THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLYDELL BRYANT, Defendant and Appellant.
S259956
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
July 29, 2021
Second Appellate District, Division One B271300; Los Angeles County Superior Court GA094777
July 29, 2021
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye filed a concurring opinion.
The 2011 Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; Realignment Act or Act) provides for a period of mandatory supervision following service of a county jail sentence for eligible defendants. Here we consider how to assess the validity of a challenged condition of such a release. We conclude that such discretionary conditions are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Late on August 24, 2014, police officers responded to a disturbing the peace call outside a housing complex. The officers arrived to find a number of people gathered around two cars in the parking lot. Clydell Bryant and his girlfriend, Lamaine Jones, were smoking marijuana in the car of Jones‘s mother. A search of the vehicle revealed a loaded, semi-automatic handgun under the seat Bryant had occupied. The gun was not registered and bore DNA matching that of Bryant.
Bryant was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle, along with related findings. (
Bryant challenged the search condition as unreasonable under the Lent test. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481.) After the Court of Appeal agreed and struck the condition (People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, 406 (Bryant I)), we granted the People‘s petition for review (Bryant I, S241937; rev. granted June 28, 2017) and held the case pending our decision in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). We subsequently directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its decision and reconsider the issue in light of Ricardo P. The Court of Appeal again struck the search condition as unreasonable (People v. Bryant (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 839, 848, 850 (Bryant II)), and again we granted review.
California employs a multi-level approach to the classification of crimes and their punishment, denoting offenses as felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions. (
The Realignment Act significantly revamped California‘s penal system by creating two new categories of postrelease supervision: mandatory supervision upon release from jail and postrelease community supervision (PRCS) following service of a prison term. The Act shifts responsibility for the incarceration, rehabilitation, and postrelease supervision of some felons from the state prison system to local jails and probation departments. (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 450;
The Realignment Act does not speak directly to how the validity of mandatory supervision conditions are to be assessed. To resolve defendant‘s challenge the Court of Appeal looked to the Lent test, which historically governed conditions of probation. (Bryant II, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 843-844, 849.) Applying Lent and Ricardo P., the latter of which involved an electronics search condition of juvenile probation, the Court of Appeal invalidated Bryant‘s search condition imposed in the context of mandatory supervision. (Bryant II, at pp. 843-850.) We conclude that Lent‘s case-by-case analysis for reasonableness should be employed in this new context. A review of the statutory provisions governing mandatory supervision reveals a scheme similar to that governing probationers with respect to the conditions of release. The balance of interests between effective supervision and an individual‘s privacy concerns does not substantially differ between probation and mandatory supervision settings.3
A. Standards Governing Probation Conditions
The trial court has broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120), and we review an imposed condition for abuse of discretion (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403). “[A] reviewing court will disturb the trial court‘s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.” (Ibid.)
We applied the Lent test to an electronics search provision imposed as a condition of juvenile probation in Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th 1113. There, the minor had been declared a ward of the court for committing two residential burglaries. He challenged a probation condition requiring that he submit to a warrantless search of his electronic devices and provide passwords for accounts accessible through them. (Id. at pp. 1116-1117.) It was uncontested that the condition was unrelated to the burglaries and did not involve otherwise criminal conduct. (Id. at p. 1119.) Focusing on Lent‘s third prong, we concluded that the condition was not reasonably related to future criminality because there was “no indication that Ricardo had used or will use electronic devices in connection with drugs or any illegal activity.” (Id. at p. 1116.) Thus, the condition failed under Lent.
Ricardo P. explained that the test of reasonableness involves a balancing of factors. ”Lent‘s third prong requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121.) Specifically, a probation condition cannot be justified solely on the basis that it enhances the effective supervision of the probationer without regard for the burden it places on the probationer. (Id. at pp. 1122, 1125.) Rather, the “requirement that a probation condition must be ’ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of proportionality” between the burden imposed by the condition and the legitimate interests the condition serves. (Id. at p. 1122.) We concluded that “[s]uch proportionality [was] lacking” based on the record. (Ibid.) Ricardo P.‘s electronics search condition “impose[d] a very heavy burden on privacy with a very limited justification.” (Id. at p. 1124.) “[N]othing in the record suggest[ed] that Ricardo ha[d] ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 1122.) Because the burden imposed on Ricardo‘s privacy was “substantially disproportionate to the countervailing interests of furthering his rehabilitation and protecting society” (id. at p. 1119), and because the first two Lent criteria were also satisfied, the condition was held invalid (id. at
B. Standards Governing Conditions of Mandatory Supervision
In determining how conditions of the new mandatory supervision status are to be assessed, we begin with the statutory language. (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 211.) The Realignment Act defined ” ‘mandatory supervision,’ ” as “the portion of a defendant‘s sentenced term during which time he or she is supervised by the county probation officer pursuant to” section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B). (
Nonetheless, the conditions of mandatory supervision resemble those of probation in that they are ordered by a judge at the time of sentencing and involve an individualized exercise of discretion based on the particular case.4 Notably, unlike other forms of supervision, the Legislature did not mandate
The Realignment Act also provides that “the defendant shall be supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation, for the remaining unserved portion of the sentence imposed by the court.” (
The Legislature also amended several statutes dealing with probation to incorporate persons on mandatory supervision. (See, e.g.,
C. The People‘s Counterarguments
The People counter that the status of mandatory supervision justifies an electronics search clause for all those so released. Thus, they argue a case-by-case review under Lent is inappropriate. They urge that these individuals have been found unsuitable for probation. Like parolees, they are sentenced to a period of incarceration and are deemed to be under continued custody during the supervisory period. The People‘s analogy to parolees in this context is misplaced. It fails to acknowledge that mandatory supervision is a new status, reserved for those considered inappropriate for a state prison commitment before parole release.
It is true that courts have noted the similarities between mandatory supervision and parole for some purposes. (See, e.g., People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422-1423 (Fandinola); People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 762-763 (Martinez).) Fandinola, for example, considered whether a person on mandatory supervision should pay a probation supervision fee under former section 1203.1b, which “unambiguously applie[d] to cases in which a defendant is granted probation or given a conditional sentence.’ ” (Fandinola, at p. 1422, quoting former § 1203.1b, subd. (a).) The court declined to extend
But the fact that mandatory supervision tracks parole for some purposes does not mean that it does so for all purposes. Fandinola dealt with the imposition of costs that are now directly regulated by statute. Statutes regulating fines and enhancements for prior prison terms do not involve conditions of release. Nor do they speak to the degree of risk or potential for recidivism posed by people on mandatory supervision. Those questions are more squarely addressed by the Legislative findings and declarations accompanying the Realignment Act and the express provisions of section 1170, subdivision (h)(1). As discussed above, those provisions reflect the Legislature‘s determination that defendants eligible for mandatory supervision are lower-level offenders who do not warrant a state prison commitment. (
The Court of Appeal in Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 759 reached the opposite conclusion that “the validity of the terms of supervised release [are to be analyzed] under standards analogous to the conditions or parallel to those applied to terms of parole.” (Id. at p. 763.) In doing so, it cited Fandinola for the proposition that ” ‘the Legislature has decided a county jail commitment followed by mandatory supervision . . ., is akin to a state prison commitment; it is not a grant of probation or a conditional sentence.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Fandinola, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) As noted, Fandinola drew parallels between mandatory supervision and parole in a different context. Martinez did not discuss the provisions of section 17.5, which squarely address legislative intent. Even so, Martinez ultimately applied the Lent test to assess the challenge to a mandatory supervision condition under the theory that “[t]he validity and reasonableness of parole conditions is analyzed under the same standard as that developed for probation conditions.” (Martinez, at p. 764.) We likewise employ the Lent test, but for
The People rely heavily on People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 (Burgener), which held that “a warrantless search condition is a reasonable term in any parole of a convicted felon from state prison.” (Id. at p. 532, italics added.)8 They argue by analogy that the reduced privacy expectations of persons on mandatory supervision, and the state‘s overwhelming interest in supervising them, mean that an electronics search condition is per se reasonable for those offenders. Burgener does not sweep as broadly as they urge. Upon his release from parole, Burgener signed a ” ‘notice and conditions of parole’ ” that stated: ” ‘You and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by any agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.’ ” (Burgener, at p. 528, fn. 10.)9 During a warrantless search of Burgener‘s apartment, officers found evidence linking him to a homicide. On appeal, he challenged the search on Fourth Amendment grounds and also argued that the parole search condition was improper. (Burgener, at pp. 528-532.) The Burgener court recognized that “parole conditions, like conditions of probation, must be reasonable [because] parolees retain constitutional protection against arbitrary and oppressive official action.” (Id., at p. 532; accord In re Taylor, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1038 & fn. 8.) However, the court concluded that “[t]he distinction between felony parole and probation justifies the inclusion of the parole search condition in all parole agreements.” (Burgener, at p. 532.) Parolees have been sentenced to prison because of the risk they pose to society, based on the seriousness of their conduct and offense history. (Id. at p. 533.) This increased risk, and a greater need to closely supervise their reintegration into the community, justified a conclusion that the condition was “per se . . . related to future criminality” and thus a “reasonable condition of parole.” (Ibid.)10
As explained, we reject the People‘s premise that, in this context, those on mandatory supervision are similar in status to those on parole, a
The People further note that, like parole, mandatory supervision may not be refused when selected by the trial court. (
The argument runs counter to Ricardo P.‘s holding that conditions of supervision may not be imposed based on “an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121.) The People fail to persuade that all defendants on mandatory supervision are inherently more prone to recidivism, justifying a lesser showing to impose a condition. Further, the Lent test does take into account the seriousness of the offense. The first Lent factor considers the relationship between the supervision condition and the defendant‘s crime, and the third factor forbids conditions that are not reasonably related to future criminality, balancing the condition‘s burden with the legitimate interest it serves. (See Ricardo P., at p. 1122; Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) These aspects of the Lent test sufficiently account for the seriousness of both offense and offender.
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Legislature has expressly determined that low-level felony offenders will benefit from “community-based corrections programs and evidence-based practices” to “facilitate their reintegration back into society.” (
As in the probation context, imposing an electronics search condition for those on mandatory supervision requires the court to balance the need for meaningful supervision and rehabilitation with the burden imposed by the condition. There may, indeed, be valid reasons for such a condition, but they must be supported by information in the record relating the condition to the defendant‘s criminal conduct or personal history. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1120-1123.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
LIU, J.
CUELLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
Concurring Opinion by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that discretionary conditions of mandatory supervision are reviewed under the test set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481. I agree, too, that a mandatory supervision condition that allows for a search of an individual‘s electronic devices is not per se reasonable in all cases. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-18.) And I agree that we need not review the particular condition imposed here in light of the Attorney General‘s concession. (Id. at p. 19.) I write separately to offer three observations regarding what I view as the narrow scope of the majority opinion in this case.
First, the majority repeatedly states that an analysis under Lent involves a “case-by-case” review concerning the reasonableness of a condition of supervision. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 4, 5.) As I noted in In re Ricardo P., we have previously held that certain probation conditions are reasonable under Lent “simply by reference to the offense of conviction, without any additional case-specific balancing of benefits and burdens.” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1114, 1134 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.) (Ricardo P.); see, e.g., People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 380-381, People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 764; see also People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 532-533 [search condition of parolee is per se reasonable].) I agree that electronics search conditions imposed in the course of mandatory supervision do not fall into this category of conditions that are reasonable per se. However, I do not understand our opinion today to disapprove of the principle articulated in Olguin and Mason. Nor do I understand our opinion to foreclose the possibility that certain conditions of mandatory supervision may be considered per se reasonable.
Second, the majority rejects the People‘s assertion that mandatory supervision conditions should be treated like parole conditions, noting in part that “[t]he People fail to persuade that all defendants on mandatory supervision are inherently more prone to recidivism, justifying a lesser showing to impose a condition.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.) I agree that Lent applies to conditions of mandatory supervision, but I do not perceive the majority to be stating that probation and mandatory supervision are so alike that a probation condition that fails under Lent will necessarily fail in the context of mandatory supervision as well.
As the majority recognizes, mandatory supervision is “distinct” from probation and parole. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 4.) Probation is “an act of grace or clemency” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 402, citing People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 32) that is “generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120). It is “neither ‘punishment’ (see
Thus, although individuals subject to mandatory supervision “are considered lower level offenders compared with those on parole or [postrelease community supervision]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 11), they are more serious offenders than those granted probation. The case before us does not require that we articulate how these distinctions between probation and mandatory supervision may impact the propriety of certain supervision conditions under
Third, the majority notes “that the degree of intrusion posed by sweeping access to [electronic] devices is great in light of their ‘immense storage capacity’ and the highly personal nature of the information stored on them.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16, quoting Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123, quoting in turn Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 393.) But not all electronics search conditions are alike. The degree of intrusion posed by an electronics search condition necessarily depends on the precise contours of the condition at issue. A condition allowing law enforcement unfettered access to all electronic devices at any time of the day or night as was at issue in Ricardo P. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1123) is quite different from a condition tailored to specific data on a particular electronic device. Furthermore, I remain of the view that concerns regarding the burden imposed by such a condition can commonly be “adequately addressed by placing appropriate limits on the ability of [law enforcement] to access [an individual‘s electronic devices], whether through the selective provision of passwords or other measures.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1139-1140 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.).) When an “electronics search condition [is] susceptible to such tailoring,” concerns about the scope of such a condition would be “better addressed through a separate overbreadth analysis.” (Id. at p. 1140 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.).)
In short, I agree with the majority‘s principal conclusions even though I remain of the view that the recent expansion of Lent at the expense of the overbreadth doctrine is misguided and in some respects counterproductive. (See Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1138 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.).) With the foregoing understanding of the majority opinion, I concur.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Bryant
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 42 Cal.App.5th 839
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S259956
Date Filed: July 29, 2021
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Michael Villalobos
Counsel:
David Greifinger, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Zee Rodriguez and Andrew S. Pruitt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
David Greifinger
Law Offices of David R. Greifinger
15515 W. Sunset Blvd., No. 214
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272
(424) 330-0193
Zee Rodriguez
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 269-6124