Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328

Background

Pankajkumar Patel (and wife) entered the U.S. unlawfully in the 1990s and applied in 2007 for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. §1255(i).
While his USCIS application was pending, Patel checked a "U.S. citizen" box on a Georgia driver’s license form; USCIS later denied his adjustment request relying on the statutory inadmissibility for false claims of U.S. citizenship.
Years later DHS initiated removal proceedings; at the removal hearing the Immigration Judge found Patel not credible and that he intentionally misrepresented citizenship, denied adjustment, and the BIA affirmed.
Patel sought judicial review in the Eleventh Circuit; a panel and then the en banc court held they lacked jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), creating a circuit split.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of factual findings underlying denials of discretionary relief; the Court held the bar precludes review of such factual determinations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Patel)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of factual findings made in discretionary-relief proceedings (e.g., credibility, intent)	The phrase "regarding the granting of relief" limits the bar to the ultimate grant/deny decision only; eligibility and underlying facts remain reviewable	The bar covers discretionary judgments; factual findings here are nondiscretionary and therefore outside the bar	Court held the bar precludes review of factual findings made in discretionary-relief proceedings — factual findings are not reviewable
The scope of the word "judgment" in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)	"Judgment" should be read narrowly to mean the step-two discretionary decision whether to grant relief	"Judgment" means discretionary decisions only; ordinary factfinding is not a barred "judgment"	The Court read "judgment" broadly (with "any" and "regarding"), covering any authoritative decision relating to granting relief, including factual findings
Effect of §1252(a)(2)(D) and the presumption of reviewability	Ambiguity should trigger the presumption that Congress did not intend to preclude review; preserve fact review	§1252(a)(2)(D) preserves review of legal/constitutional questions only; presumption does not save fact review here	Court concluded the text and context show Congress excluded factual-review claims; (D) preserves only constitutional/legal questions, not factual ones
Consequences for USCIS denials outside removal proceedings	Bar should not be read to leave pre-removal USCIS denials wholly unreviewable	Concern acknowledged but Government argued factual findings here are reviewable or issue is distinct	Court did not decide reviewability of pre-removal USCIS denials; noted possible implications but declined to resolve that separate question

Key Cases Cited

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (describing discretionary relief as a matter of grace and discussing limits on judicial review)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (interpretation of §1252 provisions and relation of clauses addressing discretionary decisions)
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (canon on the expansive meaning of the word "any")
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015) (usage of phrase "credibility judgments")
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. _ (2020) (interpreting §1252(a)(2)(C)/(D) and noting that (D) does not restore review of factual findings barred elsewhere)
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. _ (2020) (explaining limits on factual challenges to orders denying discretionary relief)
INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) (discussing that a judge may deny relief on discretionary grounds without reaching eligibility)
Abudu v. INS, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (distinguishing eligibility determinations from discretionary grants of relief)
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (historical practice of reviewing discretionary and non-discretionary decisions)