W. MARCUS W. NYE, an individual v. TOM KATSILOMETES, an individual
Docket No. 45917
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
August 26, 2019
Boise, April 2019 Term
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the award of costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to Nye is vacated.
J. Kahle Becker, Boise, for appellant. J. Kahle Becker argued.
Ruchti & Beck Law Offices, Pocatello, for respondent. James D. Ruchti argued.
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
In an appeal arising out of Bannock County, Tom Katsilometes challenges the Idaho Senate‘s order granting over $18,000 in attorney fees to Senator W. Marcus W. Nye, awarded after Nye prevailed against Katsilometes in a contest over the results of the 2016 general election. The Senate confirmed Nye‘s election and awarded him costs and attorney fees. Because Katsilometes refused to pay the attorney fees, Nye brought an action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment ordering Katsilometes to pay him the amount ordered by the Senate. The district court granted the declaratory judgment and further awarded Nye costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court‘s judgment upholding the Senate‘s award of attorney fees, and vacate the award of costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Nye and Katsilometes were opponents in the 2016 general election for the Idaho Senate seat in District 29. After Nye defeated Katsilometes in the election, Katsilometes
Following hearings before the State Affairs Committee on January 16 and January 23, 2017, the Committee presented its findings to the Senate as a whole on January 24, 2017. The Senate voted on January 25, 2017, to adopt the Committee‘s recommendations that the Senate uphold Nye‘s election and order Katsilometes to pay Nye‘s witness fees and costs of discovery. Additionally, the Senate Journal reflects that the Senate separately approved a motion adopting the recommendations and findings1 of the Committee that (1) Katsilometes’ petition contesting the election was “brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without factual or legal foundation” and (2) Katsilometes be ordered to pay attorney fees in the amount of $18,060.00. In so ordering, the Senate cited
Katsilometes paid Nye the amount owed for the witness fees and discovery costs but did not pay the amount owed for the attorney fees. Subsequently, to assist him in collecting on the Senate‘s attorney fees order, Nye brought an action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment ordering Katsilometes to pay the attorney fees that had been awarded by the Senate. Following cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Nye‘s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action and entered judgment against Katsilometes for the $18,060.00 in attorney fees the Senate had awarded Nye. In so doing, the district court determined the Senate was acting within its authority pursuant to
Following the district court‘s entry of judgment, Nye moved for an amended judgment awarding him prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees incurred in his declaratory judgment action. The district court granted Nye‘s motion and awarded costs as a matter of right, denied awarding discretionary costs, and awarded attorney fees pursuant to
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010). When the Court considers such questions in the context of a summary judgment order, it reviews the record de novo, applying the familiar standards set forth in
[T]he standard of review for this Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, then all that remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners’ Ass‘n, Inc., 164 Idaho 396, 431 P.3d 4, 7 (2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because the facts in this case are largely undisputed, this case solely presents a question of law.
“An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 716, 378 P.3d 464, 506 (2016) (quoting Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004)).
When this Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the fourpart inquiry is “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”
Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, 434 P.3d 1275, 1281 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 864, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
IV. ANALYSIS
The election contest at the center of this controversy concerns a disputed Senate seat following a general election. It is only the second such contest in Idaho‘s history. In addition, in 129 years of legislative history since statehood, the Senate has never before awarded attorney fees against a private citizen contesting the results of an election on the grounds that the contest was frivolous. Thus, in addition to the important constitutional principles at stake here, this case presents an issue of first impression for the Court.
A. The Idaho Senate did not have authority to award attorney fees to Nye at the time of this election contest.
The primary issue before us is not whether the amount of attorney fees awarded to Nye was unreasonable, but whether the Senate had authority under the Idaho Constitution to award Nye any attorney fees at all. Katsilometes argues that the Senate did not have authority under
As this Court examines the constitutional authority vested in a co-equal branch of the government—in this case, the legislative branch—we are respectfully mindful that this dispute involves the interplay of the bedrock principles of separation of powers and checks and balances enshrined in the Idaho Constitution.
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
“The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is able to operate independently.” Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139, 804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990). “The separation of powers doctrine prohibits ‘judicial review of the discretionary acts of other branches of government.‘” Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 28, 394 P.3d 54, 71 (2017) (quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995)). “The question is whether this Court, by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one properly entrusted to that other branch.” Id. (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989)).
As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the dissent does not believe that “the Senate‘s decision to award fees was so egregious as to convert a non-justiciable question into a justiciable one.” The district court recognized that “[i]n order to reach a decision in a declaratory action, a court must determine whether a justiciable controversy exists . . . .” Thus, if the majority were to agree with the dissent that this case presents a non-justiciable controversy, the necessary outcome would be to vacate the district court‘s judgment granting declaratory relief, effectively nullifying the Senate‘s award of attorney fees to Nye. Yet, the dissent does not advocate for such an outcome. Instead, it describes the declaratory judgment in favor of Nye “as a perfunctory enforcement mechanism which perfected the Senate‘s award.” The dissent cannot have it both ways—this case either presents a justiciable controversy that the courts can address, or it does not.
Neither side has argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable controversy. The
constitutional authority granted to the legislative branch under its plenary powers, we affirm the district court‘s decision to take up this matter.
Further, we note that by deciding this matter, the Court is not meddling in the affairs of the Senate—this case was brought to the district court by a member of the Senate invoking the judicial branch‘s power to impose an enforceable attorney fee award. As Nye aptly recognized, absent a judicial decree, the Senate‘s imposition of attorney fees against Katsilometes was essentially meaningless. Where, as here, a judgment of the judicial branch is required to create an enforceable obligation, we believe that a justiciable controversy exists.
The Senate cited
The version of
Security for costs—Assessment of costs.
(a) The contestant shall file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) conditioned to pay the contestee‘s costs in case the election be confirmed by the legislature.
(b) The contestants are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by them respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs against the contestant. If the election is annulled by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs against the contestee.
Ch. 209, § 28, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 580 (emphasis added). In July 2017, approximately six months after Katsilometes contested Nye‘s election, the entirety of Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code was repealed and replaced with new statutes containing much of the same language. See Ch. 293, § 2, 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws 774. However, the section relating to costs was rewritten to expressly allow for an award of attorney fees. Id. It now reads as follows:
Security for costs—Assessment of costs and fees—Assessment of attorney‘s fees
(1) The contestor must file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000) conditioned to pay the contestee‘s costs if the election be confirmed by the legislature.
(2) The parties are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by them respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs and fees, other than attorney‘s fees, against the contestor. If the election is annulled by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs and fees, other than attorney‘s fees, against the contestee.
(3) Attorney‘s fees.
(a) Attorney‘s fees may be awarded against the contestor if the legislature determines the contest of election is frivolous and has no foundation in law or fact.
(b) Attorney‘s fees may be awarded against the contestee if the election is annulled by the legislature due to misconduct, fraud or corruption on the part of the contestee.
Katsilometes further contends that this Court‘s decision in Noble v. Ada County Elections Board, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P.3d 679 (2000), is dispositive of the attorney fee issue. In Noble, the losing candidate in a primary election filed a Motion to Contest an Election in district court. Id. at 497, 20 P.3d at 681. After the district court upheld the election results, Noble appealed to this Court. Id. at 498, 20 P.3d at 682. As to attorney fees on appeal, the statute at issue provided that “[t]he appellant shall file a bond sufficient to cover the cost of appeal of a primary contest.” Id. at 504, 20 P.3d at 688 (quoting
The general rule is that costs do not include attorney fees unless attorney fees are expressly included in the definition of the term costs. The legislature‘s awareness of this rule is demonstrated by its authorization of awards of costs and attorney fees. When the legislature has intended that the
term costs cover attorney fees, it has so provided. Therefore, we hold that attorney fees are not appropriately awarded under I.C. § 34-2130 .
Id. (citations omitted). Although Noble concerned whether the Supreme Court could award attorney fees on appeal after a primary election contest was filed in the district court, our explanation of whether attorney fees could be awarded under the statute at issue there applies equally to the statute in this case, which is also located in Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code.
As noted, the Senate has the constitutional authority to be the “judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members” and to “determine its own rules of proceeding . . . .”
Nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on the Senate‘s constitutional authority to enact its own rules of proceeding in the event of an election contest. We are not intervening in the Senate‘s constitutionally-delegated powers or even in its power to define its own rules by statute. Rather, we merely recognize that where the Senate enacts a law or a rule which does not permit it to impose attorney fees in an election contest, it cannot do so on an ad hoc basis.
Although our conclusion regarding the effect of the previous version of
that “[t]he statutory scheme in place at the time this election contest was initiated and decided defined the substantive rights of the parties which could be impacted by an adverse decision by one house of the legislature.” This assertion implicates important due process concerns. As to such matters of constitutional importance, we have previously held:
A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the procedure employed is fair. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fundamental fairness through governmental conduct that offends the community‘s sense of justice, decency and fair play. Procedural due process is the aspect of due process relating to the minimal requirements of notice and a hearing if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur. A deprivation of property encompasses claims where there is a legitimate claim or entitlement to the asserted benefit under either state or federal law. The minimal requirements are that there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due process requirement.
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Procedural Order for Contest of Election issued by the Senate and sent to Katsilometes indicated that the Senate would be
during oral argument, there is no case law over the last 250 years in the United States affirming that a legislative body, through its plenary powers, can impose attorney fees against an individual who is not a member of the legislative body without a statutory basis.
Again, as we have approached this dispute, we have strived to honor the doctrine of separation of powers and respect the constitutional role of the legislature—a co-equal branch of our government. Therefore, we have not attempted to define or limit the Senate‘s constitutional authority and discretion in determining its internal “rules of proceeding” and regulating the conduct of “members” of the Senate.
In conclusion, it is important to recognize that at its core, this case does not concern a rule of the Senate; rather, it concerns the Rule of Law. Contrary to the hyperbolic assertion of the dissent, this is hardly an attempt by the judiciary to “muscle” itself into the affairs of the Senate. Indeed, this action was initiated by a member of the Senate seeking judicial assistance in enforcing a decision of the Senate. This Court is merely responding to a case that has been brought before it—and fulfilling its constitutional role—by applying well-settled legal principles to an unsettled question of law. This is a judicial function almost as old as our republic. Indeed, as Justice John Marshall observed, in perhaps the most notable appellate ruling in the last 230 years: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). In short, this Court is merely holding that the Senate, notwithstanding the provisions of
B. Nye was not entitled to recover his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest in the district court action.
Following the district court‘s entry of the declaratory judgment, Nye sought an award of his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest for bringing his action in the district court. The district court awarded Nye, as the prevailing party, attorney
In light of this opinion, Nye should not have been the prevailing party in the district court action. Therefore, the district court‘s award of costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest must be vacated.
C. Neither side is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Katsilometes requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Attorney fees under
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court‘s order enforcing the award of attorney fees to Nye pursuant to the order of the Idaho Senate, and vacate all costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest awarded to Nye by the district court. Neither side is entitled to attorney fees on appeal; however, as the prevailing party, Katsilometes is entitled to his costs on appeal.4
Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL CONCUR.
BURDICK, C.J., dissenting.
By striking down the Senate‘s award of attorney‘s fees, I believe the majority muscles the Judiciary into becoming a second judge in a proceeding where the Constitution requires the Legislature to sit as the sole arbiter. See Burge v. Tibor, 88 Idaho 149, 154, 397 P.2d 235, 237 (1964). In my view, the Senate‘s power to assess attorney‘s fees is well within its constitutionally granted power to adjudicate election contests. I also believe Katsilometes‘s due-process rights were adequately protected because he brought himself within the jurisdiction of the Senate and asked for attorney‘s fees in his petition. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
- The Senate‘s award of attorney‘s fees was within its broad constitutional power to judge election contests and is consistent with
Idaho Code section 34-2120 .
The separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits “judicial review of the discretionary acts
In my view,
I do not think the Senate‘s decision to award attorney‘s fees was so egregious as to convert a non-justiciable question into a justiciable one. First, I do not infer from
In addition, because election contests are a constitutionally distinct species of adjudication, the Senate may choose to interpret the applicable statutes as it sees fit so long as the interpretation is reasonable. Here, the Senate did not craft the award out of whole cloth. At the hearing, both the Attorney General‘s Office and the Senate signaled their understanding that attorney‘s fees were awardable as “costs” under
The majority‘s reasoning that the Senate “cannot ignore laws duly passed by both chambers of the legislature” subverts the plain words of the
- The Senate‘s award of attorney‘s fees did not violate Katsilometes‘s due-process rights.
Because
The Legislature must still comply with procedural due process even when it is acting within its constitutional power. Cf. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). The due-process requirement “is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (quoting Aberdeen–Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999)). It must be remembered that due process “is not a concept to be applied rigidly
in every matter.” Id. Rather, it is “a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation.” Id.
We should not lose sight of the fact that neither the Senate, nor Nye, instigated the election contest. Katsilometes filed the petition. Katsilometes voluntarily submitted himself to the Senate‘s jurisdiction and its
Given these considerations, I cannot say that the Senate “arbitrarily deprived” Katsilometes of his rights by failing to meet the “minimal requirements” of procedural due process when it awarded attorney‘s fees against him. Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015.