Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. ClevelandOhio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland
[Cite as Ohio Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland, 2024-Ohio-2651.]
Civil law—Arbitration Act—
(No. 2022-0724—Submitted April 05, 2023—Decided July 16, 2024.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 110816, 2022-Ohio-1403.
DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER and STEWART, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ. BRUNNER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion.
DONNELLY, J.
{¶ 1} To obtain an order vacating an arbitration award under the Ohio Arbitration Act,
I. Background
{¶ 2} This case arises from a labor dispute between the City of Cleveland and the Ohio Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association—the union that represents dispatch supervisors in the Cleveland Division of Police Communications Center—concerning the scheduling of overtime. Because this appeal does not involve the merits of the union‘s grievance or the arbitration award resolving it, there‘s no need to rehash the facts of that dispute here. In line with the collective-bargaining agreement between the union and the city, the parties submitted their dispute to arbitration, and the arbitrator ultimately denied the union‘s grievance. Relevant here is the fact that the city was represented by outside counsel in the arbitration proceedings.
{¶ 3} Following the denial of its grievance, the union sought to vacate the arbitration award under
{¶ 4} The city responded by filing an “Application to Confirm Arbitration Award” under
{¶ 5} While the parties’ briefing in the common pleas court was pending, however, the Eighth District Court of Appeals issued a decision in a different case, refuting one of the legal bases that the common pleas court had relied on in denying the city‘s motion to dismiss. See Cleveland Police Patrolmen‘s Assn. v. Cleveland, 2021-Ohio-702, ¶ 14-15 (8th Dist.) (holding that a party‘s failure to serve an application to vacate an arbitration award on the outside counsel who represented the prevailing party in arbitration did not meet the service requirements under
{¶ 6} Acknowledging that it was required to follow the precedent established by the Eighth District, the common pleas court found that the union‘s failure to serve its application to vacate on the outside counsel that represented the city in the arbitration proceedings before the deadline set out in
{¶ 7} The Eighth District affirmed the common pleas court‘s judgment denying the union‘s application to vacate the arbitration award and granting the city‘s application to confirm the award. In a unanimous opinion, the court of appeals concluded that the union‘s application contained two defects: First, the application did not meet the statutory requirements for initiating a vacatur action, because it was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion. 2022-Ohio-1403, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).1 Second, because the union did not serve its application to vacate on the outside counsel that represented the city in the arbitration proceedings, it did not initiate the vacatur proceedings within the statutory deadline. Id. at ¶ 24. The appellate court concluded that together, these defects deprived the common pleas court of jurisdiction over the union‘s application to vacate the arbitration award and supported the common pleas court‘s denial of that application. Id. at ¶ 26. This outcome, in turn, left the common pleas court “no choice” but to grant the city‘s application to confirm the arbitration award. Id. at ¶ 27.
{¶ 8} The union timely appealed to this court. We accepted the discretionary appeal to resolve (1) whom a party must serve when seeking to vacate an arbitration award in the court of common pleas and (2) what form the filing initiating that
II. Discussion
{¶ 9} The procedure that parties must follow when requesting that a court of common pleas vacate an arbitration award is set out in statute.
{¶ 10} When interpreting statutory provisions, our goal is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent in enacting the statute—an intent we discern by reading the statutory language in context and according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-2067, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 21. And in doing so, we “neither add to nor delete from the statutory language.” Id., citing Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 2008-Ohio-511, ¶ 19.
A. R.C. 2711.13 allows a party seeking the vacatur of an arbitration award to serve either the opposing party or that party‘s counsel
{¶ 11} Once an award has been made in an arbitration proceeding, any party to the arbitration may request the appropriate court of common pleas to either vacate or modify the award for one of the reasons set out in
{¶ 12} To understand why, we begin with the statutory text.
The average English speaker presented with this query would understand that she could order coffee, she could order tea, or (if she was in especial need of caffeination) she could order both. See Garner, Garner‘s Modern English Usage (4th Ed. 2016) (entry on use of “and/or“). So too here. The language in
{¶ 14} But Cox does little to help resolve the question here. In Cox, an arbitrator found that the Dayton Public Schools Board of Education had just cause to terminate Cox‘s employment as an intervention specialist with the public school system. Id. at ¶ 2-3. Cox sought modification of the arbitration award by filing a motion in the court of common pleas. That same day, the clerk of courts sent a copy of the motion to the board by certified mail. And the next day, Cox sent a copy of the motion to the board‘s attorney, also by certified mail. Id. at ¶ 4. While the copies of the motion were sent within the three-month deadline set out in
{¶ 15} By contrast, the question here deals with a possible contradiction between the statutory provision and the Civil Rules regarding on whom a party initiating proceedings to vacate an arbitration award needs to serve notice. The plain text of
{¶ 17} A civil rule is clearly inapplicable to a special statutory proceeding when its “‘use will alter the basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure was originally provided in the special statutory action.‘” Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St. 2d 131, 133 (1982), quoting State ex rel. Millington v. Weir, 60 Ohio App. 2d 348, 349 (10th Dist. 1978). As discussed earlier, a party complies with the service requirements set out in
{¶ 18} The statutory interpretation that the Eighth District used in its analysis and that the city advocates for here would undermine that intention. If we were to adopt the reading of
{¶ 19} In sum,
B. An application to vacate an arbitration award that is in the form of a pleading does not meet the requirements under R.C. 2711.05 and 2711.13
{¶ 21} Just as with the first question in this appeal, our consideration of the proper form of the filing that initiates an action to vacate an arbitration award in the court of common pleas begins with the statutory text of
{¶ 22} When read together the provisions are straightforward. Both provisions unambiguously state that when a party applies to vacate an arbitration award in the court of common pleas, the application must be in the form of a motion.
{¶ 23} Despite the clear language of these provisions, the union asks us to hold that its filing in the court of common pleas—which was in the form of a pleading and titled as a complaint—nevertheless satisfied these statutory requirements. This we decline to do.
{¶ 24} A motion is not a pleading, nor is a pleading a motion. A motion is an application by a litigant to a court for a specific order.
{¶ 25} By contrast, a pleading is a far more limited type of filing. A pleading is generally defined as “[a] formal document in which a party to a legal proceeding (esp. a civil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to allegations, claims, denials, or defenses.” Black‘s. The Civil Rules do not provide their own definition of “pleading,” but their requirements for pleadings largely incorporate the general definition. Pleadings that include a claim for relief must
{¶ 26} The Civil Rules identify only seven types of filings as pleadings: a complaint, an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, a third-party complaint, a third-party answer, and a reply to a third-party answer if ordered by the court.
{¶ 27} To be sure, a motion and a pleading are similar—they are both papers filed in a court during litigation to try to achieve a desired outcome. But they are not synonymous. As illustrated by the discussion above, a pleading (especially a complaint) is meant to initiate a legal action; a motion is meant to resolve a legal question arising during that action or even resolve the action itself. Considering these differences, the General Assembly‘s decision to require a party seeking vacatur of an arbitration award to initiate those proceedings by filing a motion makes sense. If a court of common pleas decides to vacate an arbitration award for one of the reasons listed in
{¶ 28} Applying these principles to the facts here, we conclude that the union‘s filing to initiate vacatur proceedings did not meet the statutory requirements of
{¶ 29} Were this an ordinary proceeding in which an initial pleading would be followed by the trappings of “process, pleadings, and ending in judgment,”
{¶ 30} Nor is the deficiency with the union‘s initial filing remedied by the union‘s attaching to that filing the documents required for an application to vacate an arbitration award under
{¶ 31} In reaching these conclusions, we are mindful that, as a rule, courts should assess filings based on their content rather than their form, thereby ensuring cases are resolved on the merits rather than a party‘s compliance with technicalities. See Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St. 2d 161, 175 (1973) (“The spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon their merits, not upon
III. Conclusion
{¶ 32} For these reasons, we agree with the union that a party filing an application in the court of common pleas to vacate an arbitration award satisfies the service requirements of
{¶ 33} But even if the union met
Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part.
KENNEDY, C.J., joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 34} I agree with the majority‘s holding that when a party disputes an arbitration award by motion,
{¶ 35} But, in my view, the majority errs by holding that the filing by appellant, the Ohio Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association (“the union“), did not meet the statutory requirement that a filing in which a party asks a court of common pleas to vacate an arbitration award be made in the form and manner of a motion. The majority reaches this conclusion by setting out the form and contents of the union‘s filing and then deciding whether that filing is a pleading or a motion. However, with this approach, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion. Rather, the way to determine whether the union‘s filing met the statutory requirements and complied with the rules for filing motions is by a straightforward application of the Ohio Arbitration
{¶ 36} Because the majority goes beyond the Civil Rules and dictates the type of content that is required for a filing to be considered a motion and does not simply follow the Arbitration Act and the Civil Rules, I dissent.
{¶ 37} The union‘s filing in this case meets the requirements of
{¶ 38} The union‘s filing was captioned “Complaint: Application to Vacate Arbitration Award.” However, the union‘s filing also included the subheading “Motion to Vacate.” Additionally, in its filing, the union (1) included the statutory basis on which it argued that the arbitration award should be vacated, (2) alleged facts that supported that basis, (3) included the documents that are statutorily required to accompany a motion to vacate an arbitration award, and (4) set forth a request for specific relief—conforming to the requirements for a motion to vacate an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act and the Civil Rules.
I. Requirements of an R.C. 2711.13 Motion and Civ.R. 7(B)
{¶ 39} Before discussing the requirements of an
{¶ 40}
{¶ 41} Therefore, contrary to the majority‘s assertion, the Civil Rules do not require that motions contain any legal authority beyond statutory citations, nor do the rules require that a motion contain an analysis applying the law to the facts at issue. See majority opinion, ¶ 28. These requirements that the majority states must be present for a filing to constitute a
{¶ 42} Where there is substantive variation between what is generally found in a motion and what the union filed in this case, the Civil Rules that apply to an initial filing explain the variance.
II. The Initial Filing in an Action Is, By Definition, a Complaint
{¶ 43} The only way to commence a civil action is by filing a complaint with the court. See
{¶ 44} The union‘s filing also included the identification of the parties, and a statement of the court‘s jurisdiction, and it was served with a summons. In practice, a party‘s initial filing provides the court with information that identifies the parties, and it states whether the parties have standing and under which statute or rules the court may exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. This information is key for courts to determine whether the issue and the parties are properly before it. However, the majority finds that the inclusion of this information in an application to vacate an arbitration award filed under
{¶ 45} Following the majority‘s approach, serving an
{¶ 46} In short, when a party makes its initial filing under
III. The Union‘s Filing Met the Requirements for a Motion
A. Civ.R. 7(B)(1)
{¶ 47} Applying the first four requirements for filing a motion to the facts here demonstrates that the union‘s filing complied with
{¶ 48} Because the union‘s application was successfully served on the adverse party and proof of service was docketed, the union‘s filing was compliant with
{¶ 49} As noted by the majority, this court previously stated in Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 2016-Ohio-5505, that
{¶ 50} In Cox, the party disputing the arbitration award filed a motion in common pleas court and gave the clerk instructions for serving the motion. This court declined to consider the proposition of law “which raised the issue of [the disputing party]‘s failure to comply with
{¶ 51} Here, the union‘s filing was served by a process server, along with a summons. Service was docketed as successful. This service met
B. Civ.R. 7(B)(3)
{¶ 52} Notably, the fifth requirement for filing a motion, which is set forth in
{¶ 53} Applying
{¶ 54} The majority‘s assertion that because the union‘s filing is captioned as a complaint it is therefore a pleading and not a motion does not logically follow from an application of the Civil Rules. With respect to whether the filing‘s designation as a “complaint” prohibited the court from considering the filing to be a motion,
{¶ 55} Lastly, motions are not required to have a strict form, as demonstrated by
C. Civ.R. 7(B)(4)
{¶ 56} Regarding the sixth and final requirement for the filing of motions,
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 57} When a party that seeks to dispute or confirm an arbitration award files an application with a court of common pleas, it must do so by motion as statutorily required. However, the Civil Rules provide broad requirements for the filing of motions, and in this instance, although the union‘s filing requesting review of an arbitration award did not match perfectly with those rules, it should be read in a manner that achieves its substantive purpose—here, challenging the arbitration award on statutorily defined grounds.
{¶ 58} As discussed above, the union‘s filing, however inartful, met the statutory requirements of the Arbitration Act and conformed with the Civil Rules. For these reasons, while I concur in the majority‘s holding on the first proposition of law, I dissent from the majority‘s holding on the second proposition of law. I would reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in its entirety.
BRUNNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 59} I agree with the majority opinion‘s resolution of the second proposition of law raised by appellant, the Ohio Patrolmen‘s Benevolent Association (“the union“). I disagree, however, with the majority‘s resolution of the union‘s first proposition of law.
{¶ 60}
Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is delivered to the parties in interest, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 61} Moreover,
Whenever a party is not represented by an attorney, service under this rule shall be made upon the party. If a party is represented by an attorney, service under this rule shall be made on the attorney unless the court orders service on the party.
{¶ 62} The majority questionably holds that the union did not need to comply with
{¶ 63} Even more troubling, the majority reaches its conclusion about the union‘s first proposition of law by minimizing the importance of notice and by likening a party and his or her attorney‘s service of a motion filed under
{¶ 64} Finally,
{¶ 65} Staying with the example of what to serve after dinner, the following is a more apropos analogy than that used in the majority opinion: The owner of a catering
{¶ 66} In the above example, the word “or” in the employer‘s instruction permits two alternatives for the employee‘s after-dinner service while still allowing for the possibility that one of those alternatives may not be feasible in a particular situation, e.g., when the client prescribes that it is not an option. Clearly, the owner of the catering company was not prescribing to the employee that either choice would be acceptable to every client. Neither does
{¶ 67}
Danielle M. Chaffin and Dominic D. Saturday, for appellant.
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., George S. Crisci, and Scott H. DeHart, for appellee.