THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HARRY JACKSON BOYD JR., Defendant and Appellant.
B328685
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
August 19, 2024
Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Boyd CA2/4; NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MA007943)
Kathleen Blanchard, Judge.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1997, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Harry Jackson Boyd Jr. of two special circumstance murders (
In 2022, defendant filed a motion requesting a hearing to make a record of mitigating evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. (See
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to make a youth offender parole hearing record. He argues
A. Equal Protection Claim
As the parties acknowledge in their appellate briefs, at the time defendant filed this appeal (and submitted an opening brief), all but one appellate decision rejected defendant‘s equal protection challenge. (See People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125–127; People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204–205 (Sands); In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463–465; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347–349 (Morales); People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196–197, 199-200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 777–781 (Acosta).)
Defendant contends these opinions were wrongly decided and requests that we rely on People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted January 11, 2023, S277487. There, the appellate court agreed with defendant‘s premise that no rational basis existed for
Our Supreme Court recently disapproved of this lone decision, instead adopting the majority position. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin)). In Hardin, the Supreme Court held
Defendant does not dispute we are bound to follow Hardin (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), and he concedes all but one of his arguments is barred by that decision. Nevertheless, defendant avers he may pursue an equal protection claim questioning the Legislature‘s “rational basis to distinguish between young adults sentenced to LWOP and juveniles sentenced to LWOP, because the Supreme Court, . . . did not consider that issue.” (Italics added.) He argues the Supreme Court limited its analysis to the distinction in sentences imposed on young adults, not the distinction in age between juvenile and young adults sentenced to LWOP.
We agree the Supreme Court did not expressly address the separate treatment of juveniles and young adults sentenced to LWOP. The Court declined to address that issue because ”Hardin [did] not challenge the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion on this point.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 841.) In so noting, the Supreme Court summarized the appellate court‘s decision “explain[ing] that the Legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile offenders and young adult offenders, since a unique set of constitutional rules restricts sentencing children to life without parole.” (Id. at pp. 840–841, citing Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460.)
Defendant furnishes no argument in response to the Supreme Court‘s statement or to the principles upon which courts rely to rationally distinguish between children and adults subject to the same sentence (LWOP). (See, e.g., Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) We agree with the weight of authority finding a rational basis for treating juveniles and adults
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Defendant next contends that
We agree defendant forfeited this claim for the failure to raise or discuss it below. (See People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (Baker) [“claim that a sentence is cruel or unusual requires a ‘fact specific’ inquiry and is forfeited if not raised below“]; accord, People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247; People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993.) We nevertheless exercise our discretion to resolve it. (See Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 720; People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 [appellate court may reach forfeited issue on record presented or in interest of judicial economy]; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27.)
The
“‘[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.’ [Citation.]” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 21.) “There is no question that ‘the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is “properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.“’ [Citation.] It is for this reason that when faced with an allegation that a particular sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, ‘[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 83.) “‘Only in the rarest of cases could a court declare that the length of a sentence mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive.‘” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.)
Here, defendant concedes his sentences “may not meet the three-part test” for evaluating a cruel or unusual punishment claim. (See In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424–427 [courts consider (1) the degree of danger which the offense and offender present to society; (2) punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses; and (3) punishments imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions].) Perhaps that is why defendant declines to address any factor(s) bearing on
Defendant further acknowledges this court‘s previous decision rejecting the same claim for a defendant who committed murder shortly after his 18th birthday. (People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.) The court reasoned, ““[W]hile ‘[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject . . . to the objections always raised against categorical rules . . . [, it] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.‘” (Ibid., quoting Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 554.) Defendant does not explain why this distinction is inapplicable to
The order denying defendant‘s motion for a future youth offender parole hearing is affirmed.
MORI, J
We concur:
CURREY, P. J.
ZUKIN, J.