IN RE NICKOLA J. CUNHA; NICKOLA J. CUNHA v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
AC 46813, AC 46890
Appellate Court of Connecticut
January 21, 2025
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.
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In re Cunha
IN RE NICKOLA J. CUNHA
(AC 46813)
NICKOLA J. CUNHA v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
(AC 46890)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
In these consolidated appeals, the respondent attorney appealed, in the first case, from the judgment of the trial court ordering a trustee to disburse funds from the respondent‘s fiduciary accounts following her disbarment from the practice of law and, in a second case, from the judgment of the trial court dismissing as moot her action seeking a declaratory judgment regarding attorney‘s fees allegedly owed to her. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to have permitted third parties to intervene in the postdisbarment proceedings to settle a dispute over attorney‘s fees. Held:
Contrary to the respondent‘s claim that, because the underlying disciplinary proceedings against her were initiated pursuant to statute (
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention in the postdisbarment action to two former clients and an insurance company holding disputed funds, as the intervention was timely and likely to expedite the resolution of the underlying proceedings, the intervenors had a clear interest in the controversy, and the necessity and value of the intervention were apparent because the resolution of the intervenors’ fee dispute was necessary before the court could completely determine the proper distribution of the respondent‘s funds to protect her former clients.
The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
Because this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ordering the respondent‘s funds to be disbursed to her former clients, the appeal from the court‘s dismissal of the respondent‘s declaratory judgment action regarding a portion of those funds was moot, and, accordingly, dismissed.
Argued October 2, 2024—officially released January 21, 2025
Order, in the first case, appointing a trustee to oversee the respondent‘s fiduciary accounts following the disbarment of the respondent from the practice of law, in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the motions of John Skura et al. to intervene, and action, in the second case, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the disbursement of certain attorney‘s fees allegedly owed to the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Hon. Patty J. Pittman, judge trial referee, granted the motion of the defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to transfer the action to the judicial district of Middlesex; thereafter, the court, Moukawsher, J., in the first case, ordered the trustee to disburse certain funds and rendered judgment thereon, and, in the second case, rendered judgment dismissing the action as moot, from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals to this court; subsequently, this court consolidated the appeals. Affirmed in first case; appeal dismissed in second case.
Nickola J. Cunha, self-represented, the appellant in Docket Nos. AC 46813 and 46890 (respondent in first case, plaintiff in second case).
John Skura, self-represented, the appellee in Docket No. AC 46813 (intervenor).
Thomas A. Plotkin, for the appellee in Docket Nos. AC 46813 and 46890 (intervenor State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in first case, defendant in second case).
Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the amicus curiae in Docket No. AC 46813 (Office
Opinion
CRADLE, J. These consolidated appeals arise from disciplinary proceedings against the respondent,1 Nickola J. Cunha, related to her disbarment from the practice of law. In Docket No. AC 46813, the respondent appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering that funds she claimed as attorney‘s fees be disbursed to her former clients (postdisbarment action). In Docket No. AC 46890, the respondent appeals from the same judgment2 and, additionally, the trial court‘s judgment of dismissal rendered in a separate action commenced by the respondent in which she sought a declaratory judgment with respect to attorney‘s fees related to her representation of former clients (declaratory judgment action).3 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) improperly permitted third parties to intervene in the postdisbarment action where the intervenors lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the claims raised by the intervening parties and by a nonparty.4 We affirm the judgment of the trial court in AC 46813 and consequently dismiss the appeal in AC 46890 as moot.
By way of background, the respondent, on January 25, 2022, was disbarred from the practice of law for misconduct related to her representation of a party in a marriage dissolution matter. In Ambrose v. Ambrose, 223 Conn. App. 609, 637, 309 A.3d 305 (2024), this court affirmed the January 25, 2022 judgment of the trial court disbarring the respondent. The present appeals concern disciplinary proceedings ancillary to that judgment. The following facts, as set forth by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the respondent‘s claims.
On January 28, 2022, the court, Moukawsher, J., issued an order in the marriage dissolution matter setting forth procedures related to his order disbarring the respondent from the practice of law and,
On February 8, 2022, the trustee filed a motion for advice, indicating that the respondent had yet to provide the required documents and information pursuant to the court‘s January 28, 2022 order. On the same date, the court issued an order instructing the trustee to file a motion for contempt against the respondent if she did not comply within seven days.7 On February 10, 2022, the trustee notified the court that the respondent still had not turned over the required materials and, additionally, that the respondent‘s bank had informed the trustee that on February 2, 2022, the respondent had withdrawn $30,000 from her IOLTA account. The trustee, on February 16, 2022, again sought the advice of the court, indicating that because the bank is “unable to change the signer” on the respondent‘s IOLTA account, it needed a court order authorizing it to open a new IOLTA account and to transfer the funds from the respondent‘s account to the new account. On March 2, 2022, the court issued an order authorizing the bank to take such action and further ordered that the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (disciplinary counsel) “is hereby authorized to file appropriate motions to enforce [the] court‘s orders and to participate in [the] proceedings to whatever extent may be needed to protect the public interest and the interest of [the respondent‘s] former clients.” Two days later, on March 4, 2022, disciplinary counsel filed a motion for contempt against the respondent for her failure to comply with the court‘s January 28, 2022 order.
On April 27, 2022, following a hearing, the court granted disciplinary counsel‘s motion for contempt against the respondent, finding that she had not complied with the court‘s order in that she failed to provide the trustee with any of the required documentation or information and that she had withdrawn, without authorization, $30,000 from her IOLTA account. The court noted that the respondent failed to offer any evidence to support her
On June 1, 2022, disciplinary counsel filed a motion to disburse funds, reporting therein that a limited audit of the respondent‘s IOLTA account revealed a single deposit in the amount of $290,421.65, reflecting the net proceeds of a personal injury settlement of Paula Moen, a former client of the respondent. Disciplinary counsel, on the basis of “[his] examination of the IOLTA account bank records, [his] discussions with the client Moen, and limited information from the respondent,” stated that Moen was due a minimum of $179,723.85 as net proceeds from the settlement.9 Disciplinary counsel further stated that it appeared that only a portion of the settlement proceeds, in the amount of $101,470.13, remained in the respondent‘s IOLTA account and that this amount should be paid to Moen, thereby leaving an outstanding balance of $78,253.72 due to Moen. In addition, disciplinary counsel asserted that its limited audit revealed that the respondent, on top of her one-third attorney‘s fee from the settlement, had taken, without authorization from the court, an additional $78,000, rather than the previously believed $30,000, from Moen‘s settlement proceeds. The court subsequently granted disciplinary counsel‘s motion to disburse the funds, and the trustee tendered a check payable to Moen in the amount of $101,470.13.
Thereafter, at the direction of the trustee and disciplinary counsel, Attorney Steven M. Lettick, the respondent‘s cocounsel in several prior matters, paid into the new IOLTA account several checks representing the respondent‘s earned attorney‘s fees from those matters. On November 7, 2022, the respondent filed a motion seeking immediate disbursement of her attorney‘s fees paid into the new IOLTA account by Lettick, asserting that the “trustee has not engaged in any legal services for the prior clients of the [respondent] that would entitle [the trustee] to a proportionate share of the legal fees earned by the [respondent].” The court denied the respondent‘s motion, stating: “When the court disbarred [the respondent], it set up a process to account for what she is owed and what she owes
Thereafter, on March 21, 2023, disciplinary counsel notified the court that John Skura and his wife, Lie Tjun Lim Skura, former clients of the respondent, had settled their claims for uninsured motorist coverage with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) directly. Disciplinary counsel stated that the Skuras had contacted him claiming that the respondent was not entitled to attorney‘s fees from their settlements due to “misconduct” and informed the court that State Farm was holding the disputed fees, in the total amount of $17,499.99, while awaiting instructions as to whom the money should be disbursed. Accordingly, disciplinary counsel filed a motion for order “requesting the court‘s guidance in determining the proper forum for resolving [the Skuras‘] claim[s].” Meanwhile, the respondent commenced the declaratory judgment action against State Farm, seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to the disputed $17,499.99 as her attorney‘s fees arising from her representation of the Skuras.
On April 5, 2023, the court in the postdisbarment action issued an order stating in relevant part: “[T]he court received notice that State Farm . . . is holding $8333.32 related to the claim of one former client [John Skura] and $9166.66 for another [Lie Tjun Lim Skura]. . . . The clients apparently claim [that the respondent] should forfeit these sums for misconduct and State Farm wants to know what to do with the money. To resolve this dispute, the court orders the trustee . . . to invite State Farm to move in this case to interplead these sums into court for disposition. The trustee is to invite the former clients to move to intervene in this case for the purpose of claiming these sums. . . . [U]nder
I
The respondent first claims that intervention by the Skuras and State Farm was improper in that the intervenors “lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court.”14 Specifically, the respondent argues that, because the underlying disciplinary proceedings were initiated pursuant to
The following legal principles are relevant to the resolution of the respondent‘s claim. When a controversy is before a court, “if a complete determination cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the court may direct that such other parties be brought in.”
In the present case, the court, after being made aware of the Skuras’ claim to the funds being held by State Farm, directed the trustee to invite the relevant third parties, State Farm and the Skuras, to move to intervene in the postdisbarment action. The court indicated that, once the respective motions were filed, it would determine whether “interpleader and intervention are allowed.” State Farm and the Skuras subsequently moved to intervene, and the court, following a hearing, granted their motions “for the sole purpose” of resolving the Skuras’ fee dispute, characterizing the matter as “adjunct to the process of protecting the interests of [the respondent‘s] former clients” pursuant to
“In deciding whether to grant a request for permissive intervention, a trial court should consider: the timeliness of the intervention; the [prospective] intervenor‘s interest in the controversy; the adequacy of representation of such interests by other parties; the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause; and the necessity for or value of the intervention in resolving the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 640, 664, 81 A.3d 200 (2013).
In light of the relevant factors that guide a trial court‘s decision with respect to permissive intervention, and, in turn, our determination of whether the court abused its discretion, it is helpful to first clarify the nature of the controversy that was before the court. Contrary to the respondent‘s claim, although the underlying disciplinary proceedings against her were initiated under
The court, in setting forth procedures related to the disbarment order and in appointing Boni-Vendola as trustee, expressly stated that it was exercising its jurisdiction under
With this context in mind, we consider whether the court abused its discretion in granting the Skuras’ and State Farm‘s motions for permissive intervention. We begin with the first factor, timeliness. “[T]here are no absolute ways to measure timeliness . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Austin-Casares v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 649. “Although the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispositive. Timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 651. The court, while attempting to satisfy its mandate to protect the interests of the respondent‘s clients, learned that the Skuras were claiming an interest in funds related to matters in which the respondent represented them. Under such circumstances, we conclude that intervention was timely in that the sole underlying purpose was to assist the court with resolving a controversy presently before it—namely, whether the Skuras had an interest in the respondent‘s funds. With respect to the remaining factors, the Skuras, former clients of the respondent claiming interest in funds related to her representation, had a clear interest in the controversy. State Farm, as it indicated in its motion to intervene, also had an interest in the controversy by virtue of its possession of those disputed funds in that it “require[d] advice and direction [from the court] as to the proper distribution of the funds.” Additionally, the intervenors’ interests were not likely to be adequately represented by the existing parties where the respondent was maintaining a separate, ongoing action against State Farm and the respondent‘s claim to the disputed funds was in direct conflict with the Skuras’ claim to the funds.19 We further conclude that the intervention was likely to expedite, rather than delay, the resolution of the underlying proceedings. At the time the motions
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting permissive intervention to the Skuras and State Farm in the postdisbarment action.
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the fee disputes raised by the Skuras and by Moen.21 Specifically, the respondent argues that, because neither
We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles. “Subject matter
The respondent‘s arguments in support of this claim are belied by the relevant statutes and rules of practice. In particular, she asserts that “[t]here is absolutely no language in [Practice Book] § 2-64 authorizing the court to award a remedy nor [to] consider the rights, interests or benefits of an individual.” As stated previously,
Again, “it bears emphasizing that attorney disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, that it is the exclusive duty of the Judicial Branch to regulate attorneys . . . .” Disciplinary Counsel v. Hickey, 328 Conn. 688, 702, 182 A.3d 1180 (2018). Once initiated, “the court controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require. . . . [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. Such statutes [and rules of practice] as ours are not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them for misconduct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 26, 835 A.2d 998 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1073, 124 S. Ct. 2422, 158 L. Ed. 2d 983 (2004).
With respect to the Skuras, because their claimed interest to the respondent‘s attorney‘s fees implicated the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction under
With respect to Moen, it is clear to us, and the respondent does not challenge, that
Because we affirm the judgment of the trial court ordering the respondent‘s funds to be disbursed to her former clients, the appeal from the court‘s dismissal of the respondent‘s declaratory judgment action regarding a portion of those funds is moot.25 “It is a [well settled] general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) M&T Bank v. Lewis, 349 Conn. 9, 20, 312 A.3d 1040 (2024).
The judgment in AC 46813 is affirmed; the appeal in AC 46890 is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“(b) Any such court may fine an attorney for transgressing its rules and orders an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and may suspend or displace an attorney for just cause.”
With respect to the Skuras’ claims specifically, the court, on December 22, 2022, denied the respondent‘s November 7, 2022 motion requesting, inter alia, that it order State Farm to release the disputed funds directly to her, stating: “When the court disbarred [the respondent] it set up a process to account for what she is owed and what she owes her clients. [The respondent] has not cooperated with that process thus frustrating attempts to know what she may be owed. . . . The court can‘t grant her motion when her right to the money is either disputed or unknown.”
Additionally, during the June 23, 2023 hearing on the motions to intervene, the court expressly attributed the lack of resolution to the respondent‘s failure to comply with court orders, stating that “the process of trying to find out who [the Skuras] were and what claim [they] might have was difficult because [the court] hadn‘t gotten access to documents that were subpoenaed by the court and that had been requested and that there was a long process to discover that [the Skuras] even existed.”