KENECHUKWU ONYILOGWU v. CATHERINE I. ONYILOGWU
(AC 44942)
Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Norcott, Js.
Arguеd October 17, 2022-officially released February 21, 2023
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The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant and making certain financial orders. Following a trial, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant a certain amount per month in alimony for ten years. In a subsequent articulation, the court clarified that, in determining the amount and sources of the plaintiff‘s income, it took into account funds received by the plaintiff as temporary unemployment assistance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Held that the trial court abused its discretion in making an excessive award of alimony and the case was remanded for a new trial on all financial orders: the trial court improperly included the plaintiff‘s temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits in its calculation of his income because those benefits did not occur with enough regularity due to their temporary nature and, thus, could not form the basis for determining the amount of income availаble for support purposes for the court‘s ten year alimony award; moreover, when this court subtracted the plaintiff‘s temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits from the court‘s calculation of the plaintiff‘s income, the alimony order would have consumed most of the plaintiff‘s income, which was contrary to the long settled principle that the plaintiff‘s ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating financial awards, and both cоmmon knowledge at the time of the court‘s 2021 decision, as well as common sense, indicated that the plaintiff would stop receiving temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits soon after the court‘s order of a ten year alimony award.
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the case was tried to the court, Rodriguez, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
David V. DeRosa, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James H. Lee, with whom, on the brief, was Charleen Merced Agosto, for the appellee (defendant).
NORCOTT, J. The plaintiff, Kenechukwu Onyilogwu, appeals from the trial court‘s judgment dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Catherine I. Onyilogwu. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the court‘s financial orders and claims that the court abused its discretion in making an excessive award of alimony. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment as to the financial orders.1
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant. The parties were married in Nigeria on October 4, 2010, and no children were born of the marriage. Both parties moved to the United States and were symbolically married in a religious ceremony in November, 2013. The plaintiff filed an action for dissolution of marriage in 2019. Following a trial on August 10, 2021, which was held remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court issued a memorandum of decision on August 27, 2021, in which it found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably without the possibility of reсonciliation due to the plaintiff‘s adulterous behavior and mismanagement of household expenses. The court found that the defendant has a bachelor‘s degree in chemistry and a master‘s degree in business administration and has worked as a substitute teacher and as a caregiver companion. The court further found that the plaintiff is a banker and financial adviser who is self-employed and that, although he earned a negative net income between 2016 and 2018, his “finances have improved and . . . he is able to support himself and support the defendant . . . while she attends an institution of higher education.” The court found, on the basis of defendant‘s exhibit I, which contains records of deposits and withdrawals from the plaintiff‘s savings and checking accounts, that the plaintiff “has been earning income ranging from $3000-$7000” per month. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant $1500 per month in alimony for ten years, commencing on September 20, 2021, or, alternatively, to make a lump sum payment to the defendant of $120,000 on or before November 26, 2021. This appeal followed.2
On September 15, 2021, during the pendency of the present appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue/reconsider in the trial court in which he requested that the court grant reconsideration due to, among other things, the temporary nature of the pandemic unemployment assistance he had been receiving and the fact that he stopped receiving benefits in early September, 2021. The court has not ruled on that motion.3
Following oral argument before this court, we ordered the trial court “to articulate its August 27, 2021 memorandum of decision concerning the ‘amount and sources of income‘;
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $1500 per month in alimony for ten years when that award “was so excessive it would leave the plaintiff destitute.” He сontends that the court improperly included his temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits in its calculation of his income. Highlighting exhibit I, on which the court relied in fashioning the alimony award, the plaintiff contends that, according to that exhibit, he “only made between $1500 to $3000 per month from his own efforts in his business,” and that this amount was “artificially inflated” when he began receiving “temporary pandemic related unemployment payments of about $1400 a month . . . .” In his supplemеntal memorandum, the plaintiff contends that “[t]he articulation by the Superior Court removes any doubt that in establishing a [ten] year alimony order at $1500 a month, the Superior Court considered the pandemic unemployment assistance in determining the plaintiff‘s earning capacity. . . . Given that it was foreseeable at trial that the plaintiff would no longer have access to the temporary pandemic unemployment assistance, it was an error for the court . . . to rely оn those funds in establishing a periodic alimony order of that magnitude or for a term that long as a regular periodic alimony order.” (Citation omitted.)
The defendant counters in her supplemental memorandum that, “[a]t the time the trial court made its decision, the unemployment compensation the plaintiff received as temporary pandemic relief was before the court, but the fact that it was about to end does not appear to have been. . . . While it is truе that these benefits are temporary, in a larger sense all income is temporary. Even salaried employment can end abruptly and unexpectedly. While it does not appear of record that the trial court knew at the time of its decision that these benefits were temporary and about to end, what matters is that the plaintiff did receive them and they
We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. ”
“An appellate court will not disturb a trial court‘s orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whethеr a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Steller v. Steller, 181 Conn. App. 581, 587-88 (2018). “[I]t is generally uncommon for a reviewing court to determine that the trial court has abused its broad discretion in deciding whether to award alimony and otherwise craft financial orders in a dissolution decree. Reluctance to reverse the trial court‘s exercisе of discretion, however, should not mean that the door is entirely closed to successful appeals in dissolution cases. Our appellate courts have reversed excessive or inequitable financial orders. See Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348, 356-60 (2005) (reversing financial orders when 98.5 percent of marital property and substantial alimony awarded to one spouse); Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122, 129 (2009) (reversing financial orders when orders consumed 90 percent of paying spouse‘s income).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiegand v. Wiegand, 129 Conn. App. 526, 536-37 (2011).
In its decision, the court found that the plaintiff had been earning income ranging from $3000 to $7000 per month.4 The court clarified in its December 19, 2022 articulation that, in calculating the plaintiff‘s alimony obligation, it had considered the funds that the plaintiff had received as temporary pandemic unemployment assistance, totaling approximately $16,085. Exhibit I, on which the court relied to determine the amount of the plaintiff‘s income and the award of alimony, makes сlear the excessive nature of the alimony award. Exhibit I shows that the deposits and additions into the plain-
One of the factors in
“Despite the generally expansive meaning of the term, not every receipt of funds will be considered income.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Birkhold v. Birkhold, 343 Conn. 786, 796-97 (2022). “The particular items to be included in income are likely to vary from case to case. For the most part there are no broad rulings or generalizations as to whether particular items will or will not be included in income, leaving the trial courts with wide discretion to evaluate the individual circumstances in each case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) A. Rutkin et al., 8 Connecticut Practice Series: Family Law and Practice with Forms (3d Ed. 2010) § 33:11, p. 54.
The broad, yet not limitless, definition of income does
The defendant contends that the plaintiff‘s temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits properly were included as income because there was no indication that the trial court was aware at the time of its decision that those benefits were temporary. We are unpersuaded. Although the last statement of the status of the plaintiff‘s checking account in exhibit I included within it a deposit for temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits, nothing in the court‘s decision or articulation indicates that it assumed that the plaintiff would continue to receive temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits for the ten year duration of the alimony award. Both common knowledge at the time of the court‘s August, 2021 decision as well as common sense indicate that the plaintiff would stop receiving temporary pandemiс unemployment assistance benefits soon after the court‘s August 27, 2021 order of a ten year alimony award.5 “[Triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the facts in hand . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kristy A., 83 Conn. App. 298, 316 (2004). Additionally, the defendant‘s argument thаt the plaintiff‘s temporary pandemic unemployment assistance benefits are an “appropriate stand-in” for the income earned by the plaintiff when employed ignores the court‘s finding that the monies received by the plaintiff as temporary pandemic unem-
In light of our conclusion that the court abused its discretion in fashioning the alimony award, we remand the case for a new trial on all financial orders. “Financial orders in dissolution proceedings often have been described as a mosaic, in which all of the various financial components are carefully interwoven with one another. . . . Because the court‘s support orders, particularly its spousal support or alimony order, are informed by and reflective of the parties’ incomes and assets, as affected by the court‘s other financial orders, the entirety of the mosaic must be refashioned whenever there is error in the entering of any such interdependent order.” (Citation omitted.) O‘Brien v. O‘Brien, 138 Conn. App. 544, 555 (2012). “[O]ur courts have utilized the mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration of all financial orders even though the review process might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distribution or child support awards.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keusch v. Keusch, 184 Conn. App. 822, 825-26 (2018). “[W]hen an appellate court reverses a trial court judgment based on an improper alimony, property distribution, or child support award, the appellate court‘s remand typically authorizes the trial court to reconsider all of the financial оrders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Morris, 262 Conn. 299, 307 (2003).
The judgment is reversed only as to the financial orders, and the case is remanded for a new trial on all financial issues; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.