Gene Francis STUART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
No. 34200
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2009 Term.
May 10, 2010.
232 P.3d 813
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. L. Lamont Anderson argued.
HORTON, Justice.
Gene Francis Stuart (Stuart) appeals the district court‘s judgment dismissing his fourth petition for post-conviction relief as untimely under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stuart was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murder of three-year old Robert Miller (Robert) in 1981. This is the eighth time this Court has been asked to examine some aspect of this case.
The facts of this case are described in State v. Stuart (Stuart I), 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985). In 1980 Stuart met and began dating Kathy Miller (Kathy), the mother of then two-year-old Robert. Stuart and Kathy dated throughout 1981 and Stuart “assumed primary control over Robert, feeding, clothing and caring for him.” Id. at 165, 715 P.2d at 835. In late 1980 and throughout 1981, Robert began to show various signs that he was being physically abused. Id. at 165-66, 715 P.2d at 835-36. On September 19, 1981, Stuart brought Robert to the emergency room. Stuart claimed that Robert had vomited after being put down for a nap and that he then noticed that Robert‘s breathing was unusual. Stuart claimed to have attempted mouth-to-mouth resuscitation before Robert again vomited. Stuart then rushed Robert to the hospital. Id. at 166, 715 P.2d at 836. Robert was pronounced dead on arrival. Emergency room personnel noted that Robert‘s body was cold, casting doubt as to Stuart‘s description of the sequence of events. Id.
An autopsy was conducted, revealing that Robert died as a result of internal hemorrhaging caused by the rupture of his liver. Id. The pathologist‘s observations during the autopsy were inconsistent with Stuart‘s description of the events preceding Robert‘s death. Additionally, the pathologist found a number of bruises, both internal and external, a subdural hematoma on Robert‘s head, and X-rays revealed that Robert had suffered a broken left arm several months before his death. Id. at 166-67, 715 P.2d at 836-37.
Stuart was arrested and charged with Robert‘s murder and, after conviction, was sentenced to death. Id. at 167, 715 P.2d at 837. In Stuart I, this Court considered Stuart‘s claims on direct appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Id. at 177, 715 P.2d at 847.
In 1986, Stuart filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. This first post-conviction petition was brought under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) (
Stuart filed his second petition for post-conviction relief in 1988. Again, the petition was brought under the UPCPA.
On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, based on the testimony and evidence presented, denied Stuart‘s petition. Stuart v. State (Stuart IV), 127 Idaho 806, 808, 907 P.2d 783, 785 (1995). Consistent with Stuart III, the focus of the evidentiary hearing was whether Stuart‘s conversations with his attorneys were monitored. Disturbingly, the evidentiary hearing revealed that phone logs maintained by the Sheriff‘s Department which would have identified all calls placed by or to Stuart had been destroyed. Nevertheless, the district court found that Stuart failed to demonstrate that any telephone calls with his attorneys had been monitored. Stuart appealed and, again, this Court overturned the district court‘s decision. We remanded the case to the district court with instructions to weigh the evidence in a light favorable to Stuart because of the Sheriff‘s Office‘s destruction of evidence. Stuart IV, 127 Idaho at 817, 907 P.2d at 794.
While the appeal in Stuart IV was pending, Stuart brought a motion under
In the proceedings until this point, Stuart was represented by his trial counsel, Robert Kinney. On November 9, 1995, on remand from this Court‘s decision in Stuart IV, Mr. Kinney was permitted to withdraw and a second attorney, Scott Chapman, was appointed. Following another evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Stuart‘s rights had not been violated by the monitoring of his telephone conversations. Stuart appealed. This Court affirmed the district court‘s decision. Stuart v. State (Stuart VI), 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001).
In 2002, Stuart filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The court appointed the Federal Public Defenders Unit of Eastern Washington and Idaho to represent Stuart and stayed his execution. On November 14, 2002, the federal court granted a motion to hold the federal proceedings in abeyance pending final determination of state court proceedings. In addition to the present (fourth) petition for post-conviction relief, on August 2, 2002, Stuart filed a third petition for post-conviction relief based on the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). The district court denied relief in that case. This Court heard the appeal of that decision on August 24, 2009.
The present petition for post-conviction relief was filed on December 3, 2002. In his petition, Stuart advanced claims of prosecutorial misconduct, failure to disclose mitigating evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The State moved for summary dismissal of Stuart‘s petition, asserting that the petition was barred, by operation of
A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Post-conviction procedures are generally governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA),
“When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of
Stuart raises questions of statutory construction as well as the state and federal constitutionality of
There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers. An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds it [sic] constitutionality. The judicial power to declare legislative action unconstitutional should be exercised only in clear cases. Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep‘t of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Stuart has failed to allege facts necessary for a finding that his petition for post-conviction relief was timely filed in compliance with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719 .
Stuart‘s petition raised claims that fall into three categories. First, he alleged that the prosecution in his initial trial committed four acts of prosecutorial misconduct.2 Second, he alleged that the prosecution withheld mitigating information while arguing that no such information existed. Third, he raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the representation provided by the attorney who represented Stuart at trial, on direct appeal and in connection with his first two post-conviction petitions.
Idaho Code Section 19-2719 provides a series of procedural requirements for post-conviction petitions in capital cases. These provisions supersede the UPCPA to the extent that any conflict exists. Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 199-200, 192 P.3d 1021, 1023-24 (2008) (citing McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149). Of particular import are the strict time bars of
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.
As Stuart faces a death sentence, the provisions of
“A petitioner bringing a successive petition for post-conviction relief has a heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute.” Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995) (citing Paz, 123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357). Where a claim is brought that alleges that a claim could not reasonably be known within the forty-two day period prescribed by
Rather than attempting to comply with these clearly established pleading requirements or otherwise attempting to demonstrate by way of supporting affidavit(s) that his claims were not known to him nor could they reasonably have been known, Stuart apparently elected to challenge the application of
Stuart advances three arguments in support of his request that the merits of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, including the withholding of mitigation evidence, should be addressed. First, he argues that “the State has, despite a pretrial request for exculpatory information, failed for over two decades to disclose the factual bases or any information which would reasonably put defense counsel on notice of the factual bases for Mr. Stuart‘s prosecutorial misconduct claims.” Stuart cites Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004),
These arguments misapprehend the petitioner‘s burden as to a claim governed by
Stuart was appointed substitute counsel in 1995. More than seven years passed between the appointment of substitute counsel in 1995 and the filing of the instant petition in December of 2002. Stuart‘s petition is silent as to when the facts supporting his claims were known or reasonably could have been known. It was Stuart‘s burden to present a petition alleging facts that would show that he fits within the exception to
B. The current version of I.C. § 19-2719 applies to Stuart‘s case, despite the fact that Stuart was convicted prior to the enactment of I.C. § 19-2719 .
Stuart argues that
Nor do Stuart‘s arguments regarding the subsequent amendments to
In Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Barker we quoted with approval from Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction which stated:
Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily into the adopting statute. .... Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so taken unless it does so by express intent.
38 Idaho 529, 533, 223 P. 529, 530 (1924). Applied to amendments, this means that an amending act applies to the statute act as it previously existed with any amendment then being subject to the statutory prohibition against retroactive effect. As the original version of
Idaho Code § 19-2719 ‘s time bar is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law when applied to Stuart‘s petition.
Stuart argues that
Rather than addressing this Court‘s previous ruling, Stuart, citing Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 1368, 146 L.Ed.2d 236, 244-45 (2000), argues that “[a]pplying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to [his] case would unquestionably create a significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (‘UPUPA‘) [sic] were applied.” We do not view Garner as applicable to this case. First, the decision in Garner specifically dealt with and was limited to the context of parole hearings. Id. at 252, 120 S.Ct. at 1368-69, 146 L.Ed.2d at 245-46. Second, unlike the case in Garner, the limitation of the time for post-conviction relief (indeed, any limitation on applications for post-conviction relief) falls into the category of cases described by the U.S. Supreme Court in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995). There, the court considered “changes [that] might create some speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a prisoner‘s actual term of confinement by making it more difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early release, but that fact alone cannot end the matter for ex post facto purposes.” Id. at 508-09, 115 S.Ct. at 1603, 131 L.Ed.2d at 596. Because
D. Idaho Code § 19-2719 is not an unconstitutional infringement on the judiciary‘s power.
As previously discussed, we find that
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced.
Likewise,
However, as the district court noted,
While we have referred to
E. I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate Stuart‘s rights to equal protection, due process, or habeas corpus, nor is it unconstitutionally vague.
Stuart makes a number of arguments that
Stuart argues that the distinctions between
Under the rational basis test, which is the appropriate test here, the legislature‘s action need only have a rational basis. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 374, 659 P.2d 111, 128 (1983) (“Under the ‘rational basis’ test which is generally appropriate to use when reviewing statutes which impact social or economic areas, the question becomes whether the classification ‘advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational fashion.’ “). The validity of
I.C. § 19-2719 must be tested on that standard. In applying the rational basis standard, we begin with the understanding that (1) the legislature may reasonably exercise its power to define crime and fix punishment by classifying criminals with reference to the heinous nature or gravity of the crime they committed, see Malloroy v. State, 91 Idaho 914, 435 P.2d 254 (1967), and (2) that legislative declarations of public purpose are afforded great deference in determining the validity of legislation under the equal protection clause in the United States and Idaho Constitutions. See Idaho Water Resources Board v. Kramer, 97 Idaho 535, 548, 548 P.2d 35 (1976).
In this case the legislature clearly printed out a rational basis of I.C. § 19-2719 in the statement of purpose which accompanied the enactment of the statute. The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to ‘thwart their sentences.’ The statute‘s purpose is to avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one proceeding....’ We hold that the legislature‘s determination that it was necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set forI.C. § 19-2719 . The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legislative purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. Accordingly,I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate the defendant‘s constitutional right to equal protection, and the trial court correctly denied Beam‘s post conviction petition.
State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678, 683 (1988). See also State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36, 766 P.2d 701, 705-06 (1988). Stuart simply asserts that applying
Stuart‘s due process claim relates to his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Stuart acknowledges that this Court has held that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel is one of those claims that should be reasonably known immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.” State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). Stuart argues that continued application of this holding violates his right to due process.
Rhoades addressed a due process challenge to
Stuart asks the Court to reconsider this holding in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.2001). Hoffman held that asking a defendant represented by the same counsel at trial and during post-conviction proceedings to raise ineffective assistance claims within the forty-two day period prescribed by
This Court has never held that all claims for post-conviction relief in capital cases must be brought within forty-two days of judgment. Rather, we have recognized that claims not known and which could not have reasonably been known within forty-two days of judgment may be pursued, but they must be asserted within a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably should have been known. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 227, 912 P.2d 110, 114 (1996) (citing Paz, 123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357). We are unable to conclude that the heightened pleading requirement, discussed in Part III.A, supra, violates petitioners’ due process rights.
Stuart also argues that
McKinney contends that if inadequate representation is an insufficient reason to permit a successive petition for post-conviction relief, then
I.C. § 19-2719 effectively suspends the writ of habeas corpus in violation of Article I, § 5 of the Idaho Constitution. We reject this argument, affirming the Court of Appeals’ analysis of this issue in Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 863-64, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (Ct.App.1997). All remedies in capital cases available by writ of habeas corpus or by post-conviction procedure must be pursued according to the procedures and the time limitations ofI.C. § 19-2719 .I.C. § 19-2719(4) . The legislature may pass statutes regulating the use of the writ of habeas corpus. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964). Post-conviction procedure acts have replaced the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of challenging the validity of a conviction. See Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237, 459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969). The proper use of a petition for post-conviction relief “avoids repetitious and successive applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the applicant‘s constitutional rights.” Id. Like the UPCPA,I.C. § 19-2719 does not deny the writ of habeas corpus. See id.; see also Eubank, 130 Idaho at 863-64, 949 P.2d at 1070-71.
McKinney, 133 Idaho at 703-04, 992 P.2d at 152-53.
Finally, Stuart advances a brief argument that the “known” and “reasonably should have known” provisions of
Hairston also argues that
I.C. § 19-2719 is unconstitutionally vague in identifying the standard for waiver of claims. A statute that is vague, indefinite, or uncertain violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 715, 791 P.2d 1285, 1294 (1990). A civil statute is not unconstitutionally vague if persons of reasonable intelligence can derive core meaning from it. Id. Subsection (5) ofI.C. § 19-2719 states that claims a defendant “should reasonably have known,” are waived, whereas subsection (5)(a) states that claims a defendant“could” have known are waived. I.C. § 19-2719(5) ,(5)(a) . Hairston argues these standards are internally inconsistent and the statute is therefore, unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. The statute requires an objective examination of whether a defendant should have known of a claim at the time of the filing of the first petition. Under the statute, claims that were “known, or reasonably should have been known,” are waived, while claims that “were not known or could not have reasonably been known” may be considered so long as other procedural requirements are met.I.C. § 19-2719(5) ,(5)(a) . The statute does not offer two standards. Rather, it identifies two possibilities under a single clear standard: either a defendant reasonably should have known of certain claims and so has waived them, or he reasonably could not have known of certain claims and so may file a successive petition. We reject Hairston‘s arguments thatI.C. § 19-2719 is unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 56-57, 156 P.3d at 557-58.
IV. CONCLUSION
We find that Stuart‘s claims for post-conviction relief are barred by
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK and W. JONES concur.
KIDWELL, J. Pro Tem, concurring.
I concur in the Court‘s decision on a substantially different analysis than articulated by the majority opinion. I would find, consistent with Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir.2001), ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by petitioners represented by the same counsel at trial and during initial post-conviction proceedings cannot be “reasonably known” under
Stuart‘s Claims Are Barred Under The UPCPA
“[Idaho Code] § 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict.” McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). Therefore, even if
Recently, in Rhoades v. State, this Court suggested that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would not qualify for equitable tolling under the UPCPA. 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; see also Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) (applying a two-step process for identifying equitable tolling under the UPCPA). Because, as discussed below, there are serious due process issues with regard to instances where the same counsel represented petitioners during trial, appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, I would apply
Stuart‘s prosecutorial misconduct and disclosure claims would not qualify under the equitable tolling scheme described in Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007), for all of the reasons cited by the Court. Stuart‘s argument that the district court judge dismissed the case without holding an evidentiary hearing has no more application under the UPCPA than it does under the Court‘s
Applying I.C. § 19-2719 to Ineffective Assistance Claims Poses Serious Due Process Issues Such That Ineffective Assistance Claims Should Qualify For Equitable Tolling Or the “Not Reasonably Known” Exception to I.C. § 19-2719
Since I would find Stuart‘s claims to be barred, it could be argued that the constitutional issues of
“Procedural due process requires that a party be provided with an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Paul v. Bd. of Prof‘l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 838, 843, 11 P.3d 34, 39 (2000). Where a petitioner is represented by the same counsel at trial and in initial post-conviction proceedings, there is simply no way for a petitioner to raise claims of ineffective assistance. That is, there is no opportunity provided for these claims to be heard. In State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (1991), we noted that a determination of whether a given provision offends due process is governed by the balancing test laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33-34 (1976). Mathews laid out three factors: (1) the interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) the government‘s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. Rhoades stated that the Court‘s focus was “the third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test[:] we must determine whether or not
However, the Court‘s ruling was made on general terms regarding the expedited post-conviction process and nowhere addressed the specific question of whether asking trial counsel representing petitioners during initial post-conviction proceedings frustrated ineffective assistance claims. This consider-
Notably, our legislature has recognized this fact. As Hoffman notes:
Effective August 8, 1995, the Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code § 19-2719 to require an “Inquiry Into the Need For New Counsel.” The 1995 provision provides, in relevant part:
After the imposition of a sentence of death, the trial judge should advise the defendant that, upon a particularized showing that there is a reasonable basis to litigate a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, new counsel may be appointed to represent the defendant to pursue such a claim in a post-conviction proceeding.
236 F.3d at 534 n. 15 (quoting
Finally, though I reach this conclusion, in other circumstances, concerns of stare decisis would lead me to conclude that Rhoades should be affirmed in light of the significant reliance on
Based on these considerations, I would find that, as applied to cases where a petitioner was represented by the same counsel at trial and during initial post-conviction proceedings,
Idaho Code § 19-2719 Is Jurisdictional And Therefore Unconstitutional
I acknowledge that
While challenges based on retroactivity and ex post facto application were presented in Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 227, 912 P.2d 110, 114 (1996), neither of the relevant provisions of the state constitution governing separation of powers, namely article V, section 13 and article V, section 20, are cited in any of our previous
The plain language of
As
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this Constitution....
Article V, Section 20 reads: “The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.” We have stated that “[t]he word ‘jurisdiction’ refers to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district courts.” State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003). While the district court made its ruling based on our decision in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, that decision specifically distinguished statutes such as this that “purport[ ] to limit the exercise of the judiciary‘s constitutional powers or jurisdiction.” 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d 1115, 1122 (2000) (emphasis added).
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)‘s language does not admit the possibility of reading it as a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are optional rather than mandatory and may be waived. According to the language of
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 21 (2009). But the language of
While the majority cites to Stuart v. State (Stuart II), 118 Idaho 865, 873, 801 P.2d 1216, 1224 (1990) and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 650, 8 P.3d 636, 645 (2000), I remain unconvinced that either of these cases are sufficient to overcome the plain language of the statute combined with the series of cases in which this Court has ruled that
Determining
Therefore, while I agree with the Court‘s conclusion that Stuart‘s claims are time-barred, I cannot agree with its reasoning. I concur.