NO BANS ON CHOICE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI, аnd SARA E. BAKER v. JOHN R. ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State
No. SC98879
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
Opinion issued February 8, 2022
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
NO BANS ON CHOICE, AMERICAN )
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF )
MISSOURI, and SARA E. BAKER, )
)
Respondents, )
)
v. ) No. SC98879
)
JOHN R. ASHCROFT, in his official )
capacity as Missouri Secretary of State )
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY
The Honorable Jon E.
Amidst a ballot referendum campaign, Sara Baker, the ACLU of Missouri, and No
Bans on Choice (collectively, “Challengers”) filed suit against the Missouri Secretary of
State. The lawsuit challenged the constitutional validity of sections 116.180 and
116.334.2,1 which prohibit the collection of referendum petition signatures before the
Secretary has certified the referendum’s “official ballot title” and affixed it to the petition.
The circuit court issued a declaratory judgment invalidating sections 116.180 and
116.334.2 because those provisions “interfere with аnd impede” the right of referendum
and, therefore, conflict with article III, sections 49 and 52(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
The judgment is affirmed.
Background
I. Referendum Process
The voters of Missouri first adopted a constitutional amendment establishing the
right of referendum more than 100 years ago in 1908. Marsh v. Bartlett, 121 S.W.2d
737, 742 (Mo. 1938).2 The right of referendum is now contained in article III, sections
49 and
reserve power to propose and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution by
the initiative, independent of the general assembly, and also reserve power to approve or
reject by referendum any act of the generаl assembly, except as hereinafter provided.”
Article III, section 52(a) further provides:
A referendum may be ordered ... by petitions signed by five percent of the
legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state ....
Referendum petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not more than
ninety days after the final adjournment of the session of the general assembly
which passed the bill on which the referendum is demanded.
(Emphasis added).3 The General Assembly is permitted to enact “reasonable
implementations” of the referendum process. State ex rel. Upchurch v. Blunt, 810
S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo. banc 1991). A framework for exercising the right of referendum
was enacted by the legislature in chapter 116.
To initiate the process, the referendum proponent must first submit the proposed
petition “in the form in which it will be circulated” to the Secretary, who must then send
it to the Attorney General to conduct an independent review of its form and provide
comments within 10 days. Sections 116.332.1, .3. The Secretary has the ultimate
authority to approve or reject the form of the petition and must do so within 15 days after
the petition was first submitted and following the Attorney General’s review. Sections
116.332.3, .4. If the petition is approved, the Secretary is given 23 days to prepare a
“summary statement” of the measure, and the State Auditor must prepare a “fiscal note”
and “fiscal note summary.” Sections 116.334.1, 116.175.2. The Attorney General must
then issue an opinion about the form and content of the summary statement and fiscal
note summary. Sections 116.175.4, 116.334.1. Within three days of receiving the
Attorney General’s approval for both summaries, the Secretary must combine those
summaries to create the “official ballot title,” which must be placed on the ballot measure
if it is put before the voters. Sections 116.010(4), 116.180. In sum, it may take up to 51
days from the time the proponent first submits the proposed petition until the official
ballot title is certified.
passed by the General Assembly shall take effect 90 days after the final adjournment of the
General Assembly. Together, these three provisions designate August 28 as both the deadline
for filing rеferendum petitions and the date on which laws passed during the previous session of
the General Assembly take effect.
Until 1997, proponents were able to circulate the referendum petition for
signatures before the ballot title was certified. But, in that year, the legislature amended
chapter 116 and enacted sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 to prohibit the circulation of
referendum petitions before the official ballot title is certified and affixed to the petition.
As a result of this legislation, a referendum proponent may be delayed up to 51 days
before collecting signatures to have the measure placed on the ballot.
II. 2020 Referendum Effort
The General Assembly passed House Bill No. 126 on May 17, 2019, the last day
to pass legislation during the 2019 session, and the bill was signed by Governor Parson
referendum petition on HB 126 to Secretary of State Ashcroft, seeking to place it on the
ballot for the 2020 general election. On June 6, 2019, the Secretary notified Baker and
the ACLU he was rejecting the proposed referendum petition because HB 126 contained
an emergency clause, requiring some of its provisions to become effective immediately.
The Secretary concluded the emergency clause exempted the entire bill from the
referendum process because legislation may not be challenged via referendum after it
becomes effective. See State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 250 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. banc
1952).
Baker and the ACLU sued the Secretary, alleging such constitutional grounds
were not a sufficient basis for rejecting the proposed petition. The circuit court ruled in
Secretary to immediately approve the sample sheet of the referendum petition as
sufficient as to form pursuant to section 116.332.4 and proceed with the official ballot
title certification process. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 577 S.W.3d 881, 899-900 (Mo. App. 2019).
At that time, the Secretary and Attornеy General had 36 days to complete the certification
process pursuant to sections 116.334.1, 116.175.2, 116.175.4, and 116.180. The ACLU
asked the court of appeals to shorten the statutory timeframe for certification to offset the
delay caused by the emergency litigation, but the court ruled it had “no authority to
modify the provisions of that statute, including the times therein permitted for
performance.” Ashcroft, 577 S.W.3d at 900 n.21.5
State officials ultimately used all 36 days to complete the official ballot title
certification. The Secretary did not certify the official ballot title and approve the petition
for signature circulatiоn until August 14, 2019. As a result, Baker and the ACLU were
left with 14 days to circulate the petition and submit 107,510 signatures to the Secretary
in accordance with article III, section 52(a).6 On August 22, Challengers filed suit in the
circuit court against the Secretary, arguing sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 violated the
Missouri Constitution in that they conflicted with the right of referendum under article
III, sections 49 and 52(a). Baker and the ACLU ultimately failed to collect the requisite
signatures within the 14-day timeframe, and the referendum was not placed on the ballot.
The circuit court subsequently issued a declaratory judgment that sections 116.180 and
116.334.2 were unconstitutional because they conflicted with article III, sections 49 and
52(a) in that they “interfere with аnd impede” the right of referendum.7
Standard of Review
If a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, this Court must declare that
statute invalid. Upchurch, 810 S.W.2d at 516. The validity of a statute is a question of
law reviewed de novo. Trenton Farms RE, LLC v. Hickory Neighbors United, Inc., 603
S.W.3d 286, 290 (Mo.
unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision. Id.
Analysis
The issue before this court is whether sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 violate the
right to referendum as found in article III, sections 49 and 52(a) of the Missouri
Constitution. In establishing the right of referendum, the people of Missouri
constitutionally reserved a share of the legislative power for themselves. State ex rel.
Barrett v. Dallmeyer, 245 S.W. 1066, 1068 (Mo. banc 1922).8 The purpose of this right
is to “provide the people a mеans of giving expression to a legislative proposition[.]”
Toberman, 250 S.W.2d at 706. The referendum process ensures that “those who have no
access to or influence with elected representatives may take their cause directly to the
people.” Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824, 827
(Mo. banc 1990). The referendum also exists to serve as a check on the legislature. State
ex rel. Drain v. Becker, 240 S.W. 229, 230-31 (Mo. banc 1922).
Legislation to implement the referendum process is presumed to be
constitutionally valid. Rekart v. Kirkpatrick, 639 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Mo. banc 1982). But
laws enacted to implement the referendum process must be invalidated when they
“interfere with or impede a right conferred by the constitution[.]” Id. In other words,
“[m]inor details may be left for the legislature without impairing the self-exеcuting nature
of constitutional provisions ... but all such legislation must be subordinate to the
constitutional provision and in furtherance of its purposes, and must not ... attempt to
narrow or embarrass it.” Musser v. Conrod, 496 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. banc 1973).
The circuit court concluded sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 unconstitutionally
“interfere with and impede” the right of referendum.9 It determined that,
proponents from circulating a petition before the official ballot title is certified and
affixed to the petition, the challenged statues “dramatically reduce the time available for
the circulation of a referendum petition, both in theory and in practice.” In reaching its
decision, the circuit court cited three of this Court’s priоr decisions to support the
proposition that the State “may not constitutionally delay the circulation of a referendum
petition for the purpose of certifying a ballot title.”
In the first case cited by the circuit court, Boeving v. Kander, 496 S.W.3d 498, 507
(Mo. banc 2016), this Court explained that the Missouri Constitution “only authorizes
legislation detailing the requirement for an ‘official ballot title’ at the time [a] proposed
constitutional amendment is put before the voters” and that there is “no similar express
constitutional authorization” for legislation requiring an official ballot title before the
petition may be circulated for signatures. This Court explicitly noted, however, that the
question of whether such a pre-сirculation ballot title requirement would be
constitutionally permissible was not presented in the case. Id. at 508.
116.334.2 did not affect Baker and the ACLU until after the court of appeals ordered the
Secretary to commence the ballot title certification process. As such, the parties did not fail to
present their constitutional question “at the earliest possible moment that good pleading and
orderly procedure will admit ....” Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis, 384 S.W.2d 611, 612
(Mo. banc 1964) (internal quotation omitted).
The Secretary also argues Challengers’ claim was not justiciable. Challengers, however,
clearly had standing to challenge sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 in the midst of their
referendum camрaign. While the claim may have been rendered moot once the deadline to
submit signatures to the Secretary came to pass, the time-sensitive nature of the referendum
process would place the claim squarely within the mootness exception of “capable of repetition,
yet evading review.” See State ex rel. Reser v. Rush, 562 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Mo. banc 1978)
(“The problem presented is one which is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’ and needs to
be resolved and put to rest. Accordingly, notwithstanding the suggestion of mootness, we will
decide the case on the merits, being of opinion that the questions involved are mattеrs of public
rights or interests under conditions which may be repeated any time.” (internal citation omitted)).
In the second case, Union Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo.
banc 1984), this Court held that, although the proponent’s title on a proposed ballot
initiative did not express clearly the subject matter of the proposal, petition signers could
not have been deceived or misled at this stage of the initiative process because the full act
appeared on the back of each petition. In the third case, United Labor Committee of
Missouri v. Kirkpatrick, 572 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Mo. banc 1978), this Court noted that
previous decisions “discussed the importance of the initiative and referendum,
emphasizing that procedures designed to effectuate thesе democratic concepts should be
liberally construed to avail the voters with every opportunity to exercise these rights.”
United Labor held: “The ability of the voters to get before their fellow voters issues they
deem significant should not be thwarted in preference for technical formalities.” Id.
Together, these cases suggest that an official ballot title is not necessary to prevent
individuals from being deceived at the petition-signing stage and that the ability to
exercise the constitutional right of referendum should not be “interfered with or impeded”
by a pre-circulation ballot title requirement.
The Secretary contends sеctions 116.180 and 116.334.2 leave sufficient time to
gather signatures in “virtually all circumstances.” But Challengers argue the process of
procuring the official ballot title prior to circulation is quite time-consuming.
circuit court explained, the full signature-collection period for a referendum on a measure
passed on the last day of the legislative session is only 90 days, and sections 116.180 and
116.334.2 “permit the government to take away 51 of those days.” The Secretary points
to testimony presented by Challengers indicating an organization could feasibly collect
the requisite number of signatures within 39 dаys under the worst-case scenario. But not
every citizen who may wish to utilize the right of referendum has access to the same
resources as Challengers. For example, Baker testified that, in the time leading up to the
signature-collection stage, she solicited contributions from donors who had sufficient
available funds to pay a firm that specializes in signature-gathering. And the circuit court
found “every day the time for signature collection on a referendum petition is reduced,
the cost of gathering enough signatures to get the referendum before voters will go up.”
The Missouri Constitution guarantees the right of referendum to all Missouri citizens, not
just those capable of raising the necessary funds to complete a signature-collection effort
within the tightest of timeframes.
In practice, the pre-circulation ballot title requirement has indeed proved to be a
hinderance to the referendum process. The circuit court determined the average amount
of time the State took to certify official ballot titles between 2016 and 2020 ranged from
35 to 47 days. For bills passed on the last day of session, this delay constitutes from
more than one-third to more than one-half of the 90 days allottеd for petition circulation.
Further, since the challenged statutes were enacted in 1997, only one referendum
campaign, the 2018 challenge to the “right-to-work” bill, collected enough timely
signatures to have the measure placed on the ballot. That campaign also benefitted from
the challenged legislation being signed by the governor on February 6, 2017, which was
113 days before the final adjournment of the legislative session and, therefore, 203 days
before the deadline to file a referendum petition under article III, section 52(a).
The legislature inherently has the power to reduсe the time to circulate a
referendum petition on any particular piece of legislation by delaying the passage of that
legislation until the end of the legislative session. But by significantly reducing the
allotted circulation period even further, sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 afford the
legislature the opportunity to “interfere with or impede” the right of referendum by, in
effect, controlling the viability of any referendum. The dissent notes that the legislature
may pass legislation before the end of the legislative session and accordingly leave
referendum proponents more than 90 days to circulate a petition for signatures, even
when state officials use the full 51 days to complete the official ballot title certification
process. But regardless of if or when the legislature chooses to pass legislation during its
session, sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 “interfere with and impede” the right of
referendum because they give the legislature the power to make any referendum effort
untenable.
The Secretary argues that, to declare sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 invalid, this
Court must determine that a referendum proponent could never successfully collect
enough timely signatures to have a measure placed on the ballot. See State v. Jeffrey, 400
S.W.3d 303, 308 (Mo. banc 2013)
(“Generally, to prevail in a facial challenge, the party
challenging the statute must demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists under which
the statute
violates article III, sections 49 and 52(a) is whether the law “interferes with or impedes”
the right of referendum, not whether it “interferes with or impedes” any particular
referendum effort. See Rekart, 639 S.W.2d at 608. A law need not prevent every
individual referendum effort from being successful to “interfere with or impede” the right
of referendum itself. Consequently, because sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 “interfere
with and impede” the right of referendum, they can never be constitutionally applied.
As this Court has emphasized, the establishment of the constitutional right of
referendum wаs a fundamental expression of the power held by the people:
Under our system, that intangible thing we call “government,” the existence
of which is least felt when best administered, has its origin in and draws its
life and inspiration from the people. They frame and adopt the organic law,
which defines the limits of legislative action; they incorporate therein
whatever provisions they may deem proper. Thus empowered, as are the
people in all governments organized as is ours, the inevitable conclusion
follows that if they determine, as they have in the adoption of the initiative
and referendum, to limit the province or modify the purview of the
Legislature in the adoption or rejection of laws, there is no power that can
say them nay.
. . . .
To any one familiar with the power for good or ill which the Legislature may
wield, it cannot but be regarded as an act of prudence that the people, the
repository of all power, and vitally interested in all that pertains to the
conduct of public affairs, should reserve unto themselves the right to correct
any evils which may result from unwise legislation.
Becker, 240 S.W. at 230-31. The legislature must not be permitted to use procedural
formalities to interfere with or impede this constitutional right that is so integral to
Missouri’s democratic system of government.
Conclusion
Sections 116.180 and 116.334.2’s prohibitiоn on collecting referendum petition
signatures prior to the Secretary’s certification of the official ballot title “interferes with
and impedes” the constitutional right of referendum reserved to the people by
unreasonably shortening the timeframe for petition circulation. As such, the circuit
court’s judgment declaring those statutes constitutionally invalid is affirmed.
Mary R. Russell, Judge
Wilson, C.J., Breckenridge, Draper, Ransom, JJ., concur;
Powell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;
Fischer, J., concurs in opinion of Powell, J.
NO BANS ON CHOICE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI, and SARA E. BAKER v. JOHN R. ASHCROFT, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State
No. SC98879
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
DISSENTING OPINION
I respectfully dissent because Sara Baker, the ACLU of Missouri, and No Bans on
116.334.2 are facially invalid.1 While Challengers’ referendum rights may have been
interfered with or otherwise impeded in the past, Challengers do not seek relief from the
application of sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 during their previous ballot referendum
campaign. As the principal opinion notes, Challengers specifically requested in their
petition, and the circuit court ultimately granted, declaratory relief outright invalidating
both statutes in all situations. Challengers, therefore, do not challenge the application of
the statutes as they were applied to them in the past. Rather, Challengers mount a facial
challenge seeking to invalidate the applications of the statutes for everyone going forward.
Because circumstances exist in which sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 may be applied
without interfering with or impeding the constitutional right of referendum guaranteed in
article III, sections 49 and 52(a) of the Missouri Constitution, Challengers’ facial challenge
seeking to invalidate these statutes must be rejected.
Analysis
“This Court reviews the constitutional validity of statutes de novo.” Fowler v. Mo.
Sheriffs’ Ret. Sys., 623 S.W.3d 578, 584 (Mo. banc 2021) (internal quotation omitted). The
Court presumes a statute is constitutional, finding it unconstitutional only if “it clearly and
undoubtedly contravenes the constitution.” Adams By and Through Adams v. Children’s
Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. banc 1992), overruled on other grounds by Watts
v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. banc 2012). “In order to mount a
facial challenge to a statute, the challenger must establish that no sеt of circumstances exists
under which the [statute] would be valid.” Donaldson v. Mo. State Bd. of Registration for
the Healing Arts, 615 S.W.3d 57, 66 (Mo. banc 2020) (alteration in original). Courts
should rarely tolerate facial challenges to the constitutional validity of a statute:
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial
invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of
premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones
records. Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of
judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied. Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit
the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people
from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. We
must keep in mind that [a] ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people.
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51 (2008)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Article III, section 52(a) provides, “Referendum petitions shall be filed with the
secretary of state not more than ninety days after the final adjournment of the session of
the general assembly which passed the bill on which the referendum is demanded.” The
Missouri Constitution therefore, guarantees referendum proponents only 90 days to collect
the necessary signatures to place the referendum on the ballot because referendum-
contested legislation
legislature may neither “impede” nor “interfere” with the right of referendum, Rekart v.
Kirkpatrick, 639 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Mo. banc 1982), the legislature has the power to enact
reasonable, practical regulations to address the realities of implementing a constitutional
right. State ex rel. Upchurch v. Blunt, 810 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo. banc 1991) (noting the
legislature may “enact reasonable implementations of a constitutional directive”). As long
as legislatively enacted regulations to the referendum process do not limit the 90 days set
aside to collect signatures and submit petitions to the Secretary of State, the regulations
would not interfere with or impede the time period guaranteed by the right of referendum
and would be presumably reasonable and practical. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 903 (The Court
presumes a statute is constitutional, finding it unconstitutional only if “it clearly and
undoubtedly contravenes the constitution.”).
Of course, the legislature may pass legislation before the end of the legislаtive
session. Referendum proponents accordingly would enjoy in excess of the 90 days to
collect signatures and comply with the relevant statutory regulations, even if state actors
took the full 51 days Missouri statutes permit for reviewing and certifying the ballot title.2
In such a circumstance, the referendum regulations would neither impede nor interfere with
the 90 days set aside by the Missouri Constitution to collect signatures and submit the
referendum petitions to the Secretary of State. Because the legislature may enact
reasonable, practical regulations to the referendum рrocess and circumstances exist in
which sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 would not impede or interfere with the right of
referendum, Challengers’ facial challenge lacks merit, and the circuit court erred in
invalidating these statutes.
The principal opinion insinuates the Secretary of State (“State”) failed to preserve
its facial challenge argument by neglecting to raise the argument before the circuit court.
The mere suggestion that the State’s facial challenge argument is unpreserved and
unreviewable is untenable for many reasons. First, the State did answer Challengers’
claims, vehemently asserting the statutes were constitutional.3 Admittedly, the State cited
no caselaw pertinent to facial constitutional challenges, but this omission is
inconsequential. Even if the State had utterly failed to contend sections 116.180 and
116.334.2 were constitutional, which it did not, this Court could not eschew its duty to
conduct de novo review applying controlling precedent to the circuit court’s judgment
declaring sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 unconstitutional and invalidating acts of the
legislature.4 As the principal opinion concedes, “[t]his Court reviews the constitutional
validity of statutes de novo.” Fowler, 623 S.W.3d at 584 (internal quotation omitted). It
also presumes statutes are constitutional. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 903. Challengers, not the
State, have the burden of rebutting this
claim merits the relief requested. Id. In conducting de novo review of a properly presented
challеnge to the constitutional validity of a statute, this Court has no authority to relieve
Challengers of that burden of persuasion by requiring the State, or any other party, to make
arguments supporting the validity of the statute.
These principles reflect this Court’s constitutional function: “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding American courts may invalidate laws and statutes in
conflict with the United States Constitution); see also Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 1 (“The
judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court[.]”); Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3
(“The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the
validity of … a statute or provision of the constitution of this state[.]”). This Court cannot,
and should not, relinquish its constitutional duty to review the validity of a statute merely
because the State failed to identify the proper standard of review of a facial challenge in its
argument to the circuit court. If this were possible, the State could collude with other
litigants to orchestrate outcomes by declining to faithfully defend statutes and narrowing
the scope of the caselaw reviewable by this Court.5 The State, acting through the Attorney
General, would become the ultimate arbiter of a statute’s constitutional validity.6 The
Missouri Constitution charges this Court, not the Attornеy General or any other member
of the executive branch, with exercising its judicial power to review a proper challenge to
the constitutional validity of a statute. Mo. Cont. art. V, § 1. This review necessarily
includes considering this Court’s precedents regardless of whether the State, or any other
party supporting the constitutional validity of a statute, has properly presented and briefed
the circuit court on the law related to facial challenges.
Conclusion
For these reasons, I disagree with the principal opinion’s analysis and conclusion
that sections 116.180 and 116.334.2 facially violate the right of referendum contained in
article III, sectiоns 49 and 52(a) of the Missouri Constitution. I would reject Challengers’
arguments and reverse the circuit court’s judgment.
W. Brent Powell, Judge