Matter of Ka A. PAEK, Respondent
United States Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals
September 17, 2014
26 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 2014)
Interim Decision #3813
FOR RESPONDENT: Daniel B. Conklin, Esquire, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Benjamin Ross Winograd, Esquire, Alexandria, Virginia1
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Richard S. O’Brian, Assistant Chief Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: ADKINS-BLANCH, Vice Chairman; GUENDELSBERGER, Board Member; MANUEL, Temporary Board Member.
GUENDELSBERGER, Board Member:
In a decision dated January 8, 2014, an Immigration Judge found the respondent removable under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
The respondent is a native and citizen of South Korea who was admitted to the United States in 1991 at a port of entry as a conditional permanent
Section 212(h) of the Act includes the following proviso, which is known as the aggravated felony bar:
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . .
(Emphasis added.)3 The only issue on appeal is whether the aggravated felony bar applies to an alien who was admitted at a port of entry as a conditional permanent resident under section 216(a) of the Act. More precisely, the question is whether the respondent is an alien who has previously been “admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” based on his admission to the United States at a port of entry as a conditional permanent resident.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, has held that the phrase “admitted to the
Congress clearly only placed limitations on waivers available to aliens who were previously admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. This phrase requires not only a prior admission to the United States, but also that the prior admission has been made while the alien was in the status of a lawful permanent resident. We perceive no other meaning from the language of the statute.
There is no dispute that the respondent was “admitted” to the United States at a port of entry in 1991, so we need only determine whether the phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in section 212(h) of the Act includes his admission as a conditional permanent resident under section 216(a).6
the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.
Section 216(a)(1) of the Act, which provides as follows, clearly includes aliens who are admitted on a conditional basis within the category of aliens who are “lawfully admitted for permanent residence”:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an alien spouse (as defined in subsection (h)(1)) and an alien son or daughter (as defined in subsection (h)(2)) shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the provisions of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
The language in other provisions of section 216 also makes clear that permanent resident status is obtained on the date of an alien’s initial admission as a conditional permanent resident. For example, section 216(a)(2)(A) provides notice requirements regarding the removal of the conditions that are imposed on an alien spouse, son, or daughter at the time he or she “obtains permanent resident status on a conditional basis under paragraph (1).” Similarly, section 216(c)(3)(B), which governs the removal of conditions of admission after approval of a joint petition, states that the conditional basis of the alien’s status is removed “effective as of the second anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful admission for permanent residence.” (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the terms “alien spouse” and “alien son or daughter,” which are defined in sections 216(h)(1) and (2) of the Act, include “an alien who obtains the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (whether on a conditional basis or otherwise).” (Emphasis added.) Section 216(e), which addresses eligibility for naturalization, also specifies that an alien admitted as a conditional permanent resident “shall be considered to have been admitted as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and to be in the United States as an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, although an alien may be admitted pursuant to section 216 on a conditional basis,
Were there any doubt concerning the meaning of the statute, the regulations implementing section 216 of the Act define a “conditional permanent resident” as
an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence within the meaning of section 101(a)(20) of the Act, except that a conditional permanent resident is also subject to the conditions and responsibilities set forth in section 216 or 216A of the Act, whichever is applicable, and part 216 of this chapter.
Finally, in the context of eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver, the Third Circuit held that a “conditional permanent resident” obtains “lawful permanent resident” status at the time of his or her initial admission. Gallimore v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 619 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). After considering the language of section 216 and the corresponding regulation at
Because the respondent was admitted to the United States in 1991 at a port of entry as a “conditional permanent resident,” he was admitted as an alien “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” within the meaning of sections 101(a)(20) and 212(h) of the Act. The Immigration Judge properly determined that the respondent is subject to the aggravated felony bar and is therefore statutorily ineligible for a section 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
