Paul E. Vrusho
Family Legal Services, PC
Concord, New Hampshire
Attorney for Debtor
Kathleen E. McKenzie
Raymond J. DiLucci, P.A.
Concord, New Hampshire
Attorney for Vermont Center Wreaths, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION1
Before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File Claim After Bar Date Nunc Pro Tunc (Doc. No. 88) (the “Motion“) filed by Vermont Center Wreaths, Inc. (“Vermont Center“), and Debtor Paul E. Vrusho‘s objection thereto (Doc. No. 103) (the “Objection“).2 In its Motion, Vermont Center requests an extension of the November 24, 2020, filing deadline for nongovernmental proofs of claims in this case (the “Bar Date“), pursuant to
of the Bar Date because the Debtor‘s verified list of creditors (Doc. No. 1 at 50) (the “Creditors Matrix“) listed Vermont Center only at the address of an attorney representing Vermont Center in a related (and still pending) state court proceeding against the Debtor and his company, and not at Vermont Center‘s own business address. The Debtor argues that Vermont Center received sufficient notice of the Bar Date.
The Court held a hearing on the Motion and Objection on September 8, 2021, and took the matter under advisement.3 For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that Vermont Center had sufficient notice of the Bar Date because its attorney in the related state court proceeding received actual notice of the bankruptcy filing and the Bar Date.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties pursuant to
III. FACTS
The Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition on September 15, 2020 (Doc. No. 1). On the
Schedule E/F, the Debtor listed “Daniel Proctor for Vermont Center Wreaths, Inc.” as a nonpriority unsecured creditor with a claim of $75,000, which the Debtor described as “[l]awsuit related.” Id. at 27. Likewise, the Debtor‘s verified Creditors Matrix listed “Daniel Proctor for Vermont Center Wreaths, Inc.” as a creditor, with a mailing address of “PO BOX 3544, Concord, NH 03302-3544” — which is Attorney Proctor‘s mailing address. Id. at 50. Neither form listed Vermont Center‘s direct mailing address. Thus, the Clerk of Court mailed the Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filing (Doc. No. 4) (the “Notice of Bankruptcy“) to Attorney Proctor at the address shown on the Creditors Matrix (Doc. No. 8).5 The Notice of Bankruptcy included the first date of the
Shortly after the filing date, Attorney Proctor notified Vermont Center of the Debtor‘s bankruptcy filing by speaking with Paulette Sicard, a shareholder and officer of Vermont Center. Although Attorney Proctor was Vermont Center‘s counsel in the Collection Litigation and offered to represent Vermont Center in the Debtor‘s chapter 13 case, Vermont Center did not accept that offer.6
In June of 2021, Ms. Sicard, contacted the chapter 13 Trustee and learned of the proof of claim filing requirement, prompting Vermont Center to retain counsel.7 On July 9, 2021, more than seven months after the Bar Date, Vermont Center filed a nonpriority unsecured proof of
claim in the amount of $74,556.50, based on a pre-petition partial summary judgment order issued in the Collection Litigation (Claim. No. 13) (the “Proof of Claim“).8 On July 15,
On August 5, 2021, Vermont Center filed the Motion, Ms. Sicard‘s supporting affidavit (Doc. No. 88, Exhibit 3) (the “Affidavit“), and its Response to Claim Objection. In her Affidavit, Ms. Sicard stated that while Attorney Proctor had informed Vermont Center of the Debtor‘s bankruptcy filing, he failed to explain the need to file a proof of claim by the Bar Date in order to be paid. On September 1, 2021, the Debtor filed his Objection to the Motion.9 During the September 8 hearing, Vermont Center acknowledged that Attorney Proctor received the Notice of Bankruptcy, which contained the Bar Date.10 At the conclusion of hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement.
IV. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. Vermont Center
Vermont Center requests an extension of the Bar Date pursuant to
B. The Debtor
The Debtor asserts that the Motion should be denied because it properly listed Attorney Proctor as counsel for Vermont Center on the Creditors Matrix, causing Attorney Proctor to receive actual notice of the bankruptcy filing and Bar Date by virtue of Notice of Bankruptcy. The Debtor contends that the actual notice provided to Attorney Proctor imputes to Vermont Center because Attorney Proctor represented
impute Attorney Proctor‘s actual notice of the bankruptcy filing and Bar Date to Vermont Center.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 3002
“In chapter 13 cases, a timely filed proof of claim is a precondition to allowance of the claim and the creditor‘s right to receive a distribution.” San Miguel Sandoval v. Sandoval (In re San Miguel Sandoval), 327 B.R. 493, 512 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005). See also
(6) On motion filed by a creditor before or after the expiration of the time to file a proof of claim, the court may extend the time by not more than 60 days from the date of the order granting the motion. The motion may be granted if the court finds that:
(A) the notice was insufficient under the circumstances to give the creditor a reasonable time to file a proof of claim because the debtor failed to timely file the list of creditors’ names and addresses required by Rule 1007(a) . . . .
Wulff, 598 B.R. 459, 465 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2019) (“If insufficient notice alone were grounds for an extension, [the creditor] would be entitled to one. But the rule requires more — the insufficient notice must result from one of the two conditions outlined in the rule.“)). In deciding whether to extend the proof of claim filing deadline, courts may consider the following factors:
(i) whether a chapter 13 plan has been confirmed, (ii) whether the failure to list the creditor properly was the result of inadvertence or was ill-intentioned, (iii) whether the creditor acted diligently in bringing its motion under Rule 3002(b)(6), (iv) whether the inclusion of the creditor‘s claim among allowed claims at that juncture in the case would significantly prejudice other creditors or make untenable the chapter 13 trustee‘s administration of the case, (v) whether the extension of the bar date would prove futile, as where the claim would be disallowed for a reason other than untimeliness, and (vi) whether the denial of an extension would likely subject the debtor to additional proceedings which might prove costly, frustrate the debtor‘s efforts to perform under the chapter 13 plan, or impair the debtor‘s fresh start should a discharge be obtained.
In re Fitzgerald, No. 8:19-BK-07741-RCT, 2020 WL 5745973, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 18, 2020). A court “should consider whether the creditor had actual notice of the bankruptcy notwithstanding the failure to include or accurately list the creditor on the [list of creditors].” Id. (citing In re Price, 2019 WL 2895006, at *3 (denying creditor‘s motion to extend proof of claim filing deadline under
Thus, in determining whether to extend the Bar Date pursuant to
B. Due Process and Sufficiency of Notice
A debtor seeking the benefits of bankruptcy protection must comply with specific filing and disclosure requirements designed to “ensure sufficient notice to parties in interest of various
events in [the debtor‘s] bankruptcy case[.]” In re San Miguel Sandoval, 327 B.R. at 507. Among these requirements is a debtor‘s duty to file a verified list of creditors. See
For example,
WL 2895006, at *2 (“Due process does not require that a party receive actual notice, however, but notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.‘“) (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))).
i. Imputed Notice and Actual Notice
“The general rule in bankruptcy cases, as well as other types of cases, is that notice served upon counsel satisfies any requirement to give notice to the party.” In re Griggs, 306 B.R. 660, 665 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (citing Irwin v. Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92 (1990)). Nevertheless, imputed notice requires more than an attorney-client relationship. See In re Barnes, BKR 07-31157, 2008 WL 2397618, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.D. June 10, 2008) (“Mailing notice to [a] [c]reditor‘s attorney in a prior state court proceeding located in a different state than [the] [c]reditor is not proper notice.“). “Generally, a debtor may schedule a creditor in care of the creditor‘s attorney for the purpose of providing notice of the case, provided that the attorney is the creditor‘s agent in matters related to the bankruptcy case.” Id. at *1 (citing Chanute Prod. Credit Ass‘n v. Schicke (In re Schicke), 290 B.R. 792, 801 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)). “While an attorney need not have been retained to represent a creditor in a bankruptcy case or be a bankruptcy attorney [for this general rule to apply], it is important that there be some nexus between the creditor‘s retention of the attorney and the creditor‘s issues with the debtor.” In re Schicke, 290 B.R. at 802-03; see also In re Linzer, 264 B.R. 243, 249 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that creditors’ non-bankruptcy counsel, who was actively engaged in prosecuting creditors’ claim against debtor before a non-bankruptcy tribunal, was deemed an authorized agent of creditors, for purpose of receiving notice of debtor‘s bankruptcy case due to “well-settled law“).
“In most of the cases where an agent‘s knowledge of bankruptcy proceedings is imputed to a creditor, the agent is an attorney who has been authorized either to collect the balance due on a defaulted debt or to represent the creditor in bankruptcy proceedings.” In re Barnes, 2008 WL 2397618, at *1; see also In re Schicke, 290 B.R. at 805-06 (imputing notice from attorney, who did not appear in the bankruptcy case, to the creditor for purposes of the filing deadline for nondischargeability complaints where the attorney had represented the creditor in prepetition fraud litigation against the debtor); In re Griggs, 306 B.R. at 666 (imputing notice of the bankruptcy filing and proofs of claim filing deadline to a creditor where the noticed attorney represented the creditor in a prior state court action against the debtors, which resulted in a judgment against the debtors and served as the basis for the creditor‘s claim). But see In re Barnes, 2008 WL 2397618, at *2 (finding insufficient notice to a creditor residing in Brookings, South Dakota where the debtor served an attorney, who represented the creditor in a previous state court matter, in Fargo, North Dakota).
Courts have also declined to extend the proof of claim deadline where the creditor had actual notice of the bankruptcy and/or proofs of claim filing deadline notwithstanding the debtor‘s failure to accurately list the creditor‘s address on the list of creditors. See In re Price, 2019 WL 2895006, at *3 (denying creditor‘s motion to extend deadline where the post office put the notice of bankruptcy filing in the creditor‘s post office box despite being addressed incorrectly); In re Blakely, 440 B.R. 443, 446 (Bankr E.D. Va. 2010) (sustaining chapter 13 trustee‘s objection to creditor-bank‘s tardily filed proof of claim where the creditor discovered the debtor‘s
C. Analysis
Based on a review of the record in this case and the applicable case law, Vermont Center received sufficient notice of the Bar Date. Here, the Debtor‘s listing of Attorney Proctor “for
Vermont Center Wreaths, Inc.” and the use of Attorney Proctor‘s mailing address on the schedules and Creditors Matrix was reasonable under the circumstances of this case due to his continued representation of Vermont Center in the Collection Litigation, which involved the very same claim that Vermont Center seeks to assert here.12 For these reasons, there was a sufficient nexus between Vermont Center‘s retention of Attorney Proctor and its Proof of Claim against the Debtor.
Furthermore, the parties agree that Attorney Proctor received the Notice of Bankruptcy, which contained the Bar Date and other important dates, shortly after the bankruptcy filing and well before the expiration of the Bar Date. Under these circumstances, that was sufficient notice to inform Vermont Center of its duty to monitor the bankruptcy case. See In re San Miguel Sandoval, 327 B.R. at 510 (concluding that service of the notice of bankruptcy filing on the creditors’ original counsel “constituted adequate notice” to the creditors and “was sufficient to impose upon [original counsel], successor counsel and the [c]reditors the obligation to monitor the proceedings and the deadlines“). While the Court is cognizant that the scope of an attorney-client relationship may or may not change or be refined by agreement of the parties after notice is given to the attorney, Vermont Center failed to provide the Court with any case law suggesting that an after-the-fact agreement alone prevents a court from imputing otherwise proper notice from counsel to its client.
In addition to imputed notice, Vermont Center received actual notice of the bankruptcy from Attorney Proctor. Vermont Center acknowledged that Attorney Proctor promptly notified it about the Debtor‘s bankruptcy filing and offered to pursue the Proof of Claim on its behalf,
which Vermont Center declined. Although the Court need not decide whether Vermont Center had actual notice of the bankruptcy filing and/or Bar Date due to its finding of imputed notice, it is a factor that further supports the Court‘s finding of sufficient notice, and its denial of the Motion. See In re Fitzgerald, 2020 WL 5745973, at *4 (citing In re Price, 2019 WL 2895006, at *3).13
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Vermont Center‘s Motion is DENIED, and the Debtor‘s Claim Objection is SUSTAINED
ENTERED at Concord, New Hampshire.
Date: December 3, 2021
/s/ Bruce A. Harwood
Bruce A. Harwood
Chief Bankruptcy Judge