HECTOR G. MORERA v. STEPHENIE C. THURBER
(AC 37040)
Connecticut Appellate Court
Argued October 20, 2015—officially released January 5, 2016
Gruendel, Sheldon and Schuman, Js.
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Bozzuto, J.)
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of disсrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Officiаl Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
******************************************************
GRUENDEL, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Heсtor G. Morera, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying, in part, his request for leave to file postdissolution motions for modification and contempt. The plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly denied his request for leave to file a motion to modify certain custody and parental access orders without conducting a probable cause hearing pursuant to
The record discloses the following undisputed facts. The parties married in 2002, and two children were born of the marriage. Following the subsequеnt breakdown of their marriage, the parties voluntarily entered into a comprehensive separation agreement regarding their finances that the court incorporated into its judgment of dissolution. A trial followed on the issues of child custody and access. By memorandum of decision dated June 18, 2012, the court dissolved the parties’ marriage, finding that it had broken down irretrievably without attributing fault to either party as to the cause. The court awarded sole legal custody of the minor children to the defendant and entered detailed parental access orders.
Approximately one year later, the defendant filed a motion to modify the existing parenting plan.2 The plaintiff filed an objection and various other motions in response thereto. Following аn evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that a substantial change in circumstances warranted a modification to the parental access orders.3 The court thus ordered that, henceforth, ‘‘[a]ll access with the children by [the plaintiff] shall be as directed and supervised by the Klingberg Institute until written agreement of the parties with the input of Klingberg’s experts or further order of the court.’’ In so doing, the court expressly defined ‘‘access as any contact with the children. All access shall be as directed and supervised by the Klingberg Institute.’’ In addition, the court ordered that ‘‘[n]either party shall file any motion with this court without first seeking and receiving the permission of the presiding judge.’’
The plaintiff thereafter filed a request for leave to file a motion for clarification with the court. In response, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it clarified that it had ‘‘ordered more than just professional supervised visitation for these children with [the plaintiff]. The court intended, but did not fully articulate, that a reunification program through the Klingberg [Institute] take place. The court refers
On July 2, 2014, the plaintiff filed a requеst for leave to file postdissolution motions for modification and contempt, which were predicated primarily on the defendant’s alleged interference in that reunification process. The motion to modify asked the court, inter alia, to ‘‘[r]estore joint legal custody to the [p]laintiff’’ and to ‘‘[r]estore visitation between the [p]laintiff and both minor child . . . as outlined in [the court’s] June 18, 2012 [judgment of dissolution] orders.’’ The motion also requested that the court hear argument on the motion to modify in conjunction with argument on his July 2, 2014 motion for contempt. In an accompanying form, the plaintiff alleged that a material change of circumstances arose from the fact that his ‘‘[e]ldest minor child now exhibits fear of [him], which she has never exhibited before.’’
That motion for contempt alleged four distinct violations of the court’s June 18, 2012 orders by the defendant. Specifically, it alleged that the defendant violated orders requiring (1) the defendant to notify the plaintiff ‘‘of any illness, accident or other circumstance seriously affecting either child’s health or welfare’’; (2) the minor children to ‘‘be afforded privacy for their telephone conversations’’ with him; (3) the defendant not ‘‘to do anything that may estrange the children’’ from him; and (4) the defendant to ‘‘exchange e-mails twice weekly to inform [him] of medical appointments, school projects, class trips, extracurricular activities, and health or behavioral issues involving the children.’’ On July 14, 2014, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s request for leave to file the aforementioned motions.4
Twо days later, the court issued notice of its decision on the plaintiff’s request for leave. That notice stated: ‘‘The request for leave is partially granted. The plaintiff’s motion for contempt dated July 2, 2014, only [the second and fourth grounds] shall be scheduled for hearing on short calendar. The request for leave as to all other motions is denied.’’ The court subsequently issued an articulation of that decision, in which it explained that neither the first nor third ground alleged in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt gave rise to a colorable claim of contempt. The court also stated that the plaintiff’s motion to modify ‘‘is completely devoid of any claim that there has been a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ since the entry of the court’s last order . . . . Even if the court were to assume all of [the motion’s] allegations and assertions are true, it gives no rise to a postjudgment motion to modify . . . in that, on its face, the motion is legally insufficient.’’ From that judgment, the plaintiff now appeals.
I
The plaintiff first contends that the court improperly
The rules governing statutory construction apply equally to statutes and rules of practice. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 219 Conn. 473, 480, 595 A.2d 819 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S. Ct. 1170, 117 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1992). The proper construction of a rule of practice presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. Bojila v. Shramko, 80 Conn. App. 508, 514–15, 836 A.2d 1207 (2003).
As an appellate body, this court possesses ‘‘the authority to determine whether the provisiоns of our Practice Book are directory or mandatory.’’ Banks v. Thomas, 241 Conn. 569, 587 n.19, 698 A.2d 268 (1997). ‘‘The test to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory is also applicable to rules of practice.’’ State v. Ocasio, 50 Conn. App. 748, 755 n.7, 718 A.2d 1018 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 253 Conn. 375, 751 A.2d 825 (2000).
We therefore begin with the language of
The plain language of
Equally significant is the fact that
Despite that ample authority, we nonetheless recognize that ‘‘the use of the word shall, though significant, does not invariably establish a mandatory duty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 744, 865 A.2d 428 (2005). ‘‘The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, supra, 219 Conn. 480–81; see also Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Evans, 20 Conn. App. 1, 4–5, 563 A.2d 1041 (1989).
The provisions of
We conclude that the use of the word ‘‘shall’’ in
II
The plaintiff also claims thаt the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for modification. In light of our resolution of his first claim, we need not consider that contention, as the matter is remanded to the trial court for a probable cause hearing on the plaintiff’s request for leave to file his motion for modification in accordance with
It is undisputed that, on February 25, 2015, the plaintiff filed a further request for leave to file a motion to modify the parental access orders entered in October, 2013, with respect to his minor children. On March 5, 2015, the defendant filed an objection to that motion.5 By order dated March 11, 2015, the court granted the request for leave with respect to his minor son, but did not grant it with respect to his minor daughter.6
‘‘Mootness implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . . . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot quеstions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appеllate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 506–507, 970 A.2d 578 (2009).
We conclude that the plaintiff’s appeal is moot with
III
The plaintiff’s final claim is that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for leave on two of the four claims underlying his motion for contempt against the defendant. We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over that claim due to the lack of a final judgment.
In its September 26, 2014 articulation of its decision on the plaintiff’s July 2, 2014 request for leave to file a motion for contempt, the court expressly concluded that the first and third grounds alleged therein did not give rise to a colorable claim of contempt. The court thus granted the plaintiff’s request only with respect to the second and fourth grounds alleged in the motion for contempt. Accordingly, the present case is оne in which the trial court has resolved some, but not all, of the claims presented in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt.
‘‘[T]he existence of a final judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 485, 923 A.2d 657 (2007). In Bucy v. Bucy, 19 Conn. App. 5, 7–8, 560 A.2d 483 (1989), this court held that a ruling that does not resolve all of the issues raised in a motion for contempt is not an appealable final judgment. As the court stated: ‘‘This appeal must be dismissed because the record clearly establishes that it was not taken from a final decision of the trial court. In its memorandum of decision . . . [t]he trial court . . . left several issues raised by the plaintiff’s motion [for contempt] unresolved, directing counsel to contact the court to schedule a hearing for the purpose of resolving those issues. Instead of proceeding as directed by the trial court, the defendant appealed the incomplete order. Because there are unresolved issues, the order of the trial court is not final.’’ Id.; accord McGuinness v. McGuinness, 155 Conn. App. 273, 278, 108 A.3d 1181 (2015) (ruling that ‘‘has not fully disposed’’ of postdissolution motion to modify not final judgment).
That precedent commands a similar conclusion in the present case. Here, the court determined that two of the four allegations of contumacious conduct were
The judgment is reversed only as to the denial of the plaintiff’s request for leave to file a motion to modify (1) the custody and parental access orders with respect to his minor daughter and (2) the custody orders with respect to his minor son, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The appeal is dismissed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.