Ohio Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Sutich v. SegediOhio Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Sutich v. Segedi
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Court Division Case No. SU-97774650
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 4, 2010
Paul A. Daher
700 West St. Clair Avenue
Suite 214
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Glen Ramdhan
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Child Support Enforcement Agency
1910 Carnegie Avenue
Second Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44115
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant, Raymond Segedi, appeals from the imposition of a jail sentence after failing to make child support payments. He argues that the contempt order that resulted in the jail sentence had been purged. After a thorough review of the record and based on the following law, we reverse the determination of the trial court and remand.
{¶ 2} Through a prior order, appellant was required to pay child support for his minor daughter. He failed to make timely payments. At a November 16, 2007 hearing on the State of Ohio and Cuyahoga County Child Support Enforcement Agency’s (CSEA) show cause motion, he was found to be in arrears in the amount of $13,057.58. The trial court found that
{¶ 3} Appellant alleges that he lost his job and was unable to make payments as required. Some months he did make payments, but never in the amount required. Appellant also provided his daughter with health insurance even though that was not required. On July 16, 2008, CSEA brought a motion to impose the suspended sentence for failure to satisfy either purge condition. Through negotiations, the parties agreed that if appellant could make a $2,000 payment to CSEA before the next heаring date on its motion, it would withdraw the motion and it would be dismissed without prejudice. On the morning of the next hearing, November 24, 2008, appellant made the $2,000 paymеnt and CSEA’s motion was dismissed without prejudice.
{¶ 4} Several months later, on March 18, 2009, appellant was again behind on his child support payments, and CSEA filed the sаme motion that had earlier been dismissed without prejudice, seeking to enforce the 45-day jail term. Appellant objected stating he had purgеd the prior contempt order according to the trial court’s November 24, 2008 judgment entry, which
Law and Analysis
{¶ 5} Appellant argues that [t]he trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error when it fоund [him] in contempt of an order he previously purged. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the standard of review in matters concerning child support is abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 541 N.E.2d 1028. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the ruling must be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264, quoting Spalding v. Spalding (1959), 355 Mich. 382, 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810. In order to have an abuse of that choice, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or biаs. Id.
{¶ 6} [T]he power of contempt is inherent in a court, such power being necessary to the exercise of judicial function * * *. DeNovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Comm. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362. Civil contempt utilizes а sanction that is imposed to coerce the contemnor to comply with the court’s order. ConTex Inc. v. Consolidated Technologies, Inc. (1988), 40 Ohio App.3d 94, 531 N.E.2d 1353. Offenberg v. Offenberg, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 78885, 78886, 79425, and 79426, 2003-Ohio-269, ¶73. Any sanction for сivil contempt must allow the party who is in contempt an opportunity to purge the contempt. Carroll v. Detty (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 708, 712, 681 N.E.2d 1383. If a party makes a good faith effort to pay support, contempt is not justified. Courtney v. Courtney (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 329, 475 N.E.2d 1284. Civil contempt sanctions are designed for remedial or coercive purposes and are oftеn employed to compel obedience to a court order. State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 555, 2001-Ohio-15, 740 N.E.2d 265, citing Shillitani v. United States (1966), 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622. However, substantial
{¶ 7} Here, the November 24, 2008 journal entry indicates that appellant was in substantial compliance. This would lead a party to believe that the prior contempt order had been purged even though the word purged does not appear in the entry. Appellant failed to satisfy either purge condition in a timely fashion, but the payment of an amount greater than the lump-sum purge condition soon after its expiration leads to the conclusion that appellant made a good-faith effort to pay support. The execution of sentence after a finding of substantial compliance was therefore an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 8} Parties must be able to rely on the plain language of a trial court’s judgment entry, not what the judge mаy have intended. Zolman v. Zolman (Sep. 24, 1999), Morrow App. No. CA883, 4 (Wise, J., dissenting). And, while a dismissal without prejudice normally indicates a decision otherwise than on the merits and leаves the parties in the same position as if the motion was never filed,1 in this case appellant should be able to rely upon
Conclusion
{¶ 9} Appellant’s arguments that he had substantiаlly complied with the purge conditions in the January 11, 2008 contempt order are persuasive given the lump-sum payment he made and the language оf the November 24 journal entry finding substantial compliance. The trial court abused its discretion in executing sentence on a contempt order after it had been purged. That determination must be reversed.
{¶ 10} This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings cоnsistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., CONCURS;
ANN DYKE, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY