OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. JOHN D. VENA II
AC 47495
Appellate Court of Connecticut
October 28, 2025
Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.
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Syllabus
The respondent attorney appealed from the trial court‘s judgment suspending him from the practice of law in Connecticut for five years as reciprocal discipline to his suspension from the practice of law in Virginia for five years for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. He claimed, inter alia, that the court lacked authority to suspend him for five years pursuant to the rule of practice (
The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the attorney discipline brought pursuant to
The respondent‘s unpreserved claim that the trial court‘s imposition of reciprocal discipline against him violated his right to due process failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as he failed to establish a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial.
The trial court‘s finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the Virginia proceedings against him were so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard that it would constitute a grave injustice to impose commensurate discipline in Connecticut was not clearly erroneous.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by suspending the respondent from the practice of law in Connecticut for a period of five years, as it fell within the discipline warranted under
Argued May 20—officially released October 28, 2025
Presentment by the petitioner for alleged professional misconduct by the respondent, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the court, Cobb, J.; judgment suspending the respondent from the practice of law for five years, from which the respondent appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James F. Sullivan, for the appellant (respondent).
Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas J. Sousa, Jr., assistant chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion
CLARK, J. The present appeal arises out of a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding commenced pursuant to
The respondent claims on appeal that the trial court (1) lacked authority to suspend him for five years pursuant to
The record reveals the following facts and procedural history relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The respondent is an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Connecticut. Effective May 19, 2023, the
In its memorandum order of suspension (order of suspension), the board made the following findings relating to the respondent‘s conduct on December 17, 2021. On that date, the respondent appeared before Judge Mann at the Fairfax County Circuit Court‘s monthly discontinuance docket in the case Lalich v. Lewis. Kimberly Lalich, the plaintiff in the aforementioned case, retained Tyrone Law Group as counsel prior to the December 17, 2021 hearing. Bruce A. Johnson was the attorney of record in her case. The respondent was employed by Tyrone Law Group. No court reporter was present at the December 17, 2021 discontinuance docket, but the audio of the proceedings was recorded, and the relevant portions were transcribed and entered as an exhibit by the Virginia State Bar in the respondent‘s Virginia disciplinary proceeding. The transcript of the December 17, 2021 hearing indicates that the respondent represented himself as an attorney and engaged in the practice of law before the Virginia court. Specifically, the board found that the hearing transcript reflects the following.1 The court asked, “So who‘s here?” and the respondent replied, “John Vena on behalf of the plaintiff. Kimberly Lalich, the plaintiff, is also appearing.” When asked, “And who do you represent?” the respondent replied, “Ms. Lalich.” The respondent had further conversation with the court about the facts in Lalich v. Lewis and argued procedural matters. At no time did the respondent inform the court that he was not a member of the Virginia bar, nor did he state that he was only there to inform the court that the attorney of record was late. The court asked the respondent to enter his appearance in writing, but the respondent would not do so. Judge Mann and his law clerk determined that the respondent was not a member of the Virginia bar, and Judge Mann filed a complaint to the Virginia State Bar that same day alleging that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The order of suspension further reveals the following facts regarding the respondent‘s Virginia disciplinary proceeding. A prehearing conference in the respondent‘s Virginia disciplinary matter was conducted on April 19, 2023. At the prehearing conference, the respondent made a motion to continue the matter so that he could obtain counsel. The motion was denied by the chair of the board because the respondent received notice of the proceedings and hearing in January, February, and March, 2023, and, therefore, had adequate time to obtain counsel.2 At the prehearing conference the respondent was granted the opportunity to submit, late, a witness list and exhibits, and to have witnesses participate remotely. He also had the opportunity to object to the Virginia State Bar‘s exhibits. The respondent was additionally reminded that it was his responsibility to arrange for the technology for his remote witnesses
The hearing in the respondent‘s matter was conducted by the board over the course of two days: April 28 and May 19, 2023. On those two days, the respondent appeared in person as a self-represented party before the board. The hearing began on April 28, 2023. Bar counsel presented her case first. The respondent did not make prior arrangements for remotely participating witnesses or to understand the technology, which caused considerable disruption. “It was necessary for bar counsel or the clerk‘s office to allow the respondent to use their computers” in order for the respondent to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, the respondent “repeatedly interrupted other parties and the board, spoke while other parties were speaking, made rude and disrespectful comments while others were speaking, cursed at one witness, and continuously demonstrated contempt and disrespect for bar counsel and the chair.” Bar counsel concluded her case at 4:30 p.m. on April 28, 2023, at which point it was determined that the respondent would require another day to present his case, so the parties agreed to continue the hearing until May 19, 2023.
On May 19, 2023, the respondent, again, had not arranged for remote participation of witnesses and was unable to understand the technology and “once again demonstrated disrespectful, rude, and disorderly conduct by refusing to cooperate with the chair‘s requests to conduct himself in a professional manner, by continuing to talk over other parties and make comments about other speakers, and continually disparaging the disciplinary process.” The board and the clerk‘s office assisted with providing technology so that the respondent could have his witnesses participate remotely to ensure that he had the opportunity to present his case and evidence. Over the course of the two day hearing, both parties had the opportunity to offer and to object to proffered exhibits. The respondent presented four witnesses, submitted four exhibits, three of which were admitted into evidence, and concluded his case on May 19, 2023.
In its order of suspension, dated August 1, 2023, the board suspended the respondent from the practice of law in Virginia for five years effective May 19, 2023. The board imposed the suspension on the basis of its findings by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of rule 5.5 (c) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law, in violation of Rule 8.4 (b) and (c) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, the board found by clear and convincing evidence “that the respondent‘s conduct on December 17, 2021, before the Fairfax County Circuit Court constituted the practice of law in Virginia. When the case was called by the court, the respondent stated that he was there for Ms. Lalich, the plaintiff. The respondent in fact spelled his name for the court so that the court would know who he was. Although the respondent at times noted that he was with the Tyrone Law Group, he did not explain to the court that he was not licensed to practice law in Virginia, nor did he state that he was only
After the board concluded by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated rules 5.5 (c) and 8.4 (b) and (c) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, to determine the appropriate sanction, the board considered evidence on both aggravating and mitigating factors for sanctions. The board found the following aggravating factors: the respondent (1) engaged in “[b]ad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders“; (2) engaged in “deceptive practices during the disciplinary process“; (3) “failed to demonstrate any appreciation of the wrongful nature of his unauthorized representation of a client in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, his misrepresentation to the court, or his untruthful conduct during the Virginia State Bar‘s investigation“; and (4) had practiced law for more than three decades. (Emphasis in original). The only mitigating factor the board found was that the respondent had no prior disciplinary record.
The respondent appealed from the board‘s order of suspension to the Virginia Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal.
In early December, 2023, the petitioner received notification of the respondent‘s Virginia suspension. On December 21, 2023, the petitioner filed an application for reciprocal discipline in the Superior Court pursuant to
The return of service indicates that the respondent was served by certified mail with the application for reciprocal discipline, the order for hearing and notice, and a certified copy of the Virginia order of suspension on January 2, 2024.3 The matter was assigned for a hearing before the court, Cobb, J. As of the March 11, 2024 presentment hearing, the respondent had not filed an answer to the application for reciprocal discipline, as he was required to do pursuant to
The respondent‘s relevant testimony at the presentment hearing, outlined herein, centered on his contention that the board made erroneous factual findings, that the proceedings were unfair, and that his actions and unblemished disciplinary history prior to the Virginia suspension did not warrant the discipline imposed.
The respondent testified that his actions on December 17, 2021, in the matter of Lalich v. Lewis were “wholly inadvertent.” Specifically he testified that “[t]he attorney [he] worked for, Erick Tyrone . . . was to be the attorney of record but [Tyrone] got suspended by the Maryland Bar . . . .” For that reason, Tyrone “asked [the respondent] if [he] knew an attorney who had bar in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. . . . .” The respondent “knew of such an attorney” and his name was Bruce Johnson. The respondent then testified that he “introduced [Johnson] to [Tyrone] and about a week approximately prior to [the December 17, 2021 hearing], [Tyrone] hired [Johnson] on . . . a part-time basis” and that “[t]he [December 17, 2021] hearing was scheduled for a Thursday of the first week that [Johnson] was to work . . . .” The respondent testified that he “was more familiar with the facts of the case than was [Johnson], but [Johnson] was the attorney of record. So, [the respondent] agreed to go with him in case he needed assistance with the facts of the case” but “[w]hen [the respondent] got to the courtroom . . . [Johnson] was not there” so “[the respondent] went forward simply to request a continuance on the grounds that [the] attorney was late.” The respondent testified that he “very clearly told [Judge Mann] [he] only represent[ed] the law firm and [he] did not represent [Lalich].” He further testified that Judge Mann “continued the case and [the respondent] met with the client in a . . . witness room off the back of the courtroom,” but “[w]hen [they] got back, [Judge Mann] informed [the respondent] that [Johnson] had already requested a continuance through the daily court or something like that . . . and the other judge granted it, and this made [Judge Mann] very mad because he said he was the only judge who should be in control of whether or not parties get continuances on his docket.” He further testified that “the case was continued and [he and Lalich] left the courtroom with no further action and [he] assumed everything was fine” but later “found out that . . . Judge Mann got mad at not only the lawyer, [Johnson], who
The respondent then testified that the transcript produced at his hearing “was false . . . .” To support that assertion, he testified that, during the investigation of the complaint, he “demanded a transcript” of the December 17, 2021 proceedings but was told “at least six times, one, there was no court clerk, and two, that the recording of the courtroom was not working that day and there would be no transcript.”
Next, he testified that, “[f]rom the very get-go, it was clear [he] was not going to get a fair hearing” in the Virginia disciplinary proceeding and that he “requested [the panel] recuse themselves” and “objected to several of the procedures.” He testified, for example, that “Judge Mann got promoted to the Virginia Supreme Court” and he believed that, “in deference to Judge Mann, they went along with his complaint . . . .” He also testified that he “attempted several times to request [a] continuance to get a lawyer” but that the request was denied. Additionally, the respondent testified that a bar investigator “served process on [his] daughter” but that his daughter “was thirteen years old.”
The respondent further disputed additional facts found by the board in its order of suspension, including that bar counsel did not conclude her case until 6 p.m. on April 28, 2023, but that he had to “wind up [his] case” by 3 p.m. on May 19, 2023, which “condensed the testimony of all [his] witnesses.”
Finally, the respondent testified that he has “been a member of the Connecticut bar for thirty-eight years, and [has] had no colorable claim of violation of any of the ethical codes or any misconduct whatsoever.” He further testified that “Lalich ended up having her case settled” so “there was no harm to the client or to the public.”
At the conclusion of the presentment hearing, the court determined that the respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence any of the defenses to the imposition of commensurate discipline under
Before addressing the respondent‘s claims, we begin with a review of the well established principles of law governing attorney disciplinary actions. “Attorney disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to [practice] in them. . . . An attorney as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him. His admission is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it, so that when he, by misconduct in any capacity, discloses that he has become or is an unfit or unsafe person to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of an attorney, his right to continue in the enjoyment of his professional privilege may and ought to be declared forfeited. . . . Therefore, [i]f a court disciplines an attorney, it does so not to mete out punishment to an offender, but [so] that the administration of justice may be safeguarded and the courts and the public protected from the misconduct or unfitness of those who are licensed to perform the
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I
The respondent first claims that the trial court did not have the authority to suspend him for five years pursuant to
A
We first address the respondent‘s claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. “[B]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 228 Conn. App. 803, 809, 326 A.3d 557 (2024). “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 442–43, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
“[A]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are sui generis . . . [and] it is the exclusive duty of the Judicial Branch to regulate attorneys . . . . Once initiated, the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require. . . . [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to
Moreover,
B
We next address the respondent‘s claim that he is entitled to Golding review of his unpreserved claim that the court‘s imposition of reciprocal discipline against him violated his right to due process because the Virginia judgment against him amounted to a legal “nullity” since he was not licensed there. “Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 189 Conn. App. 643, 658, 208 A.3d 676 (2019), aff‘d, 339 Conn. 503, 261 A.3d 722 (2021). “The first two steps in the Golding analysis address the reviewability of the claim, [whereas] the last two steps involve the merits of the claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn. App. 552, 567, 316 A.3d 742 (2024). “[W]e are free, however, to dispose of the claim by focusing on the condition that appears most relevant under the circumstances of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kurzatkowski, 119 Conn. App. 556, 564, 988 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010).
Assuming, without deciding, that this claim satisfies the first two prongs of Golding, we conclude that the respondent cannot prevail under the third prong because he has failed to demonstrate a clearly identifiable constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial.
Under Golding, the burden falls on the respondent to establish the existence of a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. Beaulieu, 118 Conn. App. 1, 7, 982 A.2d 245 (2009) (“[d]efendants who seek consideration of unpreserved constitutional claims [on appeal] . . . bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to such review under the guidelines enumerated in Golding” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 921, 984 A.2d 68 (2009). There is no dispute in the trial court record that the respondent received notice of the presentment complaint seeking imposition of commensurate action on the basis of his suspension from the practice of law in Virginia. There also is no dispute that the trial court provided the respondent with an opportunity to be heard. A presentment hearing was conducted on March 11, 2024, and despite his failure to file a timely answer, the trial court permitted the respondent to testify and to present witnesses and evidence to show why commensurate discipline would not be appropriate in Connecticut. At the hearing, the respondent was represented by counsel. The respondent does not claim that the process for notice and hearing prescribed in
In his briefs to this court, the respondent fails to articulate any basis for his claim that his constitutional rights were violated. Instead, he focuses his argument on the nature of his property interest in his law license, correctly observing that “[a] license to practice law is a property interest that cannot be suspended without due process.” Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick, 226 Conn. 299, 306, 627 A.2d 901 (1993). Indeed, we have long recognized that, “[b]ecause a license to practice law is a vested property interest, an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to due process of law. . . . In attorney grievance proceedings, due process mandates that [b]efore discipline may be imposed, an attorney is entitled to notice of the charges, a fair hearing and an appeal to court for a determination of whether he or she has been deprived of these rights in some substantial manner.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, supra, 195 Conn. App. 439.
Although the respondent‘s property interest in his law license may be relevant to Golding‘s second prong, the existence of such an interest alone is insufficient to satisfy Golding‘s third prong, which requires a party to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial. See Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 189 Conn. App. 656–58 (finding plaintiff‘s claim that “disciplinary counsel violated her due process rights by refusing to conduct an investigation into the allegations of misconduct against her” did not amount to constitutional violation and was not reviewable under Golding because plaintiff provided “no analysis as to why the failure to investigate deprived her of her constitutional rights“). The respondent fails to explain how his constitutional rights were violated in this case. Rather, his claim rests on his bare and conclusory assertion that, because he was not licensed to practice law in Virginia, his suspension from the practice of law in that state was a nullity and, therefore, that the imposition of discipline under
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court erred by suspending him for five years because he was deprived of his right to a fair trial in the Virginia proceeding and because the imposition of that penalty resulted in a “grave injustice.” Specifically, the respondent argues that the imposition of a five year suspension constitutes a grave injustice because he had no prior history of discipline and that Judge Mann had a vendetta against him which deprived him of a fair trial. Although the respondent‘s brief is not a model of clarity, we construe his claim to be that the court erred in concluding that he failed to establish a defense pursuant to
“[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist. . . . Our Supreme Court has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard that should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, supra, 195 Conn. App. 431. “Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court‘s finding that a respondent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.” Id., 432. “Under this highly deferential standard, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. Rather, we focus on the conclusion of the trial court, as well as the method by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine whether it is legally correct and factually supported. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it . . . or when although there is evidence in the record to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The respondent first argues that the imposition of a five year suspension for misconduct “that was anything but egregious” and in light of his thirty-eight years of practice with no history of disciplinary sanctions would result in a grave injustice.
As discussed previously, pursuant to
It was the respondent‘s burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the imposition of commensurate discipline in Connecticut would result in a grave injustice. Although it is true that lack of prior discipline can be considered as a mitigating factor in the determination of sanctions for attorney disciplinary proceedings,8 that single mitigating factor does not persuade us that the court‘s finding that the respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that a grave injustice
The respondent also argues that the court “should have considered the evidence that Judge Mann . . . had a vendetta [against] the respondent, was acting out of anger and vindictiveness, and not to protect the public.” Under
The board‘s order of suspension, however, indicates that the respondent had adequate notice of the charges against him and a fair hearing. The order of discipline reflects that, over the course of the two day Virginia proceeding, the respondent was able to present evidence, testify, and object to exhibits, and that when more time was needed for the hearing it was continued for a second day. The order also shows that the board took extraordinary efforts to ensure that the respondent could present his witnesses.
At the presentment proceeding in Connecticut, the only evidence the respondent offered was his own testimony, in which he claimed that Judge Mann was acting out a vendetta against him and that the board “went along with [Judge Mann‘s] complaint” because he was appointed to the Virginia Supreme Court.” The respondent presented no evidence in the trial court that Judge Mann was involved in the grievance matter beyond the filing of the complaint, nor did he provide any evidence other than his own testimony that he was deprived of due process in the proceeding. Thus, on the basis of the record, we are unpersuaded that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the Virginia proceedings were so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard that it would constitute a grave injustice to impose commensurate discipline in Connecticut.
III
The respondent‘s final claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five year suspension in Connecticut because the suspension is excessive when compared to the sanctions imposed in other cases that, he contends, involved more egregious conduct, and because he poses no risk to the public. We conclude that the court‘s imposition of a five year suspension was not an abuse of its discretion and falls within the discipline warranted under
“In attorney grievance cases, in the absence of mandatory statutory sanctions, a reviewing court must defer to the discretion of the fact finder, whether it be the trial court or the committee, because the fact finder is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the demeanor of the parties. . . . Accordingly, once a trial court has found by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney has engaged in professional misconduct, the court has the inherent judicial power, derived from judicial responsibility for the administration of justice, to exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction to impose in
“Abuse of discretion is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion. It is a strict legal term indicating that [an] appellate court is of [the] opinion that there was [the] commission of an error of law by the trial court. . . . A discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. Unreasonable departure from considered precedents and settled judicial custom, constituting error of law. . . . A judgment or decision by an administrative agency or judge which has no foundation in fact or in law. Abuse of discretion by [a] trial court is any unreasonable, unconscionable and arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of facts and law pertaining to [the] matter submitted.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Glass, 46 Conn. App. 472, 479–80, 699 A.2d 1058 (1997).
“A court disciplining an attorney does so not to punish the attorney, but rather to safeguard the administration of justice and to protect the public from the misconduct or unfitness of those who are members of the legal profession. . . . Inherent in this process is a large degree of judicial discretion. . . . A court is free to determine in each case, as may seem best in light of the entire record before it, whether a sanction is appropriate and, if so, what that sanction should be. . . . Accordingly, a court may accomplish the goal of protecting the public and the courts by imposing a sanction that deters other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” (Citations omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Fountain, 56 Conn. App. 375, 378, 743 A.2d 647 (2000).
Under
Here, the record reveals that, pursuant to
In his briefs to this court, the respondent cites to several cases, none of which involved the imposition of reciprocal discipline under
Here, the prima facie evidence from the Virginia suspension order reflects findings that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and engaged in conduct implicating his honesty and fitness to practice law by virtue of his appearance and representations in front of Judge Mann at the Fairfax County Circuit Court. The suspension order also reflects the existence of several aggravating factors that were considered by the board when it imposed the five year suspension, including the respondent‘s bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings and failure to recognize the wrongful nature of his actions. Because the respondent has not met
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.