” Defendant grabbed Hernandez by the hand to take her with him and Douglas threw a rock at a window.
Defendant testified that he and Hernandez were no longer dating at the time he found her body. Defendant denied that he abused Hernandez but admitted that he had “pushed her around before.” He admitted that he had physically assaulted a girlfriend before Hernandez and that he had suffered convictions for domestic violence against Marisa S. Defendant stated he was “not a violent person.”
Defendant testified that he heard Hernandez have an argument with an individual named “Nieto” about money the morning of July 25, 2021. A little before dark that day, defendant left to go canning. Eventually, defendant went back to the Desert Star motel because he could not “leave the room alone too long.” As defendant approached his room, he saw the windows open and “the board down.” He noticed “black spots everywhere” and his door was open. Defendant explained the door to his room was off
When the officers arrived, defendant told them his name was Armando Gonzales because he had outstanding warrants for burglary and did not want to go to jail. The police conducted a recorded interview with defendant that night. Defendant was arrested later that day for the warrants. Defendant then had two more interviews with the police. Defendant admitted that, during the second interview, he told McIntyre he had not seen Cuervo for over a year and he did not tell McIntyre he saw her with two males who assaulted her in a field. Defendant stated he lied because he “didn‘t want to be involved in anything with that” and he did not “know how DNA works.”
Defendant testified that he had been staying at the Desert Star motel for approximately two months at that point. He was “jumping around rooms,” and people would stay with him and “smoke all night.” He had been staying in the room where Hernandez was found. Defendant stated some of the things that could be seen in the video footage of the room were his including tools that he would use to break into stores such as the crowbar, bolt cutters, a pole, the sledgehammer, and train track spikes. He testified he used every tool in his room for burglary—to break into stores—not to hurt people.
McIntyre testified that when he saw Cuervo‘s body, it appeared the body had been manipulated or staged postmortem. It appeared to him that someone had gotten behind
Captain Chad Mullen of the Bakersfield Fire Department testified on behalf of the defense. Mullen explained that he was an arson investigator and he responded to a call for service on July 28, 2021 to the Desert Star motel. When he arrived on scene, Mullen noticed fire damage to one room of the motel which was completely burned, though the rooms next door to that room also sustained some smoke damage. Mullen opined that “this was an incendiary fire,” meaning “someone intentionally set fire to the room or the fire was caused by a reckless act.” He was unable to identify any suspects in his investigation and noted “[t]here was obvious transient activity on the property and inside the secured rooms.”
Ruth Ballard, a research scientist professor, testified on behalf of the defense. She explained that, typically with trace DNA, you only get a partial profile, “which makes it much harder to tease everything out.” Ballard reviewed the lab results for the Cuervo and Hernandez cases. She opined, in the Cuervo case, there was weak evidence for inclusion of defendant in the Y-STR profile obtained from the right hand swab of Cuervo. There was moderate support for inclusion of defendant in the Y-STR profile from the unstained portion of the ceramic-plated brick. She agreed there was “extremely strong inclusion” of defendant as the source of DNA on a stain on a wooden stick obtained from the scene of Cuervo‘s body and there was strong evidence for inclusion of Cuervo and Mariam M. as contributors to DNA found on the unstained area of the stick. There was also very strong evidence of inclusion of Cuervo and defendant as contributors to an unstained portion of a piece of wood found at the scene. Ballard stated it was possible that defendant‘s DNA got on the wood while beating the victim, leaving his DNA behind.
On rebuttal, McIntyre reiterated that during his second interview with defendant, defendant denied that he was with Cuervo three days before her murder when the CPS worker contacted her. He also reiterated that he told defendant they were going to test items recovered from the field for DNA and he asked defendant several times if his DNA would be at the scene; defendant said, ” ‘No.’ ” During the third interview, Detective Randy Petris told defendant his palm print was found on the metal tube that was seized and defendant denied it.
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder of Cuervo and Hernandez (counts 1 and 2) and found true that, in this proceeding, defendant had been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first degree or one offense of murder in the first degree and one in the second degree within the meaning of
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the murder counts or, alternatively, that joinder resulted in gross unfairness. He also argues insufficient evidence supports the jury‘s findings that each murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We discuss and reject each of these contentions in turn.
I. Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Sever the Charges
Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the murder charges. Alternatively, he asserts joinder resulted in gross unfairness. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Before trial, the defense moved in limine to “[e]xclude evidence of either homicide being offered against the other for proof of identity, or any other [section]1101[, subdivision ](b) purpose,” asserting the crimes did not have sufficiently unique aspects and circumstances such that they could be introduced for proof of identity. (Boldface omitted.)
The defense also moved in limine to sever counts 1 and 2 from each other pursuant to
“Both of the victims in this case were women involved in [defendant]‘s life. Ms. Cuervo, by the one admission of having sexual relations with her a year prior, or even excluding his statement altogether, the social worker, Deborah Vallejo, who observed the two of them together three days before the homicide hanging out. [¶] So they‘re obviously known to each other independently of his own admission. [¶] Ms. Hernandez, both by other homeless witnesses who knew they were boyfriend and girlfriend, his own admission to dating her, as well as him obviously being with her at the time of her death. Both of the women in this case were beaten with what appears to be multiple objects, not just a singular object: Bricks, sticks, metal tube in one. [¶] And in both instances, both received severe injuries all over their bodies. I would characterize ... as exceptionally violent beatings.”
The prosecutor also noted that neither victim was sexually assaulted, “but both were found with their pants pulled down around their legs just above the knees, which is also a characteristic that is unique ....”
The defense responded that “a general intent of ill will or harm” is not enough to justify admissibility under
The trial court noted it reviewed, read, and incorporated into its ruling “everything submitted by both sides, including review of all the cases and the arguments, and that‘s incorporated into the record and is part of the record.” The court found “there is some evidence that‘s cross admissible.” As to whether certain charges would inflame the jury,
“We have two female victims. They‘re both in a homeless situation. They both are known to and are ... friends with ... defendant. [¶] They both had [a] sexual relationship at some point with ... defendant. [¶] Ms. Hernandez, he at various times referred to her as his girlfriend. At one point he says it‘s his girlfriend even though she‘s also engaging in activities with other people. As far as Ms. Cuervo, it‘s a one-time thing that‘s referenced, at least that we know about or anticipate the evidence. [¶] So they both have a sexual relationship with ... defendant at ... a reasonable time period before the two homicides. Both ... victims hang out at or stayed in the area of Union Avenue and Daniels Lane. Both victims had extensive injuries attributed to blunt force trauma. [¶] Both were savagely or severely beaten. Both were victims of exceptional acts of violence. Both were either staged or found. I don‘t know if staged is the right term, but ... in [sic] one occasion the pants pulled down around or below knees and the other the underpants. Yet neither had evidence of sexual assault, so it‘s commonality.
“The argument of evidence of one homicide being inflammatory with respect to the other, these killings are so similar, as previously stated, that as we address mental state and intent, it‘s relevant and it‘s more probative then prejudicial under
[section] 352 .“When we get to
[section]1101[, subdivision ](b) , which goes to identity, it‘s still the same or similar analysis. It makes it appropriate to allow both [c]ount 1 and [c]ount 2 related to each other—or both homicides related to each other under[section]1101[, subdivision ](b) . It‘s not. It‘s for a noncharacter purpose.”
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
”
“Our review proceeds in two steps. First, we examine whether, in light of the information available at the time, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the severance motion prior to the guilt phase. [Citation.] Where, as here, the statutory requirements for joinder are met, a defendant must make a ‘clear showing of prejudice’ to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. [Citation.] A defendant seeking severance of properly joined charged offenses must make a stronger showing of potential prejudice than would be necessary to exclude evidence of other crimes in a severed trial.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 122–123, fn. omitted.) In evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider the particular circumstances of each case and the following factors: “(1) whether the evidence relating to the various charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) whether any of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant, (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or with another weak case, and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.” (Id. at p. 123.)
“Second, even if the trial court‘s ruling was proper as a matter of state law, we will reverse the judgment if the defendant shows that joinder of the charges actually resulted in ’ ” ‘gross unfairness’ ” ’ amounting to a denial of due process during the guilt phase.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 123; accord, People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575.)
C. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to sever the two murder cases. We conclude defendant has not made a “clear showing of prejudice” nor can we conclude joinder of the charges resulted in ” ’ ” ‘gross unfairness’ ” ’ ” in violation of defendant‘s due process rights.
As a threshold matter, defendant concedes the murder charges met the statutory requirements for joinder because they are “different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.” (
a) Cross-admissibility of evidence
Regarding the first factor, defendant denies evidence of the two incidents would have been cross-admissible in separate trials. He contends the trial court erred in concluding evidence of each count was cross-admissible on the issues of identity and intent pursuant to
“[T]here exists a hierarchy, or continuum, with respect to the degree of similarity that is needed for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose (see ...
We cannot conclude the trial court abused its broad discretion in concluding the evidence underlying the murder charges would be relevant and cross-admissible in separate trials to prove intent and to demonstrate the mental states of premeditation and deliberation required for murder. (See Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1224, fn. omitted [“The evidence underlying the ... charges supports a conclusion, by a preponderance of the evidence, that petitioner was the perpetrator in each, and the factual similarities among the charges tend to demonstrate that, in each instance, the perpetrator harbored the intent to kill and the homicides were premeditated.“].) As the court noted, both victims were homeless females who hung out or stayed in the same general area; there was evidence defendant was seen with both victims within days of their deaths and that he knew both women and had relations with them before died; both homicides involved blunt force trauma resulting in significant wounds on the victims and occurred within a 10-month period; the bodies of the victims appeared to have been moved after the killings and both victims’ pants were pulled down, though neither victim was sexually assaulted. (See, e.g., ibid. [“Each of the victims was a young, single Caucasian female; all of the homicides involved blunt-force facial trauma and occurred within a 19-month period; and the bodies of all of the victims were discovered unclothed, or nude from the waist down.“].) Such evidence ” ‘support[s] the inference that the [perpetrator] ” ‘probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1226.) And we cannot conclude the court erred in concluding that the probative value of such evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice such that
b) Inflammatory evidence and relative strength of cases
Defendant next contends the “facts” of the Cuervo murder were more “inflammatory,” given that he called 911 to help Hernandez but Cuervo‘s body “was placed between concrete blocks in a dirt field and covered with various items.” He also contends the evidence against him in the Cuervo case “was substantially stronger than that in the Hernandez case, based on the fact that [defendant]‘s DNA was found on some of the bloody objects near Cuervo‘s body that were likely used to assault her, and there was evidence that [defendant] told some civilians that he had killed Cuervo.” He asserts, though his palm print was found on the metal pole in the motel room where Hernandez was attacked, he had been staying in that room and the property in that room belonged to him. We disagree with defendant‘s contentions and his characterization of the evidence.
The “animating concern” underlying the second factor is ” ‘whether ” ‘strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ on another crime.” ’ ” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 124Id. at p. 127.) “The core prejudice concern arising in connection with this issue is that jurors may aggregate evidence and convict on weak charges that might not merit conviction in separate trials.” (Ibid.) “But even where evidence from one incident
Here, neither case was more inflammatory than the other, and the evidence of both cases was strong; thus, these factors do not weigh in favor of severance. That is, the victims in each case died after being brutally beaten by a blunt object. Their injuries and the scenes where they were found were extensively documented and introduced to the jury. And the circumstances of each murder could be viewed as equally egregious. On this record, we cannot conclude one case was more likely to inflame the jury‘s passions than the other.
Additionally, compelling evidence supported both the charges. Regarding the Hernandez murder, defendant admitted he had been staying in the motel room where Hernandez was beaten. His palm print was found on a metal pipe in that room and Hernandez could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the same metal pipe, supporting an inference that it was used in the beating. There was eyewitness testimony that defendant and Hernandez had been arguing near in time to the murder and there was evidence that defendant had previously committed uncharged domestic violence. With regard to the Cuervo murder, defendant‘s DNA was also recovered from the scene, including on objects that were consistent with the properties of the murder weapon. Douglas S. testified defendant admitted to him that he had beaten Cuervo to death. And Patricia A. also testified that defendant had admitted to her that he beat Cuervo. Even assuming that, when viewed as a whole, evidence of the Cuervo murder may have appeared, at the time of the severance motion, to be somewhat stronger than evidence of Hernandez‘s murder, “the salient point is that the proffered evidence was sufficiently strong in both cases.” (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 781 (Soper).)
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the evidence of Cuervo‘s killing was ” ’ ” ‘used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ ” ’ ” because the evidence defendant
c) Joinder of counts did not convert the matter to a capital case
Defendant next argues that joinder permitted the prosecution to charge the multiple murder special circumstance, thereby exposing defendant to the death penalty. He contends, though the prosecution waived the death penalty, the same concerns supporting heightened scrutiny apply. The People respond that heightened scrutiny does not apply here since this was not a capital case.
As the parties note, while joinder of the counts allowed the prosecution to pursue a multiple murder special circumstance, the prosecution did not seek the death penalty. Thus, joinder did not convert this matter into a capital case. And neither party cites any decisional law expressly holding whether joinder is (or is not) subject to heightened scrutiny when the prosecution elects not to seek the death penalty on a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation.
Notably, as defendant contends, even though the death penalty was not sought, joinder still gave rise to the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 128 [“Even greater scrutiny is required, we have said, when the joinder of separate murder charges gives rise to the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder.“]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318 [“The present case is one in which the joinder itself gave rise to the special circumstance allegation (multiple murder,
Nevertheless, we need not resolve whether heightened scrutiny applies in this circumstance because, even assuming that it does, defendant has not established an abuse of discretion. Here, the trial court heard extensive argument by counsel on the issue and scrutinized the evidence closely before rendering its ruling. As discussed, the court did not err in concluding that evidence of the murders could be cross-admissible. And neither case was more inflammatory than the other or “weak” such that joinder would bolster the likelihood of conviction. On the record before us, after considering the factors set out above, we conclude that defendant has ” ‘failed to carry his burden of making the clear showing of prejudice required to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever the [two] charges.’ ” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783; Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1227; see People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1318 [though joinder gave rise to a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to sever where it was “apparent that the trial court heard extensive argument by counsel on the issue and scrutinized the evidence very closely“]; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 632 [no abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever even though joinder gave rise to special circumstance allegation and higher scrutiny applied where trial court heard extensive argument and carefully scrutinized the issue].)
Finally, defendant argues, joinder resulted in “gross unfairness.” Defendant contends, “[t]he government cannot prove that a rational jury would have found appellant guilty of each of the charged murders if evidence of the other murder had not been presented at trial,” asserting the jury deliberated for six hours over the course of two days before reaching a verdict. However, “[t]his argument is speculative. The length of jury deliberations in this two-homicide case, by itself, supports no conclusion as to the closeness of the case or as to any prejudicial effect of joinder.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 753.) And, for all the reasons discussed ante, defendant does not establish joinder resulted in a denial of fundamental fairness, depriving him of his constitutional right to due process of law.
” ’ “A pretrial ruling that was correct when made can be reversed on appeal only if joinder was so grossly unfair as to deny due process.” ’ ” (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 632.) “Gross unfairness” exists when there is a reasonable probability that joinder affected the jury‘s verdict. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 49.)
Here, defendant asserts that the prosecutor did not discuss the limited admissibility of the other crime evidence in closing and the jury was not given a limiting instruction regarding the use of the other crime evidence. He argues “[t]he jury likely used evidence of each of the charged murders to fill in the evidentiary gaps related to each charge, and as propensity evidence in finding appellant guilty of the other charged murder.” He argues the lack of severance implicated his constitutional rights and reversal is required unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
But, contrary to defendant‘s contention that the jury was not given a limiting instruction, here, the trial court instructed the jury that “[e]ach of the counts charged in this case is a separate crime” and it “must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each one.” And, “[t]he record does not suggest that the jury was unable to decide each count separately as it was specifically instructed to do.” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 277; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 784 [instructions on the burden of proof for conviction, elements of murder, and emphasizing that each charge should be considered separately mitigated the risk of any prejudicial spillover].)
Furthermore, given the strength of the evidence in support of both convictions, including biological evidence connecting defendant to both crime scenes and potential murder weapons and testimony of witnesses connecting him to both victims at or around the time of their death and providing evidence of potential motive, we cannot conclude it is reasonably probable the joinder affected the jury‘s verdict. Rather, joinder of the charges did not render the joint trial fundamentally unfair. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 49.)
We reject defendant‘s first contention.
II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Jury‘s Conclusions Both Murders Were Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated
Defendant next argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury‘s findings that the murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated and, thus, first degree murder. We disagree with defendant‘s contentions.
A. Standard of Review
“Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of premeditation and deliberation .... Settled principles of appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases such as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that
B. Applicable Law
” ‘Murder that is premeditated and deliberated is murder of the first degree.’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443Ibid.) Deliberation ” ’ “refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action ....” ’ [Citations.] ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” (Ibid.) “However, the requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended period of time. ’ ” ‘Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly....’ ” ’ ” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543 (Stitely).)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), the California Supreme Court “distilled certain guidelines to aid reviewing courts in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of premeditation and deliberation. The Anderson analysis was intended only as a framework to aid in appellate review; it did not propose to define the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way.” (Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125 [“[t]he Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive“]; see People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081.) ”Anderson identified three factors commonly present in cases of premeditated murder: ‘(1) [F]acts
C. Analysis
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the premeditation and deliberation findings as to both murder counts. For the reasons that follow, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury‘s conclusions.
As to Cuervo‘s murder, defendant contends that there was no evidence of planning, only slight evidence of motive, and the manner of the killing does not indicate a preconceived design. The People concede the evidence of planning was “slim,” but they assert the evidence of motive and the manner of killing supported the jury‘s finding of premeditation.
Initially, we reiterate “[t]he Anderson factors are not the exclusive means for establishing premeditation and deliberation.” (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1127.) And we conclude the record provides substantial evidence to support the jury‘s finding that the killing of Cuervo was deliberate and premeditated.
Here, there was evidence—namely the testimonies of Douglas S. and Patricia A.—to support a conclusion that defendant became angry at Cuervo because he believed she had taken his syringe of drugs, evidencing a motive to kill her. Defendant himself admitted that he had a prior relationship with Cuervo—he had had sex with her in the past and they had done drugs together. There was no evidence that defendant was initially armed so the jury could infer that defendant had to arm himself with a blunt object or multiple blunt objects before beating Cuervo to death, evidencing planning activity. There was no evidence that Cuervo was armed or that she otherwise provoked the assault. And, though “the brutality of a killing cannot in itself support a finding that the killer acted with premeditation and deliberation” (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 24), “the vicious form and the long duration of the assault” can support the inference that defendant acted with a willful, deliberate and premeditated purpose (People v. Isby (1947) 30 Cal.2d 879, 888.). Dr. Whitmore testified that the nature and extent of Cuervo‘s injuries established the assault took time; “It was not sudden: Bang, you‘re dead.” Thus, there was a period of time for reflection and the assault appeared calculated to ensure death. (See Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 544 [evidence pressure was applied to victim‘s neck for a long time “suggests defendant had ample opportunity to consider
There was also evidence to support a conclusion defendant moved and manipulated the body after Cuervo‘s death. Cuervo‘s body was found lying on a cement block with her arms crossed over her chest. She was covered with various objects and debris and her pants were partially pulled down, though there was no evidence she had been sexually assaulted. Defendant then left Cuervo‘s body and denied to police that he had encountered her in the days before her death. (See Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1128 [jury could reasonably consider defendant‘s conduct after the stabbing in relation to manner of killing; defendant did not immediately flee the scene which appears inconsistent with a state of mind that would produce a rash, impulsive killing].)
We conclude the combination of these factors supports the jury‘s verdict of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder. (See People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 474 [“Based upon a combination of various factors—the multiple means of attack, the prolonged and unprovoked nature of the attacks, and evidence supporting planning and motive—a rational trier of fact could conclude that the manner of killing supports that the murder was premeditated and deliberate.“]; People v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 507, 516 [jury may determine whether premeditation exists “from a consideration of the type of weapon employed and the manner of its use; the nature of the wounds suffered by the [victim]; the fact that the attack was unprovoked and that the [victim] was unarmed at the time of the assault; the conduct of [the] assailant in ... neglecting to aid [the victim] ..., and [the assailant‘s] immediate flight thereafter from the scene of the assault“].)
2. Hernandez Murder
Defendant contends the evidence failed to establish defendant acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in killing Hernandez because there was no evidence of planning, no evidence of a motive, and the matter of killing does not indicate a
Here, defendant testified he had a prior relationship with Hernandez and that she had been his girlfriend. There was evidence from which the jury could infer that defendant had previously abused Hernandez—Douglas S. testified he had seen injuries on Hernandez in the past and he had witnessed defendant grabbing Hernandez and yelling in her face. Douglas also testified that he saw defendant and Hernandez together the day before Hernandez was killed. They were arguing, defendant was grabbing Hernandez‘s arm and face and screaming at her, and Douglas was concerned for Hernandez‘s safety. The jury could infer from such evidence that defendant had a motive to kill Hernandez. (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27 [facts about the defendant‘s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonable infer a “motive” to kill the victim support premeditation and deliberation finding]; People v. Kovacich (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 893 [holding that ” ‘quarrels, antagonism or enmity between an accused and the victim of a violent offense is proof of motive to commit the offense’ “]; see also People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 245 [“Defendant‘s pent-up resentment toward his victim[] establishes the prior relationship from which the jury reasonably could infer a motive for the killing[].“].) The jury could also consider evidence of defendant‘s prior uncharged acts of violence against Marisa S. in considering defendant‘s propensity for violence, his motive, and his state of mind. (See People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 274 [evidence of prior incidents of abuse were important evidence of motive, and was probative of material issues of identity, intent, premeditation, and deliberation].) Additionally, like the circumstances of Cuervo‘s murder, here there was also no evidence that defendant was initially armed, so the jury could infer that defendant had to arm himself with a blunt object or multiple blunt objects before beating Hernandez to death, suggesting some planning activity. There was also no evidence that Hernandez was armed or that she otherwise provoked the assault. And the
We conclude such evidence, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation in killing Hernandez. (See People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020 [“Although the evidence was far from overwhelming, we need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant premeditated the murders. The relevant inquiry on appeal is whether ’ “any rational trier of fact’ ” could have been so persuaded.“].)
Thus, we reject defendant‘s contentions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GUERRA, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
MEEHAN, J.