{¶ 2} On December 1, 1979, appellant married Christel Bonner (hereinafter "appellee"). Appellant and appеllee had three children together. Two of the children are related to this appeal: Tiffany Bonner (hereinafter "Tiffany"), born March 28, 1986, and Sydney Bonner (hereinafter "Sydney"), bоrn September 13, 1995.
{¶ 3} On May 6, 2003, the parties' marriage was terminated by a decree of dissolution. The parties had entered into a separation agreement, which the magistrаte incorporated into the decree. Under the terms of the agreement, appellant agreed to deviate upward from the child support obligation estаblished by the statutory child support guideline schedule.
{¶ 4} Appellant agreed to pay child support to appellee in the amount of $200.00 per week plus processing fees.1 Appellant also agreed to pay this amount until the youngest of his children reached the age of eighteen and was out of high school. The parties agreed, and the magistrate concurred, that the upward deviation wаs necessary for appellee to meet her financial needs and was in the best interests of the children.
{¶ 5} Tiffany turned eighteen and graduated from high school on July 7, 2004. The trial сourt subsequently terminated appellant's support obligation as to Tiffany. At this time, however, Sydney was still under the age of eighteen, and the trial court did not alter appellаnt's support obligation of $200.00 per week.
{¶ 6} On October 27, 2004, appellant filed a motion to modify his child support obligation. A recalculation of appellant's child supрort for one minor child required appellant to pay $162.25 per week, which was more than ten per cent less than the $200.00 per week to which he had agreed.2 Thereаfter, the magistrate denied the appellant's motion for modification, and the trial court subsequently adopted the magistrate's decision.
{¶ 7} It is from this decision that appellant appeals, setting forth one assignment of error for our review.
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in requiring him to prove a "substantial change of circumstances," in addition tо the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 9} Trial courts are given broad discretion in determining whether to modify child support orders. Woloch v. Foster (1994),
{¶ 10} When considering a motion to modify a child support order, the trial court must recalculate the amount of support required to be paid pursuant to the statutory child support guideline schedule and the applicable worksheet using the parties' updated financial information. Sеe R.C.
{¶ 11} The facts of the present case require R.C.
If the court determines that the amount of child support required to bepaid under the child support order should be changed due to a substantialchange of circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of theissuance of the original child support order * * *, the court shallmodify the amount of child support required to be paid under the childsupport order to comply with the schedule and the applicable worksheetthrough the line establishing the actual annual obligation, unless thecourt determines that the amоunt calculated pursuant to the basic childsupport schedule and pursuant to the applicable worksheet would be unjustor inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child andenters in the journal the figure, determination, and findings specifiedin section
Where, as in the present case, a party voluntarily agrees to pay child supрort in an amount exceeding the statutory child support guideline schedule, a trial court granting a motion for modification must find both (1) a change of circumstances, and (2) that such a change of circumstances "was not contemplated at the time of the issuance of the child support order."
{¶ 12} In the case sub judice, the trial court determined that, based upon appellant's increased income and one minor child, the recalculated amount of support under the statutory child support guidelines requirеd appellant to pay $162.25 per week, which was less than the $200.00 per week payment to which he had agreed by more than ten per cent. The trial court's finding, thereforе, that there was a change of circumstances within the meaning of R.C.
{¶ 13} At the time of the separation agreement, however, appellant voluntarily agreed to pay $200.00 per week until Sydney reached the age of eighteen and was out of high school. The explicit terms of the separation agreement acknowledge the consequences of this upward deviation in stating that, "The parties agree that said sum [$200.00] represents a deviation upward at this time of approximately $40.62 per week and $2112 per year and will result in an increased deviation upwardat the time that Tiffany turns 18 and is out of high school." Emphasis added.
{¶ 14} Given the unambiguous language of the separation agreement, the parties were cognizant that when Tiffany reached age eighteen appellant's support obligation for her could be terminated. The parties also acknowledged that appellant's support payments at that time would be more than the statutory child support guidelines required for one minor child. Appellant agreed to pay that amount, whether from a sense of obligation to his children or as part of a negotiated separation agreement, with awareness of the circumstances.
{¶ 15} Consequently, we find the circumstances surrounding the ten per cent deviation were "contemplated at the time of the issuance of the child support order." Appellant has, therefore, failed to establish the seсond element under R.C.
{¶ 16} Appellant cites DePalmo v. DePalmo (1997),
{¶ 17} The trial court relied on the holding of Roche v. Roche, 7th Dist. No. 01 C.A. 3,
{¶ 18} Under the facts presented in this case, and considering the specific and clear language of the separation agreement and its incorporation into the decree of dissolution, we need not address the trial court's reasoning. A judgment by the trial court which is correct, but for a different reason, will be affirmed on appeal as there is no prejudice to the appellant. See Lust v. Lust, 3d Dist. No. 16-02-04,
{¶ 19} Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 20} Having found no error prejudicial to the apрellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed. Bryant and Rogers, JJ., concur.