Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Assn. v. ClevelandCleveland Police Patrolmen's Assn. v. Cleveland
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 11, 2021
Appearances:
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., George S. Crisci, and Scott H. DeHart; and Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and William Menzalora, Chief Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.
Henry J. Hilow and Marisa L. Serrat, for appellant.
MARY J. BOYLE, A.J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the Cleveland Police Patrolmen‘s Association (CPPA), appeals the trial court‘s judgment denying its application to vacate the
The trial court erred in denying the CPPA‘s application to vacate.
{¶ 2} After review, however, we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the CPPA‘s application to vacate the arbitration award and therefore cannot reach the merits of the CPPA‘s appeal. We affirm the trial court‘s judgment confirming the arbitration award.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 3} The CPPA and defendant-appellee, the city of Cleveland, are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under the agreement, the city and the CPPA must resolve disputes concerning employee discipline through the CBA‘s grievance procedure, which includes arbitration. In May 2017, the city terminated Timothy Loehmann‘s employment with the Cleveland Police Department, and the CPPA filed a grievance on his behalf, arguing that the city terminated him without just cause in violation of Article IV of the parties’ CBA. The CPPA filed a demand for arbitration, and the parties mutually selected an arbitrator. The matter was heard for two days in January 2018 and two days in July 2018.
{¶ 4} On December 1, 2018, the arbitrator issued a detailed, 36-page decision. The arbitrator dismissed the CPPA‘s grievance, finding that the city had proven by a greater weight of the evidence that it had just cause to terminate Loehmann‘s employment.
{¶ 6} The CPPA timely appeals from this judgment.
II. The CPPA‘s Application to Vacate the Arbitration Award
{¶ 7} Before we can reach the merits of the CPPA‘s appeal, we must first address the city‘s arguments that the CPPA‘s application to vacate the arbitration award was procedurally defective. The city argues that (1) the CPPA did not timely serve the application to vacate the award on the city‘s outside counsel, (2) the CPPA‘s initial application to vacate the award did not include adequate legal support and acted as a placeholder, and (3) the CPPA did not submit the items required under
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} The CPPA argues that (1)
{¶ 10} We disagree that
After an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may file a motion in the court of common pleas for an order vacating, modifying, or correcting the award as prescribed in sections
2711.10 and2711.11 of the Revised Code.Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is delivered to the parties in interest, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action. For the purposes of the motion, any judge who might make an order to stay the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the award.
{¶ 11} Even though
{¶ 12} In Cox, the plaintiff requested the clerk of courts serve the defendant with her motion to vacate, which it did on March 10, 2014. The plaintiff also sent her motion via certified mail to defendant‘s attorney on March 11, 2014, which was received on March 13, 2014. The Supreme Court found that [b]ecause the [defendant] was represented by counsel, service was accomplished on March 11, 2014. Id.
{¶ 14} Here, the arbitrator issued his arbitration award on December 1, 2018. The CPPA filed its application to vacate the arbitration award on March 1, 2019, and its certificate of service states that the CPPA served the application that day to all parties. The certificate of service did not indicate that the CPPA also served the city‘s outside counsel. A few days later, the clerk of courts served the application to vacate the arbitration award on the city‘s law department. The record
{¶ 15} The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the CPPA‘s motion to vacate the arbitration award, but the trial court did have jurisdiction over the city‘s motion to confirm the award. Pursuant to
{¶ 16} The city filed its application to confirm the arbitration award and served its application on the CPPA‘s counsel on April 8, 2019, well within one year of the December 1, 2018 award. The CPPA failed to comply with
{¶ 17} A trial court has no jurisdiction to vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award where a party argues to vacate the award in response to a motion
{¶ 18} Here, the parties’ briefing on the CPPA‘s motion to vacate and the city‘s motion to confirm were intertwined, but without a timely motion to vacate the award,
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
MARY J. BOYLE, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR