JACQUELINE M. PARRICK AKA, JACQUELINE M. SNYDER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. PAUL A PARRICK, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 5-12-12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY
February 11, 2013
2013-Ohio-422
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Domestic Relations Division Trial Court No. 2009 DR 129 Judgment Affirmed
William E. Clark for Appellant
Ralph D. Russo for Appellee
WILLAMOWSKI, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Paul Parrick (“Paul” or “Father“) appeals the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his motion to modify child support payments made to Plaintiff-Appellee, Jacqueline Parrick, nka Jacqueline Snyder (“Jacqueline” or “Mother“), under an existing Illinois court order. Paul contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to modify and in failing to apply Ohio law to modify a foreign child support order; that it erred in calculating Jacqueline‘s income; and, that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over only one part of the foreign child support order. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} Paul and Jacqueline were married on May 17, 1990 and have two children, Brittany (born in 1991) and Mikaela (born in 1995). The parties were divorced in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Crawford County, Illinois (hereinafter, the “Illinois Court“) in 1997. The Illinois Court named Jacqueline as the primary custodial parent of the two children and Paul was ordered to pay child support. Jacqueline and the children moved to Findlay, Ohio in 1998. Further proceedings in the Illinois Court resulted in a stipulation and order filed November 17, 2000, whereby Paul was ordered to pay $480 biweekly as support for both children.
{¶4} On December 22, 2008, the parties entered into a “stipulation and agreement,” which was approved by the Illinois Court and filed on January 6, 2009. This stipulation and agreement contained provisions to address the visitation issues; it increased the amount of child support to $752 bi-weekly, plus a percentage of any bonus Paul might receive; and, it provided that each parent would pay a specified portion of Brittany‘s college expenses, and also Mikaela‘s educational expenses if she attended college.1 Child support for Brittany was to terminate when she began college in September 2009. At issue in the case before us today is the portion of the order that provided for the payment of child support for Mikaela after Brittany‘s emancipation. Paul, who was represented by an attorney in the Illinois proceedings, agreed to pay $537 biweekly support for Mikaela, plus 20% of any net bonus received by him.
{¶6} A hearing was held on Paul‘s motions before a magistrate on October 7, 2010. The magistrate acknowledged that the Illinois child support order had been registered in Ohio and that Ohio law would allow for the modification of that order if Ohio‘s statutory requirements for modification were met. However, the magistrate found that there had been no substantial change of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the issuance of the original child support order
{¶7} The magistrate found that the only change in circumstances that had occurred since 2008, when the parties negotiated the stipulated agreement, was that Paul‘s income had increased by about 15%. Paul‘s total gross income from his employment at Marathon Oil had been $110,660 in 2008 ($12,000 of which was a bonus payment), $126,526 in 2009 (including a $22,000 bonus), and $127,662 in 2010 (including a $20,000 bonus). Jacqueline, a registered nurse, earned $72,557 in 2008, $68,090 in 2009, and anticipated earning $73,000 in 2010. Her income had essentially remained the same.
{¶8} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision and the trial court remanded the matter to the magistrate for the limited purpose of ascertaining Jacqueline‘s actual income as defined by
{¶9} Following a hearing on this matter on September 2, 2011, the magistrate found that Jacqueline‘s actual income for 2010 was $73,418.06. The challenged deposits did not constitute income to Jacqueline and were mostly expense account payments from her employer reimbursing her for significant
{¶10} Paul again filed objections. On January 12, 2012, a hearing was held before the trial court judge on the various issues that had been raised. On February 6, 2012, the trial court filed a detailed decision discussing and analyzing all nine objections that had been raised by Paul. The trial court overruled all of Paul‘s objections with the exception of maintaining that Paul would continue to pay his support through the Hancock County CSEA. Jacqueline‘s objections were sustained.
{¶11} The trial court filed the final judgment entry on February 22, 2012, finding that the current Illinois Order regarding child support was “fair and reasonable” and ordered that Paul continue paying the child support as agreed in the stipulation of January 2009. The educational expense portion of the Illinois Order was also to remain in full force and effect. The trial court concluded by stating:
The Illinois Order and all provisions contained therein continue unmodified and in full force and effect by, between and among [Jacqueline], [Paul] and their children as set forth therein and although said Order is now registered in this state for enforcement under
Rev. Code Sec. 3115.40 , the tribunal which issued the Illinois Order retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over said Order and this Court expressly declines to assume such jurisdiction.
{¶12} It is from this judgment that Paul now appeals, presenting the following three assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying Father‘s motion to modify and committed an abuse of discretion in failing to apply Ohio law in the motion to modify a foreign order registered in Ohio
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in excluding from Mother‘s income so called reimbursement of business expenses that included unidentified amounts for her personal meals and after hours drinks and an unsubstantiated mileage.
Third Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in modifying the Illinois order in part and then holding that Illinois retains exclusive jurisdiction of the order.
{¶13} Paul‘s assignments of error pertain to the trial court‘s denial of his motion to modify the Illinois Court‘s child support order. In the past, different state laws for enforcing child-support orders contributed to a problem of relatively low levels of child-support payments in interstate cases and encouraged a disregard of court orders, resulting in hardships for the children who needed support. Cruz v. Cumba-Ortiz, 116 Ohio St.3d 279, 2007-Ohio-6440, ¶ 18. To remedy these problems, Congress enacted the federal full-faith-and-credit act,
{¶14}
{¶15} The new state in which an order is registered and confirmed generally does not have the authority to modify the order, except for certain specified situations. See
{¶16} In the limited instances where modification is allowed, the modification of a registered support order “is subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.”
{¶17} Trial courts are given broad discretion in determining whether to modify existing child support orders. Woloch v. Foster, 98 Ohio App.3d 806, 810 (2d Dist.1994). Therefore, a trial court‘s decision regarding a motion to modify a child support order will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment; rather, it suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). An appellate court must also give substantial deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact and will not reverse those findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Polk v. Polk, 188 Ohio App.3d 809, 2010-Ohio-3355, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).
First Assignment of Error
{¶18} In the first assignment of error, Paul contends that
{¶19} We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to modify the parties’ agreed child support order. The trial court did a thorough and detailed analysis of all of the facts and issues and found at least three valid reasons why the Illinois support order should not be modified. We agree with the trial court‘s conclusions as explained in the magistrate‘s opinions, the trial court‘s decisions overruling Paul‘s objections, and its final judgment entry.
{¶20} First, the trial court could find no case precedent holding that merely moving a child support order from one jurisdiction to another amounted to a significant change in circumstances. It is true that Illinois child support is computed utilizing different standards than Ohio, but this support order was based
{¶21} However, in order to be thorough and to compare “apples to apples,” the trial court completed the Ohio child support worksheets to calculate what Paul‘s support obligation would be for 2008, 2009, and 2010, based upon Ohio law. Although there was an increase from 2008 to 2009 and 2010 because of Paul‘s increased income, the differences in the support calculations between those years did not result in a ten percent difference. Therefore, utilizing the Ohio worksheets alone, the trial court concluded that there was not a change in circumstances substantial enough to require a modification of the child support amount under
The Illinois Court found that the Illinois Order was fair, just and reasonable and in the best interests of the children. There is no evidence that [Paul] cannot comply with that existing child support order. Though the existing child support obligation is significantly more than the amount calculated using Ohio‘s child support schedule and worksheet, it is not unconscionably more. The existing child support order is within the range of child support orders permitted in Ohio.
(May 3, 2011 Mag. Dec.)
{¶23} Paul‘s primary complaint on appeal was that the trial court erred in requiring both a ten percent deviation in the amount of support owed pursuant to
{¶24} We find several flaws in Paul‘s reasoning. First, the trial court in this case did not find the ten percent deviation which would constitute a change of circumstances under
{¶25} And finally, we do not find the Ninth District‘s decision in Cook v. Cook to be persuasive for several reasons. First, the facts in Cook are distinguishable and there were additional changes of circumstances in Cook that are not present in this case. See id. In Cook, the prior child support order that the father sought to modify had been filed more than two years earlier, not within the previous three months as in this case. The prior support order in Cook also included graduated increases premised upon anticipated increased bonus income. Subsequently, the father lost his job. Although he obtained new employment, his
{¶26} In addition to the facts differentiating Cook from this case, this Court has consistently held that the modification of a child support order based upon an agreement of the parties to deviate from the standard schedule4 requires that the court find that there must be a substantial change of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the original agreement. See, e.g. Adams v. Adams, 3d Dist. No. 14-12-03, 2012-Ohio-5131; Adams v. Sirmans, 3d Dist. No. 5-08-02, 2008-Ohio-5400; Steggeman v. Steggeman, 3d Dist. No. 8-06-23, 2007-Ohio-5482; Bonner v. Bonner, 3d Dist. No. 14-05-26, 2005-Ohio-6173. This is true whether the previous agreement was from another state, as in Adams v. Sirmans, or was based upon an agreement in Ohio, as in Adams v. Adams. Otherwise, a party entering into an agreement whereby the child support payments deviate more than ten percent from the statutory child support schedules, could then immediately file for modification under
{¶27} In Adams v. Sirmans, involving a Georgia court‘s child support order which was later registered in Ohio, we held that there was no substantial change in circumstances that had not been contemplated at the time of the issuance of the child support order.
In this case, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement which they voluntarily entered and submitted to the Georgia court. The court then adopted the agreement as part of its decree. The parties both testified that at the time of the agreement, it was contemplated that they would eventually be moving back to Ohio as they both have family here. * * * Additionally, it was reasonable to anticipate that the parties could remarry, have additional children, and change jobs. * * * Although these are changes in circumstances, they are not of the type that would not be contemplated at the time the parties entered into their negotiated separation agreement. The “circumstances surrounding the ten per cent deviation were ‘contemplated at the time of the issuance of the child support order.‘” Bonner, supra at ¶ 15.
Sirmans at ¶ 11. See, also, Adams v. Adams, ¶¶ 22-30 (containing a detailed synopsis and analysis of this Court‘s decisions in Sirmans, Bonner, and Steggeman).
{¶28} Based on all of the above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Paul‘s motion to modify the Illinois Court‘s child support order. The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶29} In his second assignment of error, Paul complains that the trial court erred when it found that the expense reimbursement payments from Jacqueline‘s employer should not be included as income. Paul contends that there was no evidence that the $.30 a mile she received for business travel was not excessive when there was no evidence as to her actual expenses in operating her vehicle. He further objected to the introduction of additional evidence that Jacqueline offered at the hearing to explain her deposits and reimbursements.
{¶30} After reviewing the magistrate‘s decision dated May 3, 2011 (R-56), the trial court remanded the matter to the magistrate to hear additional evidence concerning Jacqueline‘s income, specifically, various deposits which she made into her checking account as enumerated in Paul‘s Defendant‘s Exhibit 3. The magistrate held that $17,179.99 of Jacqueline‘s additional deposits should not be included in her income as they were reimbursement of employee business expenses, including $.30 a mile for the 28,306 miles Jacqueline drove during the year for her job. Other amounts were “a refund from a Mediator, a back child support check, a state income tax refund, a transfer of a mutual fund, personal medical expense reimbursements, and payments received from Paul in compliance with the Illinois Court‘s orders * * *.” (Oct. 19, 2011 Mag. Dec., R-73)
{¶32} However, Jacqueline was not self-employed. She was at all times an employee of three different skilled care facilities since 2004, either as a clinical liaison or a community liaison. In each of these positions, she worked with doctors, nurses and hospitals in a certain geographical territory. It was her job to travel extensively to the health care providers’ facilities in her territory to organize functions, make presentations, and usually provide meals and refreshments as part of her job to market her employers’ services. She was not an owner, partner, shareholder or anything but an employee of these businesses. The only compensation she received appeared on her W-2 forms and was reported on her federal income taxes. The trial court‘s decision to use the income figures from these W-2 and tax records to derive her income was supported by the record.
{¶34} Paul also takes exception to the trial court remanding the matter back to the magistrate for additional evidence concerning Jacqueline‘s income. However, the trial court clearly has discretion under
Third Assignment of Error
{¶36} Paul‘s final assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when it ordered that jurisdiction over the child support order would remain with the Illinois Court, but yet his payments would be through the Hancock County CSEA. Paul claims that this order is inconsistent. He asserts that by ordering the terms of the payments, the court has “modified” the order, and thus, Ohio should become the state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See
{¶37} It seems somewhat incongruent that Paul filed the motion, on June 3, 2010 (R-42), requesting that wage-withholding be done through the Hancock County CSEA, yet now he complains because the trial court granted his motion.
{¶38} The Illinois Court order did not require that Paul‘s child support payments be made to any particular person or agency. It simply stated that there would be a new wage support order. Even assuming the payment of child support through the Hancock county CSEA would be a different procedure than what was previously taking place, it is a minor administrative type of change and is not a substantive modification of the existing child support order that would constitute a basis for Ohio to assume complete jurisdiction over this matter.
{¶39} The purpose of the registration provision under
A registered order issued in another state that is confirmed * * * is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state. * * * [A] tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order that has been confirmed if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.
{¶40}
{¶41} The enforcement of the child support by utilizing the Hancock County CSEA to collect Paul‘s payroll withholding deductions did not constitute a modification which would confer continuing, exclusive jurisdiction upon any tribunal in Ohio. Paul‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur.
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