O'Toole v. HammanO'Toole v. Hamman
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 1, 2020
Appearances:
Michael E. Stinn, for appellees Michael O‘Toole and Colleen Neiden.
Thomas O‘Toole, pro se.
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
Appellant, Thomas O‘Toole, appeals the trial court‘s judgment awarding $13,747.10 in sanctions against him for frivolous conduct. Appellant raises two assignments of error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting judgment to Appellees, Michael O‘Toole and Colleen Neiden, in the amount of $13,747.10 against the Appellant pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 andOhio Civ. R. 11 .- The trial court erred in denying the Appellant the right to call witnesses and present a defense to the Appellee[s‘] counterclaims and motions.
{¶ 2} Finding no merit to his assignments of error, we affirm the trial court‘s judgment.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶ 3} This is the second time appellant has asked this court to reverse a sanctions award against him for frivolous conduct. The first time was an appeal from a probate court proceeding, in which we affirmed the trial court‘s sanction award against appellant for pursuing baseless arguments that three of his siblings, Michael O‘Toole (“Michael“), Colleen Neiden (“Neiden“), and Mary Patricia O‘Toole (“Mary Pat“), stole assets from their mother before her death in 2016 and had been hiding assets from her estate. See In re Estate of O‘Toole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108122, 2019-Ohio-4165.
{¶ 4} As the probate proceeding was ongoing, Michael filed a complaint in the Parma Municipal Court against appellant and another sibling, Rosemary O‘Toole-Hamman (“Hamman“), in February 2018. The complaint states that appellant and Hamman each owe Michael $1,308.73 for their share of property expenses for their mother‘s house for the twenty months between when the five siblings (appellant, Michael, Neiden, Mary Pat, and Hamman) inherited the house and when they sold it.
{¶ 6} In the common pleas court, Neiden and Mary Pat filed a counterclaim against appellant, alleging that he was engaging in frivolous conduct in violation of
{¶ 7} In February 2019, Michael, Neiden, and Mary Pat filed motions for summary judgment on appellant‘s claims. A magistrate determined that judgment
{¶ 8} Before the sanctions hearing, Michael filed a motion seeking $17,450 for attorney fees and $3,220.65 for costs pursuant to
{¶ 9} At the sanctions hearing on October 15, 2019, the trial court dismissed Mary Pat‘s counterclaim because she had passed away in May 2019, and no substitute for her had been made.2 The trial court heard arguments regarding (1) Neiden‘s counterclaim pursuant to
{¶ 10} The trial court granted Michael‘s motion for sanctions and granted judgment in favor of Neiden on her counterclaim. The trial court determined that appellant‘s claims were “obviously made to merely harass and injure his siblings; were unwarranted under existing law; lack evidentiary support; and cannot be reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.” The trial court explained that the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over appellant‘s claims and already adjudicated them. The trial court further reasoned that “objectively and subjectively, no reasonable attorney would have filed” the claims, and that appellant‘s continual pursuit of the claims adversely affected his siblings. The trial court also found that the attorney fees that Michael and Neiden incurred were
{¶ 11} It is from this judgment that appellant timely appeals.
II. Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he engaged in frivolous conduct and that the attorney fees Michael and Neiden incurred were reasonable. He repeats his arguments that his siblings stole assets from their mother and later her estate. He maintains that the probate court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over his claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance, citing Sull v. Kaim, 172 Ohio App.3d 297, 2007-Ohio-3269, 874 N.E.2d 865 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that the general division of a common pleas court may have jurisdiction over such a claim. He further contends that the attorney fees were not reasonable because Michael was the one to initiate the lawsuit, and the trial court would not permit appellant to “inquire into the issue” of whether the fees were reasonable. Michael and Neiden argue that they met their burden of showing that appellant‘s counterclaim and third-party complaint were frivolous because appellant had no factual or legal bases to assert his claims.
{¶ 14} Both
The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney‘s or party‘s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a document is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the document had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court‘s own motion, may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
{¶ 16} In deciding whether a violation under
a general and somewhat indefinite term. It has no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness. It is not simply bad judgment. It is not merely negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. It implies conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. * * * It means “with actual intent to mislead or deceive another.”
Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 151, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962), overruled on other grounds, Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994).
{¶ 17} The decision to grant sanctions under
{¶ 18} A motion for sanctions under
{¶ 19}
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.
(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} An
{¶ 22} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against appellant for a willful violation of
{¶ 24} Appellant‘s reliance on Sull, 172 Ohio App.3d 297, 2007-Ohio-3269, 874 N.E.2d 865, is misplaced. The defendant in Sull argued that the plaintiffs could not establish an expectancy of inheritance without a determination from the probate court that the will at issue in the case was valid. Because nobody challenged the validity of the will, this court held that the plaintiffs did not need to obtain such a determination, and the claim for intentional interference with expected inheritance did not fall within the probate court‘s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 9. Here, however, appellant‘s first claim is based on allegations related to the administration of his mother‘s estate and the distribution of her assets, which fall squarely within the probate court‘s exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if the trial court had
{¶ 25} Appellant‘s arguments that Michael and Neiden failed to show that the attorney fees they incurred were reasonable also lack merit. Michael and Neiden presented invoices reflecting the legal fees they incurred and an expert witness to establish that the fees were reasonable. Even though Michael filed the initial complaint in this matter, appellant‘s frivolous conduct created the need for additional legal services and fees. And contrary to appellant‘s contention, the trial court did permit appellant to “inquire into the issue” of the reasonableness of the attorney fees by providing him an opportunity to cross-examine the expert witness and to present his own evidence.
{¶ 26} Appellant has failed to offer any evidence or argument to establish that the trial court erred or abused its discretion when it awarded sanctions against him. Accordingly, we overrule appellant‘s first assignment of error.
III. Appellant‘s Presentation of a Defense
{¶ 27} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court improperly prevented him from calling witnesses in his defense at the sanctions hearing. Appellant maintains that Michael and Neiden stated off the record that they would use appellant‘s share of his inheritance to pay attorney fees incurred in this litigation, appellant might therefore have already been paying for their attorney fees, and that the allegations of frivolous conduct against him are “a ruse” to run up attorney fees and spend his share of inheritance. Michael and Neiden argue that
{¶ 28} “It is well settled that a trial court has broad discretion to control its proceedings to enable it to exercise its jurisdiction in an orderly and efficient manner.” M.D. v. M.D., 2018-Ohio-4218, 121 N.E.3d 819, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.). “[W]e review a trial court‘s decisions regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99917, 2014-Ohio-2973, ¶ 23. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Marketing Assocs. v. Gottlieb, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92292, 2010-Ohio-59, ¶ 47.
{¶ 29} At the sanctions hearing, the trial court gave appellant an opportunity to present a defense. But appellant did not call any witnesses or submit any evidence on his behalf. The only arguments appellant made were attempts to reassert his claims that his siblings were stealing from their mother‘s estate, even though the trial court had already resolved those claims on summary judgment. Only after the trial court found in favor of Michael and Neiden did appellant seek to “put on a case on [his] behalf” and address which legal “fees were associated with what conduct.” The trial court first responded that it would not allow appellant to continue to relitigate the case, but then agreed to hold another hearing and asked appellant who he wanted to call as witnesses. In response, appellant raised previous discovery disputes and claimed that Michael and Neiden may have paid their attorney fees
{¶ 30} We are not persuaded by appellant‘s argument that he is entitled to a second opportunity to “put on a case” because Michael and Neiden might be spending his inheritance to pay their legal fees. This is the type of unsupported allegation that resulted in the sanctions against him. The trial court already gave appellant an opportunity to “put on a case,” and appellant has not identified any witnesses or evidence he would present if given a second opportunity. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we overrule appellant‘s second assignment of error.
{¶ 31} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR