Dimitry Filonenko et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Smock Construction, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17AP-854
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
August 16, 2018
[Cite as Filonenko v. Smock Constr., L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-3283.]
(C.P.C. No. 15CV-9075) (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on August 16, 2018
On brief: Cook, Sladoje & Wittenberg Co., LPA, Eric J. Wittenberg and Adam C. Sims, for appellants. Argued: Eric J. Wittenberg.
On brief: Robert D. Holmes, for appellee. Argued: Robert D. Holmes.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Dimitry Filonenko and FDT Group, LLC, appeal a judgment entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasоns, we reverse in part that judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
{2} Plaintiffs initiated this action against defendant-appellee, Smock Construction, LLC, with a comрlaint filed in the Franklin County Municipal Court. With leave of court, plaintiffs amended their complaint to request damages that exceeded the municipal court‘s monetary jurisdiction. The municipal court, therefore, transferred the case to the common pleas court.
{3} Before the common pleas court, defendant submitted a number of filings that plaintiffs deemed frivolous and unsuрported by good grounds. In response to each such filing, plaintiffs moved pursuant to
{4} In a dеcision and entry dated December 14, 2016, the trial court ruled in part on plaintiffs’ September 27 and 29, 2016 motions. The trial court struck defendant‘s amended counterclaim from the record, but refused to strikе defendant‘s amended answer.
{5} Subsequently, the trial court ruled in part on the motions plaintiffs filed on January 10, 12, and 26, 2017 and February 21, 2017. The trial court granted those motions to the extent that they sought to strike dеfendant‘s filings. The trial court held the motions in abeyance to the extent that they sought sanctions, stating that “the Court will entertain Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions upon resolution of the case.” (May 17, 2017 Decision and Entry at 6.)
{6} The parties tried the case before a magistrate on June 1, 2017. The magistrate issued a decision finding for plaintiffs on their claim for breach of contract and against plaintiffs оn their claim for fraud in the inducement. The magistrate recommended awarding plaintiffs $3,075 in damages, plus post-judgment interest and court costs.
{7} No party filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. In a judgment dated November 7, 2017, the trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision, rendered judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, and ordered defendant to pay damages of $3,075, plus post-judgment interest and court costs. The trial court further stated, “the Court has reviewed the motions filed subsequent to the Magistrate‘s Decision and has independently reviewed all motions not resolved prior to the bench trial. The Court holds that the motions are moot.” (Nov. 7, 2017 Jgmt. at 2.)
{8} Plaintiffs appeal the November 7, 2017 judgment, and they assign the following error:
The Trial Court abused its discretion when, without granting Appellants a hearing, it dеnied eleven separate motions for sanctions arising from conduct of Appellee‘s counsel as moot.
{9} Initially, we must correct a misapprehension in plaintiffs’ assignment of error. The trial court did not deny plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions in its November 7, 2017 judgment. Rather, the trial court found those motions moot. “An issue is moot ‘when it has no practical significance and, instead, presеnts a hypothetical or academic question.‘” State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, ¶ 55. As a general matter, courts will not resolve moot issues. State v. Harding, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-362, 2014-Ohio-1187, ¶ 50; In re Brown, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1205, 2005-Ohio-2425, ¶ 15. Consistent with this law, the trial court declined to rule on plaintiffs’ motions once it found
{10} The trial court did not state in its November 7, 2017 judgment why it concluded that all the pending, unresolved motions were moot. Defendant contends that the trial court found the motions for sanctions moot because the court had denied those motions earlier in the litigation. The record, however, contаins no ruling on any of the motions for sanctions. In both of the two pre-trial entries addressing the motions for sanctions, the trial court postponed review of the merits of the motions until resolution of thе underlying action. Then, in the final judgment, the trial court stated that it had reviewed the pending motions and found them moot. As the trial court had not yet ruled upon the motions for sanctions when it issued the final judgment, thе purported mootness of the motions did not result because the motions were already decided.
{11} We can only surmise that the trial court held the pending, unresolved motions moot becаuse a judgment in plaintiffs’ favor had resolved the underlying litigation. We disagree with that conclusion with regard to the motions for sanctions.
{12} Pursuant to
{13} Under
{14} Both
{15} Here, therefore, the trial court erred in determining that a final judgmеnt on the underlying action mooted plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions. Accordingly, we sustain plaintiffs’ assignment of error to the extent that it asserts error in the mootness finding. We reverse the part of the November 7, 2017 judgment that held that all pending, unresolved motions were moot, and we remand this case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with law and this decision.
Judgment reversed in part; case remanded.
SADLER and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.